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INTRODUCTION 
After all is said and done, it is the human aspect that lasts the longest. The 
scholar, thinker, teacher is merged at last in the human being, the man is the 
ultimate and everlasting value. 
WILLIAM JAMES 
T H  E ENTRY ON Wayne Booth in the Dictionary of Literary Biography 
is full of richly deserved praise. But one can't read it without noting 
that there's something unusual about it, or perhaps about Booth. The 
praise is of two kinds, one much rarer in typical assessments of scholarly 
careers than the other. The first kind of praise, however deeply felt and 
however impressively true, takes forms that we are used to seeing in 
reference to prolific and influential authors. This perhaps unavoidably 
resonates when we hear that "[t]he impressive variety and consistent 
force of Booth's work have earned him one of the broadest audiences 
of any twentieth-century critic, and have made him one of the most 
important voices in American criticism over the past twenty-five years" 
(51); and "the work is stunning in its range, remarkable in its lucidity, 
ambitious in its conception and impressive in its execution" (66). 
It is clear that these claims for the originality and force of Booth's 
contributions are as far from perfunctory as they are from dismissive; 
they are sincere high praise. But in a day when so crowded a curriculum 
vitae would usually be thought sufficient to chronicle a professional life, 
Booth somehow proves more complicated, more elusive. He is a scholar 
whose measure cannot adequately be kenned simply in terms of the 
arguments he has advanced and the points he has made; it must also 
be seen in the kinds of activities and intellectual life in which he has 
engaged people: Booth is "that rare critic whom others read for both 
his company and his conclusions" (51). 
His recent release of two widely acclaimed books, The Company We 
Keep: An Ethics of Fiction and The Vocation of a Teacher: Rhetorical 
Occasions 1067-1988, may have brought Booth to the attention of still 
more audiences. Certainly the kinds of questions he has over the course 
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of his writing equipped his readers to explore seem of increasing inter­
est in a variety of areas. Booth himself has entered a new stage of his 
career, taking emeritus status. So the time seems particularly right for 
reflecting on the reach and the distinctive character of his contributions, 
not as a retrospective but as a challenge to him for the "conclusions" 
that come next. But an adequate response to Wayne Booth must also 
find a way to reflect in appropriate terms the profit and pleasure of his 
company. 
Although in retrospect Booth's work seems strikingly coherent, his 
life did not unfold in so straight a line. The first surprise was that he en­
gaged in such academic work at all. Wayne Clayson Booth was born in 
American Fork, Utah, on February 22, 1921. In school he came under 
the influence of a teacher named Luther Giddings, and went off to col­
lege at Brigham Young University with a clear academic aspiration: to 
become a chemical engineer. But at BYU, his experience with two more 
excellent teachers, Karl Young and P. A. Christensen, turned his inter­
ests to the study of English. After earning his B.A. in 1944 and serving 
in the U.S. Army, Booth returned to Chicago—the site of his Mormon 
mission—for graduate school. At the University of Chicago, he earned 
an M.A. in 1947 and a Ph.D. in 1950 working with Ronald S. Crane, 
Elder Olson, Richard McKeon, and other members of the "Chicago 
school" of criticism. 
At Brigham Young, Booth had begun to envision a career teaching 
literature to undergraduates in liberal arts colleges. And for a while, 
things turned out as he planned. Booth served as an assistant professor 
of English at Haverford College (1950-53) and then as professor and 
chair of English at Earlham College until the appearance of his first 
book, The Rhetoric of Fiction. After its publication in 1961, Booth ac­
cepted the George M. Pullman Chair in English at the University of 
Chicago. 
It would have been difficult for the boy growing up in Utah, or even 
the graduate student in Chicago, to have envisioned a more heralded 
publishing debut, or as widely honored a career. The Rhetoric of Fic­
tion won an unusual combination of honors: from Phi Beta Kappa, 
the Christian Gauss Award; from the National Council of Teachers, 
the David H. Russell Award. Booth held two Guggenheim fellowships 
(1956-57 and 1969-70). In 1970 he was named Distinguished Service 
Professor at the University of Chicago, and the subsequent year won 
the Quantrell Prize for Undergraduate Teaching, a striking combina­
tion. In 1972 he was named a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts 
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and Sciences. He conducted the Christian Gauss seminars at Princeton 
University in 1974, held a National Endowment for the Humanities 
in 1975-76, and was Phi Beta Kappa Visiting Scholar in 1977-78. In 
1979 he delivered the Beckman Lectures at the University of Califor­
nia at Berkeley, where he was also visiting professor of English, and 
that summer spent a term as professor at the University of California 
at Irvine's School of Criticism and Theory. In 1981-82 he held a Fel­
lowship from the Rockefeller Foundation. He has been awarded several 
honorary doctorates, as well as the Distinguished Alumni Award from 
Brigham Young University. 
Booth has served his academic communities in a variety of admin­
istrative roles. He was dean of the College at Chicago during the tur­
bulent years of 1964 to 1969. He chaired the Committee on Ideas and 
Methods from 1972 until 1975 and served three terms as chair of the 
Board of University Publications (1974-75, 1979-80, 1984-85). He as­
sisted Sheldon Sacks in launching the journal Critical Inquiry, served as 
coeditor until 1985, and was subsequently on its editorial board. Booth 
also served on the editorial boards of Novel, Philosophy and Literature, 
Philosophy and Rhetoric, Rhetorica, and Scholia Satyrica. But his service 
has not only been local. From 1952 to 1956 he served on the National 
Executive Committee of the College Conference on Composition and 
Communication, and from 1967 to 1970 on the Commission on Lit­
erature of the National Council of Teachers of English. He served on 
the executive council of the Modern Language Association of America 
from 1973 to 1976, as second vice president in 1980, first vice president 
in 1981, and in 1982 as president of the ML A. 
In retrospective narration, the arc of this remarkable career seems a 
smooth line. But as Gary Comstock has observed (253), The Rhetoric 
of Fiction was an act of intellectual independence; it was not only a 
confirmation of his intellectual inheritance, but an act of self-criticism 
that shaped his subsequent work by engaging him in the development 
of distinct notions of pluralism and, more basically, of rhetoric as the 
historical synthesis that would ground and drive his inquiries. 
The Chicago school critics under whom Booth trained had resisted 
the trend of their day to biographical study, and had insistently called 
attention back to the text. Their characteristic neo-Aristotelian focus 
was on the craft with which problems are solved and purposes achieved 
in the text. A great deal of this respect for the text has obviously stayed 
with Booth, although his sense of "the text" as a problematic term has 
developed into something more sophisticated than at least some of his 
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critics have noticed. But what Booth did in The Rhetoric of Fiction went 
beyond Chicago school concerns, and consequently did much to revive 
in literary studies the ancient tradition of rhetoric. Booth sought to ex­
amine then-popular dogmas about narrative technique—for example, 
that showing is always "better" than telling, or that good audiences 
must remain neutral emotionally, or that art ignores the audience. The 
problem he saw with such dogmas was that they judge literary tech­
nique in a kind of vacuum, apart from the contribution it makes to a 
work's specific fictive purposes. While Booth clearly never abandoned 
the Chicago school respect for the text, in order to pursue the issues he 
thought to be of interest he moved beyond its prevailing approaches, 
assumptions, issues, and arguments. 
In this book, Booth adopted a perspective on texts that has stayed 
with him throughout his work—an ethical perspective, in that he 
envisioned literary texts as scenes of human activity and relation, of 
interaction between people. Booth discussed them not as freestanding 
aesthetic structures or as eruptions of authors' bent childhoods, but as 
rhetorical acts: authors shaping readers into the audiences envisioned 
while writing, readers attempting to join those implied audiences. Al­
ready the pluralizer, Booth sought to multiply the considerations in 
terms of which critics might describe narrators to include such concerns 
as degree of dramatization, of self-consciousness, of involvement in the 
action, and even of the distance from the author's views. This allowed 
him to make distinctions that, as James Phelan observes, "have become 
so much a part of the vocabulary of narrative theory that they are com­
monly used with attribution" (56): the distinction between the implied 
author and the narrator, and distinctions among variously reliable and 
unreliable narrators. 
The book also pushed him into lines of thought and discourse in 
which he still remains productively engaged. Booth closed the first 
edition of The Rhetoric of Fiction with an extensive discussion of the 
ethical risks and gains of certain sorts of narration. His chapter on 
"The Morality of Impersonal Narration" drew fire from those who read 
Booth as flatly condemning all impersonal narration, even though he 
had continued to discuss techniques in terms of particular purposes. 
Booth himself has acknowledged both that this chapter was in some 
interesting sense a failure, and that the roles our moral judgments play 
in reading are more complicated than he had first represented them; 
in the second edition of the book he attempted with some success (and 
still more controversy) to address those complications. 
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Much of his subsequent work shows the influence of what he learned 
in these controversies. But even at this stage, ethical concerns were fun­
damentally connected with Booth's project of envisioning fictive dis­
course as rhetorical: Gary Comstock even contends that The Rhetoric 
of Fiction's greatest contribution may be its insistence that the choice of 
narrative effects inescapably involves moral choices about the relation of 
author and reader and the way they may share meaning. 
That relation formed the backdrop of A Rhetoric of Irony, Booth's 
inquiry into perhaps a most elusive kind of sharing of meaning. Again, 
Booth saw irony as a kind of interaction between people. Booth's now-
familiar distinction of stable and unstable irony depends on the extent 
to which any given "reading" of an irony may be subverted further in a 
way that brings both reader and author along: stable irony is intended, 
covert, fixed in where interpretation is to stop, and finite in application. 
Of course any irony can be destabilized if its author's intended meaning 
and relation to the reader are ignored, but there are benefits that arise 
from anchoring inquiry in this relation. Booth was able to do a variety 
of things with irony that no one had done quite so well before; to dis­
tinguish irony from other figurings of language that require readers to 
go beyond literal meaning, to explore the extraordinary literary "knowl­
edge" that irony can afford, to explicate the clues to that knowledge, to 
analyze distinct levels of evaluating irony, and even to identify handicaps 
of character that might prevent readers from forming such a relation. 
Booth's persistent emphasis on reasonable and arguable judgments 
illuminates another aspect of his conception of rhetoric, while it dis­
played his uncommon intellectual range. A Rhetoric of Irony was widely 
recognized as a distinguished book of literary criticism and, to some 
extent at least, theory. Modern Dogma and the Rhetoric of Assent was 
rather a philosophy of rhetoric. Here Booth took up the problem of sub­
jectivity where The Rhetoric of Fiction left it, by putting into question 
modernism's antirhetorical split of fact and value. Some commentators 
have speculated about the extent to which his own experience as dean 
of a college in a tumultuous time is recapitulated in the two camps he 
describes, "irrationalists" and "scientismists." If so, he behaved as he did 
in his deanship, still refusing simply to pick a side; arguing that facts 
and values cannot be split, Booth questioned the modernist dogmas of 
both scientismists and irrationalists, and offered some alternative ways 
of proceeding. 
His "warrants of assent" depend on a new picture of the thing we 
change when we change minds: the human mind, the human self as a 
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"field of selves." Our hold on "truths"—be they truths of the wildest 
heart or truths of the coldest laboratory—is always social, always made 
in symbolic exchange, always refined in the process of sharing values 
and facts. James Phelan explains (62) why this emphasis on the social 
is a key move for Booth's commitment to pluralism, as well as to his 
interdisciplinary bent: it implies that "there can be no one supreme logic 
against which all assertions must be tested," and that we must recognize 
many valid logics, a plurality of domains of knowing. 
Modern Dogma was an attempt to found and enact a peaceable, 
pluralistic community of those readers whose essential assent was an 
assent to rhetoric—to the pursuit of good reasons together. But in the 
1960s and 1970s, Booth saw that his own profession had been riven 
by increasingly virulent "logomachy," critical warfare. His next book, 
Critical Understanding: The Powers and Limits of Pluralism, developed 
the pluralistic insights of the rhetoric of assent in a way that applied to 
critical pluralism. 
Critical Understanding takes up issues that needed to be addressed 
for Booth to extend, and even defend, the conclusions of The Rheto­
ric of Fiction, so in some ways its place in Booth's career is easy to fix 
retrospectively. Yet in important ways it was a surprise because of the 
ethically extraordinary turn it took. The opening chapter, expectably, 
posed the comprehensive philosophical questions that confront such 
arguments: Is pluralism ever really genuine, or does it always ultimately 
cloak a deeper monism or lapse into relativism? How might one argue 
that the meaning of a work might be made determinate in different 
ways? In what pluralisms is there a chance for these different ways to 
be reconciled in a critical coexistence, and how in turn might different 
pluralisms be related to each other? 
To answer, Booth discussed in extensive detail three different plural­
ists: R. S. Crane, Kenneth Burke, and M. H. Abrams. These discussions 
led Booth to articulate two principles of his own pluralism: that there is 
no one true definition of the text, but rather something like five major 
approaches to texts, each of which admits of further variations; and, 
nevertheless, there are ways in which one can share, test, and try to 
improve a particular interpretation. The explanation must have its own 
logic or "coherence"; it must treat accurately with the world outside of 
itself, which Booth called "correspondence"; and it must show "com­
prehensiveness," accounting for all the textual features its own principles 
implicate and all those identified in the object by other modes. 
At this point, a reader might expect Booth to use conclusions from 
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these "case studies" to somehow resolve the philosophical questions he 
raised. Here instead arose the surprise: even though he would not aban­
don his commitment to pluralism, Booth's next move was to point out 
his own inability to carve out a ground from which to argue for it, since 
none of the three pluralisms adequately passed these three tests. 
The measure of a mind often is apparent in what it does after it con­
fronts an interesting failure; so it has been consistently with Booth. The 
self-avowed "failure" of the last chapter of The Rhetoric of Fiction, for 
example, spawned the whole line of ethical thinking about discourse 
that would so productively occupy Booth for twenty-five years, to cul­
minate (so far) in The Company We Keep. Within Critical Understanding, 
this failure forced Booth to articulate his own privileged assumption, 
that pluralism is so important a good for criticism that no arguments nor 
argumentative failures can overturn it. What had to be overturned is the 
book's apparent purpose, to work out a justification for pluralism on the 
philosophical level of a Modern Dogma. Booth instead took a pragmatic 
turn: the critical community must be dedicated to the advancement of 
three inseparable ends that are, when push comes to shove, more im­
portant than comprehensive truth: vitality, the end of cultivating rather 
than stilling further discourse\ justice, which calls each critic to apply a 
consistent standard; and understanding, the capacity to set aside even the 
strongest convictions and deepest presumptions long enough to enter 
another's critical framework and mind, to take in another self in a 
continually enriching field of selves. 
Booth then worked out the implications of a pluralism based on 
vitality, justice, and understanding, a pluralism for which truth is less 
important than the way of life critics create for themselves and each 
other when they talk. A pursuit of truth that violates these values in its 
interactions—with literary authors or with other critics—is for practi­
cal purposes an ethical contradiction, in that it subverts the community 
of discourse in which it seeks to claim or carve a place. A cultivation 
of vitality, justice, and understanding that falls short of the whole truth 
will nonetheless enhance the critical community and the possibilities of 
the lives we can live together in it. 
In addition to editing The Knowledge Most Worth Having, Booth 
subsequently published collections of his own essays and occasional 
addresses, Now Don't Try to Reason with Me: Essays and Ironies for a 
Credulous Age and The Vocation of a Teacher: Rhetorical Occasions, 1967­
1988. The seriousness with which Booth has always taken teaching is 
reflected and refracted in the occasional pieces he produced all along 
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and collected in these works. The variety of those occasions, the inven­
tiveness and flexibility in perspectives, and the gentle irony that make 
those books cohere grace all his work. But perhaps because of their sub­
ject matter, those books have not received much attention. In a scholarly 
generation not noted for such concern, no retrospective on Booth can 
afford to understate how seriously he has always taken his teaching; 
nowhere is this seriousness more variously, resourcefully, convincingly, 
and even buoyantly represented than in these works. Most recently, he 
has chosen from his own compendious reading a poignant and bracing 
anthology of selections on The Art of Growing Older. 
Among his most widely noted books is The Company We Keep. 
Thomas Conley points out that Booth shares the conviction that litera­
ture is equipment for living with contemporary political critics, both 
Marxist and feminist. But characteristically, "Booth's ethical criticism is 
based not on universals but on particulars, not on theoretical demystifi­
cations but on our experience of literature" (162). In coining the critical 
concept of coduction, Booth opens a way to address ethical problems 
left untouched, it seems, by the traditional categories of logic. Criti­
cism neither follows deductively from premises held above the fray nor 
does it arise inductively from a series of all-authoritative instances, but 
emerges "coductively," in comparing one's experience with other more 
or less qualified observers in acts of reading that are always "reciprocal 
and responsive," part of a "continuing conversation." 
Ethical conversation about narrative texts is worth pursuing, Booth 
argues, because narratives embody norms that may be accepted, re­
jected, tolerated, negotiated; because evaluations of a narrative can be 
rational if they are based on accurate descriptions of a narrative's power 
to elicit responses; because the inevitable diversity in ethical judgments 
does not by itself undercut the legitimacy of such judgment; and (in a 
move reminiscent of Modern Dogma) because in practice we live as if 
some judgments qualify as shared knowledge. 
If we regard narratives, as some contemporary critics do, under the 
metaphors of games or puzzles, ethical criticism seems inappropriate. 
But Booth provides an alternative metaphor: texts may be seen as acts of 
personal relation; implied authors claim to be not just companions but 
friends. So instead of asking what future effects a story will have on a 
reader. Booth wants to discern the kind and quality of company it offers 
while the reader is engaged with it. Booth uses the rhetorical tradition 
to set up criteria for friendship that can be applied to the evaluation 
of literature. Then he applies them, with some surprising results, to 
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some of his own favorites: Rabelais, Austin, Lawrence, and Twain. In 
fact, Booth introduces this project with the story of a decades-old con­
troversy about teaching Twain's Huckleberry Finn. The objections that 
Booth once discounted, he now takes more seriously; characteristically, 
he has learned from the discourse in which he has engaged, has been 
changed by it, though not in the ways that any of his interlocutors might 
have foreseen. And in this insight as well as any might be captured part 
of Booth's intellectual and ethical legacy. 
In our day's academic bestiary we are more than familiar with Old 
Boars who have closed their minds, or at least their ears. Booth surely 
was in a sufficiently cushy position to have done that, to have defended 
himself, as some contemporaries have, behind a palisade of academic 
honor and power. Instead, he has been persistently hard on himself in 
print, not for the sake of public penitence but to push his own thought 
further in original ways. In The Rhetoric of Fiction he criticized the as­
sumptions that might have been his professional gravy train, and pushed 
himself beyond them. In The Vocation of a Teacher he mocks the sex­
ism in an earlier essay with "Is There Any Knowledge a Woman Must 
Have?" And the whole introduction to Company depends on Booth's 
having continued to think about Paul Moses's objection to Huckleberry 
Finn, thought that leads him not to Moses's position but to one more 
fully his own. 
Booth has taken a certain amount of flak for this bothersome habit 
of continuing to think from those who wish him to champion Determi­
nate Meaning in Texts, who see him as having recanted what he knows 
or, at least, knew. It is true that he has continued to reshape certain 
of his conclusions. But he has done so not as a literary Galileo, bent 
to the corrupt papacy of the politically correct, but (what some might 
find more subversive) because he has listened, learned, and changed his 
mind. Booth talks in The Vocation of a Teacher about teaching by mod­
eling; what he has modeled in his writing about good reasons is the 
capacity to change his mind in response to good reasons. To an extraor­
dinary extent, Wayne Booth has been living in his critical discourse the 
kind of critical life that he has been writing about. By the way he has 
"taken in"—although I'm sure he'd tell me to use that phrase advisedly 
and with due irony in this context—other selves into his field of selves, 
he has not only practiced what he's preached; he has "preached" it in 
an even more persuasive way in the quality of his intellectual company, 
and in the critical life in which he has engaged others. 
This volume is evidence of just how true and how high a compli­
io Introduction 
ment that is. A few of the authors included here have been students in 
Booth's classrooms. But in pursuing their own very diverse projects, all 
have found it important to keep his company in reading, and each in 
distinctive ways and degrees has clearly been shaped in that interrela­
tion. Each—whether investigating logic or literary criticism, Bakhtin 
or Bacon, economics or music—shows at least this much of his influ­
ence: each genuinely and rigorously engages Booth's work and grapples 
seriously with Booth's evolving notions of rhetoric and pluralism; each, 
however, extends his work in a productive new direction. Reflecting on 
what Booth brings to their areas of inquiry, each responds with the "yes, 
but . . ." that Booth regards as the most welcome of critical responses; 
striving to understand and to do justice to his work while vitalizing the 
critical conversation further, in an intriguing variety of directions. 
First come two chapters that attempt to resituate Booth, both within 
contemporary controversies and within the life experiences and roles 
where such controversies matter most for human character. 
Booth has taken on several roles in his illustrious career, most in­
triguingly the simultaneous roles of generalist and specialist in rhetoric. 
Walter Jost looks for a way to integrate the roles without demoting or 
denigrating either one. He finds it in a discussion of the formal and spe­
cial topics of rhetoric, and the argument that Booth makes about them: 
that the duty of liberal education is to provide a base on which spe­
cialties might be built without losing sight of the foundations on which 
they rest. Jost finds in this approach to considering specifics while at­
tending to the whole an essential characteristic of Booth's life, beliefs, 
and work. 
One peculiar aspect of that work is the distinctive continuity—in 
which Booth takes great pleasure—between what Booth has done and 
what teachers of elementary literacy, grade school teachers of reading 
and writing, do. Francis-Noel Thomas enlists Booth's continuity with 
those who are on the front lines of teaching to make a revealing cri­
tique of current dogmas about literacy. To say more risks giving away 
too much, but Thomas's argument is a most ingenious, and perhaps the 
most devastating, contribution to our ongoing discussions about "core" 
knowledge—and as such is a meaningful mobilization of (and tribute 
to) Booth's specific excellences as a teacher. 
Booth's work as a literary critic shapes the second section. These 
chapters focus what the authors take to be Booth's key ethical questions 
on literature and the criticism of literature. Monica Johnstone takes up 
two related topics: the first to explicate Booth's version of ethics as heu­
ristic, the second to demonstrate what his ethics offers that other explic­
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itly ethical rhetoricians do not. While two more prescriptive approaches 
fail in application to Jean Genet's Querelle, she shows how Booth's more 
descriptive criticism makes conversation possible even among critics of 
differing disciplinary commitments who are bound into community by 
their very activity as critics. 
Susan Shapiro examines an intriguing limit case—a case involving 
the breakdown of narrative community and even the possibilities of 
discourse—in reading Elie Wiesel's "true fiction" on the Holocaust 
through Booth. Shapiro sees Wiesel confronting a dilemma: How could 
Wiesel narrate such an event—seemingly the end of all history and 
God's presence in history—as stories, accounts that have beginnings, 
middles, and ends? Yet how could he remain silent, and fail to witness? 
What seemed to be demanded was no less an enactment, in fiction, 
of some sort of "postcovenantal religious praxis." Shapiro uses Booth 
to explicate how Wiesel found the authenticating possibilities of true 
fiction risked in friendship. 
Don Bialostosky examines Booth's revision of his notions of rheto­
ric in light of Mikhail Bakhtin's works on Dostoevsky and on feminist 
criticism. Bialostosky characterizes Booth as shifting from a monologic 
Chicago school perspective toward Bakhtin's dialogic perspective, dem­
onstrating how rhetoric and dialogics have a symbiotic relation worth 
further analysis. But Bialostosky also argues that Booth, in his response 
to Bakhtin, effectively shifts the grounds of argument from technical 
attacks to something like moral differences, confronting directly the 
problem of evaluating the number of critical voices implied by plural­
ism, given that neither rhetorical nor dialectical means can fully answer 
all critical objections. 
David Richter examines the evolution in Booth's sense of plural-
ism—a critical approach that grew and deepened from originally cham­
pioning instrumental pluralism to revealing an inherent weakness in it, 
its peculiar and distorting reliance on aligning critical methods as com­
peting rather than as complementary. Richter notes how Booth's move 
from instrumental pluralism to a pragmatic scheme embroils him in the 
debate over textual meaning: can Booth reasonably search for inherent 
meanings in a text—the values of vitality, justice, and understanding— 
while at the same time not limiting the meaning of the text to the in­
herent, the predetermined? Although Booth has not yet offered a full 
solution for this problem, Richter notes a sense in which Booth's em­
phasis on the social and practical aspect of criticism has enabled him to 
elude it. 
As a University of Chicago dean during the tumultuous 1960s and as 
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the president of MLA and a national figure during difficult times for 
literary study, Booth has surely had a public life. But Booth's greater 
public significance may lie in the implications of his writing. Part 3 
pushes Booth further on various aspects of the politics of his work. 
James Phelan probes Booth's conception of pluralism by elaborating its 
connection with politics. By examining Gilbert and Gubar's work in 
feminist criticism and their critique by Toril Moi, Phelan suggests that 
committed pluralists do indeed have standards by which they judge 
critics, standards by which he can show how Moi's arguments fail, and 
how Gilbert and Gubar also fall short. Phelan notes the political im­
plications of his choice of texts, which allow him to conclude "though 
there is no getting outside of politics, there is also no good reason to 
treat discourse only as political." 
Barbara Foley nonetheless wishes for the connections between 
Booth's work and politics to be stronger. The Company We Keep has 
evoked in several quarters a similar kind of critique—that the book 
is apolitical to a fault. Since Booth himself comments extensively in 
response to Foley's essay, suffice it to say that it is a resourceful and 
rousing challenge to Booth's choice of putting ethics before politics. 
In my own chapter, on Martin Luther King, Jr.'s rhetoric of non­
violence, I may be offering a partial response to Foley's criticisms. I 
argue for an inherently political (if as yet not fully explicated) strain in 
Booth's ethical approach to rhetoric, and explore its character by using 
it to open up aspects of a particular text that is wonderfully problematic, 
both ethically and politically. 
Booth's "interdisciplinarity" provides the unifying (or, perhaps the 
plurifying) theme for part 4, where his influence is stretched from 
music to economics to philosophy. First, Peter Rabinowitz imports 
Boothian insights into the musical variant of the rhetorical situation. He 
constructs at least the foundations of a theoretical framework for under­
standing how people derive spiritual and emotional messages—essen-
tial material for ethical stances and systems—from music. Rabinowitz 
shows us how to seek such messages not "in the music itself" but in the 
listener's attributions, made via recollections and interpolations of life 
experience, to which Booth gives him an original and interesting angle 
of access. 
Few disciplinary worlds are more apparently different from Booth's, 
if Donald McCloskey is to be believed, than economics, which sustains a 
kind of academic tradition of divorcing itself from ethics. Nonetheless, 
McCloskey insists that "modern economics would do well to recog­
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nize its Aristotelian ethos" \ he points to important ways that a Boothian 
pluralism can speak ethically to economics, and even to a few reciprocal 
ways in which economics is needed to teach students of literature "a 
thing or two about ethics." The economist who can make the realiza­
tion that she is, after all, "a teller of tales" a part of everyday practice will 
become more valuable company to keep, and thus can teach us more 
interesting senses of valuable company. 
Eugene Garver brings Booth's perspective to a kind of discourse he 
charges Booth with having scanted, at least in The Rhetoric of Fiction (a 
charge of selectivity to which Booth will choose to respond): discourse 
in which neither the author nor the reader is abstracted—at least quite 
so fully as in fiction—from specific political and ethical context. Garver 
shows how this may be true of discourse that is didactic by design. In 
this, Garver takes on an interesting burden, for we have all read dreary 
species of the bludgeoningly didactic kind. And in many instances of 
this kind of discourse, the purpose of which is to teach, we have seen 
authors seeking actually to reduce the moral activity of the reader. But 
for Garver, the genre need not be so bankrupt; he sees in Francis Bacon 
an intriguing alternative, and uses concepts from Booth to make it ac­
cessible, and to allow us to explore how reading didactic discourse can 
make us better people. 
Part 5 explores the problematic and promising relation among as­
sent, ethics, and pluralism. Patsy Callaghan and Ann Dobyns explore 
that relation as it arises in teaching ethical argument. They place argu­
ment at "the theoretical heart of the ethical pursuit," in that region of 
contingency between the unbending certainties of "hard fact" and the 
easy relativism of "soft faith" where characters are made. They explicate 
provocative implications for the purpose and status of the basic course 
in composition. Booth's notion of assent emerges from their analysis 
as a prime resource for retheorizing critical thinking for this essential 
component of education. 
Alan Brinton approaches Booth's notions of systematic assent from 
an analytic tradition, and raises challenging questions about the nature 
of systematicity. He argues both that Booth's foils in Modern Dogma, 
especially Descartes and Russell, were not as systematically dubious as 
he characterizes them, and that a truly systematic assent—endorsing 
the diametric opposite of these foils—would confine Booth to the same 
intellectually barren ground that rejecting all propositions would. If 
Brinton can hang Booth on this hook, then systematic assent turns out 
neither a method of assent, nor systematic. Rather, it would be revealed 
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as an ethically conservative method, favoring established beliefs and re­
lying on authorities for matters of belief—not a systematic assent, but 
a system of presumptions and burdens, ironically like the program put 
forth by Bertrand Russell. 
James McOmber regards Booth as in pursuit of a rhetoric of inquiry 
that is also an ethic of inquiry, urging and enabling persuaders "to at­
tend carefully to the kinds of persons they make of themselves and 
their followers as they inquire together." McOmber explores the special 
connections Booth has forged between argument and character in our 
pluralistic context, and assesses the value of such connections for the 
life of the mind and the possibilities of continuing discourse. 
Of course it would be an impoverished version of "pluralism" that 
read it as a mandate for Booth to just stand up and take hit after hit. In 
the afterword. Booth reflects on these essays and their relative reason­
ableness; the understanding and the force with which he does so is itself 
instructive of how he has characteristically engaged in critical discourse. 
For while Booth has, throughout his career, been willing to correct him­
self, admit failure, and learn, he has also engaged in strenuous debates 
with his critics, as much in this volume as elsewhere, and has devas­
tated many of the attacks made upon him. Booth again makes clear 
that pluralism entails not an uncritical passive acceptance, but a greater 
responsibility to argue actively (see, for example, the second edition of 
The Rhetoric of Fiction); he continues to teach us here in the critical and 
ethical qualities with which he makes his counterarguments. 
I find consolation in the belief that this book is not the last we will 
be hearing about, or from, Wayne Booth. This eases my apprehension 
that full perfect justice has not yet been done to all sides of him—say, 
to Booth the ironist (has one of our authors missed the irony in Booth's 
call for "inventionics or arrangementistics"?); to Booth, the still-aspiring 
cellist; or to the Booth whose attention, teasing, and practical jokes con­
vinced at least one dubious graduate student of the humanity of the 
scholarly life, and thus almost singlehandedly kept him in it. After all is 
said and done, it may be this human aspect that is most elusive. Yet the 
merger of scholar, thinker, and teacher into the human being is perhaps 
the ultimate realization of value that makes all the rest of his virtues 
and insights so enduring and persuasive. 
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Situating Booth 
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Teaching the Topics: 
Character, Rhetoric, and 
Liberal Education 
WALTER JOST 
Betwixt genius and dilligence there is very little room left for art. 
CICERO, DE ORATORE, 2 . 3  5 
T O W A R  D A U N I F I E  D F I E L  D T H E O R  Y 
CONSIDE R HOW, AT first glance (and for some time thereafter), Wayne 
Booth impresses one not so much as a single Booth than as a com­
plex field of Booths: teacher, dean, member of university and national 
seminars-colloquia-committees uncountable, MLA president, visiting 
lecturer, author of works on fiction, criticism, film, education, irony, 
rhetoric, ethics, religion, teaching. . . .' In a recent address Booth calls 
himself a rhetorician, and in a recent book a generalist: a closer look 
will reveal to the initiate that for Booth these mean the same thing, but 
a set of questions will have occurred to the longtime Booth reader well 
before this: Is there a center to this widening (or at least fluctuating) 
gyre, is there some doctrine, activity, character, that pulls these pursuits 
together? Is calling oneself a generalist only an unsuccessful dodge of 
the more obviously demeaning label "dilettante" (however brilliant this 
A slightly different version of this essay appeared in Rhetoric Society Quarterly, 21 (Winter 
1991), 1-16. 
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dilettantism may be)? Or is there a unified field theory to account for 
these many Wayne Booths? 
Such a unified center does exist, I believe, though my aim in this 
chapter is not personal praise. Instead, I am interested in arguing that 
Booth's version of rhetorical generalism is relevant to understanding— 
Booth, to be sure; in my view an essential perspective on Booth—but, 
more importantly, to understanding the very enterprise of rhetoric itself, 
as a dynamic, changing basis for liberal education—an education pre­
cisely to a specific, coherent, intellectual and moral character.2 Booth has 
never been content with whatever ethical order or identity he may have 
managed for himself (as real-life author or act-er) over forty-odd years 
of multiform activity. Explicitly in most of his writings, more or less 
implicitly in the rest, Booth has not only written about rhetorical edu­
cation, he has urged it on his readers (and exemplified it in doing so) as 
an ideal that will organize us—both our own individual characters, and 
the collective character of the communities we share. My question about 
Booth, then, is at the same time a question about the unity of rhetoric, 
ethics, and education: Just what is the unified activity of a rhetorician 
(qua generalist) such that we should attempt to fashion ourselves, our 
communities, and this very fashioning itself, in accord with it? My em­
phasis, it will be clear, is not on Booth the man or "Booth" the implied 
author, much less on anything like a real "theory" (certainly as meta­
phorical a concept here as "center" and "gyre"), but on the rhetorical 
activity of educating to a "rhetoric" that can be named and identified 
and studied in performance, but not frozen in historical time or place. 
An inquiry that would begin to do justice to these themes would 
range further and penetrate deeper than the limits of this chapter allow, 
but within these limits I seek to offer some insights into these related 
matters. My thesis is simple but works on two levels: first, character, 
rhetoric, and the cultivation of these in liberal education constitute the 
very center of Booth's concerns—both the subject of his writings, and 
the activity exemplified in those writings and in his other activities— 
and I am concerned on this level with the coherence of the two together. 
Second, and more broadly, I believe that we can all gain a coherent and 
compelling view of what liberal education should be, precisely through 
an understanding of what a rhetorical character should be. I might set 
up my argument more clearly by dispatching (if not disproving) a few 
common misconceptions. 
First, as Aristotle (and the subsequent tradition in which the likes 
of Cicero, Vico, Newman, and Booth stand) makes clear, rhetoric is 
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not a principled inquiry into a determinate subject matter, but rather 
a "faculty" or "power" or (loosely, as in Cicero) an "art" or method. 
This power or method in turn, however, is to be equated with neither 
those interminable, barren lists of tropes, or commonplaces, or rules, 
or argument-types, that rhetoricians have regularly accumulated in the 
past, nor again with those "good reasons" or "warrantable assents" that 
theorists (like Booth, partly following Dewey) have rightly championed 
against various positivisms in our own time. Booth's stress on "good 
reasons" has been right, no doubt, given the dogmas he was trying to 
remove, but throughout his works implicitly, and explicitly in The Voca­
tion of a Teacher (1988), Booth reminds us that rhetoric involves not only 
proof or judgment, but discovery or inventio. In diverting our attention 
from judgment to invention, I am suggesting that earlier campaigns in 
the rhetoric war, particularly those fought to establish the nonfounda­
tionalist nature of reason (excellently chronicled by Richard Bernstein, 
among others3), are now widely seen to have been successful. On the 
other hand, we have not yet begun to fight for the changes in education 
our earlier gains require if they are not to be wasted. More than twenty-
five years ago, in "The Revival of Rhetoric" (1965), Booth had observed 
(not entirely tongue-in-cheek): "I find it interesting . . . that with all 
our modern passion for inventing new studies with proper labels we 
do not even have words in our language for the sciences of invention 
and arrangement. . . . [Sjurely it is time for someone to make himself 
a professor of inventionics or arrangementistics . . ." (42). For Booth, 
as for Aristotle and Cicero, rhetoric involves inquiry as well as proof; 
and for Booth and Cicero, Vico and Vives, Newman, Kierkegaard, and 
Kenneth Burke, rhetoric comprises the building of character, commu­
nity, and truth by cultivating the ability to discover warrantable assents 
in all areas of knowledge (or, across the curriculum), because all knowl­
edge is more or less rhetorical, more or less bound up with the interests, 
values, beliefs, expectations, and the like of inquirers. 
From this perspective, secondly, we can conceive of liberal educa­
tion, after Booth himself, not so much in the first instance as a doctrine, 
a "knowledge most worth having," than as a method, a knowing most 
worth doing, that shares with rhetoric three characteristics: first, it con­
cerns all areas of knowledge, not a single determinate subject matter; 
second, it is mediated (in varying degrees) by the "whole person"; and 
third, it involves a critical inquiry or invention not reducible to algorith­
mic methods—it involves a rhetorical power of discovering, as Booth 
says, what really warrants our assent (not only within a stable frame­
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work of truths, as in Aristotle, but also among competing frameworks 
or paradigms). To be sure, this view of liberal education as rhetorical is 
not unique to Booth, nor is it free of tension with several contrary cur­
rents in his thought. Still, it is a view in eclipse in recent discussions of 
liberal education, though there are stirrings on the right and the left re­
specting rhetoric and education.4 But it has been little observed and less 
remarked that Booth illuminates this matter in rich detail in both his 
discussion and his critical practice, and for the remainder of this chapter 
I pursue his type of rhetoric of liberal education, in part by reference 
to his works, but first by picking up a discussion among rhetoricians 
over what I take to be the heart of rhetorical invention (and thus liberal 
education): the role of rhetorical topics (topoi) in teaching and inquiry. 
PLACING THE TOPICS 
The history of the topics is notoriously slippery (as is well known, the 
term has a dozen or more meanings and applications) but we might try 
to simplify: topics are "places" the rhetor turns to—or, less metaphori­
cally, ideas, terms, formulas, phrases, propositions, argument forms, and 
so on that the rhetor turns to—to discover what to say on a given mat­
ter. Topics as determinate formulas of one sort or another, what Bacon 
called "promptuary devices" and others "commonplaces," ranging from 
a memorized word or line to entire prefabricated passages, are of no 
concern here since they are peculiarly nonrhetorical (fixed and deter­
minate when the supposition of rhetoric is the opposite). What is of 
interest are those topics that are more or less indeterminate verbal re­
sources useful for discovering (or "inventing") what is relevant, argu­
able, persuasive in a given case (let us call them inventional topics). The 
inventional topics belong to rhetoric as an intellectual faculty oriented to 
"action" (to practical effect, to nonexpert audiences or expert audiences 
considering nonexpert aspects of their expertise, and to the "practical" 
generally), and to "indeterminacy" (the concrete and contingent nature 
of rhetorical issues).5 But how, more specifically, are topics to function, 
and how is the teaching of topics to proceed? To answer these ques­
tions we need to do two things: first, by an act of (topical) "placement," 
in Kenneth Burke's terms, we need to identify how topics have been 
understood historically; and secondly, by a further act of placement, we 
need to turn to specific examples (the exemplary work of Wayne Booth), 
to the application of an otherwise abstract knowledge of rhetoric, to ap­
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preciate that only such concrete knowledge of topics can provide what 
has long been understood to be genuine liberal education. 
The most comprehensive schema in the literature on topics distin­
guishes between material and formal, that is, topics that express or 
generate substantive issues and warrants of various sorts, and those that 
provide only the "forms" of arguments.6 Aristotle is a case in point 
(Cicero, Quintilian, and later theorists would do as well): the twenty-
eight inferential "forms" (the topoi enthumematon) listed in Book II of 
the Rhetoric, arguments from definition, cause, sign, similarity, circum­
stance, and so on (which have never ceased to reappear in one guise or 
another in textbooks on composition, speech, rhetoric, and criticism) are 
formal topics. Material topics (in Aristotle at least) are of two types: the 
kpina or "the commons" applicable to all subjects (more/less, possible/ 
impossible, past/future fact, and the premises that derive from these 
headings); and the eide or "special topics" belonging to specific substan­
tive areas. To be sure, the distinction between material and formal topics 
is relative: formal topics seek to help generate material but are them­
selves empty, and material topics naturally have some formal dimension 
to them, inferential or otherwise, though their utility is substantive, not 
formal. 
Of the material topics there are several types or forms that can be 
found in Aristotle, Cicero, and other theorists: in particular, special top­
ics (though common also) can be (1) general substantive headings or 
categories of knowledge (in Cicero "act" and "person," or again the utile 
and honestas; in Aristotle "ways and means," "imports and exports," 
"motives," "laws"); or substantive concepts (and groups of concepts), or 
indeed verbal structures of any sort (a law case, a character in a narrative, 
a narrative itself, an image), whose meaning is to be (re-)negotiated in a 
given case; (2) propositions used as major premises in arguments (vid. 
Rhetoric, Book I, 5-15); and (3) background information—assumptions, 
truths, and so on—that the rhetor can use to generate arguments of 
various sorts based on such information (e.g., Aristotle's analyses of the 
emotions in Rhetoric, Book II). With respect to the greater importance 
of special as compared to common topics, John Henry Newman ob­
served, "To say nothing else, common-places are but blunt weapons, 
whereas it is particular topics that penetrate and reach their marks" 
(338). And Bacon was equally impressed by the special topoi: ". . . topics 
are of two sorts, general and special. The general we have spoken to; 
but the particular hath been touched by some, but rejected generally as 
inartificial and variable. But . .  . I do receive particular topics, (that is, 
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places or directions of invention and inquiry in every particular knowl­
edge,) as things of great use, being mixtures of logic with the matter of 
sciences. . ." (129, emphasis added). (But this acceptance by Bacon of 
the special topics is historically untypical.) 
Finally, all such categories, concepts, propositions, and information 
can be explicit or implicit in a given text. 
Something like this scheme covers the rhetorical topics, so that we 
are in a position to inquire more closely into how topics are to func­
tion realistically in teaching, inquiry, and criticism. We know how they 
typically have functioned. Some years ago Professor Carolyn Miller ex­
pressed consternation over what she argued has been the repeated loss 
of the special topics in the teaching of rhetoric (she meant, I believe, all 
material topics, common or special, but particularly the special topics), 
and the habitual turn to the formal or "inferential" topics.7 Miller rightly 
saw that the history of rhetorical pedagogy and theory has favored infer­
ential or formal topics, in great part because, unlike material topics, 
formal topics can be easily itemized, circumscribed, and transmitted, 
as Bacon himself had observed, "But leaving the humour which hath 
reigned too much in the schools, which is, to be fairly subtle in a few 
things which are within their command, and to reject the rest" (129). 
As Miller writes: " . .  . the inferential perspective is clearly advantageous 
to the teacher—it provides convenience, coherence, and limitations; it 
permits isolation [from the topics' original context] and elaboration. 
The materialist perspective, in contrast, emphasizes the diversity and 
complexity of rhetorical practice" (65). In other words, what we gain 
in the turn from material topics to formal topics is a (sometimes dubi­
ous) systematic coherence at the risk of forfeiting reality and informed 
judgment. 
Miller's response to this problem, with which I concur, is to call 
for the rejuvenation of the special (material) topics, those drawn from 
specific areas or disciplines, in rhetorical study and education, and she 
proceeds to offer a triad of topical headings as a new typology for special 
topics.* Her typology is perfectly reasonable, but it could, one imag­
ines, easily degenerate into the rhetorician's characteristic move toward 
systemizing that she rightly fears. The problem here is that we cannot 
really rejuvenate the material topics unless we appreciate the goal of 
rhetorical education; too often in the past the use and teaching of top­
ics have been cut off from what rhetoric might practically be and what 
organizational structure our knowledge and teaching might plausibly 
take. In fact I think it quite probable that the very "places" where rheto­
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ricians have looked to understand both topics and rhetoric, namely the 
standard theories of rhetoric from Aristotle and Cicero onwards, have 
blinded us in two ways: (1) the previous historical contexts that gave 
rise to these theories of rhetoric and topics may have occluded our view 
of the new conditions under which we might now more realistically 
understand topics; and (2) the theoretical remove at which such general 
inquiries into topics have been conducted has led us to deflect our­
selves inadvertently from a more realistic, practical, rhetorical grasp of 
what topics might be and do. An "objective" or theoretical knowledge 
of topics is necessary but insufficient for grasping such practical devices. 
The task, then, is not to dismiss rhetorical history or theory, but to 
read both in the light of present (and past) realities of rhetorical prac­
tice, the structure and aims of liberal education, and the practice of 
teaching. That practical turn in my title—teaching the topics—may ap­
pear to some to threaten to make elementary (to juvenilize) this aspect 
of the philosophy and theory of rhetoric, rather in the way Miller has 
rightly argued it has in the past, but my argument here is that this need 
not occur. In the thought and practice of Wayne Booth, I believe, we 
find a model of practical sensitivity to the special topics often lacking 
in "general" rhetorics, and it is to this thought and practice, now itself 
understood as a material or "special" rhetoric, that I wish to turn. 
REINVENTING THE MATERIAL TOPICS 
From the beginning of his career, Booth has ventured characterizations 
and definitions of rhetoric, which we might simply summarize thus: 
rhetoric is the faculty and art of producing and appraising what really 
warrants our assent. This is simple enough, though far reaching in its 
scope and depth. It is grounded on the premise that all knowledge is 
mediated in some degree by the "horizons" or "paradigms" or "fidu­
ciary frameworks" in which we necessarily move and have our being. Of 
course, some problems are more determinate than others, but, when we 
face those problems we agree can or should be treated more or less "ob­
jectively," as recurrencies susceptible to determinate methods, our initial 
recognition that such problems need to be so treated (given our pur­
poses) depends on our ability to encounter them first as indeterminacies, 
within contexts that admit of more and less, possible and impossible— 
that is, within rhetorical contexts of interpretation, emphasis, valuing. 
A datum or problem can only first be recognized as amenable to more 
26 WALTER JOST 
or less determinate or "objective" treatment against the full range of 
possibilities as to its existence and meaning, and this requires its in­
terpretation by the "whole person" using the full range of his or her 
powers and resources—cognitive, emotional, ethical, and so on. 
Moreover, the more our questions about a problem implicate our 
total ways of life, the more rhetoric is involved. And when the whole of 
life and knowledge becomes the object of our inquiry, as it does in all 
accounts of liberal education, rhetoric is maximally involved; indeed, 
the challenge of education is just that of producing a "whole" person— 
and, by extension, a wmversity (not a multiversity), a community, a cul­
ture (the diversity intrinsic to such "wholes" notwithstanding).9 On this 
view, liberal education is the cultivation of our ability to discriminate 
what is indeterminate, to produce warrants for assent, and to appraise 
those warrants and the warrants offered to us by others. 
The way we achieve such cultivation, Booth has said explicitly and 
repeatedly, is "to find new topics, new shared places from which any 
given rhetorical community can move, trusting to various degrees of 
warranting in the search for liveable truths, not certainties" (Vocation 
126); also, "In the ancient terminology of rhetoricians, we seek to dis­
cover the topics, the topoi, the places or locations on which, or in which, 
a shared inquiry can take place" {Vocation 108). Such topics are not 
abstract lists of inferential forms to be memorized; they are rather sub­
stantive resources for inquiry into the concrete. But what is meant here 
by topics, how can they be taught, and how exactly will they function 
such that we shall indeed cultivate abilities of discrimination and judg­
ment, and not merely replicate commonplaces and diffuse all sense of 
unity and structure? 
In one of his footnoted asides in Modern Dogma, Booth again has re­
course to rhetoric and topics to explain what he is up to, although a little 
reflection will show that these remarks apply to all of his work: "Those 
who know classical rhetoric will be aware that I am experimenting 
with the old notion of the topoi, those . . . shared 'standpoints' where 
good arguments can be found because in them men did in fact discover 
warrantable beliefs" (11 in 18). Booth is right about his "experimenting" 
here, because the collection (as he calls it) of topoi that he offers us dif­
fers from traditional lists in at least two ways: first, Booth offers special 
topics, not vague common or formal topics, so that he ends up with no 
"list" at all but a "collection," enormously wide ranging and therefore 
difficult to formalize; and second, the special topics he offers, while they 
include the standard value propositions and headings, include also any 
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and all verbal (and presumably nonverbal) artifacts capable of providing 
warrants for claims. Booth lists "stories as reasons," for example, "art as 
the changing of minds," and the first principles of specific disciplines, 
discussing many of the specific topics that come under such matters. 
Not since Cicero (or, not since Richard McKeon and Kenneth Burke) 
has anyone recommended so sweeping a topical philosophy. As Cicero 
has Crassus state it in De oratore, "the real power of eloquence is such, 
that it embraces the origin, the influence, the changes of all things in the 
world, all virtues, duties, and all nature, so far as it affects the manners, 
minds, and lives of mankind" (213). 
The manners, minds, and lives of mankind: Cicero's qualification 
(such as it is) of the kind of knowledge rhetoric embraces points to just 
that indeterminacy of the real and the known central to Booth. But we 
must not misconceive how the rhetorician is to go about this virtual 
"knowing all things," as both Cicero and Booth urge. In the De oratore 
(2.39-40), Cicero explicitly adverts to the formal topics as useful devices 
for the rhetor, but it is equally clear that such topoi are easily memorized 
and applied, hence not central to his problem. What is of far greater 
concern to Cicero, as to Booth, is the orator's more or less systematic ex­
posure to "all things." Cicero, it is true, does not call these complex and 
various matters topoi™ but clearly they function as material, special top-
ics—ideas, terms, distinctions, value propositions in all fields, literary 
works, histories, the civil law, "all antiquity" (1.35)—not as determinate 
and fixed facts and truths, but as more or less negotiable, interpretable 
possibilities for argument—"general principles" (2.17) used as places to 
argue on both sides of a question (1.34)." This, I take it, is what Booth 
himself has in mind: 
. . . what would happen if you probed and found what assumptions 
your own intellectual convictions really rest on, then tested them against 
other people's assumptions, andfinally concluded with more or less con­
fidence. . . . 
The collection of topoi from which such principles come would have 
become an organon, always to some degree sifting and uncertain, but 
reliable in discovering not only what you yourself believe but what you 
should believe. . . . 
Instead of making an a priori list of topics at a high level of generality, 
as those who revive classical rhetoric sometimes do, I shall pursue the 
consequences of this notion [of special topics] inductively. . . . {Modern 
Dogma 111 n 18) 
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This inductive turn to special topics is what makes Cicero's and 
Booth's approaches to rhetorical invention in all of their works mature 
ones. In the abstract, topics lose touch with what gives them purpose; to 
approach topics inductively—by examples, by entering concrete cases— 
renders rhetoric realistically complex, demanding, and sophisticated.12 
Admonished myself here to practice what is preached, I propose 
to examine a quite simple yet telling example of Booth's own topical 
theory and practice, as a way of making my argument more concrete. 
In the first chapter of A Rhetoric of Irony, Booth attempts (among 
other things) simply to locate his subject matter (note that for Booth 
this is preeminently a rhetorical task, as "irony" is understood to be, 
not fixed and given, but a contestable and negotiable concept, properly 
approached by way of rhetorical topics). He then explains how one type 
of irony (stable irony) is recognized, and subsumes the interpretation of 
irony under the rubric "knowledge," all the while urging quietly that 
irony is particularly worthy of such pains as he is taking, distinguishing 
it from puns, allegory and fable, satire, and so on. 
But note what happens next, in the beginning of chapter 2. Aware 
of the limits of abstract explanation, our rhetorician has recourse to a 
metaphor to illuminate the interpretation of irony—one trope to clar­
ify another. Stable irony, Booth says, entails a "reconstruction" of our 
beliefs and values, our "dwelling places," one in which we experience 
a move or climb to a new level of understanding (33-37). Now, when 
I say that Booth turns to the metaphor of building (or rebuilding) to 
clarify or illuminate irony, I really have in mind a far more complex rhe­
torical transaction (or reconstruction) than might otherwise be noted. 
Consider the following: 
1. Along with his argument and claims about irony in chapter 1, Booth's 
metaphor of reconstruction directs attention to facts about irony and 
its interpretation, its use by speakers to transform their audiences, 
which together are intended to qualify irony as a source of knowl­
edge. Now, this is itself the use of rhetorical argument (in part by 
way of metaphor) to reconstitute what had been considered a mere 
trope and turn it into a topic, a source of arguments. (And charac­
teristically, Booth himself is explicit about this linkage with topics; 
see p. 34). 
2. The metaphor, moreover, requires on the reader's part a reconstruc­
tion of meaning similar to the interpretation of any stable irony. Said 
otherwise, here the metaphor too is not only a trope but a topic. 
Like stable irony, it engages and reconstitutes both the meaning of 
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metaphor and of irony, as well as the audience taking it in. Like 
irony, it requires that we "dwell" in its implications about dwelling, 
inhabiting "places" that we find livable or not, comfortable or not, 
true or not, so that if we come to accept this place as acceptable, our 
world (and its inhabitants) is reconstructed as a place where irony 
and metaphor do in fact reconstruct.13 
3. The grasp and appreciation of the metaphor involves (at least in 
principle) all the "powers and resources" the reader-as-generalist has 
at hand. That is, only if the reader can actively imagine houses or 
other dwellings, has a sense for private rooms and public rooms and 
the values they imply, knows something (but not necessarily much) 
about interior wall frames and exterior sheet-rock, about founda­
tions and so on—only then can the reader follow Booth in what 
he makes of his metaphor.14 We cannot grasp the arguments and 
claims the metaphor suggests without implicitly relying on a range 
of beliefs, values, and experiences; such an ability (even if not deeply 
called into play by any given metaphor) requires just that broad "uni­
versal" knowledge of the "manners, minds, and lives of mankind" 
that Cicero promoted. Like irony, our rhetorician's metaphor invites 
discrimination and judgment. 
4. The metaphor of reconstruction points back to the "four steps" 
of reconstructing ironic meaning that Booth outlines in chapter 1. 
Together, the discursive "steps," along with the metaphor, exemplify 
how material topics (i.e., the steps and the metaphor themselves) 
function as both list and st{ill: alone, the list of the four steps of 
interpretation could easily become abstract and mechanical; made 
concrete in the metaphor and in subsequent examples, the topics 
activate interpretive skills that a list alone cannot touch. 
5. The metaphor is intended to persuade in an extended sense of the 
word (extended in the way that irony-as-/o/w extends the classical 
sense of topos): like irony, it initiates an intellectual dance whose 
truth-values are proved (or disproved) in the dancing. Such a "dance" 
for Booth is community oriented in the way persuasion often is not. 
6. Irony as reconstruction also seeks community. The point of Booth's 
reconstituting it as topos is partly to indicate how irony creates a com­
plex dwelling-together not appreciated before. Thus the rhetorician 
finds new common ground. 
It would not be in the least difficult to apply these six lessons to any 
other of Booth's works. The Rhetoric of Fiction (1961) (to cite but one), 
notwithstanding its concession to the mimetic-didactic dichotomy, re­
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constituted the topos of fiction itself as the rhetorical practice of an 
implied author seeking to shape the response of implied readers. More 
rhetorically still (to cite another), The Company We Keep: An Ethics of 
Fiction (1989) is also a "rhetoric," this time of fiction's ability to reconsti­
tute ethically (and politically) both character and community—themes 
only implicit in the Rhetoric of Fiction. Indeed, in many ways Com­
pany summarizes Booth's conception of rhetorical education: reading 
any sort of narrative (reading anything) requires that we draw on and 
make more or less subtle and comprehensive connections among values, 
ideas, emotions, beliefs, historical contexts, historical and other kinds 
of narrative, and so on, in order to cultivate our ability to know. This is 
quite along the lines of what Maclntyre, Hauerwas, and Charles Tay­
lor call for in ethics,15 and what Gerald Graff, in Professing Literature, 
calls for in the contemporary teaching of English (and, presumably, all 
liberal studies): in Cicero's language, the placing of the "origin, the in­
fluence, the changes of all things in the world, all virtues, duties, and 
all nature" as these are manifested in literature, in the context of the 
"manners, minds, and lives of mankind." 
To take this a step further, Graff also recommends a more honest 
airing of our interpretive disputes and the conflicts among interpretive 
modes, and here too Booth's Critical Understanding: The Powers and 
Limits of Pluralism (1979) uses rhetoric to adjudicate paradigm disputes 
among critics. That is, while adhering to rhetoric, the rhetorician above 
all will be sensitive to different and even opposing critical paradigms 
precisely by recognizing how they cultivate the lives of mankind. Un­
able to fit them all under a monistic critical umbrella, Booth does not 
forswear the goal of "truth," as is sometimes claimed, but operationally 
maximizes the rhetorical community of criticism, redefining it as a place 
not for aimless killing but for inquiry (under controlled conditions) for 
as inductively adequate a community of inquirers as we can get. Here 
theoretical incommensurability of paradigms is subordinated to a prac­
tical (and analogical) compatibility built on open-ended, indeed topical, 
criteria of adequacy: univocity of statements about truth in criticism 
takes second place to the critical inquiry about such statements. 
POLYTOPIA 
It might be useful to summarize Booth's approach to material topics. 
First, topics involve a holistic thought of various sorts—the unity of 
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the knower as a "whole person," of the knower and the known, and of 
the known as a universe (or pluri-verse whose unity we know, however, 
only asymptotically). For Booth, topical rhetorical thought is connective 
and comprehensive, as in Cicero, such that all specialist advancement 
of learning is controlled by an equally indispensable generalist compre­
hension of what is learned. 
Second, such generalism need not contradict (though it will almost 
certainly exist in tension with) specialism, because specialism both pre­
supposes generalism—topical connectiveness—and is also able to make 
use of generalism itself. This point can be made clearer by considering 
in some detail one of Booth's most succinct treatments of this question. 
In his Ryerson Lecture for 1987 presented to the University of Chi­
cago, entitled (significantly) "The Idea of a £/mversity as Seen by a 
Rhetorician" (1987) (rpt. in Vocation 309-34), Booth asks how those in 
institutions of higher learning, threatened on all sides as they are by 
forces of specialization and departmentalization, manage to commu­
nicate with each other, formulate and undertake common enterprises, 
discuss their activities, conduct the business of the place—hiring and 
firing and promoting and planning—in short, how they manage to be a 
umversify rather than a multiversity. This is, of course, much the same 
question, in different guise, that Booth asks in Critical Understanding: 
how do/can critics of radically different stripes talk to each other in a 
common enterprise of criticism? It is also the question (the same special 
topic) with which I began, namely, what identity, what integrated self, 
does so diverse a generalist as Booth offer us? 
Booth sketches out in this lecture a characteristically rhetorical re­
sponse to this problem facing the university, when he locates three 
overlapping sets of special topoi by means of which the members of 
a university community earn their unity and get their collective work 
done. First, there are those shared facts and assumptions within a given 
field of expertise by means of which specialists talk to each other about 
their field and their individual work. Second, the members of a uni­
versity community (or of any community, for that matter) share many 
values, beliefs, expectations, experiences, and so on that they can call on 
to assess character, in hiring and firing for example, or to judge actions. 
And third, there are those not-quite-so-general values and beliefs of 
the academic community in particular, about whether another academic 
sounds intelligent, has mastered the tricks of the trade, argues well, and 
so on. Quoting Polanyi, Booth asserts that all of us live in complex and 
overlapping fiduciary structures or webs of beliefs of the kind just men­
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tioned, and that that is how we get our work done, through a rhetorical 
or topical invention that seeks "good reasons" for assent. 
To rhetoricians at least this is perhaps obvious enough regarding 
how the university gets its more quotidian business accomplished. But 
Booth goes further and suggests that it is also by locating rhetorical 
topoi that specialists within the disciplines can themselves make connec­
tions within and among (not just outside of) their disparate specialties, 
specialties of which no single individual can hope to master even one, 
let alone six or a dozen or a score. Note that Booth's suggestion about 
the centrality of topical generalism is consonant with their being spe­
cializations and specialists: himself a specialist speaking in this address 
as a generalist to a group of specialists, it is not surprising that Booth 
directs his discussion here to how specialists as such can contribute to 
the making of community through topics. But note also that topical 
inventiveness is a power, and a kind of character, that belongs first to 
the rhetorician-as-generalist, and only secondarily to the specialist, who 
uses this power both to contact what is indeterminate in her field, as well 
as to make new connections with realities (and people) outside of the 
field. In other words, despite Booth's rhetorical adaptation here to an 
audience-of specialists, liberal education through the rhetorical arts of 
topical inquiry and persuasive proof privileges, not a specialist's exper­
tise, but the generalises orientation to all of reality, since such education 
concerns finding good reasons for beliefs in any field. Thus, to educate 
liberally is to enfranchise to the arts of invention and judgment across 
disciplines, with the aim of producing reasonable assents. 
In a (again not entirely tongue-in-cheek) sketch of an ideal Uni­
versity of Polytopia, Booth explicitly situates what he calls rhetorical 
"curiosity," this topical inventiveness within and across subject mat­
ter specialisms, at the very center, not only of liberal education, but 
even of the research university itself. The practice of the three rhetorics 
mentioned, and the study of these rhetorics, what Booth calls rheto­
rology, would promote a "polytopicality" that would stimulate origi­
nal research, insure its communicability, and generate that orientation 
towards the whole of knowledge and of community that makes for a 
shared universe of value, aim, and action. Here there exists no split be­
tween the "two cultures," or between specialism and generalism: the 
generalism to which one is habituated or enfranchised in the college of 
a university provides the basis for just that more focused inventiveness 
that the specialist himself needs and uses to seek novelty and to com­
municate to others. In the University of Polytopia, as Booth indicates 
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elsewhere, the work of the rhetorologist "is precisely to pursue the com­
parative worth of different warrants in different persuasive enterprises, 
and to invent—or if you prefer, discover—improved ways for minds 
to meet within disciplines and among seemingly different or conflicting 
disciplines" {Vocation 126).16 
To be sure, such a position is not without its dangers. In an article 
entitled "Modern Sophistic and the Unity of Rhetoric," Michael C. Leff 
has argued that one of the dangers in imperializing rhetoric across the 
disciplines (in the way that Booth has done) is that we may miss the 
special kinds of rhetoric that the specialist sciences practice, if we only 
speak—in our quest for hunting out the "rhetoric of" these sciences— 
of rhetoric as a matter of civic discourse, that is, of talk directed to an 
uninitiated public. I should think, however, that Booth's focus on the 
topics, including topics as first principles of subject matters, manages to 
avoid this danger, for it allows us to see that the constitution of "com­
munities" is not bound by one model of community (or "public"), that 
the use of different sets of topoi allows us to create different types of 
community, specialized or generalized. By the same token, however, we 
can never lose the concept of community if we stay focused on topics, in 
the way that it has often been lost in our blind pursuit of specializations 
and individualisms among both humanists and scientists. Whether it 
is structuralists seeking a closed system of signs, or deconstructionists 
elevating the play of the trace, or physicists or sociologists pledging 
allegiance to something called scientific method, the topic as a locus 
of relatively indeterminate meanings, as a fluid, potential connection to 
other meanings, and as a first principle that can ground all further in­
quiry and appraisal, is the sort of device that, when inventively used, is 
able to conserve tradition while allowing for new connections to new 
meanings—and thus to new communities. 
PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS 
If all discourse is more or less rhetorical, as Booth and others argue, 
then rhetorical topics are useful to specialists within a discipline, to spe­
cialists trying to link their disciplines with others, and to specialists and 
generalists linking disciplines with larger ethical, political, and other 
concerns. Booth's contribution is to have argued, and exemplified in his 
own writings, that rhetorical topics are the means for building com­
munity within and among different specialties, and indeed that liberal 
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education is best when it trains its students to function first as general­
ists wh o can connect fields by constituting indeterminate issues within 
larger ethical, political, and other contexts, and then as specialists-qua-
generalists within fields who can create new areas for inquiry and proof. 
Th e character of the rhetorician, then, is first and foremost that of 
the generalist wh o learns to use the field-variant topoi of the different 
disciplines to achieve (always limited) views of the whole of an always 
shifting reality. Education to such a character means providing students 
with controlled opportunities to address indeterminate and ambiguous 
problems that require, from the student's own changing and develop­
ing knowledge and experience, the deployment of ideas (topics) that 
promise to constitute an issue adequately, disclose its circumstances for 
apprehension and understanding, interpret its meanings, and assess its 
value and truth. For Booth, of course, it is the great texts of our tradition 
and indeed potentially of all traditions (whose canons are themselves 
always undergoing topical negotiation—Arnold's "best that has been 
thought and said" understood topically rather than dogmatically) that 
most fully provide such opportunities. 
To bring that about, how will the teaching of topics occur? 
First, it should be clear by now that the "general rhetorics," as they 
might be called, of Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, Hermogenes, Ramus, 
and the like, cannot teach special topics, which are, I have argued, the 
very stock-in-trade of the rhetorician's (or rhetorologist's) art. In fact, 
when it comes to topics (though not necessarily to other rhetorical mat-
ters—argument forms, style, genres of discourse, and the rest), it is 
doubtful that the term art applies in any very useful way at all, because 
special topics slip through such general categories, and their number 
and types preclude any helpful comments at so general a level. I believe 
this is what Aristotle had in mind in the lost Gryllus, where he is alleged 
to have said that rhetoric is not an art; or what Cicero himself had in 
mind when he had Antonius in the De oratore declare, "Betwixt genius 
and dilligence there is very little room left for art," and when he pre­
scribed broad liberal learning as the best training for the orator.17 It is 
what Quintilian meant when he referred to topics as more a sl(ill than a 
list—a power or faculty of adapting to specific cases rather than any list 
to be memorized1 8—and what Miller intended when she said that the 
special topics exist in an unstable relationship to the rest of Aristotle's 
Rhetoric (64-65). It is what Booth is up to in Modern Dogma when he 
forswears an "a priori list of topics at a high level of generality," and 
what he does in all of his writings, where he works out what ought to 
be called "special rhetorics" on a variety of problems.19 
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This is not to suggest that we can or should dispose of lists of top­
ics, or even lists of general topics. We ought not to stop teaching the 
general rhetorics of Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, and so on, nor try to 
imagine a composition teacher teaching invention, or a Wayne Booth 
writing a rhetoric of irony, without either one's having recourse to lists, 
schemas, grids, "steps of interpretation," and the like. The problem is 
not schemas per se, but our failure to recognize that rhetoric really lives 
only at the level of concrete examples, cases, problems—unstably, as 
it were, between pure theory and determinate fact. Learning rhetoric 
must be "inductive," and when it becomes so even the history of rhe­
torical theory will look quite different, focused as much (if not more) 
on special rhetorics in various fields. This turn to special rhetorics in 
the name of rhetorical generalism may appear paradoxical, but it rather 
underscores the entire point: the generalist herself needs specific matter 
to connect if she is to escape mere dilettantism (however brilliant). 
Second, it is another of Booth's contributions to the contemporary 
discussion of rhetoric and liberal education to point out that much of 
what we do in the curriculum is already rhetorical, whether flown under 
the banner of Rhetoric or not: "You can see immediately that there are 
a lot of rhetorologists around, travelling under other names" (Vocation 
125); also, "I hasten to add that it is an art that need not be taught 
under the title of 'rhetoric' I cannot think of any course in which some 
contribution to its mastery could not be made . . ." (Vocation 117). 
Yet the problem remains that the rhetorical nature of most courses 
goes unthematized, if not totally unrecognized, so that we need in the 
undergraduate curriculum at least both to recognize and to dwell on the 
negotiated nature of subject matters and their canons, and the means 
of such negotiation—material topics (and tropes), and persuasive war­
rants. In the rhetoric major itself (in those too few places where it 
exists), we need courses that thematize invention, whose goal it is to 
study inquiry and to cultivate the effectiveness of would-be inquirers. 
Such courses can take at least two forms: (1) courses that trace the his­
tory of negotiation of some special topic or network of topics (e.g., the 
growth of some concept in common law), focusing, as Gerald Graff 
and Thomas Sloane have recommended, on the rhetorical contest to 
view it in one way or another; and (2) courses that identify rhetori­
cal "arts," what I have called special rhetorics operative in fields not 
obviously rhetorical—history, theology, philosophy, psychology, and so 
on—focusing on the articulation of topics and their use in specific cases. 
The Federalist Papers or The Constitution of the United States, Machia-
velli's The Prince or More's Utopia, Bacon's or Johnson's essays, Buber's 
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land Thou or Carl Rogers's On Becoming a Person, Newman's Tracts for 
the Times or Coleridge's Aids to Reflection, Cicero's De qfficiis or Kierke-
gaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript—these and innumerable other 
works can be profitably approached as special "rhetorics" that require 
and develop inventional powers while they exhibit the indefinite range 
of rhetorical thought. As rhetoricians we must not be afraid to blur 
genres, as Geertz has put it, or to treat alike both "texts and lumps," in 
Rorty's phrase—or, as Booth has it, to "pursue the comparative worth 
of different warrants in different persuasive enterprises" {Vocation 126). 
Lastly, lest the infinite range of special topics alluded to above 
threaten to create a crisis of coherence for the rhetorician, indeed an 
identity crisis of the sort that I earlier suggested seemed to threaten 
Wayne Booth, we need to bear in mind Booth's own focus on "com­
munity." It is true, as Booth allows, that there are innumerable commu­
nities, each as generalized or as specialized as the topoi that constitute 
them. But the ongoing struggle of the community of communities, the 
place of places that offers a topical center from which further rhetorical 
studies can radiate, is that ethical-political community, that company 
we keep, in which all human beings live and have their being. The topi­
cal study of "civil discourse" broadly conceived can provide that center 
where rhetoric itself is maximized, as Aristotle, Cicero, and the Renais­
sance humanists understood, and it can provide the common ground (of 
consensus as well as conflict) that can integrate liberal learning. Wayne 
Booth's contribution to the study of such discourse has been to dem­
onstrate in his own inquiries how special topics can be used to discover 
new meanings and to renovate traditional values. 
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tion—surrounding Ciceronian invention, see Thomas O. Sloane, "Reinventing 
Inventio," College English 51 (1989), 461-73. 
12. For two examples, see Victoria Kahn, Rhetoric, Prudence and Scepti­
cism in the Renaissance (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1985); and Eugene Garver, 
Machiavelli and the History of Prudence (Madison: U of Wisconsin P, 1987). 
13. For a recent treatment, see George Lakoff and Mark Turner, More 
Than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor (Chicago: U of Chicago 
P, 1989)-
14. As Mark Johnson makes clear {The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis 
of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason [Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1987]), this also 
directly involves bodily awareness. 
15. See Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame: U of Notre Dame 
P, 1984), and Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame: U of Notre 
Dame P, 1988); Stanley Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Chris­
tian Ethics (Notre Dame: U of Notre Dame P, 1983), and A Community of 
Character (Notre Dame: U of Notre Dame P, 1981); Charles Taylor, Sources of 
the Self: The Mating of the Modern Identity (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1989). 
16. For an example of rhetorical interconnections across disciplines, see 
Booth's "Systematic Wonder: The Rhetoric of Secular Religions," Journal of 
the American Academy of Religion 53.4 (1985): 677-702. 
17. Thus Michael Leff has observed of "propriety," Cicero's linguistic 
counterpart to topical inventiveness: "We cannot disentangle propriety from 
its manifestations, and so it cannot be captured in theoretical abstractions. It 
can be apprehended only as embodied in a particular discourse. But that does 
not mean propriety is unteachable, for where one method of instruction fails, 
another succeeds. . . . De Oratore is neither a rhetorical textbook nor a philo­
sophical treatise. It is an oration about the art of oratory, and it instructs by 
being what it cannot explain" ("Burke's Ciceronianism," 124). See also Leff, 
"Genre and Paradigm," 313: "The art [of rhetoric] is constituted by its perfor­
mance, and its application can expand in unlimited and unpredictable ways as 
oratorical principles are transferred into new domains of practice. . . . Cicero 
was more concerned about the orator than the art of rhetoric, more interested 
in concrete practice than abstract precept, and more inclined to view oratory 
as the central force in civilized life than as one among a number of practical 
activities open to theoretical investigation." 
18. See Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, trans. H. E. Butler, 
4 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1920; rpt. 1980), 2: 257-59. 
19. See note 8 above. 
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Cultural Literacy: Concepts 
and Information 
F R A N C I S - N O E  L T H O M A  S 
I N Cultural Literacy, E. D. Hirsch, Jr., addresses a problem that is real 
enough to be recognized by almost any teacher whose students are more 
than nine or ten years old. Contemporary Americans from sixth grade 
to graduate school don't seem to know very much of the information 
that their teachers take for granted. It isn't unusual today to ask a class 
of college students about to read Pride and Prejudice how many of them 
have ever heard of Jane Austen and find that fewer than half of them 
have. College teachers are stunned to realize that their students don't 
know that the United States and the Soviet Union were allies—or at 
least fought on the same side—in World War II. If these teachers want 
to refer to the Magnificat or the Annunciation, they quickly find out 
that they had better explain these terms because they mean no more to 
an average college humanities class than the binomial theorem means 
to an average gathering of English professors. 
Shocking as it is to stand before a class of college students and dis­
cover that most of them have never heard of Jane Austen, haven't any 
idea of what you are talking about when you say that Bourges was the 
capital of the duchy of Berry, and don't know if the Battle of Ther­
mopylae is an event that happened before the Vietnam War or is actually 
an action fought in that war, for most classroom teachers who are also 
active scholars, it is even more shocking to realize that Hirsch's proposal 
to right this situation has been taken seriously by so many people. 
The people who concern them are not Hirsch's popular audience 
but his large audience among professionals responsible for making edu­
cational policy, running school systems, and buying textbooks. Such 
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people feel a powerful attraction to any reform that promises to show 
by some "measurable and objective" test that things are improving. 
Hirsch points to a genuine phenomenon, says it's a problem that must 
be solved because it is the cause of other, more serious, problems, and 
has a solution that will bring fast, fast,^w/ relief, as this scientific chart 
will demonstrate (Hirsch's scientific chart is called the "Chall Curve"). 
He has been successful enough with this audience to alarm a lot of 
classroom teachers. People who make educational policy, run school 
systems, and buy textbooks do not hide their annoyance when teachers 
tell them that their policies, directions, and textbooks are a menace to 
teaching and learning. Since the policy makers are unlikely to listen to 
them, the teachers try to find scholars and thinkers who are not part of 
the school system to argue their case. 
That is how Wayne Booth, a literary scholar, like Hirsch, with a 
demonstrated interest in educational policy, found himself attempting 
to argue in a reasonable and almost excessively civil way that the re­
forms proposed in Cultural Literacy will treat symptoms only and end 
up causing new problems without solving any of the ones we have now 
("Cultural Literacy"). Hirsch, invited to respond, dismissed what Booth 
had to say with all the impatience of a district superintendent and re­
affirmed his commitment to "the cultural literacy project." He declined 
to deal with Booth's argument at all. To do so, he says, would be "easy 
but tedious" (23). 
Wayne Booth's objections to Hirsch's proposals are addressed to 
teachers and make sense to teachers. Hirsch is a teacher too; that is why, 
I suppose, Booth wrote in the form of an open letter to him. But Hirsch, 
it seems to me, has chosen not to address teachers in his response; he is 
addressing policy makers instead. He tells them that the reason Booth's 
objections seem so much harder to read than the original proposals is 
that while he himself is crisp and constructive, Booth, despite his repu­
tation as a thinker, is "rambling and unconstructive" (22). The reason for 
this contrast, Hirsch claims, is that Booth is not engaged in thinking. He 
is, instead, speaking for a coalition of English teachers—an activity that 
evidently precludes thinking. Booth, according to Hirsch, is a politician 
representing notoriously recalcitrant obstructionists. 
For Hirsch, Wayne Booth's professional life has a sinister resem­
blance to the strange case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. There is Booth the 
thinker, who writes mentally harmonious literary criticism, and Booth 
the spokesman for a coalition of English teachers, who writes rambling 
and unconstructive essays full of "cognitive dissonances" (22). Hirsch, 
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in his eagerness to discredit dissent from his own project, argues ad 
hominem and, in doing so, creates a false division. This charge is not 
merely my pious opinion as Wayne Booth's onetime dissertation student 
and longtime friend. It will seem to be too evident to require argument 
for anybody willing to do a little intellectual history of the sort I did 
myself almost inadvertently. 
In the summer of 1965, just after my first year of graduate study at 
the University of Chicago, I worked as a research assistant for two of 
my professors, Gwin }. Kolb and Wayne Booth, who were preparing 
an annotated bibliography of modern scholarship on English literature 
of the eighteenth century. The job occupied my mornings and left me 
free afternoons to poke around the half-deserted university. One day I 
wandered into a class in "Philosophy of Education" taught by Joseph J. 
Schwab, at that time a legendary Chicago teacher. The members of 
Schwab's class were, with the exception of one or two very senior class­
room teachers, all professional administrators at precollegiate schools 
from around the country. I was twenty-two years old at the time and 
had never taught a class anywhere, but somehow talked Schwab into 
letting me attend on a regular basis. The course proved to be tremen­
dously exciting. By asking a series of strategic questions—and refusing 
to accept inauthentic answers—Schwab forced us to read The Republic 
not for information but for concepts. 
I had read The Republic in college but Schwab was getting me to 
read it in a way I hadn't before. He was also getting me to observe what 
I was doing as a reader. It brought sharply to mind what Wayne Booth 
had said one day to his class in "Forms of the Novel" the previous win­
ter: "If you ever find yourself wondering why we are spending all this 
time examining these novels in such detail, I think we ought to stop and 
discuss it in class until we have a satisfactory answer, even if we don't 
get through the list." It is the only thing he said in that course that I 
still remember. He was the first teacher I had ever heard say such a 
thing. Where I went to college you read the books because they were 
on the list. Not getting through the list was regarded as a crime. The 
punishment was a low mark on the test—almost inevitable, since there 
were questions on the test about every book on the list. A low mark 
on the test could keep you out of graduate school and so on down an 
endless chain of artificial motives creating the conditions for reading as 
conditioned behavior instead of ethically informed action. 
My work as a compiler of lists of modern scholarship on English 
literature of the eighteenth century slowed to a hot summer's crawl as 
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I spent more and more of my time in the education library consulting 
bound volumes of The Journal of General Education, to which Schwab 
had referred me. This journal, new to me that summer, had articles 
analyzing the same strategies and techniques that Schwab was follow­
ing in his class. Some of those articles were by Schwab himself, others 
were by Wayne Booth.1 They opened what was for me a new way of 
thinking about both reading and teaching, as a practice, an activity. 
To divide Booth, then, as Hirsch does, into two qualitatively unequal 
parts, literary critic and spokesman for English teachers, defies what the 
evidence my summer's research and the experience of the subsequent 
twenty-eight years have established. Booth has always been a spokes­
man for teachers, even at the outset of his career when he spoke only 
for himself. It is as wrong to attempt to separate Booth's thought as 
a literary critic from his thinking about teaching as it would be to at­
tempt to separate Samuel Johnson's thought as a literary critic from his 
thinking about morality. For Booth, literary criticism is a refinement 
of a kind of reading that children begin to learn in the first grade; it 
isn't another world.2 Literary criticism as Booth has practiced it for all 
of his professional life is precisely speaking for a coalition of English 
teachers. The particular coalition he spoke for against Hirsch's propos­
als taught at every level from primary grades through college, and one 
of their most pleasant discoveries when they met during the summer 
of 1987 was that English teachers at all levels can form a professional 
continuum and become a natural coalition. 
This essay, then, is a response to Hirsch's remarks. It is not addressed 
either to him or to his clients, the school administrators who are too 
interested in predictions, "findings," "reform," "progress," and "success" 
to bother much about reason and argument. It is addressed instead to 
the ultimate policy makers in any society: the community of its citizens, 
and in the first instance to those members of that community who have 
the professional knowledge and experience to understand the damage 
that can be caused by reforms of the sort Hirsch is promoting and who 
have the public reputations to gain the attention of parents, whose per­
ception of what is good for their children will slowly but ultimately 
prevail even over the educational bureaucracies. 
In responding to Hirsch, it will be helpful to understand why he 
has made such a positive impression on so many professional admin­
istrators in the first place. This too requires a little history, for Hirsch 
has demonstrated that he is a skillful salesman working in a proven 
American tradition. In seeking to reform American education, he has 
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adopted the methods of another reformer, a military reformer of the 
1950s and 1960s, who commanded the attention of policy makers and 
became one himself, Maxwell Taylor, "the intellectual general." Taylor's 
catch phrase was "flexible response." (As a phrase, it bears a structural 
resemblance to "cultural literacy.") Taylor placed his proteges in charge 
of the first great test of "flexible response" and assured the president 
and the secretary of defense that all the other generals who raised objec­
tions weren't worth listening to. They were just jealous that Taylor got 
a war and they didn't. I think Taylor would have admired the phrase 
"rambling and unconstructive." Taylor and his followers had "projec­
tions" and "findings" by the yard. He confidently predicted success and 
produced statistics that showed continuing progress through years of 
disaster. The great testing ground of "flexible response" was, of course, 
Vietnam.3 
I see considerable reason to fear that Hirsch may succeed in the same 
way that Taylor did. Like Taylor, he's got hold of an audience that 
thinks "something must be done to stop this," and, again like Taylor, 
he is a good salesman, especially when his audience has little direct 
experience with the situation that something must be done to stop. 
Most administrators, like the teachers themselves, are shocked to dis­
cover that information they take for granted is simply unknown to the 
students for whom they are responsible. But unlike most teachers, the 
administrators feel public pressure directly and seek to cover themselves 
by adopting programs of reform to remedy the situation. If students 
have so little information, a program of reform that promises to supply 
the lack can be seen as just what is wanted. Of course, there is no end 
to information. Almost all of the English teachers who can't remember 
when they first heard of Jane Austen know who Michelangelo is, but 
most of them don't know who Rogier van der Weyden is and practically 
none of them can identify Philippe de Champaigne. It is impossible to 
explain why being able to identify Michelangelo in a trivial and super­
ficial way is necessary to being culturally literate for someone who lives 
in Buffalo, New York, or American Fork, Utah, in the 1990s, but why 
being entirely ignorant of Rogier and Philippe is no disqualification. 
There is a tacit system that determines for any community what infor­
mation can be taken for granted and what is esoterica. College teachers 
think they belong to what ought to be the cultural community of their 
students; most of their students disagree. 
Hirsch and many others attach a great deal more importance than 
that, of course, to the phenomenon of students who don't know the in­
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formation their teachers think they should. Hirsch himself thinks that 
ignorance of the sort teachers see in their students impedes these stu­
dents' ability to learn. Being able to identify Michelangelo in a trivial 
and superficial way, taken together with thousands of other similar bits 
of information, is, Hirsch maintains, a necessary preliminary to liter­
acy and learning. He calls this a "research finding" (23) as if it were 
something we ought to consider on the same level as, say, the "research 
finding" that oxygen is necessary to combustion. 
Hirsch thinks the best solution to the educational problem he sees is 
to establish a set of universally required texts, but he concedes that this 
is unacceptable in the United States for cultural and political reasons. 
To meet the need without offending American sensibilities, then, he 
suggests that a list be compiled of all the bits of information people like 
himself take for granted and that this list be taught to students in the 
elementary grades. 
Hirsch is, I think, disingenuous in his claims for what he proposes. 
"I predict that [the reforms proposed in Cultural Literacy] will result 
in a greater percentage of high school graduates who are qualified to 
go to college, and also a greater number of students who are able to do 
distinguished work after arriving there" (23). 
The first part of this prediction will almost certainly prove accurate 
if we declare that mastery of a list like the one Hirsch composed is what 
will determine who is qualified to go to college. Most of the people who 
qualify now will, with little effort, be able to master the list and so will 
many others. It is like saying that many more people would qualify to 
be licensed as brain surgeons if we accepted as proof of qualification a 
candidate's ability to name every winner of the Nobel Prize in medicine 
in chronological order. Anyone who now qualifies to be a brain surgeon 
might see this requirement as a silly nuisance, but it's a safe bet that 
any brain surgeon can memorize the list and, of course, so can a lot of 
people who can't bone a chicken. 
The second part of the prediction depends on what we define as dis­
tinguished work. Since there is a lot of disagreement right now about 
what qualifies as distinguished work—some colleges think deconstruc­
tive analyses of slasher videos can qualify as distinguished work—who 
knows what the situation will be after Hirsch's reforms are in place? 
The elite universities in this country may start giving people Ph.D.'s for 
dissertations that demonstrate why Aeneas Piccolomini should not be 
on the list but Howdy Doody should be, or why knowing that Hattie 
McDaniel won the Academy Award for best performance by an actress 
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in a supporting role in 1939 is a reliable index to a twelve year old's 
ability to do brain surgery when he's thirty. These might be thought of 
as research findings some day. 
As things stand now, no competent college teacher with any sense 
stays shocked and immobile, waiting for reforms like Hirsch's to give 
her students who can identify Jane Austen and don't need to be told 
that Bourges was the capital of the duchy of Berry, because she knows 
something from her experience as a classroom teacher that many ad­
ministrators do not. Once you have done what needs to be done to 
make one of Jane Austen's novels accessible to a group of students who 
never read a book that wasn't written in the twentieth century, never 
read a book that wasn't addressed to people like themselves in back­
ground and values, they will know who Jane Austen is. Once you've 
given people the concepts they need to look intelligently at the Cathe­
dral of Saint-Etienne de Bourges or the Tres riches heures de Jehan, due 
de Berry, they will be able to identify Bourges—and they won't con­
fuse it with Bruges or Burgos, either. To teach concepts effectively is, 
to be sure, much harder than to teach a list of information, and testing 
a student's conceptual range requires quite a lot of skill and ingenuity. 
It takes a resourceful and knowledgeable person to evaluate learning 
if she tries to test it by asking, Why were such buildings as Saint-Etienne 
de Bourges built? Why were they thought to be worth the money and 
effort? What was their conceptual purpose? Does our own society do 
anything comparable? It is also time-consuming to evaluate the answers 
and teach students how to improve them. It is certainly easier to test 
information, and, of course, a machine can grade the answers. 
Machine grading will, in itself, have a certain appeal to the hacks, 
the incompetents, the indifferent, and the cynical. To teach anybody 
anything worth knowing requires, in general, actual knowledge about 
something the teacher believes is valuable, not as an inert lump and not 
as the coin that will get a student past a test, but valuable in action. The 
architects of the Vietnam War—both the policy makers in Washing­
ton and the commanding generals—knew all sorts of information and 
are just the kind of people who would have done swimmingly on any 
test based on Hirsch's list or anyone else's. The insights Wayne Booth 
fostered about the cognitive process and the ethical value of reading 
lead me to wish the policy makers and generals had left the directed 
intelligence reports to gather dust and instead had all read two books 
with conceptual comprehension: The Peloponnesian War and Pride and 
Prejudice. 1 don't believe that anyone who has read these two books and 
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learned the concepts required to understand them won't be equipped to 
make better decisions in any circumstances than someone who has not. 
(I am not proposing a sacred canon here; there are books in other cul­
tures that will serve the same purpose; there are others in our own, but 
the two I have named have a fabulous track record.) I don't believe being 
able to identify Thucydides as the author of The Peloponnesian War with 
his dates and knowing that the book was written in Greek, or knowing 
that Jane Austen wrote Pride and Prejudice and being able to give her 
dates and her father's profession and the names of all her brothers and 
sisters and throwing in Lady Catherine de Bourgh's daughter's govern-
ess's name to boot is good for doing anything except taking a test that 
gives arbitrary value to such information.4 
Jane Austen, who was neither a snob nor a fool, reminds us how 
useless such accomplishments are in any situation that actually requires 
some thinking. In Mansfield Par\, Sir Thomas Bertrand's daughters are 
struck at once by their cousin Fanny's cultural illiteracy in precisely 
Hirsch's sense. 
Fanny could read, work, and write, but she had been taught nothing 
more; and as her cousins found her ignorant of many things with which 
they had been long familiar, they thought her prodigiously stupid, and 
for the first two or three weeks were continually bringing some fresh re­
port of it into the drawing-room. "Dear Mamma, only think, my cousin 
cannot put the map of Europe together—or my cousin cannot tell the 
principal rivers in Russia—or she never heard of Asia Minor—or she 
does not know the difference between water-colours and crayons!— 
How strange!—Did you ever hear any thing so stupid?" 
. .  . "I am sure I should have been ashamed of myself, if I had not 
known better long before I was so old as she is. I cannot remember the 
time when I did not know a great deal that she has not the least notion 
of yet. How long ago it is, aunt, since we used to repeat the chronologi­
cal order of the kings of England, with the dates of their accession, and 
most of the principal events of their reigns!" 
"Yes," added the other; "and of the Roman emperors as low as 
Sever us; besides a great deal of the Heathen Mythology, and all the 
Metals, Semi-Metals, Planets, and distinguished philosophers." (18-19) 
People like Julia and Maria Bertrand, who find looking down on 
their neighbors an important source for preening and find that memo­
rizing Hirsch's list gives them the objective and measurable proof of 
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superiority they crave, easily can be persuaded of the danger of Hirsch's 
proposals. Implementing his reforms would only spoil their fun. Many 
others who think some sort of reform is called for could be persuaded 
in a couple of hours that the reforms Hirsch suggests are useless at best 
and potentially harmful at worst, since they will promote the docile and 
the timorous, bore the intelligent to death, and enrage the creative and 
original. 
Although she hadn't the benefit of the Chall Curve, Jane Austen 
valued reading greatly and was an excellent observer of what is and is 
not a necessary preliminary to literacy and learning. Being able to re­
cite the list of Roman emperors as low as Severus, as well as all the 
Semi-Metals, proved of no use to Julia and Maria Bertrand when they 
were faced with having to make decisions. Neither did it prove to be a 
necessary preliminary to literacy and learning in Fanny Price's case. 
Kept back as she was by everybody else [Edmund's] single support could 
not bring her forward, but his attentions were otherwise of the highest 
importance in assisting the improvement of her mind, and extending its 
pleasures. He knew her to be clever, to have a quick apprehension as 
well as good sense, and a fondness for reading, which, properly directed, 
must be an education in itself. . . . [H]e made reading useful by talking 
to her of what she read. . . . (22) 
I suggest that the evidence of such culturally literate observers as Jane 
Austen should be taken with as much seriousness as the anonymous 
"research findings" to the contrary that Hirsch cites so briskly and con­
fidently. Projects such as Hirsch's are the curriculum of the Bertrands, 
are anything but new, and regularly have been dismissed by the seri­
ously literate. Gustave Flaubert seemed to have devoted his spare time 
to compiling a massive dictionary of "cultural literacy" of his own to 
illustrate the mentality of such characters as the progressive pharmacist 
Homais in Madame Bovary. Flaubert called it the "Dictionary of Re­
ceived Ideas." Some of the entries are almost fit for the Dictionary of 
Cultural Literacy. 
Archimedes On hearing his name, say "Eureka!" Or else: "Give me a 
fulcrum and I will lift the world." There is also Archimedes' screw, but 
you aren't expected to know what it is.5 
Flaubert seems to illustrate the results of this sort of education in 
the conversations and actions of his most foolish characters. At their 
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first meeting Emma and Monsieur Leon repeat all the current cliches 
about nature, music, and literature. They have learned to parrot things 
of which they have no experiential knowledge. Emma knows all the 
sort of information that Fanny Price does not, yet she isn't the reader 
that Fanny is. Her reading does nothing but lead her into disaster by 
allowing romantic fantasy to block conceptual maturity. She uses her 
knowledge of information and cliches to pass a test, a social test that 
persuades her that she is too good for the conditions in which she lives. 
That is what mastering detached bits of information leads to, the sub­
stitution of conditioned behavior for ethically informed action. It is a 
point Bernard Shaw takes up in Pygmalion. 
Professor Higgins's project in Pygmalion (perhaps even better known 
from Alan Jay Lerner's adoption of it in My Fair Lady)—passing off a 
cockney flower girl as a "lady"—fails in its first test, Mrs. Higgins's at 
home, because the surface of Eliza Doolittle's speech, how it sounds, 
creates a dissonance with her concept of appropriate action. Hirsch 
wants to say that we become literate in the way Higgins wanted to make 
Eliza into a lady: from the outside in. It may be worth remembering 
here that Higgins's project was simply to pass Eliza off as a lady, not to 
make her into a real one. Higgins despises the social values that create 
distinctions between flower girls and ladies and thinks they are based on 
silly and superficial marks. Given a test properly constrained to reveal 
only certain distinctions in dress and pronunciation, with the help of a 
cram course and an expense account, anyone endowed with a good ear 
can pass. Hirsch seems to think the distinction between the culturally 
literate and the culturally illiterate is a similarly silly one. His project 
reduces cultural literacy to a mastery of information as a necessary foun­
dation to more complex skills. He can, if he is allowed to control how 
literacy is tested, pass off almost anyone who can be charmed or threat­
ened into learning a list of information (Higgins's two methods with 
Eliza) as literate. His project will never be able to make them actually so. 
Higgins's project—and Hirsch's too—is at best irrelevant to educa­
tion for self-directed activity. In both cases, what is learned is directed 
to a test. Can Eliza succeed in fooling people into thinking she is a 
lady? Can a sixth grader in Cincinnati, who has never seen a single 
painting or sculpture by anybody, identify Michelangelo on a test? Why 
would they want to? Eliza merely wanted to speak proper English so 
she could get a job in a shop; she didn't want to pass herself off as 
what she wasn't. That was Higgins's project. The sixth grader will be 
put into the position of sixteenth-century gentlemen's sons, who were 
forced to learn Latin without understanding why. The reason was not 
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intellectual, but merely social. Conventionally, gentlemen had to show 
some knowledge of Latin to separate themselves from lower orders who 
hadn't the money to hire Latin masters. Almost everyone who was really 
culturally literate, from Montaigne to Erasmus to John Locke, deplored 
both the practice and the inevitable means of its achievement.6 
The archetype of the sort of test Hirsch proposes, analytically if not 
historically, is the Turing Test, in which, given a certain protocol, a 
machine when questioned gives answers indistinguishable from those 
given by a human being and so must be regarded as thinking in the 
same sense that a human being thinks. For Turing himself, there is no 
distinction between machines and human beings. If a machine's answers 
to the questions put to it are indistinguishable from a human being's an­
swers to the same questions, then machines must be regarded as being 
able to think. It isn't that people are reduced to machines by the Turing 
Test, since Turing began by thinking that human beings are machines 
who process bits of information; it is just a question of duplicating the 
ability to process information without all the unnecessary trappings of 
being human.7 
The model is a monstrosity and is always rejected by children be­
cause children, unlike Turing and Hirsch and sixteenth-century Latin 
masters, have never accepted the thesis that thinking is processing bits 
of information. Learning a list of information does not advance a child's 
ability to read; it is a cheap substitute for the difficult work of satisfying 
a child's naturally growing desire to read for concepts instead of infor­
mation. Persuading children that learning is directed exclusively or even 
primarily toward a test discourages their desire to learn. Early in their 
education, children hope that the learning they acquire through reading 
will be directed toward their lives, their choices, their decisions, the way 
they perceive the world around them. When elementary school reading 
books present bland characters who never have conflicts or problems, 
never get frustrated, never raise their voices, never feel like strangling 
one another, children lose interest because these books teach them that 
reading has nothing to do with the world they live in; it's just another 
meaningless school task like long division, which no adult, once out of 
school, is ever seen doing.8 When a reader is mature enough to read for 
concepts, and is about to begin Pride and Prejudice or The Peloponnesian 
War, that reader can learn all the necessary information very quickly, 
even if he is not carrying around dictionary-like bits of information 
about Austen, Jane (1775-1817) or Culture, Ancient Greek. 
I would like to end with a "research finding" of my own. This find­
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ing does not require much labor to establish, and the reader can test it 
by a brief self-examination. It does not require the ability to interpret 
the Thomas Projection or the Booth Curve (English teachers are easily 
intimidated by anything that sounds even vaguely like mathematics). 
It doesn't offer fast relief, just a warning against trying to substitute 
skillfully promoted fads for the difficult but necessary effort to achieve 
the most fundamental goal of general education: the ability to read for 
concepts instead of information. 
My finding is the same as Jane Austen's, that knowing lists of in­
formation is not a necessary preliminary to literacy and learning. Here 
is how to test it experimentally. There are fifty-nine items in this essay 
that might go into a "cultural dictionary." They are 
American Fork, Utah Flexible Response, 
Analysis, Deconstructive strategic doctrine of 
Annunciation Higgins, Mrs. 
Argument ad hominem Higgins, Professor Henry 
At home Homais 
Austen, Jane Johnson, Samuel 
Award, Academy Leon 
Berry, duchy of Lerner, Alan Jay 
Bertrand, Julia Locke, John 
Bertrand, Maria Madame Bovary 
Bertrand, Sir Thomas Magnificat 
Binomial theorem Mansfield Par\ 
Bourges McDaniel, Hattie 
Bourgh, Lady Catherine de Michelangelo Buonarroti 
Bovary, Emma Montaigne, Michel Eyquem, 
Bruges seigneur de 
Buffalo, New York My Fair Lady 
Burgos Nobel Prize for medicine 
Chall Curve Peloponnesian War, The 
Champaigne, Philippe de Piccolomini, Aeneas 
Cincinnati Price, Fanny 
Doody, Howdy Pride and Prejudice 
Doolittle, Eliza Pygmalion 
Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, Republic, The 
The Strange Case of Slasher videos 
Erasmus Soviet Union 
Flaubert, Gustave Taylor, Maxwell 
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Thermopylae, Battle of Turing Test 
Thucydides Vietnam War 
Tres riches heures de Jehan, Weyden, Rogier van der 
due de Berry, Les World War II 
Turing, Alan 
Now ask yourself a few questions. Could you identify all of these 
items before you started reading my essay? Did the fact that you did not 
know, let us say, that Bourges was the capital of the old duchy of Berry 
impede your ability to read this essay or to learn something—perhaps 
why I think Hirsch's project is silly? 
I assume Hirsch would concede that I am culturally literate and so 
is anybody who has read my essay to this point. It must be clear to my 
readers that I have a fondness for information of a broadly cultural kind 
and have collected quite a lot of it from a variety of domains, some 
of them not usually thought to be at all closely related. Familiar and 
casual reference to Alan Turing and Hattie McDaniel, Maxwell Taylor 
and Rogier van der Weyden suggests that I have taken an unusual itin­
erary across the cultural terrain. Like anyone's range of reference, mine 
is the by-product of a particular set of activites and interests. I did not 
sit down and learn to pass a test on what I can now articulate as a list 
of allusions and references drawn from this essay. Knowing this list did 
not lead me to write this essay, nor is it a necessary preliminary to such 
writing. Someone who had learned my fifty-nine-item list as detached 
bits of information would not, as a result, be able to write an essay like 
this one. Moreover, I suspect that few of my readers happen to be mas­
ters of precisely this list. I don't expect that everyone who reads this 
essay started off knowing that Bourges was the capital of the old duchy 
of Berry. Some probably still have no precise idea what or where the 
duchy of Berry was. For most of my readers, I suppose the binomial 
theorem could have an entry like Flaubert's on Archimedes' screw: "It 
exists, but you aren't expected to know what it is." Aeneas Piccolomini 
makes fine reading, is a fascinating person, and is the only known writer 
of pornographic romances to have been elected pope, but I don't expect 
that very many readers of this essay recognized his name or could have 
identified him. Did this ignorance of detached bits of information— 
however delicious in themselves—stop you from reading this essay and 
understanding my ideas? 
Hirsch seems to suggest that it should have, and has made a great 
impression on administrators and an even greater one on bureaucrats. 
In The Vocation of a Teacher, Wayne Booth describes an encounter with 
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one of them, Chester Finn, from the federal Department of Education, 
speaking to the sixty teachers for whom Booth later spoke in his open 
letter to Hirsch. Like the good teacher I have always known him to be, 
Booth is not a talking head offering facile solutions to problems that 
every generation must solve anew. Booth's analysis of Finn's effect on 
the teachers shows no more evidence of cognitive dissonance than the 
best pages of The Rhetoric of Fiction or The Company We Keep. I end 
this chapter by quoting Wayne Booth, critic-as-spokesman-for-teachers, 
doing what the best teachers have always done, framing good questions 
that lead their readers to activities and practice, not to the possession of 
dead information. 
When [Chester Finn] told us that we should either buy Hirsch's list of 
about 5,000 terms, "what every American needs to know" (or as the new 
jacket has it, "The Thinking American's List") or come up with a list 
of our own, he set the agenda for the conference in ways he could never 
have dreamed of. We now know that our task is to combat his way of 
working; we must try to thin\ about how to educate. How are we to con­
front ourselves as we now are—a vast, complex, disorganized group of 
men and women with a vocation for "English teaching" but without a 
central, articulated notion of what that vocation requires of us and of our 
various publics? How can we turn our fellow citizens, who in some sense 
believe deeply in the importance of "English," into a nation of learners: 
a learning culture rather than an information-processing culture? (267) 
Anyone can understand the problems facing "the profession of 
English" by reading passages such as this one, even if she doesn't know 
that Wayne Booth was born in American Fork, Utah, and even if she 
never heard of The Journal of General Education. Reading Wayne Booth 
might also serve some readers as a source for a concept of criticism— 
one that is sophisticated enough to deepen our understanding of writers 
as great as Jane Austen and Gustave Flaubert while remaining securely 
part of the common activity of reading, an activity that extends from 
the first grade to graduate school. Wayne Booth's practice consistently 
implies that literary criticism is no more than a nuance added to the 
immensely more complex cognitive phenomenon of reading, and sub­
sequently that the activity of literary criticism always speaks for a coali­
tion of English teachers. For Wayne Booth, the practice of criticism 
is the vocation of a teacher, and that is, I suggest, the best and most 
fundamental reason to celebrate his career. 
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Notes 
1. These articles hold up remarkably well. Schwab's have been reprinted 
in Joseph J. Schwab, Science, Curriculum, and Liberal Education, ed. Ian 
Westbury and Neil J. Wilkof (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1978); see especially 
"Enquiry and the Reading Process," 149-63. Some of Booth's articles have 
not been reprinted, but see "Reading and Writing on Human Values" (with 
Ralph M. Sargent), Journal of General Education 5 (1950-51): 245-53. 
2. When Wayne Booth read this essay in draft, he told me, on coming to 
this sentence, that he once visited his son's fourth-grade class and discussed 
with these young readers a story they had recently read. "I used the same prin­
ciples I wrote about in The Rhetoric of Fiction," he said, "Who are the bad 
guys, and how do you know?" I had never heard this anecdote before, but was 
glad to have such an authoritative confirmation of my description of Booth as 
a critic. It stimulated a fantasy: Hillis Miller visits a class of fourth graders. 
Could he use his normal critical principles in discussing a story with thcm,apo-
ria and the uncanny moment? Miller may be more sophisticated than Booth, 
but, to my mind, losing touch altogether with fourth graders, when it comes 
to reading stories, is to achieve the sophistication of the sophists. 
3. An account of Maxwell Taylor's career and the success of his strategic 
doctrine of flexible response can be found in Neil Sheehan, A Bright Shining 
Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam (New York: Random, 1988), see 
esp. 59, 116-18, 304-5, 365-67. 
4. For a further discussion of this point, see Mark Turner, Reading Minds: 
The Study of English in the Age of Cognitive Science (Princeton: Princeton UP, 
1991), ch. 10: "Cultural Literacy and Poetic Thought," 216-38. 
5. Flaubert, Bouvard and Pecuchet 294. The translation of Flaubert's col­
lection of idees recues is by Robert Baldick and appears on 293-330. 
6. See Lawrence Stone, "Radical Wisdom for Elite Boys" rev. of John 
Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, ed. John W. Yolton and Jean S. 
Yolton, TLS (March 2-8,1990): 229-30. 
7. For an account of the Turing Test accessible to nonmathematicians, 
see Douglas R. Hofstadter and Daniel C. Dennett, The Mind's I: Fantasies and 
Reflections on Self and Soul (New York: Bantam, 1981), 53-95; and Andrew 
Hodges, Alan Turing: The Enigma (New York: Simon, 1983), esp. 415-26. 
8. On children learning to read and their desire to connect their reading 
with their experience, together with an evaluation of reading books used in the 
primary grades, see Bruno Bettleheim and Karen Zelan, On Learning to Read: 
The Child's Fascination with Meaning (New York: Vintage, 1982), esp. 235-64. 
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II

Ethics and Fictions 

Wayne Booth and the 
Ethics of Fiction 
MONIC A J O H N S T O N  E 
BEFORE WAYNE BOOTH'S article "Kenneth Burke's Way of Knowing" 
went to print, he had the opportunity to read Burke's reaction. Burke's 
response compelled Booth to add a "Postscript as Preface": "When I re­
ceived Kenneth Burke's response to the following piece, I was distressed 
to find that what was intended as an encomium had given him pain" 
(i). It is my hope that my similar intention will not give Booth pain. 
The hazards of working on books that have become friends are many, 
as are the rewards. Friendship makes objectivity difficult; fortunately 
for me, Booth's Rhetoric of Fiction makes the notion of authorial objec­
tivity suspect (67-88). Therefore, I will proceed as if with impunity to 
gather together and test what I find to be Booth's most helpful heuris­
tic questions concerning the ethics of fiction. These questions are fully 
realized in Booth's recent book The Company We Keep, but they are 
also predicted by passages in his earlier works. Not surprisingly, these 
questions echo concerns implicit in the direction of recent ethical phi­
losophy. Alasdair Maclntyre characterizes the current climate in ethical 
philosophy this way: "The controversy between emotivism and pre­
scriptivism on the one hand and their critics on the other expresses the 
fundamental moral situation of our own society" {Short History of Ethics 
266). The move away from prescriptive ethics and toward descriptive 
inquiry in ethical philosophy acts as an invitation for literary criticism 
to reclaim areas it previously explored, this time with new rigor. Booth, 
as both literary critic and rhetorician, accomplishes this evaluation in a 
much more helpful way than do others interested in the ethics of rheto­
ric, such as Richard Weaver and Henry W. Johnstone, Jr. The primary 
difference lies in the questions each asks. 
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To test Booth's heuristic questions, I have selected a text that is my 
personal hobgoblin, Jean Genet's Querelle. To illustrate the difficulties 
that Querelle represents, we have only to look at the quotations pro­
vided by the critics on the book's jacket. The New Yorf^ Times called 
this novel, "Genet's purest perverse romance." Michael Levenson writes 
that Querelle "drags us with [Genet] to a confrontation with the basest 
of angels." And Dotson Rader lauds the work for its "exquisite per­
versity of imagination." We might ask why this novel inspires such 
tropes. To put my anxiety about this text into Boothian terms, the most 
pressing concern may be the lack of distinction I find between the nar­
rator, implied author, and even actual author—if we can trust Genet's 
self-appraisals.1 This novel provides us with exactly the kinds of ethi­
cal difficulties that can demonstrate the usefulness of Booth's mode of 
inquiry because this novel undercuts the very norms upon which the 
ethical systems of other rhetoricians are based. In short, Booth's ques­
tions succeed where others' fail. In The Company We Keep, as elsewhere, 
Booth reintegrates literary evaluation: 
The blanket rejection of evaluation, especially in its ethical forms, ignores 
the variety of kinds of judgment that we in practice share. Many an 
appraisal may indeed be worthless to everyone except the appraiser; but 
once we make some elementary distinctions, we discover that some ap­
praisals qualify as shared knowledge, no more dubious than many a 
"factual" claim. (83) 
In order to be more specific, I have gathered together ten representative 
questions that suggest Booth's mode of inquiry. 
1. What are the distinctions between the narrator, the implied author, 
and the actual author? 
2. Is the text ironic? 
3. Should I believe the narrator? 
4. Am I willing to be the kind of person the storyteller is asking me 
to be? 
5. Would I admit this author into the circle of my true friends? 
6. What are the text's implicit norms? 
7. To what extent do readers take in the values of what they read? 
8. Has something been achieved that is in its own terms admirable? 
9. Has some gift or skill been exhibited here that those who see and 
accept its implicit standards will admire? 
10. What is the judgment community in which the text exists? 
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Though reductive of Boothian inquiry, this list suggests some prime in­
gredients and preserves Booth's emphasis on how we know things about 
a text and what constitutes assent-worthy reasons for evaluation. 
Though the saying goes that the proof is in the pudding, a recipe 
may be better tested by giving it to an apprentice than to the master chef, 
whose brilliance might cover the defects of the concoction. We already 
know that Booth can blend together the delicate flavors of Emma in a 
way that brings us back to the table for delicious discussion. Querelle is 
a tougher cut in less experienced hands. If the outcome of my inquiry 
is fit for consumption, so much the greater compliment to Booth. 
The brand of rhetorical inquiry that leads us to Booth's ethics of 
fiction is an outgrowth of what Booth has called "ecumenical rhetoric" 
(Vocation 309). Booth's style of inquiry does not so much mend fences 
as remove entire walls between discourse communities represented by 
academic departments and critical methods. In his Ryerson Lecture (re­
counted in The Vocation of a Teacher), where he demonstrates how we 
can and do blend special and common topics with more intuitive judg­
ments of ethos, and in Critical Understanding, where he follows com­
peting critical methodologies to their problematic conclusions, we find 
an undercurrent of rigorous humanism. Loosely speaking, it is Booth's 
program to give the humanities back to humans by wresting them from 
departments and dogmas. His attitude of critical glasnost, if you will, 
belies the notion that a rhetorical education is at best elitist and at worst 
sophistic because he seeks precision while resisting jargon, he demands 
assent-worthy evidence while scrutinizing unargued assertion, and he 
renews lines of ethical inquiry while repudiating shortsighted calls for 
censorship. In short, in Booth's hands the ethics of fiction is a testing 
ground for a new rhetorical sensitivity that both raises hard questions 
and suggests rigorous and assent-worthy ways to answer them. This 
seems a simple enough proposition, but as he so clearly demonstrates in 
The Rhetoric of Fiction, many critics have been asking questions born of 
prescriptive dogma that obscures difficulties in their reasoning, or have 
left their evaluations of texts' ethical merits undefended. Both cases split 
the discourse community into those who agree with the dogma or the 
evaluation as they stand and those who do not. 
In response, Booth asks us to provide reasoned judgments of texts 
("Ethical Criticism" 279). His is a call to talk to rather than at each 
other. The value judgments we make are not assumed to be made in 
a vacuum; the discourse community is an integral part of the assess­
ment: ". . . how do I argue for such value judgments about human 
beings, imagined ones at that? What must I do if someone disputes 
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my evaluation?" (Irony 215). In these arguments the ethical appeal of 
texts is not underrated. He asks us to explore the values implicit in lit­
erary works by examining the way these values are transmitted to us: 
"Should I believe this narrator? Am I willing to be the kind of person 
that this storyteller is asking me to be? Will I accept the author among 
the small circle of my true friends?" ("Ethical Criticism" 289-290). The 
questions Booth asks of imagined human beings, narrators, and authors 
are all eventually asked of the critical community. "The question in 
appraising wholes, given their intentions, will always finally be, Has 
something been achieved here that is in its own terms admirable? Has 
some gift or skill been exhibited here that those who see and accept its 
implicit standards will admire?" (Company in )  . Booth stresses the idea 
that we people our lives with the authors we read, calling friendship 
with books "a neglected critical metaphor" ("George Eliot" 4). If we 
do, as Booth argues, "underestimate the extent to which we take in the 
values of what we read," ("George Eliot" 291) then the stakes are high. 
The Company We Keep reminds us that the metaphor of book as friend 
is central to the questions Booth asks of literature. In practice, often 
the most deceptively simple questions produce complex answers. We 
would do well to take seriously a question Booth once posed to fourth 
graders: "How do you tell the good guys from the bad guys?" (Rhetoric 
of Fiction 457). 
These questions seem simple only until we contrast them with other 
systems intended to help us make reasonable statements about ethi­
cal dimensions in rhetorically crafted texts. Booth asks us how we tell. 
Richard Weaver, in The Ethics of Rhetoric, suggests a system based on a 
different sort of questioning. Though Weaver is addressing himself not 
specifically to fiction but to argumentation, the difference in approach 
is not determined by genre so much as philosophy. In fact, Booth's ap­
proach proves helpful for both fiction and arguments concerning it. In 
a highly prescriptive fashion, Weaver suggests that a speaker is ethical 
who demonstrates four qualities: 
1. the quality displaying the speaker as seeking mutual agreement with 
his audience 
2. the quality displaying the speaker as recognizing the rational au­
tonomy of the speaker 
3. the quality displaying the speaker as recognizing the equality of the 
listener with himself 
4. the quality displaying the speaker as recognizing that the ends ot the 
audience have an intrinsic value for him (102)2 
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The four qualities could be seen as a carefully rendered golden rule 
for rhetoric or, as the philosopher Henry Johnstone called it, the rule 
of bilateral argument: "A rhetor may use no device of persuasion that 
he could not in principle permit others to use on him" (101).3 It would 
seem that it should not matter whether the rhetor in question is an 
actual person or a character in fiction; for certain types of rhetorical 
situations perhaps it does not. 
That these rules have limited power for criticism of discourse like 
that of Genet's becomes clear when we test them against Querelle. In 
general, we could say that all of Genet's works violate all of these rules 
in some way. Genet said in an interview that he does not seek our agree­
ment, actively seeks to manipulate the audience, holds himself superior, 
and places no value on anything outside himself (Fichte 178-90). H  e 
receives an " F " on these prescriptive tests. But this failure does little to 
give us an answer to Sartre's famous defense of Genet: 
I know what can be said: "Let him write, if he wants to, but we don't 
have to read him. His poems are premeditated crimes, he tries to base 
his salvation on our destruction and to trick us by means of words. 
These are excellent reasons for admiring his works from afar and not for 
buying them." 
I admit that Genet treats his readers as means. He uses them all to 
talk to himself about himself, and this peculiarity may alienate readers. 
When he asks himself: "Should I steal?" Why should he expect the 
answer to interest us? "What I write," says Genet, "is valid only for me." 
To which the public replies: "What I take the trouble to read should 
at least be valid for everyone. Let him preach theft! One could at least 
discuss the matter, could take a stand for or against his views." But he 
does not say that one should steal. Quite the contrary, he knows that it 
is wrong to steal and it is in order to be wrong that he steals. But he 
does not even ask us to be wrong: he asks us nothing at all. If anyone 
planned to become his disciple, I'm sure he would answer: "How could 
anyone act like me if he's not me?" This poet "speaks to us as an enemy." 
(628-29) 
Sartre's argument is based on a different perception of authorial in­
tention from that which Weaver and Johnstone imply. We arrive at an 
impasse. But there are ways, following Booth's example, that we might 
critique Sartre's defense. First, Sartre does not give us assent-worthy 
reasons to believe that he can be sure of Genet's answer to the questions 
we might pose; as it turns out, Genet says many things to the contrary 
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in his writings and interviews (Fichte 180-90; Genet, Journal passim). 
Second, we could argue, after examining how Genet's rhetoric func­
tions, that Genet does expect our interest and, beyond that, is asking us 
to be "wrong" and implies that we already are. 
To illustrate these claims, I turn to Genet's Querelle. A taste of the 
novel's beginning reveals that this work was prepared under a system 
different from the one implied by the prescriptive "rules" of Weaver 
and Johnstone, or even from the position described by Sartre. Genet, 
through his narrative technique, actively seeks to break rules such as 
theirs and to take us with him. Querelle begins: 
The notion of murder often brings to mind the notion of sea and sailors. 
Sea and sailors do not, at first appear as a definite image—it is rather 
that "murder" starts up a feeling of waves. If one considers that seaports 
are the scene of frequent crimes, the association seems self-explanatory; 
but there are numerous stories from which we learn that the murderer 
was a man of the sea—either a real one, or a fake one—and if the latter 
is the case, the crime will be even more closely connected to the sea. 
The man who dons a disguise relieves him from the necessity of going 
through all the rigamarole required in the execution of any preconceived 
murder. Thus we could say that the outfit does the following things for 
the criminal: it envelops him in clouds; it gives him the appearance of 
having come from that far-off line of the horizon where the sea touches 
the sky; with long, undulating and muscular strides he can walk across 
the waters, personifying the Great Bear, the Pole Star or the Southern 
Cross; it (we are still discussing the particular disguise, as used by the 
criminal) it allows him to assume dark continents where the sun sets and 
rises, where the moon sanctions murder under roofs of bamboo beside 
motionless rivers teaming with alligators; it gives him the opportunity 
to act with the illusion of a mirage, to strike while one of his feet is still 
resting upon a beach in Oceania and the other propelling him across 
the water toward Europe; it grants him oblivion in advance, as sailors 
always "return from far away"; it allows him to consider landlubbers as 
mere vegetation. It cradles the criminal, it enfolds him—in the tight fit 
of his sweater, in the amplitude of his bell-bottoms. It casts a sleep-spell 
on the already fascinated victim. We shall talk about the sailor's mortal 
flesh. We ourselves have witnessed scenes of seduction. In that very long 
sentence beginning "it envelops him in clouds . . . ," we did indulge in 
facile poeticisms, each one of the propositions being merely an argument 
in favor of the author's personal proclivities. (3-4)4 
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The narrator announces himself to be one and the same with the author, 
shows us his self-conscious control of his rhetoric, and even dem­
onstrates a tendency to pass aesthetic judgments on his storytelling. 
Jacques Derrida described Genet's technique as "poisoning the flowers 
of rhetoric" (13). As readers, we have both witnessed a seduction and 
been its intended object. We must either enter into the narrator's per­
spective with its risks or find ourselves described as "mere vegetation" 
and thus victims. If we look closely at the narrator's initially strange 
connection between the sea and murder, we find not syllogistic reason­
ing but the repeated terms ofagradatio that mimics logical progression. 
Our benign willingness to make sense of the narrator's connections and 
Genet's masterful use of tropes allows this odd passage to track. Pro­
pelled by these curious linguistic links, his labyrinthine sentences, and 
sheer curiosity, the reader becomes enmeshed in the narrator's internal 
"logic" and becomes the referent, at least by implication, of the nar-
rator's "we." There seems to be no charge on the words "criminal" or 
"murder" as the narrator uses them. Nor is there any detectable ironic 
undercutting of the norms the narrator builds into his "argument." In 
fact, we may strain our internal ear for the entire length of the novel for 
an implied author who in some way repudiates this narrator's values, 
but we will hear only silence. 
By the end of the novel we find we have been keeping company 
with a narrator who condones a character who chooses to be a mur­
derer, thief, drug dealer, corrupter, and traitor. The act of continuing 
to read has made us at least voyeuristic, if not complicit. As accessories, 
we have allowed ourselves to indulge the narrator's facile poeticisms, 
to witness scenes of seduction, and to hear arguments for the author's 
proclivities to the end. Above all, we have entered into a world of vio­
lence for at least the time it takes us to read the text. Genet has lived 
in that world for at least the time it took him to write it.5 This is as 
Genet would have it. In his autobiographical A Thief's Journal, Genet 
comments, "Such a definition of violence—through so many contra­
dictory examples—shows you that I shall use words not in order to 
better describe an event or its hero but in order to provide instruction 
about myself. To understand me, complicity on the part of the reader is 
needed" (16). This complicity in his crimes against the community and 
even the idea of community is a means to secure in our breasts his dark, 
interior definition of beauty. 
We aren't in Kansas anymore. This is the guy our mothers warned us 
about. Neither Genet nor Querelle\ implied author is our friend even 
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in the most tolerant conception of friendship. Genet shows us that there 
is no honor among thieves even as he invites us to walk along the dock; 
the seductions in Querelle lead to betrayal and murder. 
There can be little consolation that this is a relatively isolated liter­
ary incident. In his article, "The Reason for Stories: Toward a Moral 
Fiction," Robert Stone takes on William Gass's "proposition that art 
and moral aspiration were mutually distant." He sees in Gass's position 
an "antinomian vision, morality and art are independent and even in 
opposition" (71). 
But does this independence, should it be the case, exclude ethical 
criticism? We might rightly ask if these texts, given that they do not 
actually kill us, make us stronger. If truth is beauty, and Genet can 
make a claim on either, we certainly are presented with some grist for 
our critical mills. That these questions derive from Nieztsche is telling. 
Maclntyre locates the modern controversy in ethical philosophy along 
lines that are on the one hand Nieztschean and that on the other de­
rive from Aristotle. The Nietzschean contention rests on the idea of the 
individual apart: "It is because this is so that the great man cannot enter 
into relationships mediated by appeal to shared standards or virtues 
or goods; he is his own only authority and his relationships to others 
have to be exercises of that authority" {After Virtue 240). This position 
is clearly anathema to Booth, but is quite like that of Genet. The com­
peting tradition is Aristotelian, and not surprisingly, quite similar to 
Booth's conception of the questions we ought to explore: 
For if the conception of the good has to be expounded in terms of such 
actions as those of a practice, of the narrative unity of human life and of 
a moral tradition, then goods, and with them the only grounds for the 
authority of laws and virtues, can only be discovered by entering into 
those relationships which constitute communities whose central bond 
is a shared vision and understanding of goods. To cut oneself off from 
shared activity in which one has initially to learn obediently as an ap­
prentice learns, to isolate oneself from the communities which find their 
point and purpose in such activities, will be to debar oneself to that moral 
solipsism which constitutes Nietzschean greatness. Hence we have to 
conclude not only that Nietzsche does not win the argument by default 
against the Aristotelian tradition, but also, and perhaps more impor­
tantly, that it is from the perspective of that tradition that we can best 
understand the mistakes at the heart of the Nietzschean position. (After 
Virtue 240) 
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The idea of looking at the narrative unity of life is akin to Booth's 
questions of implicit norms; it exposes our assumptions as well as some 
texts' deficiencies. Booth would have us look at the ethos present in 
the text; in Querelle we find the solipsism Maclntyre describes in the 
Nietzschean position. Here, too, this perspective exposes the mistakes 
in the heart of the novel's position. Genet preys on our basic trust of the 
written word, our perhaps naive but customary assumption that authors 
are trying to do us some good (albeit their own definition ofgood), and 
our tendency as readers to give the benefit of the doubt to others as an 
extension of the way we give flexibility to the societal ties that bind us. 
Genet abuses these virtues of community in the attempt to pull us away 
from the very norms that allow communities to cohere. 
But in an ironic twist not intended by the novel, Genet's antisocial 
claims are undercut to some extent by the act of his writing and pub­
lishing them. Though he writes from a position of alienation, an actual 
jail cell, his act is communicative even while it is hostile, a kiss of death. 
Ultimately, he is unsuccessful in conveying the norms he espouses be­
cause to convey them he must communicate with us, rendering his 
position of isolation meaningless. 
We are unlikely to allow Genet into the small circle of our close 
friends unless it is our custom to run with a very tough crowd. What 
our custom is has some relevance. Turning to Booth's notion of reader's 
ethics as it applies to me as the reader of Querelle, I find that this work 
reminds me of how very actively values are implied by all works.6 A 
dose of Genet makes the camouflaged values in other literary works 
closer to my own norms stand out in relief. Genet intends me no good, 
but reading Querelle does me some good. My perception of Querelle as 
an inherently inconsistent epistemology is, ironically, its value for me. 
When I move from an evaluation of the novel as it affects me as one 
reader and write about it in this chapter, I open myself and the novel 
to the coductive process Booth describes in The Company We Keep.7 As 
my critique enters the larger discussion of the ethics of this novel with 
Sartre, Levenson, Rader, and others, it becomes an example of Booth's 
premise that "judgement requires a community" (Company 72). My 
contributions are then judged in terms of the larger discussion. "The 
validity of our coductions must always be corrected in conversations 
about the coduction of others whom we trust" (Company 73). 
Thus Booth can lead us to inquire about the nature of authorial and 
readers' ethics and the interdependency of criticism itself. We are not 
limited by proscriptions to what an author ought to have done when he 
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or she, in fact, did something quite different. Instead, we are allowed 
the freedom to inquire beyond the customary boundaries of our pre­
dominant methods even into systems that stand in opposition. We are 
afforded this freedom because Booth's heuristic is relational and invites 
rhetorical description. By this I mean that by asking us to look at the 
relationship among authors, readers, and critics, as well as by asking 
us to examine how these relationships are accomplished and what they 
imply, Booth avoids the trap of judging one system only by another 
alien to it. His questions do not constitute some new foundationalism. 
Maclntyre would locate this approach in the Aristotelian tradition. 
Following Maclntyre, I would locate Genet in the Nietzschean. But 
unlike the positions of Richard Weaver or Henry W. Johnstone, Jr., these 
locations are not themselves the reason for the judgments made of the 
text. Belonging to the wrong club is not the reason for censure. That 
Booth's approach allows us to see this other tradition in relation to the 
one in which Booth works bodes well for increasing the availability of 
this sort of discourse to even competing critical communities. 
Booth's recipe can be claimed a success because it has rendered 
Genet's Querelle digestible, if not particularly palatable. Querelle has a 
bitter aftertaste but also, for some, a hidden medicinal purpose. Booth's 
questions concerning how we are invited to partake and what sort of 
fare we are offered prove to be useful because they ask us to examine in­
gredients rather than assume them. We make fewer mistakes and reach 
fewer dead ends because we make fewer faulty assumptions about the 
norms implicit in texts or the range of values possible in people. 
Notes 
1. Genet is the first to admit that he sometimes lies in autobiographi­
cal writings and interviews. Booth, in Rhetoric of Fiction, deals with Celine's 
Journey to the End of the Night. While that text has intricacies that bear some 
similarity to the difficulties I find in Querelle, those in Genet's novel are more 
pronounced because Genet does not claim to be at any distance from his nar­
rator. 
2. Weaver here follows George Yoos's "A Revision of the Concept of 
Ethical Appeal," Philosophy & Rhetoric 12 (Winter 1979): 41-58. 
3. In his "Relevance of Rhetoric" Johnstone makes his position clear: 
"persuasion is responsible when it does not tend to degenerate. One must per­
suade only in such a way as to maintain the possibility of persuasion" (4s). This 
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Kantian approach relies on the idea that persuasion is of unquestionable value 
for a community. This communitarianism is foreign to Genet. 
4. An earlier "clandestine" version of the original Querelle de Brest was 
circulated in French. Joseph H. McMahon, in his book The Imagination of Jean 
Genet (New Haven: Yale UP, 1963), translates some of this same opening pas­
sage from the clandestine version: "We have let ourselves go to a facile verbal 
poetry in which each proposition is nothing but an argument in favor of the 
authors complaisances. We want to present the drama which unfolds here under 
the sign of a quite striking inner movement. Furthermore we want to point out 
that it is addressed to perverts. To the idea of the sea and of murder is added 
the idea of delight and naturally of love—rather of unnatural love" (86-87). 
5. See Company 41-42 for Booth's discussion of ethical dimensions of time 
spent reading. 
6. See "Epilogue: The Ethics of Reading," in Company 483-90, for 
Booth's extended discussion of reader's ethics. 
7. Booth defines coduction on pp. 72-73. 
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Elie Wiesel and the 
Ethics of Fiction 
SUSA N E . SHAPIR O 
ELIE WIESEL'S POST-HOLOCAUST fiction offers a test case for ethical 
criticism, such as that explicated in Wayne Booth's The Company We 
Keep: An Ethics of Fiction. Wiesel's writings are, among other things, 
about the grounds of possibility of both discourse and community after 
the Holocaust. Friendship, both as a theme and as the relation con­
structed between implied author and implied reader(s), is that which 
ultimately makes possible for Wiesel the risk of speech, the writing of 
narrative in particular, and the construction of the possibility for ethical 
community in confronting the Shoah.1 
The Holocaust represents, for Wiesel, the radical negation of all ethi­
cal and discursive orderings of the world. One of the hermeneutical 
antinomies facing him, as it does many other post-Holocaust writers, is 
the act of narrating an event that ruptures such order.2 For how does one 
tell in narrative discourse about an event and its effects that have negated 
or undone the possibility of narrative coherence? By merely construct­
ing a story with a beginning, middle, and end, has one not already 
teleologically sutured the very rupture that is to be told? Some writers, 
in response to this antinomy, eschew narrative discourse altogether and 
write explicitly antinarrativist texts (such as Edmond Jabes) or disrupted 
poetry (such as Paul Celan and Nelly Sachs). 
In thinking through this problem of the testimonial dilemmas and 
possibilities of, especially, narrative discourse after the Holocaust, I turn 
here to Booth's ethical criticism.3 By reading these texts together, as it 
were "coductively," I intend to read Booth through Wiesel by treating 
Wiesel as a limit case, testing Booth's arguments about narratological 
7' 
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friendship by attempting to apply (at least some of) them to this ex­
treme circumstance of writing, in which narrative is itself questioned as 
to its ethical viability. By in turn reading Wiesel through Booth I hope 
to judge whether (and, if so, how) the Holocaust has challenged or fur­
ther intensified the grounds of possibility of narratological friendship 
and ethical community.4 
The problem of fictional discourse "about" the Holocaust is a theme 
in Wiesel's writings, and is structurally present in the very problem of 
narration.5 To project a future is to betray the past, to acknowledge a 
present (just as surviving itself evoked tremendous guilt for survivors 
of the Shoah). To write historically, in this case, is to place an event 
that seems to be isolated and outside of temporality, back into time— 
past time. 
The risk of narration, of telling stories "about," is that of distance and 
pleasure. Just as speaking at all (in a passionate gesture of communica­
tion and community) is a great risk, so also is it problematic to emplot 
and, thus, impose linear time on the event, giving it a past, present, 
and future. The event that seemed to eclipse all of history and God's 
presence in history is surpassed, it seems, in a projection of a future (as 
possibly different, hence as future) in the risk of narrating a story about 
the event as past, with a beginning, middle, and end. The dimensions 
of the risk of speaking about the Holocaust begin to become clearer. 
At stake is an intrinsic betrayal, not related to the content of speech or 
writing but, rather, to the fact that to speak and write at all is neces­
sarily to project a future and, thus, to distance oneself from an event by 
making it past. 
The other side of this risk is the betrayal implicit in forever keeping 
silent about the event of the Holocaust, not telling, not witnessing, not 
testifying to its never-ebbing wake of effects. Not to speak about the past 
is to condemn it to be forgotten to history. It is to repeat too resonantly 
the awful silencing deaths, themselves become silent if not told. 
Speaking and silence, then, this double betrayal, are the opposing 
and mutually implied poles present within Wiesel's discourse, both as a 
theme or subject of discourse, and as a structuring principle of Wiesel's 
narration and, thus, of the discourse itself. I have already treated the 
first of those manifestations elsewhere.6 I will here turn to the sec­
ond and consider the rhetorical grounds of possibility of this narrative 
structuring. 
How does Wiesel dare to take this risk of speech in the face of the 
double betrayal of speech and silence? Aside from making it an explicit 
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problem in his stories, and of the characters that tell these stories, Wiesel 
risks this emergence into speech rhetorically; that is, in constituting a 
peculiar rhetoric of friendship, Wiesel makes the implied reader (as well 
as his characters) a potential friend: "Gabriel [the protagonist of The 
Gates of the Forest] is my friend and he speaks for me. All my fictional 
characters exalt friendship; for some it is an obsession. Sometimes I 
tell myself that I have made them up only because I needed to believe 
in friendship, because I needed them as friends" ("Celebration" 79). 
Gabriel asks, "What is a friend ? Someone who for the first time makes 
you aware of your loneliness and his, and helps you to escape so you in 
turn can help him. Thanks to him you may remain silent without shame 
and speak freely without risk" ("Celebration" 79). Indeed, it is only in 
friendship, through the risk of encounter between two "persons" (in 
this case, two characters and/or the implied author and implied reader), 
that Wiesel seems to locate the place for the possible reemergence of 
discourse about God, as well as of speech in general. What is true of 
the Hasid applies as well to the characters of Wiesel's novels, although 
perhaps articulated with less optimism. 
A Hasid is never alone nor allowed to be depressed. This is permitted the 
rabbi, but not the disciple. What, then, is a Hasid to do who is crushed 
by his memories, shattered by his inability to affirm life while he mourns 
his dead? How can a Hasid who has lived through the long night of 
the concentration camps still open himself to joy, to ecstasy ? Alone, he 
would not have the strength. With friends, he can undertake anything, 
relearn anything; the duty of keeping the faith, of loving, of singing, of 
sharing with others the salt of his life, and his secret, too, through stories 
and melodies, through words and silences. The unhappy Hasid will have 
to choose happiness so as not to be a bad influence on his friends, so as to 
prevent them from following him into the abyss. ("Celebration" 84-85) 
The rhetorical principle of friendship structuring Wiesel's writing and 
making possible the risk of narration (making past present, projecting 
a possibly different future, and making past past) is itself a theme, then, 
of his novels. This rhetorical principle is shown in the way characters 
relate as they grow toward or away from each other as survivors, that is, 
as those people who are able to become friends because each has been 
permeated so thoroughly by silence and death that the usual or ordinary 
terms of friendship are no longer the determining ones. 
The implied reader of Wiesel's novels is constructed and positioned 
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in two ways, as one who either was or was not there, in the Holocaust 
itself. Nonsurvivor readers are encouraged to imagine that, had fate 
been otherwise, they could have been there, might even have died there; 
but this imaginative possibility also ironically heightens the awareness 
of their distance from the event in recognizing that in fact they were 
not there. This distance preserves silence even in the risk of speech. 
Indeed, it is through various strategies of distancing in and through lan­
guage that silence is inscribed in discourse. For that distance between 
those who were there and those who were not is, according to Wiesel, 
unbridgeable. Wiesel writes in "The Holocaust as Literary Inspiration": 
Ask any survivor and he will tell you, and his children will tell you. 
He or she who did live through the event will never reveal it. Not en­
tirely. Not really. Between our memory and its reflection there stands a 
wall that cannot be pierced. The past belongs to the dead and the sur­
vivor does not recognize himself in the words linking him to them. We 
speak in code, we survivors, and this code cannot be broken, cannot be 
deciphered, not by you no matter how much you try.7 
This distance creates a necessary silence in language. But this dis­
tance does not mean that there is not an overall will to, or strategy of, 
friendship in the narrative structuring of Wiesel's works. Rather, one 
of the conditions of friendship with the implied author of Wiesel's texts 
is the recognition of just this necessary silence and distance. The risk 
required of the implied reader is the risk of understanding the silence 
inscribed in the text's language: its source, its pervasiveness, its impene­
trability. Reading toward the limits of discourse through distance and 
silence is the implied strategy of Wiesel's narration. This via negativa 
(i.e., knowing that you cannot know) is the ground of possibility of 
friendship and understanding. It is, in turn, only the desire for and will 
to friendship that makes possible the risk of speech. 
The relation of friendship between the protagonists of Wiesel's 
novels, especially in The Gates of the Forest and The Town Beyond the 
Wall, is of a peculiarly intense sort, friendship in which discourse about 
death, profound negativity, mad hope, and despair are central.8 The 
friends in Wiesel's novels are most often survivors struggling to find 
themselves, each other, and God in a world that has become abysmal. 
These friends often are not polite. They hurl angry and, most often, 
wounded and wounding words at one another, messages sent in an at­
tempt to orient the other to the distinctive, profound, and fundamentally 
dislocated site in which each struggles. Disconnected from one another, 
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alienated from themselves, apparently abandoned by God, each charac­
ter whispers and shouts to the other as a way of sharing by recognizing 
their broken worlds. Struggling toward each other in silence and in 
fragmented, sometimes "mad," discourse, Wiesel's characters provide 
the basis for their emergence in the narrative through their risking of 
speech in the context of friendship. 
The relation of friendship between implied author and implied 
reader is analogously an arduous one. Friendship is the rhetorical 
ground of possibility for the narrative act of communication. The rela­
tions of friendship constituted in Wiesel's narrative discourse between 
implied reader and implied author may well be understood as analo­
gous to the relations between the characters in his novels. As Booth 
suggests, there are various kinds of narrative friends.9 
The kinds of friendship—the quality of companionship during the 
process of reading—in Wiesel's novels, is, as noted, peculiar. It is con­
stituted through distance and to that extent, ironically, it is shared. Like 
the disconnected and alienated characters of the novels, the relation be­
tween implied author and implied reader(s) is predicated upon distance, 
separation, and respect. Part of this distancing is, perhaps, maintaining 
the difference between, and thus memory of, those friends from whom 
the Holocaust has irretrievably separated the implied author and those 
who people Wiesel's novels, as well as his implied reader-friends. 
I remember the friends of my childhood as I remember my child­
hood; I look at them as I look at myself, and a familiar sadness engulfs 
me. Where are they? Why were we separated? How could I have de­
served to outlive them? For most of them are no longer of this world.... 
Ever since, I have been looking for them. I have never stopped look­
ing for them. Other friends have come to enrich my life, but not one has 
resembled either of them. When they left they took with them not only 
a conception of Messianic hope, but also the ideal of friendship. 
My new friends and I try to understand what has happened to our 
people, and sometimes even to act upon its destiny, but my mystical 
experiences of long ago remain enveloped in memory. 
In other words: friendship has not disappeared from my life; it has 
only changed in nature. Even in a universe of ultimate horror friendship 
was a haven. ("Celebration" 77, 81-82) 
The formidable distance between implied author and implied 
reader(s) is a rupture for understanding and in discourse that is caused 
by the Holocaust. It is the silence evoked by this event's uncommuni­
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cable, unenunciably horrific dimensions. This rupture in both speech 
and understanding is itself told in Wiesel's novels through their pecu­
liar modes of negative transgressive discourse and in their impossible, 
but necessary, mediations of friendship. 
Narrating by saying that one cannot fully say is a strategy for talking 
about the Holocaust without thereby immediately making it simply a 
subject of, and therefore subject to, discourse.10 Rather, the event of the 
Holocaust is understood as being always beyond discourse. It is nar­
rated only to the extent that this unreachability and distance is itself 
articulated and grasped. As Wiesel remarks, "Only one of my books, 
Night, deals directly with the Holocaust; all the others reveal why one 
cannot speak about it" (Edelman 18). Thus, the inscription of the failure 
of discourse is a necessary condition of its testimonial effectiveness.11 
Mediation of the ultimacy of the Holocaust's radical negation of dis­
course (and of the social and religious coherences that make possible 
such speech and community) is itself made possible through the con­
fession of this testimonal failure. This narrative confession of the failure 
of narrative ironically makes possible testimony to the Holocaust as 
ultimately, but not finally, rupturing discourse and community. 
What both the problem of narrating at all about the event of the 
Holocaust and Wiesel's peculiar use of the rhetoric of friendship that 
makes possible this narration demonstrate is the difficulty of constru­
ing ultimate negation in discourse. The problem is that of narrating 
a radically disruptive event without either finalizing its negation, thus 
making impossible its (especially, but not only, narrative) telling, or 
domesticating its ruptured character and effects in the easy-analogizing 
and teleological ordering implicit in telling a story to another. Wiesel's 
peculiar rhetoric of friendship between implied author and implied 
reader(s), however, makes possible a narrative discourse in which just 
such a distinction between ultimate and final negation can be made, 
even as this distinction, as it construes their "proper" narrative distance, 
makes possible their "proper" narrative friendship. 
This peculiar friendship does not in any way erase the rupture the 
Holocaust poses in discourse and history. It is rather one in which 
the recognition of the disorienting, silencing event of the Holocaust is 
itself intensified and shared. As constituting and occupying the place 
of friend, implied readers who are nonsurvivors understand only to the 
extent that they also recognize that they cannot fully understand either 
the event or what surviving fully means.12 But, as already suggested, 
implied nonsurvivor readers also know that had fate or historical cir­
cumstances been different, they could have been there. This recognition 
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makes the implied readers imaginative or, as it were, potential survivors 
and both maintains the grounds of distance (one is, as it were, poten­
tially, though not actually, there) and of connectedness (one could have 
been there had fate and historical circumstance been otherwise).13 
This is the peculiar friendship Wiesel offers nonsurvivor readers. 
Friendship is the ground of possibility of narrating what one cannot 
fully tell. It allows showing how words fail and silence intervenes. This 
rhetoric of friendship is crucial to the narrative strategies of Wiesel's 
novels generally. 
Just as the recognition of distance, silence, and the negation of 
the possibility of communicating fully about the Holocaust form the 
grounds of possible narratological friendship, so is friendship the basis 
of the risk of speech about and to God. The rhetorical reaching out 
in communicating negation (of both the radically negative character of 
the event and of the impossibility of fully communicating this nega­
tivity) is present as well in the simultaneous affirmation and denial of 
Wiesel's peculiar God-language, as in his denial of God's existence in 
discourse addressed to God (the affirmation coming rhetorically rather 
than grammatically or logically). It is, likewise, manifest in the meta­
phorical extension of the term revelation as applied to the Holocaust 
(negative in the similar ultimacy of both Sinai and the Holocaust, and 
affirming the possibility of difference in the past and future by the meta­
phorical negation "as if" but not "that" the Holocaust is [i.e., "literally"] 
a revelation). 
The risk of speech, as I have noted, is a testimony of ultimacy, but 
not of finality. In fact, for Wiesel, if the revelation of the Holocaust had 
been final, the term would not be metaphorical: indeed, it would not 
be employed at all. The only response for Wiesel to such finality would 
be silence. 
The rupture within discourse for Wiesel, then, is double (of language 
in general and of God-language) and also is ultimate, but not final. This 
rupture, is, therefore, open to further negation, further difference and 
otherness, as produced in historical events. The site of rupture, then, 
is within both language and history. The shattering of language by the 
Holocaust reflects the ultimate and radically negative character of that 
event and yet, through language's disfiguring, we may both recognize 
and think about its character. The rupture in language does not take 
the form of a displacement from history and, as it were, into discourse; 
rather, it allows discourse to intensify our understanding of the events 
and eventful character of history, in this case, of the Holocaust. 
Events end for the writing of conventional histories on a particular 
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date or a particular moment, effectively sealing them off from other 
events and times. However, an ultimate event that so radically disrupts 
our assumptions about humanness and about God, that tears apart even 
the very social fabric of speech and writing, is inscribed through its rup­
turing effects in discourse. Discourse thereby becomes testimony to the 
event in its shattered and ruptured character, in its aporias, its silences, 
its ellipses, its gaps. And to the extent that the language we "inherit" 
and learn is so inscribed, our speaking and acting will be affected by 
this event, whether we are aware of these effects or not. The Holocaust 
does not, then, simply end, but continues—through its inscription into 
our language and functioning—to affect us in a wake that we cannot, 
as linguistic beings, hope to escape. 
Our horizons of both understanding and belief have been thus radi­
cally altered. Hermeneutical matters are therefore significant in consid­
ering this event, for its effects persist in our language, communities, and 
history/ies. Indeed, as I have suggested, the very temporal ordering of 
both discourse and history has been radically put into question. 
Wiesel notes, "The trouble is that we [survivors] have lived beyond 
time and therefore find it difficult to distinguish between past and 
present" ("Why Should People Care?" 17). How can one narrate both 
the experience of an end of time and the abysmal character of history 
within the temporal ordering of narration? As stated, the antinomous 
character of the double betrayal of either writing or remaining silent 
about the Holocaust is present in the very risk of the temporal ordering 
of narrative. 
To narrate is to construct, in narrative discourse (statement), a tem­
poral account and ordering that is about the story and its temporality.14 
To order temporally is (1) to make the event in some way coherent and, 
thus, sensible; (2) to construe it as an occurrence in "pseudo" time, that 
is, to fictionalize it; (3) to structure a temporal mediation of this event 
that was experienced as out-of-time and end-of-history and, thus, in 
some way to risk phenomenologically betraying its victims; and (4) to 
recognize that each of the preceding acts risks domesticating, reducing 
and, in particular, betraying the radically disruptive and negating force 
of the event itself. This problem of domestication in discourse applies 
to, and is exemplified by, the problem of creating a linear narrative of 
an event that shatters and radically transforms our notions of time and 
history, as well as our very notions and use of language. How does one 
avoid domesticating the Holocaust, as a subject of discourse, to speech 
or writing about the event?" About the inadequacy of language to and 
after the Holocaust, Wiesel writes, "all words seemed inadequate, worn, 
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foolish, lifeless, whereas I wanted them to be searing. Where was I to 
discover a fresh vocabulary, a primeval language?" ("Why I Write" 201). 
Beginning from rupture and silence, how does one emerge into order 
and speech? According to Wiesel, as a survivor he "enters literature 
through . . . silence" ("Why I Write" 201). As already noted, Wiesel 
enters literature through the risk of friendship in the narrative relation 
of implied author and implied reader(s) through the confession of the 
testimonial failure of discourse to adequately represent or tell about the 
Holocaust, a confession, however, given in narrative. This risk of friend­
ship rhetorically makes possible the risk of narrative temporal ordering 
as well. 
The narration of time, constructing the relations between narra­
tive statement time and story time, becomes possible in the context 
of Wiesel's construal of narrative friendship. Just as Wiesel makes the 
recognition of distance from the event the basis of friendship, so too 
does he heighten the distance from historical discourse by writing fic­
tion, increasing the distance between narrative statement time and story 
time. If readers know that they are not reading history but rather "true 
fiction" (a true story), then the first-order reference is suspended.16 
The temporality of the story is suspended in favor of the "pseudo­
temporality" of the narrative statement. The reference of the tempo­
rality of the narrative statement is likewise suspended (i.e., "pseudo"), 
but for the sake of telling a true story. Truth in this context entails 
distance from historical narration through a narrative discourse and 
temporality that is at once "pseudo" and "most true." The "pseudo" 
characteristic is the necessary condition for narrating a true story that 
recognizes that writing about the event of the Holocaust is impossible. 
As Wiesel says, 
I wrote a book called The Town Beyond the Wall, which is a novel. . . . 
And it is written in the third person, which is rare in my books, but if 
you ask 99 percent of the people who read the book they will tell you it 
is written in the first person. And for me it was a discovery; it pleased 
me very much because I was so much there although it was pure fiction. 
And the same goes for the Holocaust. I never really write about the 
Holocaust. Yet ask people who read (and there are a few) and they will 
tell you that I write nothing but about the Holocaust. ("What Is a Jew?" 
151-52) 
Wiesel has come to consider historical documents of, and personal 
testimonies to, the Shoah as most veracious and trustworthy.17 While 
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the split between historical and fictional accounts of the Holocaust is 
implicit in his hermeneutic practice generally (effacing their shared 
narrative sources and character), Wiesel's increased concern with the 
documentary force of historical testimony may be understood not only 
as a fearful anticipation of the general inattentiveness to the subject 
and claims of the Holocaust on the part of the public, especially im­
mediately after the war, but as in response to the actual denial that 
the Holocaust occurred at all. Wiesel's earlier trust in the transforma­
tive reception of the truth of his fictional narratives seems somewhat, 
and perhaps intensely, broken by such denials: "[T]he leader of the SS 
today in Germany . . . recently told a convention that the Holocaust 
was a lie, a hoax of the century. . .  . I do not know how you react to 
all this. I can only tell you what one survivor feels. More than sadness, 
he feels dismay, and more than dismay he feels despair, and even more 
than despair, he feels disgust" ("The Holocaust as Literary Inspiration" 
19). In "Why I Write," Wiesel notes: "And yet the survivor may ex­
perience remorse. He has tried to bear witness; it was all in vain. . . . 
[But] they [the survivors] will continue, for they cannot do otherwise" 
(205). The essay "The Holocaust as Literary Inspiration" was delivered 
at Northwestern University, in part in response to the denial, by a pro­
fessor at that institution, that the Holocaust had in fact occurred. As 
Irving Abraham notes, "this essay examines the impossibility for fiction 
to treat the event. Wiesel stresses that a new literary form has grown out 
of the Holocaust—the literature of testimony—and he offers numer­
ous telling quotations that illustrate this new genre and authenticate 
the event."18 
I think, however, that it would be important to consider Wiesel's own 
writing, his "true fiction," as a part of this genre of testimony, thereby 
extending (and making more complicated) our notions of narrative truth 
beyond the radical split between historical and fictive narrative.19 De­
spite this hermeneutical fence built around historical narrative in an 
attempt to protect the veracity of the Shoah from assault, Wiesel's prac­
tice opens up the possibility of imagining and thinking about truth in 
ways not constrained by, or confined to, notions of literal representation. 
For the peculiar strategies of discourse required for the testimony of 
ultimacy but not finality, and for telling by saying that one cannot say, 
are constituted in Wiesel's novels as a kind of "true fiction." The truth 
of fiction is made possible by heightening the epistemic distance from 
the event, thus preserving the silence, the character, of the event as be­
yond discourse, the fictional necessary conditions of the telling of a true 
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story. Writing fiction, then, ironically becomes the literary condition of 
telling the truth, part of which is the telling of precisely that epistemic 
distance. Only by first widening this temporal gap in fiction—indeed, 
by making it unbridgeable—is "true" narrative possible. 
The first condition of narration, then, is negative; the inaccessibility 
of the Holocaust is intensified by the fictional status of the narrative. 
This negation is again ultimate, but not final. The rhetoric of friendship 
between implied author and implied reader(s) makes such discourse 
"about" the Holocaust possible through, among other things, the por­
trayal of its effects. But this friendship must continue to be distanced. 
It must not fully bridge the abyss between those who were there and 
those who were not. The limits of discourse, though rendered not final 
through the rhetoric of narrative friendship in Wiesel's works, are not 
eradicated. If recalcitrant "no" is rhetorically transformed into "yes," it 
still preserves its negativity in the grammar and logic of the text. Gram­
mar and logic are rhetoricized but not sublated in Wiesel's writings in 
a testifying to the event for the sake of the dead, for those who can no 
longer tell and on behalf of whose memory Wiesel attempts, however 
problematically, to speak. 
This is the concentration camp language. It negated all other language 
and took its place. Rather than link, it became wall. Could it be sur­
mounted? Could the reader be brought to the other side? I knew the 
answer to be negative, and yet I also knew that "no" had to become "yes." 
It was the wish, the last will of the dead. One had to break the shell 
enclosing the dark truth, and give it a name. One had to force man to 
look. ("Why I Write" 201). 
As the rhetorical definalization of the narrative friendship in Wiesel's 
novels mediates and reorients their negative grammars and logics, and 
as the relation of friendship is constituted in and by the "quality of 
the companionship during the time of reading,"20 so is the odd logic of 
temporality of Wiesel's "true fiction" that occurs between kinds of tem­
poral ordering governed by the time of reading.21 The relationship of 
friendship—through which the temporal aspects of the narrative dis­
course are construed—is constituted in the terms of the quality of the 
companionship during the time of reading. Just as story time and the 
narrative statement time are derived in and from their metonymic dis­
placement in and of reading time,22 so the relative quality of friendship 
is derived from and constituted in the quality of the companionship be­
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tween implied author and implied reader(s) during the time of reading. 
This displacement into the possibility of saying "yes" to friendship is 
constitutive, therefore, of the temporal ordering of the narrative as it 
allows the (ambivalent) projection of a future horizon. This horizon is 
different from the past, and yet allows its retrieval, as well as a retrieval 
of those values more fundamental of humanity. 
Friendship allows for the emergence of thought of the future as 
shared destiny rather than as fateful end. The relationship of friend­
ship between implied author and implied reader is thus the ground 
of possibility for the risk of narrating, however indirectly, the event of 
the Holocaust. Narrative friendship also reorients the reader(s) (and the 
implied author) by allowing for a future that recovers the possibility of 
community. In this way, it makes possible a recovery of just those fun­
damental relations and assumptions about humanness and the divine 
that the Holocaust ruptured. As Wiesel retrospectively writes, 
Of course, the technicians of death tried to deprive us of it [the haven 
of friendship]. Forget your parents, your brothers, your past, or else you 
will perish. That is what they kept telling us day and night. But what 
happened was the opposite. Those who lived only for themselves, only 
to feed themselves, ended up succumbing to the laws of death, while 
the others, those who knew whom to live for—a parent, a brother, a 
friend—managed to obey the laws of life. ("Celebration" 83) 
Friendship is, thus, a kind of resistance to the relentless attempts by 
the Nazis to dehumanize, and thus to destroy, the Jews.23 It is also an 
affirmation founded in the very risk of friendship. 
The move is made in Wiesel's narratives from attempting to bring 
the Messiah for the sake of the world to the act of one individual charac­
ter on behalf of another. The saving of one human life is for Wiesel, the 
saving of a world. And this act is the ground of possibility for redemp­
tion more generally, although it is not explicitly performed for the sake 
of that more general aim. This risk on behalf of another person is the 
basis for possibly recovering viable God-language. The implied author 
exhorts his characters (and readers) not to wait for the arrival of the Mes­
siah, not to judge, finally, the effectiveness of God-language in terms of 
divine intercession. This is not, however, a counsel of indifference. 
"The Messiah may come by accident," said a Hasidic Master, one hun­
dred and fifty years ago. Today he would say: the end of the world may 
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come by accident. How can it be saved? That's not for the novelist to say. 
There is a "Savior" for that particular purpose. But the Savior, according 
to the tradition of my people, is not one person: he is all of us. Which 
means: we can—we must—help him help us. Which means: we must 
appeal to our collective memory: only the tale of what was done to my 
people can save humankind from a similar fate. Which means: we must 
care—lest we fall victim to our own indifference. 
Could this be the answer? No. But—it is the question. ("Why Should 
People Care?" 18) 
But God is not let off easily in Wiesel's works, either. This possibility 
of saving action despite God is achieved through the risk and demand to 
save another human being, to make a difference in the world through 
one's own acts. This is very much a retrieval of the praxis character of 
Halachah, but it is not a praxis grounded in a simple, reassuring, cove­
nantal relation between God and the Jewish people or between God and 
humankind.24 Historical events appear, rather, to be countercovenantal. 
This belief in the ultimate value of saving action on behalf of another— 
and as an act that saves a world—is, in some ways, a postcovenantal reli­
gious praxis. It does not necessarily deny the possible truth or validity 
of the now undisclosed—indeed, seemingly negated—covenantal rela­
tion. This postcovenantal religious praxis is grounded, one might say, in 
the risk of friendship. Saving a world by saving a life is a reaffirmation 
of the ultimate value of life: this in the face of an event in which the idea 
of humanness was itself negated, and in which there was an explicit 
attempt to dehumanize the Jews completely before annihilating them. 
Such an affirmation does not proceed through the prior affirmation 
of God and the guaranteed creation of an ultimately valuable universe. 
Rather, this affirmation is a risk, and it is a risk of friendship between 
two "persons" (two characters or the implied author and implied reader) 
who encounter and struggle with each other as they do with themselves 
and God. 
The affirming of the ultimate value of human life—in a saving act 
of friendship—mitigates the finality of the Holocaust. This mitigation 
does not reduce its ultimate negativity. This affirming, this "yes," is the 
risk of friendship that grounds itself in this very risk. It is not a denial 
of the ultimate negativity of the event. It is, however, the allowing of a 
possibly different future: drawing upon what is a fundamental human 
characteristic and also a ground of possibility for reorientation toward, 
and retrieval of, a religious tradition for which such humanity is nee­
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essary. If the risk of friendship were impossible, then both secular and 
religious humanistic traditions would be finally irretrievable. This pro­
jecting of a potentially different future through the risk of friendship 
makes possible, but does not guarantee, a retrieval of those traditions. 
It also grounds the possibility of an ethical criticism, such as Booth's, 
that draws on and places itself in relation to them. 
Reading Wiesel through Booth helps us read Booth through Wiesel. 
Wiesel's writings "invite" Booth's concern with narratological friend-
ship.25 If the stakes of an ethical criticism such as Booth's require a limit 
case for demonstration, surely Wiesel provides such an occasion. For 
while their works are so very different in style and subject, they share 
profoundly similar concerns for the continued viability of language 
and ethical community. Keeping company with Booth and Wiesel thus 
vividly demonstrates both the breakdown and limits of ethical commu­
nity and discourse as well as their continued viability and claim upon us. 
Notes 
1. The terms Holocaust and Shoah (as is every other such term, e.g., Chur-
ban) are in different ways problematic. Holocaust implies that the event was a 
(completely consumed) sacrifice to God, and Shoah is a term used primarily to 
refer to natural catastrophes. I use both terms to call attention to the problems 
and limits of each. 
2. See, for example, my "Failing Speech: Post-Holocaust Writing and the 
Discourse of Postmodernism." 
3. Booth, Company, especially chapters 5, 6, and 7. 
4. The present chapter draws on a chapter on Wiesel (ch. 3) from a larger 
work of mine, "Recovering the Sacred: Hermeneutics and Theology after the 
Holocaust" (forthcoming). 
5. In this essay, I do not closely read any of Wiesel's novels. Such readings 
of his The Gates of the Forest (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1966) and 
The Town Beyond the Wall (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1964), two 
of his novels most concerned with friendship, may be found in "Recovering 
the Sacred," ch. 3. 
6. See my "Hearing the Testimony of Radical Negation" p. 7. 
7. Wiesel, "The Holocaust as Literary Inspiration," 7-8. For a brief and 
thematic discussion of friendship and meaning in the novels of Wiesel, see 
Michael Berenbaum, The Vision of the Void: Theological Reflections on the Worlds 
ofElie Wiesel (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan UP, 1979) 37-42. 
8. In "Celebration," Wiesel notes that these two works in particular are 
concerned with friendship. 
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9. See Booth, " 'The Way I Loved George Eliot'" 4-27. These themes 
are once again developed in The Company We Keep, especially chs. 6 and 7, 
168-224. 
10. See Michel Foucault on the dialectic of subject and subjection, dis­
course and power, in "The Subject and Power," Michel Foucault: Beyond Struc­
turalism and Hermeneutics, eds. Herbert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (Chi­
cago: U of Chicago P, 1982) 208-25. 
11. See my "Failing Speech" 66, 87n. 2. 
12. In this chapter, I am treating only the implied nonsurvivor reader. It 
is this reader, I believe, that forms the primary audience for these novels. The 
implied survivor-reader represents the degree zero of reading/writing. Like 
the implied author, the implied survivor-reader(s) is constructed as knowing, 
but not telling all, both because of the limits of discourse adequately to nar­
rate and, relatedly, because if the survivors did tell, their discourses would be 
considered excessive and unrealistic and, thus, as unbelievable fabrications of 
or upon the event. This romantic, absolute horizon of shared knowledge and 
understanding, however, functions in some ways problematically to efface the 
constructed and partial character of all knowledge and memory. In construing 
the nonsurvivor reader(s) as his primary audience, however, Wiesel opens up 
yet other ways of reading this detour into fiction in order to "truly narrate," as 
I later demonstrate. 
13. Because of its connotation of futuricity, using the term potential in this 
context is somewhat awkward. However, the implied reader's recognition that 
she or he could have been there is a recognition of fateful potential, the limi­
tations of which are, I believe, that none of us is finally excluded from such 
fateful negative possibility. 
14. See Genette, Narrative Discourse, for the narrative terms and their use 
in this discussion. Although Genette's terms do not necessarily directly corre­
spond to Booth's (see Booth, Company i25n), there are some shared insights 
about the working of stories and narrative discourse that my treatment of 
Genette highlights. 
15. In "Failing Speech" and "Recovering the Sacred," I have shown the 
risks of this displacement of event by discourse in the grammatical, rhetorical, 
and logical assumptions and strategies of Edmond Jabes, among others. 
16. See Genette 33-35 for a related discussion of this manipulation of nar­
rative distance. The ideas in this paragraph are drawn in part from these pages. 
17. See "The Holocaust as Literary Inspiration" 7-8; see also Wiesel, 
"Myth and History" 20-30. 
18. See Rosenfeld and Greenberg, eds., Confronting the Holocaust 210. 
19. For an insightful criticism of hermeneutically naive understandings of 
documenting the event, see James E. Young, Writing and Rewriting the Holo­
caust (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1988). 
20. See Booth, "George Eliot" 7. 
21. See Genette, 33-85. 
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22. See Genette, 25-32. 
23. In some ways, this risk of friendship might appear to resemble the logic 
of resistance as explicated by Emil Fackenheim, To Mend the World: Founda­
tions of Future Jewish Thought (New York: Schocken, 1982). We must, how­
ever, recall that Wiesel's resistance is founded both rhetorically and socially in 
friendship, not in a quasi-categorical (logical, isolatively founded) imperative 
as for Fackenheim. 
24. Halachah means "the way" or "the path" and refers both to the decision-
making processes and the determinations of Jewish law, specifically in the 
Talmud. 
25. See Booth's The Company We Keep, ch. 4, 90-92, for a discussion of 
the terms invite, tolerate, and violate, or resist as applied to the relation between 
texts and particular acts of criticism. See also Wayne Booth, Modern Dogma 
and the Rhetoric of Assent 191-92, for his treatment of Wiesel's Gates of the 
Forest. I have found the resources of his The Company We Keep more helpful, 
however, in reading this (and other) Wiesel works in "Boothian terms" such as 
those explicated above. 
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Booth, Bakhtin, and the 
Culture of Criticism 
DON H . BIALOSTOSK Y 
IN AN ESSAY IN PMLA'S centennial number, Geoffrey Hartman por­
trays the present "culture of criticism" as "within historicism, reacting 
to the expanded horizon of fact it has brought about, now integrating 
by an impossible embrace and now violently throwing off the burden 
of multiplying and fragmenting perspectives" (372). Hartman assumes 
in the essay the impossible task of integrating the diverse and self-
divided culture he imagines, embracing the German, French, British, 
and American cultures of criticism, and sublimating the violence of the 
"knowledge explosion" within his own cosmopolitan cultivation of ac­
quaintance with more than one hundred fifty scholars and critics from 
Aarsleff to Zumthor. 
At one point in his argument, Hartman asks whether Bakhtin's 
dialogics can help criticism cope with its "burden of multiplying and 
fragmenting perspectives." Hartman thinks that Bakhtin's "dialogic 
principle" "exposes a constitutive unintelligibility" in both the modern 
novel and human relations, and he asks whether such a principle can 
sustain us without our resorting to other powerful structures of thought 
and discourse: "Can we tolerate such ambiguity, such unresolved diver­
sity," he asks, "without structures of domination or dialectic?" (389). 
Hartman fears that we cannot, but his commitment to survey the whole 
present culture of criticism does not permit him to pause and consider 
the question. I take it up in this chapter as part of a longer inquiry that 
asks whether a deliberately cultivated dialogic criticism can stabilize 
and clarify our culture of criticism without giving in to the alternatives 
Hartman fears. 
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When Hartman recognizes "domination or dialectic" as alternative 
practices that threaten to undermine Bakhtin's dialogics, he draws upon 
powerful Western cultural paradigms. He calls to my mind, for ex­
ample, the paradigm of political regimes in the eighth book of Plato's 
Republic. There the democratic regime is threatened from below by the 
temptation to escape from its unresolved diversities into the domination 
of the tyrant's single voice, the "sinister unifying" Hartman fears (389). 
But it is also threatened from above by the dialectical philosopher's push 
to transcend diversities and subordinate them in an ideal scale of forms. 
In terms more pertinent to my argument here, Hartman's alternatives 
also recall how easily we can slip from the relatively unfamiliar and un-
rationalized practices of dialogic thought and discourse back into the 
familiar cultural tracks worn by the traditional verbal arts of rhetoric 
and dialectic. 
Rhetoric, after all, may be understood as the great storehouse of ver­
bal strategies for imposing "structures of domination." In one of its 
persistent forms, it teaches its practitioners how to shape their discourse 
to "win over others," whether the phrase implies persuading them or 
just plain beating them. Dialectic, I have argued elsewhere, cultivates 
techniques of manipulating ideas rather than people, teaching its practi­
tioners to organize and overcome ideas without reference to the people 
who hold them. Because rhetoric resembles dialogics in its concern 
with the relations among people in a given community and dialectic re­
sembles dialogics in its concern with the relations among ideas, the dia­
logic figure of the hyphenated person-idea, the ideologist-hero, easily 
reduces, without a well-known art of dialogics, to a rhetorical person 
struggling for domination or a dialectical idea contradicting, subsuming, 
or being subsumed by another idea.1 Dialogics is always breaking down 
into the rhetorical and dialectical arts that oppose it and each other. 
But the issue is really more complicated than this dialectical formu­
lation allows, because the arts brought forward under the names rhetoric 
and dialectic are not all of a piece, and the modes of opposition and co­
operation among their advocates and the advocates of dialogics are not 
uniform. A dialogic survey of some of the many projects for criticism in 
recent years that have explicitly identified themselves with either rheto­
ric or dialectic would disclose friends, opponents, and even practitioners 
of dialogics flying the banners of both the other arts and calling on 
Bakhtinian dialogics to account for itself in a variety of terms. In this 
survey, neither domination nor dialectic would maintain a single iden­
tity as an alternative to dialogics, but each makes its appearance not only 
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among those who represented rhetoric and dialectic for Bakhtin but 
also among others who now represent these arts in Anglo-American 
criticism. 
Domination is a significant motif for the writer who most often 
represents rhetoric in Bakhtin's writings, Victor Vinogradov, a con­
temporary of Bakhtin's and an influential figure in Soviet stylistics.2 
Vinogradov, who views the novel as a rhetorical genre and analyzes 
its devices "from the point of view of their effectiveness as rhetoric" 
(Dialogic Imagination 42), helps to shape Bakhtin's zero-sum image of 
the art. Bakhtin writes in his late notebooks, "In rhetoric there is the 
unconditionally innocent and the unconditionally guilty; there is the 
complete victory and the destruction of the opponent. In dialogue 
the destruction of the opponent also destroys that very dialogic sphere 
in which the word lives" ("Extracts" 182). Such remarks about rhetoric 
take on dialogic force in the context of the continuing dialogue Nina 
Perlina documents between Bakhtin and Vinogradov. She writes, 
Where Bakhtin states that any individual discourse act is internally a 
nonfinalized, open-ended rejoinder, Vinogradov demonstrates that even 
a real-life dialogue is built by a set of clear-cut monologic procedures. 
Where Bakhtin finds dialogic reaccentuation of another person's utter­
ance, the hidden multivoicedness, or the polyphonic "word with the 
loop[hole]," Vinogradov discovers the speaker's attempt to muffle the 
voice of the opponent, to discredit his speech-manifestations, and to 
advance his own monologic pronouncement over the dialogic reply of 
another person. . . . Within the framework of Bakhtinian poetics, a 
speech-partner is the protagonist of the idea. Within the framework of 
Vinogradov's poetic system, a speech partner is the rhetorician whose 
main intention is to make his oratory the only effective and authorita­
tive speech manifestation. For Bakhtin, the individual utterance is born 
between the speech partners, in the immediacy of discourse; for Vino­
gradov, a dialogic rejoinder is generated by and belongs to its abso­
lute owner. 
With Vinogradov in the background, Bakhtin associates rhetoric 
with "style determined by demands for comprehensibility and clarity— 
that is, precisely those aspects that are deprived of any internal dialo­
gism, that take the listener for a person who passively understands 
but not for one who actively answers and reacts" (Dialogic Imagina­
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tion 280). As opposed to the seriocomic genres Bakhtin links with the 
dialogic, the classical rhetorical genres are one-sided, serious, rational, 
univocal, and dogmatic {Problems 107). Though rhetoric does represent 
the voices of others, rhetorical double-voicedness does "not extend to 
the dialogical essence of evolving language itself; it is not structured on 
authentic heteroglossia but on mere diversity of voices; in most cases the 
double-voicedness of rhetoric is abstract and thus lends itself to formal, 
purely logical analysis of the ideas that are parceled out in voices" or to 
polemically "erecting potential discourses for the accused or for the de­
fense (just such free creation of likely, but never actually uttered words, 
sometimes whole speeches—'as he must have said' or 'as he might 
have said'—was a device very widespread in ancient rhetoric)" {Dialogic 
Imagination 353-54). 
Enter, at last, Wayne Booth, a frequent user of this device, probably 
the best-known rhetorical critic in the Anglo-American culture of criti­
cism, and in his Rhetoric of Fiction the most significant American analog 
of Vinogradov in the recently renewed critical dialogue with Bakhtin. 
Just as Vinogradov strengthens Russian formalist poetics by accommo­
dating the novel under the heading of rhetoric, so Booth strengthens 
Chicago Aristotelian formalist poetics by the same move.3 In his Aris­
totelian framework, Booth conceives the rhetoric of fiction as focused 
on techniques of domination, on "the rhetorical resources available to 
the writer . .  . as he tries to impose his fictional world upon the reader" 
or on "the author's means of controlling the reader" {Rhetoric of Fic­
tion xiii). Booth assumes the end of imposing a unified fictional world 
of a given kind—such as the tragic, comic, or horrific—and concerns 
himself with advocating the unrestricted use of all rhetorical means to 
impose that world upon the reader. 
Within Booth's argument for the author's use of all available tech­
nical means in imposing a fictional world on the reader, his polemical 
emphasis is on the uses of the author's voice. He shows the usefulness 
of direct authorial commentary, and he argues that even when such 
commentary is lacking and the author resorts to the "hundreds of de­
vices that remain for revealing judgment and molding response," "the 
author's voice is still dominant in a dialogue that is at the heart of all 
experiences with fiction" {Rhetoric of Fiction 272). Booth's account of 
the novel at one point as dialogue among the author, narrators, char­
acters, and readers (55) suggests Bakhtin's dialogic model of novelistic 
discourse, but his repeated insistence on the dominance of the author 
92 DON H. BIALOSTOSKY 
over narrators, characters, and readers links him more firmly with Vino-
gradov's monologic rhetorical theories of the novel than with Bakhtin's 
dialogic account of the Dostoevskyan novel. 
Bakhtin's account of the Dostoevskyan novel (Problems) gives us an 
idea of how its ends differ from more familiar tragic or comic or rhe­
torical ends that Booth prefers. Bakhtin traces Dostoevsky's generic 
sources along several lines of what he calls the "serio-comic" or carni­
valized genres. In all these genres, he writes, "there is a strong rhetorical 
element, but in the atmosphere of joyful relativity characteristic of a car­
nival sense of the world, this element is fundamentally changed: there 
is a weakening of its one-sided rhetorical seriousness, its rationality, its 
singular meaning, its dogmatism" (107). The "stylistic unity . .  . of epic, 
the tragedy, high rhetoric, [and] the lyric" is replaced by mixed styles in 
the seriocomic genres (108) as "the epic and tragic wholeness of a person 
and his fate" is replaced by self-division in which the hero "ceases to 
mean only one thing" (117). Carnival familiarization suspends the usual 
hierarchies of social values and destroys "epic and tragic distance" (124). 
"Deeply ambivalent" responses to fundamental contradictions replace 
the clarified responses of separate tragic and comic genres; promiscuous 
participation replaces the conventional "division into performers and 
spectators" (122). 
This highly compressed summary of the seriocomic genre shows how 
Bakhtin gives positive character to a literary effect that Booth reads as 
a lac\ of the "clarity of distance" provided by the "traditional forms" 
(Rhetoric of Fiction 331). To Booth, who argues for the reader's right 
to know whether to "approve or disapprove, laugh or cry" (Rhetoric 
of Fiction 331), Bakhtin's "joyful relativity of all structure and order" 
(Problems 124) and his "ambivalent laughter" (166) are a challenge to 
fundamental distinctions of literary effect. The clarification of response 
one seeks in Aristotelian tragedy and comedy, and the determinate de­
cision aimed at in some Aristotelian rhetorical genres depend upon the 
audience's recognition of the hero's standing and the audience's dis­
tance from the hero's situation, but the participatory response Bakhtin 
envisions puts the hero and the audience in a carnivalized proximity to 
one another that replaces definitive judgment with mutual vulnerability 
and responsiveness. 
In such a fictional world, the author does not design characters to 
provoke laughter, tears, or admiration but to provoke articulate response. 
Instead of issuing in a nonverbal recognition or feeling or attitude or 
decision, the unfinalized interplay of value-charged discourse in the 
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dialogic work continues in the diverse verbal responses it provokes in its 
readers. Booth's rhetorical emphasis on determinate and generally non­
verbal effect leads him to call "the critical disagreement" provoked by 
stories "a scandal" (Rhetoric of Fiction 315). For Bakhtin, that unsettled 
controversy can be a mark of success in a work designed to dialogic 
rather than rhetorical specifications. 
Although Booth's rhetoric of fiction appears to share a perspective 
with Vinogradov's that makes their work appropriate to the monologic 
novel, I shall resist the temptation to set up their monologism in rhe­
torical or dialectical opposition to Bakhtin's dialogism, because the dia­
logic perspective finally does not allow for such an opposition in critical 
theory any more than in novelistic practice. Though Bakhtin himself, 
despite his dialogic principles, habitually makes use of this heightened 
opposition, he writes in the essay "Discourse in the Novel" that "even 
in those places where the author's voice seems at first glance to be uni­
tary and consistent, direct and unmediatedly intentional, beneath that 
smooth single-languaged surface we can nevertheless uncover prose's 
three-dimensionality, its profound speech diversity, which enters the 
project of style and is its determining factor" (315). For Bakhtin, then, 
neither "monologic" novelists nor critical theorists would "mean only 
one thing" any more than does the hero of the Dostoevskyan novel, 
and even rhetorical discourse, Bakhtin concedes, "once [it] is brought 
into the study [of the novel] with all its living diversity, . . . cannot 
fail to have a deeply revolutionizing influence [in revealing] the inter­
nally dialogic quality of discourse" (Dialogic Imagination 269). While 
monological arguments, then, attempt to reduce their participants to 
representing single meanings, dialogic criticism recognizes the impos­
sibility of such reduction and remains alert to what remains to be said 
from the unfolding positions of its concrete participants. 
Booth's several recent engagements with Bakhtin's work reveal a 
more ambivalent dialogue than the reductive opposition between mono­
logic and dialogic would allow. In the afterword to the second edition 
of The Rhetoric of Fiction (401-57), Booth singles out Bakhtin's dialogic 
poetics of the novel as especially impressive on the topics of language 
and style, historical and implied authors and readers, objectivity and 
technique, and ideology and form. Booth's acknowledgment of Bakh­
tin in his afterword is remarkable for its willingness to see Bakhtin 
as a challenge on the same issues that The Rhetoric of Fiction raises 
rather than to quarantine him as a theorist of some other critical mode 
with its own distinctive but unrhetorical questions. In this he shows the 
94 DON H. BIALOSTOSKY 
effects of the responsive and open-ended pluralism he invents in Critical 
Understanding. But in his introduction to Caryl Emerson's translation of 
Bakhtin's Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics—an essay he sees as spilling 
over from the afterword to his own book—Booth combines this stance 
with the more defensive pluralism of his 1968 essay "The Rhetoric of 
Fiction and the Poetics of Fictions." He generously acknowledges Bakh-
tin's challenge to his rhetoric of fiction but also isolates that challenge 
in a critical mode distinct from his own. 
Booth begins his introduction by establishing a common ground be­
tween his Chicago school Aristotelianism and Bakhtin's dialogism on 
the question of ideology and form, claiming that both positions reject 
the opposition between abstract form and ideological content for an 
idea of form charged with value or ideology. Booth distinguishes his 
Chicago Aristotelianism, however, for its focus on the distinction be­
tween the effects authors intend in their ideologically charged formal 
unities and the technical means they use to achieve them. According 
to the Chicago premises Booth worked under in The Rhetoric of Fic­
tion, "Authors," he writes, "were . .  . in charge of created unities that 
consisted of choices exemplified and judged" ("Introduction" xviii). 
Booth's introduction presents Bakhtin's position, however, as if it 
transcended the whole question of fictional techniques and their rela­
tion to artistic ends. Bakhtin's challenge, he writes, "has nothing to do 
with the author's effort to produce a unified effect. Its subject is not the 
ordering of technical means toward certain effects so much as the quality 
of the author's imaginative gift—the ability or willingness to allow 
voices into the work that are not fundamentally under the 'monologi­
cal' control of the novelist's own ideology" (xx). As Booth recognizes, 
he has assimilated Bakhtin's position to Longinus—the alternative to 
Aristotle that the Chicago school has long acknowledged—an alterna­
tive concerned to demonstrate the presence of genius or greatness or 
sublimity in the author rather than to articulate the functioning of parts 
in the whole in a given work (xx, xxvii). Booth repeatedly emphasizes 
Bakhtin's transcendence of mere technical concerns for more profound 
and important issues (xx, xxiv-xxv, xxvii), making his challenge to the 
rhetoric of fiction seem more like a moral and spiritual challenge to 
its questions than a technical and artistic challenge to Booth's answers 
to them. 
Booth thus diminishes his direct encounter with Bakhtin by con­
ceding him the high ground and holding onto the low, but, as we have 
seen, the dialogics and the rhetoric of fiction challenge one another 
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more directly on the common grounds of the author's chosen artis­
tic task and the technical means of realizing it than Booth's account 
of Bakhtin allows. While Booth repeatedly posits a dialogue in which 
"the author sees more deeply and judges more profoundly than his pre­
sented characters" {Rhetoric of Fiction 74), Bakhtin explicitly examines 
the novel in which not the author's superior consciousness but the hero's 
self-consciousness is the dominant of representation {Problems 49-50). 
Booth might see such a move as a shift in technical devices that "turns 
the character whose mind is shown into a narrator" {Rhetoric of Fiction 
164), but Bakhtin's self-conscious hero is not a "center of consciousness" 
through whose perspective a story is told but the object of representa­
tion itself. The hero's discourse in its response to discourses of the other 
characters and the discourse of the author is, for Bakhtin, the novel's 
principal object of representation {Problems 63-65, 266). 
Bakhtin's dialogics of fiction thus reopens the question of what is 
means and what is end in the novel and suggests that in some cases at 
least the choices Booth advocates as technically effective would not serve 
the end Bakhtin imagines. If the hero's self-consciousness is to be the 
dominant of representation, the author's position must be shifted from 
the finalizing and judging role Booth defends to an actively dialogic 
interchange with the hero. "Only in the light of this artistic project," 
Bakhtin writes, "can one understand the authentic function of such 
compositional elements as the narrator and his tone . . . and the . . . 
narration direct from the author" {Problems 64). This is not the critical 
language of someone unconcerned with "unified effect" and the "tech­
nical means toward certain effects" (Booth, "Introduction" xx), but that 
of someone who posits a different kind of effect, one that calls for a 
radical reconsideration of fictional means and ends. In Bakhtin's serio­
comic genre, as we have seen, it is not, as Booth says, that the characters 
"defy any temptation the author may have to fit them into his superior 
plans" ("Introduction" xxiii) but rather that, as Bakhtin says, "the free­
dom of the character is an aspect of the author's design" and "is just as 
much a created thing as the unfreedom of the objectivized hero" {Prob­
lems 64-65). Bakhtin has not forfeited an interest in artistic design and 
the technique that serves it, but has radically enlarged the field of such 
designs, and so has not only shifted the possible functions of techniques 
but also shifted the very boundaries between technique and design. 
But Booth's linking of Bakhtin to the Longinian tradition may be 
seen not just as an evasion of this fundamental conflict over the means 
and ends of fiction but also as part of another agenda. Booth's recent 
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book on the ethics of fiction shows him less interested in Bakhtin's 
bearings on the technical issues of the rhetoric of fiction than on the 
evaluative issues that now concern him. Even in The Rhetoric of Fiction 
itself, Booth opens the question of "the moral, not merely the technical, 
angle of vision from which the story is told" (265), and his identifica­
tion of Bakhtin's argument with that "more profound" question may 
serve to acknowledge Bakhtin's challenge where it matters most to him 
now, rather than to deflect it from the issues of the rhetoric of fiction in 
which he is no longer engaged. 
Booth's and Bakhtin's divergent accounts of the novel are not with­
out implications for the discursive practices of the culture of criticism, 
but this issue can be joined more directly through examining Booth's 
Critical Understanding: The Powers and Limits of Pluralism, in which he 
explicitly addresses his version of Hartman's problem of "multiplying 
and fragmenting perspectives" in criticism. Though Bakhtin's relevant 
work was not available in translation when Booth wrote Critical Under­
standing, its argument nevertheless bears upon Booth's discussion and 
complicates the potential relations between Booth's rhetoric and Bakh-
tin's dialogics. Booth there imagines what he calls the problem of "criti­
cal variety and conflict" (3) in characteristically rhetorical terms that 
produce images of "chaos" (7) and "warfare" (37), but he also gestures 
repeatedly in the course of his inquiry toward dialogic formulations 
that would reconstruct his initial rhetorical image of "the immensely 
confusing world of contemporary literary criticism" (3). Booth's argu­
ment shifts from the rhetorical to the dialogic in another sense when he 
turns from generating potential discourses about poems and pluralism 
to engaging at length the words and works of three specific pluralist 
thinkers, all of whom have persuaded him of their diverse views. 
Booth's opening formulation of the problem of "critical variety and 
conflict" envisions a characteristically rhetorical situation of diverse rhe­
tors brought to a given occasion of discourse to mobilize, display, and 
distinguish their rhetorical resources. Booth imagines a dozen critics 
given W. H. Auden's "The Surgical Ward" and asked to say what they 
think is the most important point to be made about it, and he fur­
ther imagines, in a characteristic hyperbole, that "an infinite number of 
possible interpretations" of "unlimited variety" would result (1-2). Fol­
lowing something like I. A. Richards's protocols in Practical Criticism, 
Booth's imaginary experiment brings diverse critical rhetoricians to a 
given occasion and asks them to produce their discourses in isolation 
from one another without mentioning a context of prior discourse on 
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the poem. In accord with Bakhtin's account of the practices of rhetori­
cal genres, Booth's experiment produces what Bakhtin calls "potential 
discourses" of hypothetical critics instead of using the "actually uttered" 
words of published critics, and it issues not in what Bakhtin calls "an au­
thentic heteroglossia" but only in "a mere diversity of voices" (Dialogic 
Imagination 353-54). To the "unlimited variety" of that "mere diver­
sity" Booth adds the diverse potential judgments of his critical readers 
and thus produces his image of "the immensely confusing world of 
contemporary literary criticism" (3), but this confusing world to which 
he offers his pluralism as the best response is a function of the mono­
logic rhetorical rules by which he constructs his image in the first place 
rather than a necessary or adequate portrait of the literary critical world 
itself. 
A dialogic criticism, for its part, would emphasize the artificial iso­
lation of Booth's hypothetical critics and offer the countermodel of the 
prose writer who 
confronts a multitude of routes, roads, and paths that have been laid 
down in the object by social consciousness. Along with the contradictions 
inside the object itself, the prose writer witnesses as well the unfolding of 
social heteroglossia surrounding the object, the Tower-of-Babel mixing 
of languages that goes on around any object.... For the prose writer, the 
object is a focal point for heteroglot voices among which his own must 
also sound; these voices create the background necessary for his own 
voice, outside of which his artistic prose nuances cannot be perceived, 
and without which they "do not sound." {Dialogic Imagination 278) 
Bakhtin's account of this situation may still seem like confusion, but 
these other voices are many, not infinitely numerous, and they "sound" 
against the background of each other as the isolated voices of Booth's 
imaginary experiment do not. Furthermore they belong to a "social 
heteroglossia" that makes their various utterances reflect the finite, if 
heterogeneous, possibilities of critical discourse in a given time and 
place, developing those possibilities, revealing new ones, and making 
the participants recognizable to one another in their developing con­
crete diversity. The problem for dialogics is never what to make of the 
confusing multiplicity of voices and evaluations in general but always 
what to say in response to the differences among this particular set of 
actually or potentially interrelated voices. 
Booth's initial vision of the production of critical discourse shares a 
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model of the determinants of that discourse with R. S. Crane's response 
to the questions, " 'What ought I to say?' or 'What is important to say?'": 
it depends only on "the kind of problem you are interested in and . . . 
the resources of your 'language'" (43). Bakhtin's image of the prose 
writer would not only add to these determinants who has already spoken 
and whom the critic is addressing but would also reinterpret both the 
"interests" and the "language" of the individual critic as already derived 
from and implicated in the social discourses that entail the interests and 
languages of others. Even critical rhetors called to display their critical 
resources and interests in response to a given poem speak from a prior 
conversation and to unnamed mentors and opponents, share or oppose 
their interests, and revoice their languages. 
Booth, however, at another point in his argument, reaches a position 
very similar to Bakhtin's. He writes, 
No critic makes himself; every one of us discovers his own voice only 
by listening or mis-listening, to those before us who seem to have spo­
ken best. This much is seldom denied. What seems to be forgotten is 
that, even after I have begun to speak what I mistakenly call "ray own 
critical truth," my continued vitality as a thinking critic . . . depends on 
my continuing capacity to take other voices into account. My life, indis­
tinguishable from the life of my critical tribe, requires that my thought 
be an exchange among "selves" rather than a mere search for ways to 
impose what I already know. (Critical Understanding 223) 
Note here Booth's departure from a rhetoric of imposition and domina­
tion toward a dialogics of mutual determination through exchange. A 
different emphasis on these same relations might bring out, in addition, 
the way in which "my thought" is an "exchange among selves" from 
the start and "my critical tribe" is already, as Booth elsewhere puts it, 
"inherently and irreducibly plural" (40). My vitality is not just at stake 
in my continued engagement with other voices outside my tribe but in 
its continuing articulations of the conflicts within my tribe and within 
"myself." And my investment in those conflicts always orients me to 
the discourse of my tribe and the discourses of other tribes (to which I 
may in other ways also belong) and shapes my sense of "What I ought 
to say" and "What is important to say." 
I never encounter a situation, then, in which the critical world is 
all before me and the choice of critical interests and languages is en­
tirely open, nor do I ever display my critical resources as if no one else 
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had already spoken, or encounter the display of others' resources as if I 
had never heard of them before. Even utter neophytes in professional 
critical discussions arrive with investments in critical terms and human 
relations from familial, religious, political, and other social context that 
permit preliminary orientation to those discussions, recognition of their 
participants, and investment in their stakes. At the beginning of my 
own critical training, a schooling in the texts of American democracy 
attracted me to Wordsworth's vision of the poet as "a man speaking to 
men," though feminism had not yet called my attention to how that 
phrase sounded from a different social location. Similarly, the religious 
predispositions of some of the New Critics drew them to Coleridge's 
notion of the Godlike poetic imagination. Both the transcendental mys­
tifications of some schools of criticism and the demystifying gestures 
of others are continuous with discourses in the precritical culture in 
which we are schooled, and our interests in the critical sophistications 
of these discourses are predisposed, though not wholly determined, by 
our interests in these discourses themselves. 
From Crane's dialectical point of view (see Olson), these predis­
positions may appear as mere "prejudices" that account for any given 
subject's arbitrary departure from the ideal universal subject, who could 
disinterestedly entertain all interests and disinterestedly choose the ap­
propriate critical mode of pursuing each interest {Critical Understanding 
43), but Booth's rhetorical commitments make him aware of both the 
difficulty of separating critical modes from the individual critics who 
practice them (28) and of the problem of distinguishing critical modes 
themselves (94). He approaches a dialogic reinterpretation of Crane's 
philosophically distinct modes when he identifies the modes we have 
learned with the " 'school' we were trained in" (254) that constitutes our 
intellectual dispositions, sets our agendas, enables our inquiries, and in­
volves us in a historical conversation, but he concludes with a rhetorical 
reinterpretation of "critical modes not as positions to be defended but 
as locations or openings to be explored—in the traditional rhetorical 
terminology, as topoi or loci" (339). 
As topoi or commonplaces, the diverse critical modes lose not only 
the philosophical discreteness of Crane's dialectical formulation but also 
the individual, historical recognizability of the dialogic person-idea in­
volved in the cultural discourse of schools of thought. Although Booth 
characterizes a topic as "an inhabited place in which valued activity can 
occur among those who know how to find their way in" (339), it has 
lost the historical specificity of a "place" like the Chicago school, in­
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habited by R. S. Crane and Richard McKeon and engaged with such 
figures as M. H. Abrams and Kenneth Burke, all of whom constitute 
the dialogic agenda of Booth's inquiry into pluralism. Both rhetorical 
topoi and dialectical modes have a generality that appears to transcend 
what Booth calls the "historical accident" (201) of specific affiliations 
and encounters. Booth wishes he could justify his decision to discuss 
Crane, Burke, and Abrams as topically or even dialectically representa­
tive of '\inds of pluralism," but he cannot escape his admission that "my 
life encountered these lives at such and such moments, and the personal 
force of these men strengthened the impact of their pluralisms" (201). 
The Rhetoric of Fiction, which distances itself from Chicago Aristote­
lian poetics by shifting its ground to Aristotle's rhetoric, directs itself 
against the predominant consensus about fiction in the wider culture 
of criticism, but Critical Understanding is dialogically preoccupied with 
powerful person-ideas affiliated specifically with the Chicago school. It 
self-consciously abandons the high ground of philosophical universality 
maintained in Crane's dialectical pluralism, but its rhetorical pluralism, 
under the powerful influence of Crane's voice, still ambivalently aspires 
to transcend the accidents of historically contingent rhetorical commu­
nity and the violence of aggressively competitive rhetorical domination. 
Booth's preoccupation with that violence colors much of Critical 
Understanding with the heightened diction of critics' killing and being 
killed, annihilating each other, battling, destroying, violating, and living 
only at the cost of others' death and defeat. Bakhtin's vision of rheto-
ric's intent "to bring about the destruction of the opponent" is right at 
home in this rhetorical battlefield. It would be fair to say that Booth 
strives to formulate a version of what Bakhtin calls "the dialogic sphere 
in which the word lives" as an alternative to this rhetorical scene of car­
nage ("Extracts" 182), and it is interesting that Booth makes his closest 
approach to Bakhtinian dialogics in his sections on the value of vitality. 
But it would also be fair to observe from our present perspective that 
the powerful habit of thinking in terms of the opposition between the 
familiar arts of rhetoric and dialectic limits the alternatives available to 
him. Booth resists the dialectical reduction of discourse to the "trans­
 n  e  w i s n e  s personal" adjudication of "rival propositions" (28-29) )  u s  t a  s
for a better world than the bloody rhetorical battle of rival critics, but 
he is apologetic about using the word "dialogue" (237), deeply invested 
in the dialectical pluralism of modes he resists, and habituated to turn 
to rhetoric—in both theory and practice—when all else fails. 
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The book's most vital and provocative moments for me—its sec­
tion on the value of vitality (220-23) t  o which I have already referred 
and its chapter on "overstanding" (235-56)—reach beyond the famil­
iar alternatives and Booth's avowed affiliations to break new ground. 
Booth himself recognizes and dramatizes the novelty for him of his 
thinking in that chapter (236), where he not only defends the imposition 
of alien terms and questions on a text ("overstanding") against his own 
powerful commitments to submit to the author's intentions but also 
recognizes that the repertory, as he puts it, of questions and responses 
we might bring to any text "will in large part depend on how many 
other texts we have respected and absorbed in the past" (242-43) and 
on the " 'school' we were trained in" (254). Booth's closing "image of 
the reader we seek to propagate" provides also a powerful image of the 
mode of intelligibility of the dialogic self: such a reader "is one who is 
so active, so broadly experienced, so thoroughly 'possessed' by texts pre­
viously understood that his very individuality, no longer idiosyncrasy, 
will teach us not only something about himself but something about 
the text and the world" (256). Such readers individualize in their own 
texts the possibilities and conflicts of prior texts and thereby realize in 
themselves possibilities of the social world that are not simply peculiar 
to them but recognizable to others who are both inside that social world 
and outside that particular individual location in it. Booth's slightly em­
barrassed notion of "a kind of conversation or dialogue between a text 
and a reader" recognizes their participation in a common culture just 
as his affirmation of overstanding (Todorov translates a related Bakh­
tinian word as "exotopy") recognizes their inalienable alienation from 
one another. 
The combined effect of these two recognitions would be to rule out 
the model of isolated critical rhetors from which Critical Understand­
ing begins and to open the way to a dialogic model of "critical variety 
and conflict" that would resist both domination and dialectic for the 
sake of continuing the lives of historically diverse communities and his­
torically diverse selves. Though a dialectical reading of Booth might 
expose the contradictions between his rhetorical and dialogic premises 
in order to refute them, and a rhetorical reading might try to exploit the 
inconsistencies between these premises in order to defeat him, a dialogic 
reading would try, as I have, to identify such divergences as productive 
sites for further conversation with him and to honor them as vital con­
flicting identifications within his exemplary life of ideas. 
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Notes 
1. For extended discussion of the ideologist-hero, see Bakhtin's Problems 
ofDostoevs^y's Poetics 78-100. For more on the distinction among dialogics, 
dialectic, and rhetoric, see Bialostosky. 
2. Todorov identifies him as "a linguist and marginal Formalist destined 
to become the official guiding light of Soviet Stylistics" (9), and Shukman calls 
him "the doyen of the Soviet school of stylistics" (v). See also Busch for an 
extended discussion of Vinogradov. 
3. See Bakhtin's remark that in dealing with the stylistic dilemma posed 
by the novel, "the re-establishment of rhetoric, with all its rights, greatly 
strengthens the Formalist position. Formalist rhetoric is a necessary addition 
to Formalist poetics" {Dialogic Imagination 267). 
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From Pluralism to Heteroglossia: 
Wayne Booth and the Pragmatics 
of Critical Reviewing 
DAVID RICHTER 
MOS T SCHOLARS WHO have silently suffered from hostile reviews, 
whether their critics were vapidly incomprehending or actively malefi­
cent, have dreamed venge fully about being granted unlimited space to 
respond in print. Perhaps it is fortunate that few of us get the chance, 
because not many would use the occasion for anything better than a 
return bout with our detractors, whose ignorance or malice tends to be 
far less permeable than our own thin skins. 
Wayne Booth is one of the lucky scholars who have been asked to 
reply to his own reviewers in a commissioned article for an academic 
journal; in fact, he has done so not once but twice, in essays spaced 
nearly ten years apart. True to what one might expect of a critic of 
his character as well as his stature, Booth eschewed the easy exercise in 
the countercheck quarrelsome, and used both "The Rhetoric of Fiction 
and the Poetics of Fictions" and "Three Functions of Reviewing at the 
Present Time" as occasions for discussing the critical scene, the way 
critics interact with and describe each other's theories and judgments, 
and the difficulties of critical understanding. 
But though one might describe these two essays in similar terms, 
they are different in tone as well as underlying philosophy: A close 
examination of the arguments would mark a change in what Booth ex­
pects as well as thinks possible in critical discourse, and we can see the 
results of that change in his subsequent books, both Critical Understand­
ing and The Company We Keep. The shift is from what Booth himself. 
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in Critical Understanding, termed the "pluralism of discrete modes," a 
position derived from the metatheories of R. S. Crane and the philo­
sophical semantics of Richard McKeon, to a vision of contact through 
shared topoi. This vision in turn anticipates Booth's adoption of a social 
version of the self as the locus of competing languages and characters, 
which is reminiscent of the ideas of Mikhail M. Bakhtin. 
INSTRUMENTAL PLURALISM 
Booth's first stab at his reviewers is, rhetorically, a brilliant example of 
doublespeak, in that Booth bases a subtle ethical appeal upon his self-
restraint in not doing several things that he characterizes as futile or 
self-indulgent (attacking his enemies, rewriting what was unclear about 
his book), and then does them anyway, but so indirectly that we may 
not realize what is being done. 
The chief victim of Booth's rhetoric is John Killham, whose "The 
'Second Self in Novel Criticism" in the British Journal of Aesthetics "at­
tacked me for beliefs I had specifically repudiated, using arguments I 
myself had used" ({'Rhetoric and Poetics" 106). Booth is first tempted to 
ignore Killham as "not worth bothering with," then presents over six 
hundred words of invective, written at white heat, accusing Killham of 
distortions so gross and obvious that he has to appeal to malice rather 
than mere stupidity to explain them—a first draft that Booth allows us 
to read and savor before he pulls himself up short and repudiates the 
entire disputational enterprise. 
Repudiates it, however, only to continue it by other means: part 2 of 
Booth's article consists of an analysis of Killham's mode of interpreting 
literature: the problems he sees as central, the critical terms he uses, and 
the methodology he employs. 
Mr. Killham's problem is that of reconciling what he calls the "au­
tonomy" of a novel . . . with his knowledge that any novel is, after all, 
written and read by human beings; he seeks... a reconciliation between 
the autonomous "well-wrought urn" and the world of the author's biog­
raphy and psychology and intentions. . . . His talk is thus mostly in the 
expressive rather than the rhetorical mode. . . . [For Killham] true au­
tonomy in a novel comes from our recognition of its independent "sense 
of life" which is, in fact, what the total creative act of the author, with 
his sense of life, gave it. (109) 
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As Booth goes on to demonstrate, there is no room within Kill-
ham's system—a dialectical method using the central principle of "ex-
pression"—for the sort of inquiry Booth is engaged in, or indeed for 
any inquiry using the problematic method and the principle of rheto­
ric. For Killham, "rhetoric" is a pejorative term—what inferior novel­
ists are forced into using when they cannot fully develop their "sense 
of life"; for Booth, of course, it is an inescapable aspect of narrative 
technique—almost another name for technique. He presents Killham's 
critical enterprise seriously and sympathetically, and then suavely inter­
poses: "It is easy to see that no author holding Mr. Killham's views 
uncritically—that is, without thinking through their implications for 
method—could possibly grasp my way of going about things ..." (109). 
In eristic terms, Booth understands Killham to death, by read­
ing Killham so much better—and so much more generously—than 
Killham had bothered to read him. Killham indeed stands convicted, 
neither of mental incapacity nor of malice, but of something much 
worse: of holding his views so tightly that he has become incapable of 
grasping another kind of argument—incapable of learning from anyone 
who thinks differently than he does.1 
What Booth demonstrates in his rhetorical victory over Killham 
(and, implicitly, over all the other detractors who failed to understand 
the implications of his methodology) is the power of "instrumental 
pluralism" (Booth's term for the pluralism of his mentor, Ronald 
Crane): the notion that different critics have worked in discrete critical 
"languages" or "methods," each capable of its own powers and limita­
tions, each a characteristic mode of insight with its own characteristic 
forms of blindness. Crane had demonstrated, in The Languages of Criti­
cism and the Structure of Poetry, how a question such as, "How many 
children had Lady Macbeth?" may be meaningless within the formalist 
New Critical approach of L. C. Knights (in which poetry is seen as a 
pure symbolic structure), but perfectly apt within the mimetic criticism 
of A. C. Bradley (in which literary characters are seen as imaginative 
analogues of real persons). 
Both Crane's insight into Knights's meaningless quarrel with Bradley 
and Booth's insight into Killham's meaningless quarrel with him 
(Booth) derive directly or indirectly from instrumental pluralisms such 
as the philosophical semantics of Richard McKeon, who viewed argu­
ments between rival philosophers as derivable from differences in their 
prior choices of method, principle, organization, and mode of thought. 
Booth demonstrates the real power of this form of pluralism—its power 
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to orient the relationship of one critical enterprise to another—in part 3, 
where he discusses his choice to write a rhetoric of fiction, and how that 
had dictated major differences in method and vocabulary, not only from 
those of his mentor Crane, but from other strong modes of criticism: 
"If [the author] is thought of as making readers, then . .  . every stroke is 
in this sense rhetorical, just as in the objective view every stroke is part 
of the concrete form, or in the expressive view every stroke expresses 
the artist's psyche, and in the art-is-truth view every stroke reflects a 
world of values or universals which the book is 'about' "(111-12). 
Booth's four terms for critical principles come directly from M. H. 
Abrams's The Mirror and the Lamp; they constitute a critical common­
place that the readers of Novel were likely to know. One sees McKeon 
behind both Abrams and Crane, as the most powerful creator of a 
meroscopic ("splitting") pluralism in our time.2 And one sees his direct 
influence on Booth, certainly in his later work, but even here in his 
sense that the principle with which he is operating is in potential con­
flict with another ultimate end he might explore (a "poetics" of fiction), 
so that Booth speaks of the rhetorical critic as a "stranger in a strange 
land" when he moves from the question of what authors do to readers 
to the question of what the literary works they create are by nature. 
Booth expresses no dissatisfaction, within "The Rhetoric of Fiction 
and the Poetics of Fictions," with the pluralism of discrete modes. In­
deed, he seems eminently contented with the privileged access to dis­
parate systems of thought, together with the self-critical capacity, that 
systems such as McKeon's grant their users. Nevertheless, Booth may 
have a problem with the fact that, as a metaphor, McKeon's system 
suggests a four-dimensional matrix of 256 pigeonholes, into which any 
philosophical enterprise may be slotted.3 Such a metaphor emphasizes 
both the barriers between systems and the irreconcilability of each sys­
tem with every other. In the last paragraph of "The Rhetoric of Fiction 
and the Poetics of Fictions," Booth sees the short-term remedy for mis­
understanding as silence—hardly an attractive solution for this lover of 
discourse—and, in his own metaphor, envisions literary critics as on "a 
series of climbing expeditions, attempting different peaks or different 
faces of the same peak" (117). Such a vision of isolated climbers seems 
clearly preferable to the war of each against all that Booth compares 
it with ("demolishing each man's shelter to provide materials for our 
own"), but it does not approach any notion of a scholarly community. 
For people personally reconciled to the ultimate strangeness of any indi­
vidual to any other, there may be nothing unpleasant about this, but 
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Booth is not one of those people, and one suspects that may be why 
instrumental pluralism was not finally, for him, a sustaining vision. 
THREE FUNCTIONS OF REVIEWING 
AT THE PRESENT TIME 
Booth's second essay is a far more intricate (one might almost say 
"shiftier") piece of rhetoric, not because the values Booth is trying to 
inculcate are themselves more complex, but because some of the contra­
dictions between the ideology inherent in Crane/McKeon pluralism 
and Bakhtinian dialogism are beginning to surface in his prose. 
Booth opens with a self-deprecating introduction far more extensive 
than usual, twitting himself for his own bad reading habits: he confesses 
to misremembering reviews of his work, emphasizing the "careless or 
inane or hostile strokes," nastier than they were, more given to simple 
factual inaccuracies. "What I now see are at least three criteria for good 
reviews, only the first one having much to do with either the reviewers' 
or the author's ego" ("Three Functions" 3). 
Of Booth's three functions of reviewing, only the first, to give the 
ready-made reader an accurate report and a clear appraisal, establishes 
a criterion of critical understanding comparable to that posed in "The 
Rhetoric of Fiction and the Poetics of Fictions." The other two, to entice 
the indifferent and hostile reader into the enterprise, and to advance the 
inquiry by vexing the author and others into thought, can occur outside 
the realm of understanding itself. 
Booth's examples of the second function are of celebrated theorists 
who use the occasion of a review to advance their own views. There is a 
certain degree of covert irony here, particularly in the implication that 
by virtue of his fame a Kenneth Burke or a William Empson acquires 
a license to misread denied to lesser mortals. On the one hand, "the 
author discovers that his own sense of injustice may be less important, 
in the long run and for most journal readers, than the effort to keep 
a given kind of critical culture alive by making recruits" (6, empha­
sis added). On the other hand, Booth claims that this job will be most 
effectively done "by the reviewer who has best understood the book in 
hand. . . . In the long run, making recruits to an enterprise is important 
only if the enterprise is maintained at the highest possible level, and it 
seems likely that carefree distortions, however stimulating, will in the 
long run vitiate the enterprise" (6, emphasis added). On both sides of 
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the fence, Booth appeals to the "long run." Perhaps, as with My Fair 
Lady and A Chorus Line, there are long runs and longer runs. Critical 
understanding is in the long run subordinate to vitality, but vitality is 
in the longer run subordinate to critical understanding.4 
While in the abstract it seems absurd to argue that A is more impor­
tant than B, which is more important than A, we frequently find that 
in the political arena contradictions such as these are more plausible. 
It happens frequently that a society fighting a war to preserve its free­
dom may have to suspend, for the duration, some of the very freedoms 
it fights to preserve. Survival is a precondition of any other good, and 
we recognize that one is occasionally forced to compromise the good to 
survive. When the same issue comes up in the case of individual sur­
vival, though, as in Plato's Crito, the moral issues are less clear. And 
surely we are likely to disapprove, however well we may understand, a 
legislator who feels forced to vote in minor matters against his or her 
best judgment in order to be reelected and fight for more important 
ideals. What may not be entirely clear are the ultimate consequences of 
relocating an argument about academic discourse in the political arena, 
where the collective good always outweighs the individual interest. 
Booth's third criterion—advancement of the inquiry—is in some 
ways the most complex of the lot. One reason is that, unless there is al­
ready considerable meeting of minds between reviewer and writer, the 
former cannot advance the latter's inquiry. Of course, one could always 
take the position that by saying Boot{ X is no damn good, a reviewer is 
"advancing the inquiry" by forestalling the reader from taking seriously 
a meretricious argument. But this would be a trivial case; Booth gen­
erally presumes criterion (1) as part of criterion (3), which implies that 
reviews that meet the third criterion will be rare indeed. 
Though Booth never discusses how the process of "vexing into 
thought" works, there may be an analogue to the notion of the car­
nivalization of language in Bakhtin: "The trick is to vex [the writer] 
into further thought by allowing the book to goad the reviewer into 
a genuine encounter with its problems" ("Three Functions" 7). Book 
goads reviewer; reviewer encounters writer; reviewer vexes writer into 
thought. We all get dirtied by each other's rhetoric. 
How this dialogical approach actually works in practice is not quite 
so simple, as we shall see. The example Booth chooses to take up is 
not a casual journalistic assessment but a full-scale Diacritics review 
article devoted to an analysis of his methodology in A Rhetoric of Irony: 
Susan Suleiman's "Interpreting Ironies," published in 1976. The dia­
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loguc between Booth and Suleiman extends, in fact, over five works: 
The Rhetoric of Irony itself, Suleiman's "Interpreting Ironies," Booth's 
commentary on Suleiman in "Three Functions of Reviewing," and a 
further exchange of views published in 1979 as "Re-Viewing Reviews: 
Letters by Susan Suleiman and Wayne Booth." 
The argument between Suleiman and Booth shifts ground several 
times over these five texts, but the central area of disagreement is over 
whether understanding the meaning of a text necessarily includes an 
emotional participation in its values or only an understanding of its 
language and the contexts implicit in that language. But it is not en­
tirely clear how Suleiman "advances" Booth's "inquiry," by "vexing the 
author . . . into thought"; indeed, Booth and Suleiman agree so much 
more than they disagree that their dialogue might be viewed as a well-
choreographed waltz, with Booth deftly leading, rather than the dispute 
threatened in such verbs as "vex" and "goad." 
THE CENTRAL DISAGREEMENT I READING DEGREE ZERO 
Suleiman argues that Booth's Rhetoric of Irony collapses the valuable 
distinction between language that we can interpret as irony from an 
analysis of the meanings of words alone and ironies that require of 
the reader prior knowledge of the values and intentions of the author.5 
Booth admits to collapsing the distinction, since he does not see how 
any irony, or indeed any utterance, with the exception of "those texts in 
which there was no intending author," can be interpreted without refer­
ence to authorial intent. He admits that it is possible for a reader to inter­
pret without regard to this intent, but that, when one chooses to do so, 
" 'meanings' become infinite" and hence indeterminate ("Three Func­
tions" 9). In insisting upon intention as determining meaning, Booth 
is opposing the "uncanny" critics—deconstructionists such as J. Hillis 
Miller—and rhetorically painting Suleiman into that corner. 
In her letter of response, Suleiman is prepared to acquit Booth of col­
lapsing the distinction; she concedes, in fact, that the difference between 
Booth's intentionalism and that of some structuralists and semioticians 
is that Booth speaks in terms of an author's intention, while the others 
might speak instead of an intentionality inherent in the text. The dif­
ference in vocabulary is suggestive, but, for Suleiman as for Booth, 
it pales beside the more important differences between those "canny" 
critics who feel that authors or texts can determine meaning through 
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intention and those "uncanny" critics (like Miller) for whom meaning is 
radically indeterminate. Nevertheless, Suleiman continues to insist that 
there is a difference between understanding what emotional response a 
text requires of its implied reader and actually granting that response— 
citing her own analysis of Drieu La Rochelle's anti-Semitic novel, Gilles 
(Booth and Suleiman 45). 
In his reply, Booth refuses to allow Suleiman to acquit him of col­
lapsing a distinction that he indeed intends to explode—the distinction 
between intrinsic and extrinsic grounds of interpretation. Booth there­
fore insists upon "the difficulties that underlie your claim that one can 
somehow get a text as a kind of fact without becoming embroiled in 
its implied author's values" (49). Suleiman appears to be claiming that 
she performed less than a fully sympathetic reading of Gilles. Booth dis­
agrees: The repugnance Suleiman registers to the values of Gilles sug­
gests that she has performed at least the simulacrum of a sympathetic 
reading; she must have "in some sense 'gone along' with the intended 
experience (at least far enough to know how it would feel to go all the 
way)" (49). For Booth, Suleiman has fully understood Gilles, but she 
has also overstood it. 
By the end of this dialogue, the reader may not be clear whose in­
quiry has been advanced. Though Booth praised Suleiman's review as 
one that vexed him into further thought about his problem, it is not 
clear that he has modified his ideas or conceded any ground, and Sulei­
man has been driven to qualify or cancel most of the theoretical ob­
jections she had raised against his enterprise and its methods. For his 
part, Booth gives up a skirmish or two—for example, he admits Sulei-
man's contention that his analysis of irony had skimped on the difficult 
cases of unlimited global ironies, a point that had been made much less 
politely by other reviewers—but it is not clear that he has been made 
to change materially his notion of literary meaning.6 In effect, her cri­
tique has not so much altered or shaken his beliefs as forced him to 
understand more clearly what his true belief was: namely, that pure 
linguistic processing, what might be called "reading degree zero," is a 
chimera, because an ethical assessment of the values inherent in a text 
is already included within any interpretation of the text's meaning. If 
this dialogue has genuinely clarified something for Booth that was not 
clear already, it was the two directions in which his line of thinking was 
leading him: toward his qualified defense, in Critical Understanding, of 
"overstanding" as a generally valid approach to literature, and toward 
the pluralistic "ethics of fiction" in The Company We Keep. 
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Perhaps the most interesting thing about Booth's approach to Suleiman 
is that he does not repeat, mutatis mutandis, what he had done to John 
Killham: that is, he does not explain Suleiman's misunderstanding of 
insights generated by his method in terms of the blindness inherited 
from her own. And Booth could have done this very easily: As one 
can see from her essay on Gilles, published in Neophilogus, Suleiman 
is working essentially from a structuralist or semiotic perspective that 
views meaning as the product of the decipherment of codes; such a 
logistic method requires some version of the process I have termed 
"reading degree zero" (pure linguistic processing) as a state from which 
more sophisticated forms of figural interpretation depart (see, for ex­
ample, the works by Barthes or Eco, or Suleiman's favorite sources, 
Genette and Todorov, listed in the bibliography). For Suleiman, under­
standing language, meanings, and values represent three distinct steps 
in a hierarchy of semiosis. For Booth, doing a "rhetoric" rather than 
a semiotics of irony, the reader's grasp of authorial values is already a 
given, not something to be explained. Their disparate critical languages 
explain a great deal about the (admittedly minor) ways in which they 
miss each other's points. 
There may have been any number of reasons why Booth did not 
choose to repeat the lesson in pluralism he had given in the pages 
of Novel ten years before: a preference for novelty over repetition, or 
courtesy to Suleiman, whose article was generally favorable, who had 
worked harder than most reviewers had done to understand him, and 
who was as sophisticated, methodologically, as he was. But as I have 
already hinted, the most likely explanation, given the terms of his ap­
proach and the evidence of Critical Understanding (published the fol­
lowing year), is that he had become disenchanted with instrumental 
pluralism as a metatheoretical principle. Where he had once enjoyed 
demonstrating its powers, Booth is here at least as much concerned to 
demonstrate the limitations of any pluralism of discrete modes. 
The opening chapters of Critical Understanding present the limita­
tions of instrumental pluralism in epistemological terms: though any 
pluralism seems to be better than any nonpluralistic alternative (mon­
ism, skepticism, eclecticism, and so forth), Crane's "pluralism of discrete 
modes" is only one of many methods for organizing the variety of voices 
into a harmonious (or dissonant) chorus. After examining the rival plu­
ralisms of Kenneth Burke and M. H. Abrams, Booth feels driven to 
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seek a metapluralism (a pluralism of pluralisms), but this quest, even 
before it begins, is doomed to fail: "Can we imagine a genuine pluralist 
of pluralisms, one who can accept and use many different. . . metalan­
guages? . . . How could he avoid an infinite regress of ever more vacu­
ous pluralisms?" {Critical Understanding 34). Ultimately, Booth's vision 
of a pluralism of pluralisms fails, doomed by the "umbrella paradox" 
from above and from beneath by the humanity of his exemplars (Crane, 
Burke, Abrams), whose mutual understanding, despite their efforts, was 
decidedly imperfect. Disappointed of his ultimate "pluralism of plural-
isms," Booth settles for a "pragmatic" scheme that will maximize the 
"inseparable values" of "vitality," "justice," and "understanding." 
As James Phelan has shown, this gets Booth out of one difficulty 
only to get him into another: specifically, Booth becomes incoherent 
on the degree to which data about literary texts constrain interpretive 
hypotheses. When he wants to emphasize the respect for and under­
standing of the exemplary text, "Booth sometimes speaks as if data are 
fairly fixed and decisive, permitting us to distinguish proper from im­
proper questions and to identify different degrees of violation." At other 
times, when he seeks a harmonious chorus of pluralistic interpreters, 
"Booth . . . speaks as if data, though numerous, are not at all decisive" 
(38-39)7 Phelan attributes this incoherence primarily to the contradic­
tions inherent in Booth's simultaneous commitments to understanding 
and metapluralism. This is surely right as far as it goes, but these com­
mitments too derive from prior choices. As Booth says at the end of 
Critical Understanding, "I am not one of those who loves knowledge for 
its own sake. . . . [M]y goal is practical: how to improve the practice of 
controversy by increasing the chances of understanding. I have, in fact, 
made understanding into a supreme goal, running the risk of implying 
that it is better for two human minds to share erroneous views than 
for one to have the truth and the other to misunderstand him" (341­
42). Without taking Booth as literally committed to communal error as 
preferable to isolated truth, the social aspect of learning is decidedly im­
portant to him. (Booth's mentor Crane, as I have suggested elsewhere 
[see bibliography], seems to have idealized the positivistic goals and 
methods of science in ways that have contented few of his students. 
It would seem that to Crane, the isolated and disinterested pursuit of 
truth would be satisfying in ways it was not to Booth.) 
In the shifting figures of speech Booth has used to describe the criti­
cal reading and argumentation, over the twenty years that separate "The 
Rhetoric of Fiction and the Poetics of Fictions" from The Company We 
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Keep, we can observe something about the way in which this social 
commitment, surely always present to his character, has surfaced in his 
thought. Where in the Novel essay Booth had valorized the image of 
solitary climbers, by 1979 he views Susan Suleiman and himself as two 
"who can somehow move together in critical thought . . . because cer­
tain settled grounds are shared. As the old rhetoricians might have put 
it, but never did, certain topoi, thank God, remain in place, at least 
long enough for us to talk together" ("Re-Viewing Reviews" 47). Other 
thinkers, by contrast, "are so unsettled that they simply drift further 
apart" (47). 
While their moving together has been characterized above as a waltz, 
Booth gently leading, the figure Booth may have had in mind is that of 
explorers, temporarily sharing tent space on a "settled ground," or pos­
sibly the inhabitants of icebergs, which generally drift at random but 
occasionally settle in one position long enough to allow a community to 
develop. What he and Suleiman can share is a topos, literally a common 
place, even if their methods and principles do not precisely coincide. 
It is a metaphor Booth uses even more self-consciously in the conclu­
sion of Critical Understanding, where he treats "critical modes not as 
positions to be defended but as locations . .  . to be explored. . . . [The 
topos] is not . .  . a pedestal from which one looks out upon a world 
of error. Rather it is an inhabited place in which a valued activity can 
occur among all those who know how to find their way in" (339). From 
here it is not a long way to the center of The Company We Keep, where 
Booth slightly revises Bakhtin's notion that "each of us is constituted in 
a kind of counterpoint of inherited 'languages,' a multiplicity of voices 
only the ensemble of which can . .  . be called 'my own'" (239) into the 
vision of the self as a "character" within which the various embodied 
possibilities and roles—social, familial, literary—are all inscribed: 
someone doing my best to enact the various roles "assigned" me. . . . 
[T]here are no clear boundaries between the others who are somehow 
both outside and inside me and the "me" that the others are i n . . .  . I am 
a kind of focal point in a field of forces,... or, as we used to say, a crea­
ture made in the image of God and hence essentially affiliated, joined to 
others and more like them than different from them. (239-40) 
If we become our metaphors—as Booth insists at length in The Com­
pany We Keep—it would appear that Booth's own key metaphors for 
the processes of literary interpretation and argumentation have been 
From Pluralism to Heteroglossia 115 
undergoing a sea change since the late 1960s, shifting thematically from 
isolation to affiliation, from the individual climbers each ascending a 
private mountain to the pioneers who chance to meet and exchange 
views at a convenient topos. The change seems a natural outgrowth of 
his life and his character, as an individual who sees doing good in the 
world as one of the principal functions of the intellectual. But if much 
is gained by this—particularly clarity about Booth's ethical views, so 
much belabored since the notorious thirteenth chapter of The Rheto­
ric of Fiction—there is also something lost, perhaps, in the waning of 
the motive behind the earlier metaphor that had also formed a part of 
Wayne Clay son Booth: those solitary climbers, each making his or her 
own heroic assault upon a separate mountain peak, symbolic of the pur­
suit of truth wherever it leads, not for social or personal motives, but 
for its own sake. 
Notes 
1. Killham's reply to Booth in the following issue of Novel shows that he 
has learned nothing from the encounter: he keeps attempting to skewer Booth 
on dilemmas that are pointed within his own frame of reference but not in 
Booth's (is the narrator of Tom Jones a "surrogate for the real Fielding" or 
"a sort of character in the story"?; is fiction a "category" or an "autonomous 
form"?) ("Quarrel" 270). A further reply to Killham by Booth, promised for 
a subsequent issue, never appeared. Either Booth or the editors of Novel must 
have realized that those readers who, like Killham, had not already grasped 
Booth's methodological point, never would. 
2. As Kenneth Burke must be considered the most powerful creator of a 
holoscopic ("lumping") pluralism. 
3. In The Architectonics of Meaning, one of McKeon's students, Walter 
Watson, has further elaborated this system into an eight-dimensional matrix of 
65,536 (4s) slots. But this massive increase in the number of subdivisions does 
not change the metaphor in the slightest. 
4. Booth's incoherence here over whether understanding or a wide-
ranging and vital pluralism is more important is also discussed by Phelan in 
"Data, Danda, and Disagreement," and in his chapter in this volume. 
5. One example of irony derived from word meaning alone might be the 
opening of Anatole France's Penguin Island: "The penguins had the mightiest 
army in the world. So had the porpoises." 
6. As with "The Rhetoric of Fiction and the Poetics of Fictions," Booth's 
careful reading of Suleiman has guaranteed a debating victory over her. 
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7. Phelan goes on to imply that Booth's pluralism of pluralisms is a chi­
mera, since the real remedy for the problems inherent in holding to a single 
form of pluralism is to be a better pluralist in one's own chosen mode. 
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Rhetoric and Politics 

Pluralism, Politics, and the 
Evaluation of Criticism 
JAMES PHELAN 
There can be no such thing as peeping out of politics. 
GEORGE ORWELL 
Become a pluralist. .. . Become a pluralist. . . . Become a pluralist.. . . 
WAYNE C. BOOTH 
FIFTEE N YEARS AFTER its publication, Wayne Booth's Critical Under­
standing remains a major statement on pluralism in literary criticism.1 
In these fifteen years, however, criticism in general has paid less atten­
tion to the powers and limits of pluralism than to the pervasiveness of 
politics—in interpretation, in theory, in the intersection between one's 
identity and one's critical beliefs and values, especially where matters of 
race, gender, and class are involved. Furthermore, as theorists have come 
to regard Orwell's dictum above as a universal truth, they have typically 
become more dismissive of pluralism.2 From the perspective of Orwell's 
epigram, a pluralism such as Booth's is suspect because it pretends to 
be above politics while its efforts to reduce conflict by advocating the 
validity of multiple perspectives actually performs the political function 
of preserving the status quo. In this chapter, I would like to counter 
such objections by arguing that it is desirable for critics to attend to both 
Orwell's dictum and Booth's injunction; that, in other words, politically 
committed critics and pluralists have much to teach each other. For any 
politically committed criticism to do more than preach to the converted, 
it must move beyond implicit assertions of the "more-left-than-thou" 
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variety, and pluralism provides some useful lessons in how to do that. 
Pluralism, for its part, needs to be more cognizant than it has typi­
cally been to the political dimensions of both the general program and 
any practical application of it. In a sense, then, I am seeking to build 
on some of the principles of Critical Understanding in order to address 
an issue Booth never takes up explicitly: the relation between politics 
and pluralism. I will be working not so much to defend the details of 
Booth's pluralist program as to realize a potentiality in its spirit. 
Because one of the charges frequently leveled at plural ists is that they 
are unable to discriminate strong positions from weak ones, I will de­
velop my argument by focusing on the questions that surround the act 
of evaluating criticism. On what grounds do pluralists evaluate other 
critics? Are those grounds ultimately political, that is, explainable as the 
imposition of a privileged set of interests on the other's discourse? Or 
are those grounds not entirely explainable in political terms? In other 
words, what force and emphasis ought pluralists give to Orwell's dictum 
as they reflect on their own procedures of evaluation? More generally, 
what are the politics of pluralism? To give an added twist to the inquiry, 
I will focus on a specific example of political criticism, Sandra Gilbert 
and Susan Gubar's The Madwoman in the Attic, considering, first, Toril 
Moi's evaluation of it from the vantage point of her feminist stance, and 
then an evaluation conducted from the vantage point of pluralism.3 
Because dismissals of pluralism often proceed from an inadequate 
understanding of it, and because I am less interested in the detailed 
argument of Critical Understanding than its general project, I would like 
to begin by clarifying my version of pluralism. My work is indebted 
to Booth's, and before him to R. S. Crane's, though I part company 
with Booth in his conclusion that there is no philosophical foundation 
for pluralism and part company with both Booth and Crane with their 
privileging of understanding over other purposes of criticism.4 Plural­
ism is the stance I arrive at through the following chain of reasoning: 
(i) to engage in critical discourse is to implicate oneself, whether con­
sciously or not, in some theoretical positions. If I utter the apparently 
unstartling statement that "In Pride and Prejudice Jane Austen created 
one of the most lovable characters in Englishfiction," I imply a theoreti­
cal commitment to many ideas that will be seen as startlingly erroneous 
from the perspective of some other theoretical commitments: authors 
create the meanings of texts; characters are representations of possible 
people; readers share responses to texts; fiction is a category distinct 
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from nonfiction. Thus, (2) to speak critically is to speak with principles 
and assumptions that both enable and give meaning to the speech; to 
speak critically is to speak within a mode or a framewor\. These terms 
denote an implicit or explicit critical system (which may or may not 
be internally consistent, well formed, efficient, or effective). A mode 
includes (a) a characteristic set of questions; (b) some methods for an­
swering those questions; (c) a set of principles and assumptions about 
such things as the nature of the text, the importance of the author (or 
authorial function) in the creation of meaning, the role of the reader 
in interpretation, the significance of history to the creation or inter­
pretation of a work, and the relation between the text and the world 
outside the text; (d) some general purpose toward which the questions, 
methods, principles, and assumptions are directed. Answers to critical 
questions about a given text can be seen as a result of the interaction of 
these four parts of a mode with the particulars of the text. 
(3) Some modes are fundamentally discrete: the questions they ask, 
the methods they adopt, the principles and assumptions on which they 
are built, and the purposes they serve are so different that even though 
they may share some terms (e.g., the "meaning" of the text), they are not 
offering competing kinds of critical knowledge. A Marxist who asks 
how a text reveals its relation to the conditions of production within its 
culture and a psychoanalytic critic who asks how a text reveals the psy­
che of its author may focus on the exact same textual data but because 
they interpret that data in light of their discrete frameworks, they offer 
interpretations that do not compete. 
(4) More than one mode is capable of yielding results that are fully 
adequate to the data it seeks to explain. There are two related points 
here: first, the different kinds of knowledge offered by different modes 
can't always be ranked; one kind isn't necessarily better or worse than 
others, it can sometimes just be different. Second, the different kinds 
of knowledge are not partial in the usual sense of the term. The Marx­
ist may be able to use her framework to explain the whole text with 
admirable precision—and so may the psychoanalytic critic. Each expla­
nation is itself total, but each explanation occurs within a framework 
that is one of several possibilities. 
(5) Some modes, and especially some executions of a mode, are de­
ficient: there are many ways to be wrong. If a mode's first principles 
lead its practitioner to reductive views of data, then the mode will be 
flawed. If a mode's characteristic methods lead to distortion of the data 
or to a kind of reasoning that is severely limited, then the mode will be 
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inferior to others that are more methodologically sound. Furthermore, 
if a given practitioner violates principles of the mode or employs the 
method in a sloppy fashion, then the execution of the mode will yield 
dubious results. 
At first glance the consequences of pluralism for critical practice may 
seem minor: because pluralism is a metacritical stance, a position on 
positions, the pluralist must still operate within a single mode when 
doing practical criticism.5 The consequences can, however, be very sig­
nificant, because the pluralisms understanding of what it means to oper­
ate within a mode is radically different from the nonpluralist's. On the 
one hand, the pluralist develops a keener sense of the limits of her in­
terpretation: she abandons the belief that her interpretation is the truth 
about the text and adopts the belief that it is one of multiple truths. 
On the other hand, the pluralist, believing that there are many ways 
one can go wrong, becomes much more attentive to the methodology 
of the mode in which she is working—and to her execution of that 
methodology. Furthermore, the pluralist will both eagerly welcome and 
carefully scrutinize the work of other critics. Believing in the validity 
of more than one mode, the pluralist operating on a particular occa­
sion as, say, a Freudian, will not reject out of hand the interpretation 
of a Marxist, but will consider such things as whether the Marxist ad­
dresses elements of the work that she might have unwittingly neglected 
within her psychoanalytic approach. At the same time, given the belief 
that there are many ways to go wrong, the pluralist will pay special at­
tention to the Marxist critic's execution of the mode, probing for both 
weak and strong features of the argument. In short, as a practical critic, 
the pluralist will be at once more modest and more rigorous than the 
nonpluralist. 
Notice that once I talk about rigor and about being wrong, the ques­
tions about the relation between pluralism and politics in the task of 
evaluation immediately and unavoidably emerge. If methodologies vary 
from one framework to the next, whose conception of rigor do we use? 
Are there transmethodological tests of methodologies and their execu­
tion? If there is no such thing as keeping out of politics, then we also 
need to ask about the political dimensions of the tests we use—and 
the political consequences of the results we obtain. I will keep these 
questions in mind as I turn to Gilbert and Gubar and to Toril Moi. 
Gilbert and Gubar's central question is, "How did women writers of the 
nineteenth century establish a distinct female literary tradition within 
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a patriarchal literary culture that wanted to deny them the authority 
of authorship?" Gilbert and Gubar's chief methodological steps are to 
analyze the patriarchal literary culture and the woman writer's place 
within it, and to read women's texts for signs of their resistance to or 
subversion of the patriarchy and for signs of their awareness of female 
precursors. More specifically, they conduct their analyses of patriarchal 
culture by reading the gender politics involved in metaphors about writ­
ing employed by male writers as well as the gender politics implied 
by male writers' typical representations of women as either monsters 
or angels. Gilbert and Gubar read women's texts in three main ways: 
First, they seek to uncover the textual details that reveal resistance to or 
subversion of patriarchy, typically finding recurring images of enclosure 
and escape, disease and health, and fragmentation and wholeness, as 
well as characters who play off the angel-monster dichotomy; they then 
use these details to construct their feminist readings of women's texts. 
Women from Jane Austen and Mary Shelley to Emily Bronte and Emily 
Dickinson produced literary works that are in some sense palimpses­
tic, works whose surface designs conceal or obscure deeper, less acces­
sible (and less socially acceptable) levels of meaning. Thus these authors 
managed the difficult task of achieving true female literary authority 
by simultaneously conforming to and subverting patriarchal literary 
standards. (73) 
Second, Gilbert and Gubar analyze the structure of a narrative text 
according to what the structure reveals about the nature of men and 
women's relations under patriarchy. Third, they employ analogical 
reasoning to establish connections between women's texts and their 
precursors (indeed, sometimes ancestors as well) in both the male and 
female traditions. For example, they argue that because both texts are 
crucially involved with the concepts of heaven, hell, and a fall, Wuther­
ing Heights is a response to Paradise Lost. 
Gilbert and Gubar's main assumptions, some of which I have al­
ready touched on, are the following: They view the text as the site of 
a revelation of male-female relationships within the culture in which 
it was produced. They regard the author as the source of the text's 
meaning. They posit an implied reader who can understand the covert 
story of women's texts. They assume that history restricts authors but 
not readers: authors inevitably respond to their cultural moments but 
readers can move across cultures—Gilbert and Gubar imply that the 
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meanings available to them in the twentieth century were also avail­
able to readers in the nineteenth. Thus, they claim that the women 
writers themselves were aware of the tradition they describe in the 
book; Gilbert and Gubar see themselves as uncovering rather than con­
structing that tradition. They assume further that texts relate to the 
world by representing and adopting stances toward cultural attitudes, 
situations, and ideologies. 
The purpose of Gilbert and Gubar's criticism is political. They want 
to refocus attention on the gender politics of the texts they read, and 
they want to establish the power of the female literary tradition they 
uncover. Indeed, by emphasizing the adverse cultural conditions under 
which women wrote, their history of the female tradition is in part a 
celebration of women writers' power of resistance, insight, and creation. 
By accomplishing these tasks of reading politically and establishing the 
power of the tradition, Gilbert and Gubar also want to achieve the 
political purpose of making feminist criticism more important in their 
own cultural moment of the late 1970s. Their book is not only an analy­
sis of the power of the woman writer in the nineteenth century but also 
a demonstration of the power of the feminist critic in the twentieth. 
In Sexual/Textual Politics, Toril Moi praises Gilbert and Gubar's "often 
inventive and truly original readings," but she objects strongly to their 
assumption that the woman writer is the source of the meaning of her 
text: Gilbert and Gubar's insistence, writes Moi, 
on the female author as the instance that provides the only true mean­
ing of the text . . . actually undermines [their] anti-patriarchal stance. 
Having quoted Edward Said's Beginnings with its "miniature medita­
tion on the word authority" as a description of "both the author and the 
authority of any literary text," they quote Said's claim that "the unity or 
integrity of the text is maintained by a series of genealogical connections: 
author-text, beginning-middle-end, text-meaning, reader-interpretation, 
and so on. Underneath all these is the imagery of succession, of paternity, 
of hierarchy." But it seems inconsistent . .  . to accept with Said that the 
traditional view of the relationship between author and text is hierarchi­
cal and authoritarian, only to proceed to write a book of over 700 pages 
that never once questions the authority of the female author. For if we 
are truly to reject the model of author as God the Father of the text, 
it is surely not enough to reject the patriarchal ideology implied in the 
paternal metaphor. It is equally necessary to reject the critical practice it 
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leads to, a critical practice that relies on the author as the transcendental 
signified of his or her text. For the patriarchal critic, the author is the 
source, origin, and meaning of the text. If we are to undo this patriarchal 
practice of authority, we must take one further step and proclaim with 
Roland Barthes the death of the author. (62-63) 
From my perspective, the most important feature of Moi's argument 
is its political nature, and especially its assumption about the relation 
between critical positions and political ones. This assumption becomes 
clearer once we break the argument down into the twin syllogisms at 
its crux: 
1. Any critical position that perpetuates patriarchal beliefs is politically 
objectionable. 
The belief that authors are the source of meaning is patriarchal. 
The belief that authors are the source of meaning is politically objec­
tionable. 
2. The work of critics who subscribe to a politically objectionable posi­
tion should be repudiated. 
Gilbert and Gubar subscribe to the politically objectionable position that 
authors are the source of meaning. 
Gilbert and Gubar's work should be repudiated. 
Note, first, that the argument as a whole turns round on itself and 
convicts Moi of the same political crime she finds Gilbert and Gubar 
guilty of: her discussion treats them as the source of meaning for their 
book. Thus, either her argument participates in the perpetuation of 
the patriarchy and should be repudiated or her premises need to be 
questioned. I will question one of those premises as I relate it to the 
assumption Moi makes about the relation between critical positions and 
political ones. 
Perhaps the most notable feature of Moi's reasoning is that the linch­
pin of the whole argument, the minor premise of the first syllogism 
(the belief that authors are the source of meaning is patriarchal) is not 
demonstrated but simply asserted. This point has greater force when we 
go back to Gilbert and Gubar and recognize that the apparent support 
Moi gives for the belief—their use of Said's analysis of the traditional 
image of an author—functions very differently in Madwoman from the 
way Moi claims. 
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Gilbert and Gubar turn to Said not to accept "the traditional view 
that the relationship between author and text is hierarchical and au­
thoritarian" but to show that patriarchal culture has adopted the meta­
phor of author as "father" and "authority" of the text and thereby has 
given women an anxiety of authorship. At no point do Gilbert and 
Gubar agree that the patriarchal view accurately describes authorship; 
not only are they objecting to it from the very first sentence of their book 
("Is the pen a metaphorical penis?"), but they are also offering their ac­
count of the success of women writers as a refutation of that view. Moi 
seems implicitly to acknowledge that Gilbert and Gubar want "to reject 
the model of author as God the Father of the text" and its attendant 
patriarchal ideology, but she in effect denies the possibility of separat­
ing a belief in authors as the source of meaning from a perpetuation 
of patriarchy. "It is surely not enough to reject the patriarchal ideology 
implied in the paternal metaphor. It is equally necessary to reject the 
critical practice it leads to, a critical practice that relies on the author 
as the transcendental signified of his or her text. For the patriarchal 
critic, the author is the source, origin, and meaning of the text." In 
short, Moi assumes that a given critical position—in this case, a belief in 
authorial meaning—has a single politics—in this case, perpetuation of the 
patriarchy. This assumption is so deeply embedded in her work that 
she never questions it and thus never questions—or feels the need to 
substantiate—the minor premise of the first syllogism. 
The assumption is doubly troubling here: not only does Moi fail to 
offer a warrant for it, but Gilbert and Gubar also implicitly reject it and 
posit a different relation between critical and political positions. They 
do not see any necessary connection between a belief in authors as the 
source of meaning and any specific political belief; for them, the politics 
derives not from the critical position but from how it is appropriated. 
In other words, for Gilbert and Gubar the politics of criticism do not 
inhere in specific critical first principles but in how those principles are 
used. The nineteenth-century patriarchal culture used the belief in au­
thors as the source of meaning to reinforce patriarchal ideology. Gilbert 
and Gubar's book works in conjunction with the texts of the women 
writers they analyze to subvert that ideology. For Moi's case to have 
force, she would have to take on the task of showing that the belief 
in authors is not politically neutral. Because she does not do that, she 
does not genuinely engage with Gilbert and Gubar's book, and thus 
her commentary tells more about her critical position than about theirs. 
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Let me engage her position on authorial meaning more fully by ex­
amining its specific logic. Moi's view equates authors with authority, 
authority with the authoritarian, and the authoritarian with patriarchy. 
The problem arises in the equation of authority and the authoritarian. 
Proclaiming the death of the author does not eliminate authority but 
merely transfers it—to the reader or to history or to culture or to the play 
of signification or perhaps to some synthesis of these forces. If authority 
is to be equated with the authoritarian, then these other positions are 
also authoritarian (note, too, that the proclamation of the author's death 
exercises a strong authority against one kind of reading), and thus, 
within Moi's logic, equally patriarchal. Gilbert and Gubar's position is 
no more—and no less—patriarchal than Barthes's. The larger point is 
that once we recognize that authority will always be located somewhere 
and thus will always privilege something, we must give up making argu­
ments about the necessary connection between authors, authority, and 
patriarchy. Whatever is privileged can always be analogized to the male 
and whatever is marginalized can always be analogized to the female. 
If, for example, authority is located in the reader, then readers can be 
seen as in the male position of appropriating and claiming dominance 
over the work of authors who are in the female position of laboring in 
the service of the dominant sex. And so on for the other locations. This 
kind of analysis, of course, is just playing games with terms, games that 
are themselves authorized by the erroneous assumption that there is a 
direct link between one's critical and one's political position.6 
This analysis of Moi's evaluation leads to a larger question: Is her 
failure to engage meaningfully with Gilbert and Gubar just a local 
problem, a failure of execution on her part, or something that is more 
revealing of what happens when we read other critics in terms of our 
own politics? It is, I think, revealing of what typically, though not in­
variably, happens. Furthermore, it is typical not so much because it is 
political but because it is dogmatic. As I have implied above, Moi's 
failure to engage derives from her deep, unquestioning commitment to 
her assumption about the relation between critical and political posi­
tions. In that respect, she is no different from a critic who is not at 
all overtly concerned with political positions but who has some deeply 
entrenched assumption about the nature of texts. For both of them, 
some direct—or, more frequently, indirect—appeal to that assumption 
will be sufficient to carry the argument (note Moi's "it is surely not 
enough" just before she invokes the consequences of her assumption). 
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The trouble here is the trouble with all such arguments from mon­
ism: assertion replaces argument, declaring one's superiority replaces 
engaging the other's position. 
At the same time, despite all my complaints about Moi's analysis, I 
must recognize that she has brought into focus a significant dimension 
of Gilbert and Gubar's text that was absent from the account based 
on my pluralism. While that account acknowledged the overarching 
political purpose of Gilbert and Gubar's project, it did not address the 
political dimension of their position on authorship. Moi's attention to 
the political in combination with the strategies of pluralist reading allow 
for the recognition that the politics of the principle must, as we have 
seen, be understood not in the abstract but in the uses to which it is put. 
How then would a pluralist evaluate Gilbert and Gubar's book more 
generally? One way of conducting that evaluation is to go to their 
answer and assess the case they make for it. Here is the central passage 
in their argument that the covert story of Jane Eyre is one that makes 
Bertha Jane's double, the argument that gives them one of their chief 
warrants for titling their book as they do: 
. . . Bertha has functioned as Jane's dark double throughout the govern-
ess's stay at Thornfield. Specifically, every one of Bertha's appearances— 
or, more acurately, her manifestations—has been associated with an 
experience (or repression) of anger on Jane's part. Jane's feelings of "hun­
ger, rebellion, and rage" on the battlements, for instance, were accom­
panied by Bertha's "low, slow, ha! ha!" and "eccentric murmurs." Jane's 
apparently secure response to Rochester's apparently egalitarian sexual 
confidences was followed by Bertha's attempt to incinerate the master in 
his bed. Jane's unexpressed resentment at Rochester's gypsy-masquerade 
found expression in Bertha's terrible shriek and her even more terrible 
attack on Richard Mason. Jane's anxieties about her marriage, and in 
particular her fears of her own alien "robed and veiled" bridal image, 
were objectified by the image of Bertha in a "white and straight" dress, 
"whether gown, sheet, or shroud, I cannot tell." Jane's profound desire 
to destroy Thornfield, the symbol of Rochester's mastery and of her own 
servitude, will be acted out by Bertha, who burns down the house and 
destroys herself in the process as if she were an agent of Jane's desire 
as well as her own. And finally, Jane's disguised hostility to Rochester, 
summarized in her terrifying prediction to herself that "you shall, your­
self, pluck out your right eye; yourself cut off your right hand" (chap. 27) 
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come strangely true through the intervention of Bertha, whose melodra­
matic death causes Rochester to lose both eye and hand. (360) 
The case is both detailed and concrete; if it holds up to a closer look, it 
will be very persuasive. That closer look, however, undermines its per­
suasiveness. The first serious problem arises in the second association 
they find—Jane's apparently secure response to Rochester's sexual con­
fidences being followed by Bertha's attempted arson. If Jane gives no 
sign that she is angry (and she says "I had a keen delight in receiving 
the new ideas he offered, in imagining the new pictures he portrayed, 
and following him in thought through the new regions he disclosed, 
never startled or troubled by one noxious allusion"), then how do we 
know that Bertha's action ought to be associated with Jane's anger? 
Gilbert and Gubar solve the problem by reversing the direction of their 
argument: they go backwards from Bertha's action to Jane's response to 
Rochester. Because Bertha acts Jane must be angry; if she doesn't ex­
press the anger it is because she is repressing it. But those inferences will 
be valid only if Gilbert and Gubar have already established the associa­
tion they're trying to prove. Their argument at this point is circular and 
unconvincing. It is failing the test of coherence. 
The third association, between Rochester's gypsy masquerade and 
Bertha's shriek and attack on Richard Mason, again acknowledges that 
Jane's resentment is unexpressed, and so runs into similar problems. 
Furthermore, the reasoning here faces the additional problem of dealing 
precisely with the data: if Bertha is to be seen as acting out Jane's anger 
toward Rochester, why is Mason the object of the attack? Rochester, 
after all, would be glad to have Mason out of the way. 
With the fourth association, between Jane's anxieties about marrying 
Rochester and Bertha's appearance, Gilbert and Gubar are on firmer 
ground, though of course alternative explanations for Bertha's appear­
ance, including foreshadowing, are also possible. With the fifth associa­
tion, the problems recur and multiply: first, Gilbert and Gubar assert 
that Jane has a profound desire to destroy Thornfield but they give no 
evidence that she does. Second, they say that Bertha will act out this 
desire. But the case they have been making is that Bertha's manifes­
tations are associated with an experience or repression of Jane's anger. 
Bertha's burning of Thornfield is associated with no such experience— 
it occurs while Jane is beyond her anger at Rochester, if indeed, that 
anger ever exists—while she is living with the Rivers and thinking of 
becoming a missionary. The association also overlooks the fact that after 
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setting fire to hangings in the room next to her own, Bertha went and 
set fire to the governess's bed. When placed within Gilbert and Gubar's 
hypothesis, this detail must be seen as a sign of Jane's self-hatred— 
again, something we have no evidence for. The reasoning fails the tests 
of both coherence and correspondence. 
Finally, they claim that Jane's disguised hostility toward Rochester 
is carried out through the intervention of Bertha whose death causes 
Rochester's maiming. The main problem here is the gap between cause 
and effect. Bertha provides the occasion for Rochester's maiming but 
she is not its cause; she does not set fire to him but to the house; it 
is made clear that he could have easily escaped injury, even after his 
unsuccessful and unselfish attempt to save Bertha. Instead, he wants to 
make sure that everyone else is out of the house before him and so gets 
burned when the beam falls on him. Again, the argument suffers from 
a lack of precision. 
Of course, to conclude that the reasoning in this single, albeit very im­
portant, paragraph from a 700-page book is flawed is not to establish 
that the argument of the whole is flawed. Indeed, although I do think 
that the analysis I have just scrutinized is far from an isolated example 
of their reasoning, I also find that in many places their readings become 
more convincing under such scrutiny.7 So it might seem that what I 
should do here is conclude that their work is flawed but not fatally so 
and then reflect on the politics of this pluralist evaluation. But I am 
not ready for that step just yet, because the pluralist position asks me to 
take one more step toward understanding. 
Can my reconstruction of their framework tell me something about 
the sources of the flaws in the argument? Why should readers who are 
as skillful and sophisticated as Gilbert and Gubar sometimes produce 
readings that seem as questionable as the one we have analyzed? One 
powerful feature of their framework is their definition of the text as 
a site of the female writer's responses—and especially resistance—to 
patriarchy. Part of the significance of their book is its demonstration of 
how such a view of the text opens up some understandings of Austen, 
the Brontes, Eliot, Dickinson, and others, that were not available be­
fore. This conception of the text joins with their goal of showing that 
the women writers themselves created the tradition to lead Gilbert and 
Gubar into the position of having to offer comprehensive readings of 
the texts as resistances to patriarchy. Once in that position, however, 
they are virtually committed in advance to reaching certain conclusions 
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about their texts. In other words, by implicitly defining the text not 
just as a political document capable of revealing its author's attitudes 
about male-female relations under patriarchy but also as a document 
that will be more powerful the more it reveals about the woman writer's 
resistance to patriarchy, they become powerfully predisposed to finding 
that resistance. And that predisposition leads to some strained read­
ings. If they gave up the predisposition, then they would be less likely 
to offer such readings. They would, however, also have to give up the 
conclusion that the tradition they are describing is one that they are un­
covering from the women writers' texts because those texts cannot be 
comprehensively read as resistances to patriarchy. Nevertheless, the con­
vincing readings of parts of texts could be recombined into a different 
kind of narrative, one in which Gilbert and Gubar could take more re­
sponsibility for constructing a pattern of resistance in the female literary 
tradition. 
On this view, the flaws in the reasoning have important consequences 
for our evaluation of the whole project: the flaws detract from the per­
suasiveness of Gilbert and Gubar's large claim about the female tradi­
tion. At the same time, these flaws do not touch Gilbert and Gubar's 
powerful demonstration of how to do literary history when the text is 
conceived not as a formal object but as a political document. Further­
more, when we step outside their framework and historicize it in the 
larger context of literary critical politics, the flaws become even less 
important. By demonstrating in 1979 on a grand scale what a literary 
history built on the notion of text as political document would be like, 
Gilbert and Gubar helped to consolidate the growing power and in­
fluence of feminist criticism in the academy. Their voices loudly joined 
those of many other feminist critics to produce a compelling case for the 
necessity of rereading familiar texts with new principles in order to at­
tain a different kind of knowledge about those texts. Even if one wants 
to argue with specific readings, their larger case for the importance of 
reading politically remains intact. As a result, the book has contributed 
in an important way to the emphasis on political interpretation in the 
last decade. 
What then are the politics of the pluralist evaluations of Moi and 
Gilbert and Gubar I have conducted in this chapter? This question, 
I think, needs to be broken down into three separate questions, be­
cause politics operates here on three different levels. First, there is the 
"internal" politics involved in the analysis of the critics' arguments. 
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Because I have attempted to conduct those analyses according not to 
transmethodological standards but to the ones Moi and Gilbert and 
Gubar implicitly set for themselves, and because those standards in­
volve some conception of the relation between evidence and conclusion 
in argument, then the politics here are the politics of rational argument. 
Privilege accrues to those who generate the best reasons according to 
the standards agreed upon in advance. In Moi's case, the test is whether 
the inferences she draws are adequately based upon the data that she 
is working with. In Gilbert and Gubar's case, the test is whether their 
account of the data is sufficiently precise and coherent to support their 
inferences about the relation between Jane's anger and Bertha's actions. 
And for my analysis, in turn, the question is whether I have met them 
on their own terms and whether my conclusions follow from my evi­
dence. For other critics with different standards, the politics of such 
"internal" pluralist evaluation would shift and become the politics im­
plied in those standards. Orwell is right that there is no getting outside 
of politics, but for the pluralist doing internal evaluations of others' 
arguments, the politics themselves are plural. 
The second level on which politics operates here is in my evaluation 
of Gilbert and Gubar from outside their framework. My case about the 
significance of their book is based at least in part on an assumption 
about the importance of their feminist ideology. And that assumption 
itself is supported by two political positions. One derives from the poli­
tics of pluralism, a politics that valorizes the multiplication of critical 
perspectives for the different kinds of knowledge that they can offer. 
The second derives from my personal belief in the validity and impor­
tance of the feminist ideology itself. That belief arises out of more deeply 
embedded assumptions about such matters as justice and equality but 
those, too, of course have a political dimension. It is crucial to recog­
nize, then, that in the final evaluation conducted in the last section 
both my commitment to pluralism, which prompted the question— 
why should these kinds of problems develop in this project—and my 
political commitments to feminist ideology converged. 
The third, and most complex, level on which politics operates here 
is in my choosing feminist criticism as the illustrative case. First, the 
choice itself reinforces the power of feminist criticism because it assumes 
that one way to get a hearing for my case about pluralism is to pose the 
problem of evaluation in this way. At the same time, the structure of 
the whole chapter privileges pluralism over these feminist positions— 
they are being evaluated from the perspective of pluralism—and in that 
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respect the politics of pluralism in this chapter are the politics of any 
discourse that is trying to establish its own power. But to reduce the 
politics of this chapter, let alone the politics of pluralism in general, to 
that stance is to deny the other levels on which politics are operating 
here. Thus, though there is no getting outside of politics, there is also 
no good reason to treat discourse only as political. To evaluate our con­
versations only in light of Orwell's dictum is to impoverish our sense 
of the work they do; to think of those conversations pluralistically is to 
enrich our understanding of them. At the same time, to think of plural­
ism as escaping the realm of politics is to fool oneself; to pay attention 
to the political dimensions of pluralistic anlayses will heighten our self-
understandings. And it is these last assertions that form the ultimate 
message—political and philosophical—of my discourse. 
Notes 
1. Other important works on pluralism in criticism in this period include 
Walter Davis, The Act of Interpretation (1978), Paul Armstrong, Conflicting 
Readings (1990), and James Battersby, Paradigms Regained (1991). For a more 
general philosophical treatment of pluralism, see Watson. 
2. Note, for example, that the special issue of Critical Inquiry (Spring 1986) 
devoted to pluralism is entitled not "Pluralism and Its Powers" but "Pluralism 
and Its Discontents" and that the great majority of the contributors (Booth, 
Richard McKeon, and Kenneth Burke are the exceptions) focus on perceived 
discontents. 
3. I will comment later on the politics involved in the choice of this ex­
ample. 
4. For Crane, see Languages of Criticism. For my detailed assessments of 
Critical Understanding, see "Data, Danda, and Disagreement," and "Pluralism 
and Its Powers." Booth himself talks about Crane's tendency to privilege his 
neo-Aristotelian mode of understanding as the one best way to do interpreta­
tion. 
5. The mode a pluralist chooses will depend upon the kind of knowledge 
that he wants to acquire, and thus, the purpose he sets for his act of criticism. 
6. Moi has other objections to the book, and some of these strike me as 
more cogent precisely because she is more successfully engaging with it. When 
she questions Gilbert and Gubar's practice of identifying female characters 
with their authors, she can appeal at least implicitly to the common ground of 
the authors' lives and their texts. 
7. To take just one example, it seems to me that their analysis of how 
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Edgar Linton in Wuthering Heights, though lacking the physical attributes 
of the strong male, nevertheless acquires power from his social position as 
patriarch of Thrushcross Grange, offers a new and powerful insight into the 
dynamics of the relationships among Edgar, Catherine, and Heathcliff after 
Catherine gets married. 
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Wayne Booth and the Politics 
of Ethics 
BARBARA FOLEY 
ETHICAL CONCERNS HAVE always been at the heart of Wayne Booth's 
critical enterprise. The early The Rhetoric of Fiction (1961) as well as 
the subsequent A Rhetoric of Irony (1974) proposed pioneering critical 
methodologies for locating authorial point of view—a point of view 
that was, Booth always insisted, while mediated through structure, 
style, and voice, necessarily ethical in its implications. Modern Dogma 
and the Rhetoric of Assent (1974) and Critical Understanding: The Powers 
and Limits of Pluralism (1979) offered rigorous commentaries on the 
logical grounds upon which readers, critics, and authors might achieve 
a common terrain for critical dispute—and, in so doing, articulate their 
common or divergent ethical concerns. It is, however, in The Company 
We Keep (1988), subtitled "An Ethics of Fiction," that Booth shrugs off 
the formalistic aspects of his Chicago school heritage and undertakes 
his fullest encounter with the ethical questions that are involved in the 
activities of writing, reading, and commenting upon literary texts. In 
this discussion of the relation of politics to ethics in Booth's work, I shall 
therefore focus upon this book, which, in its encounter with questions 
of interpretation and value that have been urgently raised by recent 
critical theory, combines an abiding passion for the literary classics with 
a lively concern for social justice and a strong intellectual commitment 
to discovering the connections between the two. 
There are certain crucial respects in which Booth's attempt to pro­
pose an ethics of reading is made problematic by the very question he 
is asking: Can the "ethics" embedded in literary texts be meaningfully 
discussed apart from an analysis of the social and political assumptions 
'35 
136 BARBARA FOLEY 
and practices that endow any given ethical system with its aura of legiti­
macy? However fully it may wish to historicize the values invoked in 
a text, can any project taking "ethics" as its ground succeed in relating 
these values to the competing ethical systems generated by actual social 
groups in conflict? Does the very invocation of the term ethics—even 
if qualified by the modest singular article "an"—fetishize questions of 
textual morality, setting them apart from—and prior to—the messy 
and embattled terrain of political practice? Before I plunge into a con­
sideration of the relation of ethics to politics in Booth's study, however, 
I must acknowledge the massive dimensions of Booth's achievement in 
The Company We Keep. For, in this landmark study, Booth builds upon 
the most valuable insights of Chicago school theory, which was by no 
means as unremittingly formalistic as is often supposed, to construct a 
compelling model for describing the ways in which a text's "power of 
form" implicates readers in its author's values. 
Arguing that ethical considerations are intimately bound up with 
any encounter between an author and a reader, Booth declares that it 
is incumbent upon critics to engage in "ethical criticism," which he 
defines as the "attemp[t] [to] describe the encounters of a story-teller's 
ethos with that of the reader or listener" (Company 8). As he develops 
what he means by the theory and practice of "ethical criticism" in The 
Company We Keep, it becomes clear that Booth has relinquished much 
of the ahistoricism and abstraction at times accompanying the Chicago 
school's formulations about the relation of form to ideology and recep­
tion. In stipulating that an author's "patterning of desire" articulates 
historically grounded social beliefs at the same time that it shapes these 
intentionally into a certain type of artistic whole, for example, Booth 
supersedes the rigid and artificial distinctions between "extratextual" 
and "literary" causalities proposed by earlier Chicago school critics such 
as R. S. Crane and Elder Olson (see Olson, "Outline"; Crane, Prin­
ciples 52; Crane, "Introduction" 20). Thus in his remarks on e. e. cum-
mings's "ygUDuh," ostensibly a satire upon white American workers' 
crudely racist attitudes toward the Japanese in the World War II era, 
Booth points out that the "formal" cause of cummings's clever play 
with linguistic opacity is inseparable from its "final" cause, namely, 
the poet's desire to expose the ways in which patriotism can mask— 
but also enable—a fascistic characterization of the "other." Booth also 
notes, however, that a recognition of cummings's simultaneously aes­
thetic and social intention should prompt the critic to scrutinize closely 
the particular ways in which the poet positions his reader: 
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Looked at more closely . . . the poem may come to seem tainted by 
another form of bigotry; in capitalizing on one rejected act of stereotyp­
ing on the basis of race, it relies on another, on the basis of class, as it 
suggests that people who speak substandard English embrace substan­
dard moral notions. . . . The elite position of the poet attacking bigotry, 
reinforced by the elite assumptions of readers who take pride in perform­
ing an intricate act of linguistic deciphering, is vulnerable to the reader's 
question: "as you mock these slobs for their blindness to the Japanese as 
'other,' where do you stand toward them as your 'other'?" (218) 
Booth's ethical criticism of the "patterning of desire" in cummings's 
poem entails not only an examination of the satisfactions afforded by 
the (educated) reader's decoding of cummings's play with "typical" 
working-class language but also an inquiry into and judgment upon 
the elitist social assumptions encoded within the generalizations about 
the working class that the poem encourages. After a point, Booth dem­
onstrates, historical and aesthetic causalities are indistinguishable from 
one another. 
In The Company We Keep, Booth continually points out how generic 
convention and dynamis mobilize social values: the text is, for Booth, by 
nature ethical to the core. In setting forth his ethics of reading, Booth 
demonsrates the various axes along which a neo-Aristotelian concern 
with such matters as instabilities and resolutions in plot is not merely 
compatible with, but actually requires, analysis of the specifically liter­
ary ways in which fictional texts work upon readers. In a subtle and 
highly dialectical commentary upon Jane Austen's Emma, he shows 
how the text's adherence to romantic plot conventions would appear to 
entrap the reader into endorsing the notion that marriage is the neces­
sary context of female self-realization: by being urged to desire Emma's 
consignment to the custodianship of the gallant but sober Knightley, 
readers are entrapped within sexist social values by their own vicari­
ous "literary" desires. Yet Booth also analyzes the narrator's persistently 
ironic deflation of the expectations routinely accompanying romantic 
closure, which, he argues, functions to undercut the notion that Emma's 
selfhood, hard won through her own experience, can really consist in 
nuptial bliss. The text's manner of representation interacts with, and 
alters, its mode of representation. Booth salvages Austen for feminism 
by demonstrating that the text's meaning cannot be equated with any 
single narrative element but must be inferred from a description of the 
specific narrative experience afforded by the text. A Chicago school ex­
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amination of the text's "power" as an instance of narrative comedy thus 
provides privileged access to its embodiment of ideology.1 
But the ethical criticism of narrative form does not always yield ideo­
logical recuperation of the classics for contemporary readers. After a 
close consideration of the alternative interpretive possibilities embodied 
within Rabelais's dialogic treatment of the status of women in Gargan­
tua and Pantagruel, Booth concludes that these texts' refusal to include 
the voices of their many female characters leaves the reader with the 
indelible impression that women are simply material for "masculine 
laughter" (394). Similarly, after undertaking a careful reading of Adven­
tures of Huckleberry Finn that focuses not only on the novel's vexing 
ending but also on the shifting attitudes and judgments orchestrated 
throughout the narrative, Booth feels compelled to conclude that the 
representation of Jim implies very damaging generalizations about the 
responses of slaves to their conditions of servitude. Although he con­
tinues to insist that Adventures of Huckleberry Finn is a "wonderful" 
book, he also concedes, "I cannot, by sheer act of will, restore Twain's 
former glow" (477). The application of ethical poetics to an examina­
tion of the dynamis informing various classic works of literature is thus 
as likely to produce a lowering of the critic's estimate of a text as it is to 
yield "proof" of the text's untarnished and enduring value. 
At the heart of Booth's ethical enterprise, then, is a conception of 
the rights—and responsibilities—of the reader that substantially alters 
the notions of textual reception originally postulated by the Chicago 
school critics, who generally stipulated an undifferentiated "we" recep­
tive to an apolitical "pleasure" and "beauty" (Olson 566). While Booth, 
as an unreconstructed intentionalist, rejects the subjectivism he sees im­
plied in many versions of reader-response criticism, he also grants that 
different readers will bring different ethical values to texts and come 
away with different assessments. A key "character" introduced at the 
outset of The Company We Keep is one Paul Moses, a black member of 
the University of Chicago professorial staff, who in the early 1960s re­
fused to teach Hucf{ Finn because of its "many distorted views of race" 
(3). Moses's principled stand—which, Booth freely admits, he failed 
to grant sufficient legitimacy at the time—haunts Booth throughout 
his study, functioning as a social conscience continually challenging the 
formalist abstractions of a "pure" (that is, nonethical) criticism. Booth 
continues to insist, as he did in The Rhetoric of Fiction, that literary 
texts work upon their readers by "creating" them as "peers" {Rhetoric 
of Fiction 397). But he now insists with equal force that it is the task 
of criticism to query "the offer of disinterested friendship" held out by 
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the implied author—who may "prove to be a wolf in sheep's clothing" 
(177). The "we" who, for Olson or Crane, served as the author's perfect 
mirror is now dissolved into multiple social and historical selves, each 
claiming the right to engage in reading and criticism along the lines dic­
tated by distinctive ethical imperatives. "Pleasure" is no longer a form 
of potential energy stored within the text, awaiting transformation into 
kinesis by an ideal reader, but a material measure of the extent to which 
the text's implied values have been made moving and acceptable to an 
actual reader experiencing an actual evaluative response. 
What Booth urges in The Company We Keep, in other words, is a 
view of the reading process, and of the critical acts elucidating that 
process, that enlists the best features of the Chicago school's concern 
with texts as instances of persuasive praxis. Booth's rehabilitation of 
neo-Aristotelian poetic and rhetorical theory for socially committed 
criticism thus prompts us to consider exactly how poetic and fictional 
texts do their ideological work. While much valuable semiotic inquiry 
has recently been undertaken by critics arguing that all texts need to 
be scrutinized as texts, without exempting the so-called "nonfictional" 
genres, Booth's study usefully illuminates the rhetorical strategies pecu­
liar to the "specifically literary" genres. In short, The Company We Keep 
enriches our understanding of the ethical powers of literature, helping 
us to see both how literary works perform their rhetorical tasks and why 
we should take seriously their function as purveyors of social values. It 
brings us to the threshold of a rhetoric of politics. 
If Booth's study brings us to this threshold, however, it does not take 
us over the lintel. It fails in this enterprise, in my view, largely be­
cause it never directly confronts the relation between the ethical and 
the political, but instead continually slips from the former to the latter 
without clarifying their points of tangency or difference. Booth evinces 
an awareness of this problem at the outset, declaring that 
[w]e might. .. broaden the term "ethical" even further, making it carry 
the weight of all political criticism as a rough synonym for what many 
people would call ideological criticism. I must often use it in that broad 
sense, but although I raise political issues throughout, I cannot pretend 
to offer the full encounter with them that the enterprise inherently de­
mands. (12) 
At subsequent points in The Company We Keep, Booth expressly points 
to the embeddedness of political considerations within ethical judg­
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ments, as, for example, when he refers to the "political questions that 
naturally spring from any serious thinking about the ethical powers of 
fictions" (137), or when he notes that the capacity to acknowlege one's 
beliefs requires "a fully developed art of ethical (and, by implication, 
political) criticism" (290). Booth's careful wording in these passages 
suggests that he does not see the political and the ethical as precisely 
equivalent to one another, though they may be closely related. His ab­
stention from defining this relation, however, leaves the reader with the 
impression that what "comes first"—and really "matters"—is ethics: 
politics may in some sense flow from ethics, but ethical decisions and 
judgments are prior in both temporal sequence and importance. 
Booth's reluctance to confront the relation of ethics to politics results 
in two major omissions in The Company We Keep. The first of these con­
sists in his almost exclusive concentration upon acknowleged "classics" 
and his refusal to engage in sustained critical dialogue with any work 
that is not squarely situated within the established canon. To make this 
charge is not to claim that Booth makes no mention of noncanonical 
texts; The Company We Keep is in fact replete with passing references 
to soap operas, detective stories, popular romances, and sensationalis­
tic potboilers such as Jaws. He offers laudatory assessments of several 
texts—for example, Alice Walker's The Color Purple, Toni Morrison's 
Beloved, Tillie Olsen's Tell Me a Riddle—that have in fact become ca­
nonical, or near canonical since the publication of this book six years 
ago. But Booth refrains from discussing the particular sorts of ethical 
criticism that can be prompted by the works of serious writers who, 
for reasons having to do with race, gender, class, or simply historical 
contemporaneity, have not (or not yet) emerged as creators of cultural 
monuments. His most fully fleshed out examples are drawn from Yeats, 
Pound, Joyce, Austen, Lawrence, Rabelais, and Twain—all white, all 
but one male, and all—with the exception of Rabelais, for whom such 
a label would be anachronistic—bourgeois.2 
No doubt Booth could justify his choice of textual examples by argu­
ing that his principal point is that even—indeed, especially—the clas­
sics need to be scrutinized for ethical shortcomings: Rabelais, Austen, 
Lawrence, Twain, and others warrant close investigation precisely be­
cause they are commonly held to propound incontrovertible wisdoms 
and articulating universal values. The fact remains, however, that the 
reader of The Company We Keep is left with the distinct impression that 
the most significant (if flawed) company one should choose to keep is 
the "classic" writer, who offers a "richer, fuller life" than any of his or 
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her lesser counterparts. Thus, by a curious turn of the wheel, the classic 
writers whom Booth chastises for their questionable ethics emerge as, if 
not "morally" rehabilitated, at least rehabilitated as the principal objects 
of critical inquiry. As Booth notes, 
[R]ather than finding reasons to ban narratives, we are now more inter­
ested in protecting them—and thus ourselves—from premature, unac­
knowledged, and irresponsible judgments. The classics need not fear us 
if we look them in the eye; most of them—we cannot know which ones 
in advance of fresh reading—can more than hold their own in any fair 
encounter. Perhaps the supreme value of ethical criticism is that once 
we have practiced it vigorously in the presence of a classic, that classic 
becomes more fully alive in our culture than it was before. (423) 
Indeed, Booth's repeated use of the word "classic," as well as his 
continual deployment of honorific adjectives such as "wonderful" and 
"beautiful" to describe even works he finds ethically lacking, has the 
effect of protecting his cherished texts in advance from even the most 
searing criticism. The current debate about canon busting is thus 
largely defused by Booth's emphasis upon the classics, which, he assures 
us, contains sufficient meat—delicious meat—for the most voracious 
political critic. 
Booth is of course entitled to his love of the classics. But the absence 
in The Company We Keep of any detailed analysis of texts by working-
class writers or writers of color substantially limits the range of his 
description of the powers and functions of ethical criticism. My point 
here is not simply that Booth has violated some pluralistic notion of 
"equal time" for all comers on the literary scene; although, given his 
evident enthusiasm for other sorts of pluralism, this point could also be 
made. My complaint is that he has sloughed over one very important 
type of ethical effect that a text can produce—namely, that of immers­
ing readers in a represented world that calls into question their sense of 
moral purity or that simply teaches them something new about social 
reality. If ethical criticism consists simply of describing and judging the 
ways in which classic texts encode social values that may, upon closer 
examination, appear morally repugnant, the critic is assumed to inhabit 
a superior ethical stance: possessed of egalitarian values the author does 
not hold (or at least not fully enough), the critic confronts her or his own 
agonized contradiction between aesthetic pleasure and social belief. But 
if ethical criticism is to address the real political problems that many of 
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us encounter, not only in our own reading experiences but also in those 
of our students, it must additionally theorize the dynamics of situations 
where writers challenge readers to assume more egalitarian attitudes 
(antiracist, antisexist, antielitist) than they might already espouse. Ethi­
cal criticism must take into account that the writer may be the principal 
"ethical critic," and the would-be emancipated reader his or her pupil— 
chastened, bemused, guilt-ridden, indignant, even resentful. 
Booth by no means ignores the transformative power that books 
can have: indeed, at one point in The Company We Keep he offers a 
fascinating catalogue of instances in which numerous friends and ac­
quaintances have attested to the liberating influence certain books have 
had upon their attitudes and lives (278-79). But, in a study that is gen­
erally quite remarkable for its candor and self-critical openness, Booth 
himself offers no detailed ethical criticism of his own encounter with 
any of the noncanonical texts he finds compelling, even though doing 
so might significantly buttress his ethical criticism of classic texts. His 
incisive commentary upon the racism embedded in Huc\ Finn, for ex­
ample, would be immeasurably enriched by a juxtaposition of his read­
ing of this novel with an account of an "ethical" response—his own or 
someone else's—to the representation of the lives of slaves in Beloved 
or Frederick Douglass's Narrative of the Life of an American Slave. To 
be sure, as Booth himself points out, a critical discussion of any text is 
no substitute for the actual narrative encounter itself. One very impor­
tant type of ethical criticism is accomplished when a reader "corrects" 
the version of reality tendered in one text by counterposing it with 
the lived experience of another "rival" world with which it is "in dia­
logue" (344). Nonetheless, by refraining from describing how attitudes 
or knowledge gained from an encounter with an "emancipated" text 
intersect with those gained from an encounter with a "retrograde" text, 
Booth leaves the reader with the impression that the ethical critic's pre­
sumably enlightened judgmental stance derives from principle alone, 
rather than from the experience that shapes and alters principle. No 
doubt one's lived experience—such as many of us have had in recent 
decades with social movements against racism and sexism—is the best 
teacher of such principles. But we cannot underestimate the role played 
by exposure to texts that embody and articulate the ethical values at the 
heart of such movements, providing political experiences of a valuable 
if different kind. 
To ask the question, then, How might Frederick Douglass tell the 
"story" of Jim? is not to substitute literature for life, but to ask how 
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the representation of social practices in Twain's novel might be sub­
jected to scrutiny through the lens of a narrative particularly empowered 
to tell us things about those practices that Twain himself could never 
have known. Posing this question entails a risk, however. For it ex­
poses Twain's novel to an ethical criticism perhaps more searching than 
any criticism derivable from an examination of implied social beliefs 
embedded within the "text itself." The juxtaposition of Douglass with 
Twain might require not only a careful consideration of what is repre­
sented in the text, as Booth does so ably, but also a consideration of what 
is excluded—namely, a depiction of the institution of slavery (includ­
ing the whippings, the daily humiliations, the back-breaking labor, the 
emotional pain, the psychological alienation) that would render plau­
sible Jim's decision to cut all his social ties and take off down the river. 
The risk entailed here, in short, is that, after his ethical scrutiny "by" 
Douglass, Twain might in fact never fully recover from the shock: the 
terms "classic" and "wonderful" that Booth lovingly (if ambivalently) 
bestows upon Huc\ Finn might indeed get stuck in the mouth. The 
impact of considering at length the "ethical criticism" offered by a text 
that is both noncanonical and oppositional, in short, might be to dem­
onstrate that the "rival" worlds offered in the two books are not simply 
in dialogue, but in conflict—political conflict. It might be impossible to 
continue to cherish the former if one takes seriously the ethical burden 
of the latter.3 
For Booth to have included more extended discussions of the ethi­
cal criticism embedded in texts by ethnic minority and working-class 
writers would not simply have called into question his abiding venera­
tion of the classics; it would also have put in a new light the aesthetic 
criteria for adjudicating literary value that justify this veneration. Booth 
notes at one point that "[w]hat we all admire (though the details of our 
admiration vary tremendously) are works that are either consistent with 
themselves, and thus in some sense unified, or works that acknowledge 
their own inconsistencies and thus reflect a genuine encounter with re­
calcitrant materials" (193-94). Jane Austen undertakes an exemplary 
feat of ethical criticism in Emma, he claims, because she ably deploys the 
conventions of sentimental romance in constructing an emotionally and 
aesthetically satisfying plot at the same time that she subtly undermines 
these conventions by refusing to narrate scenes of romantic fulfillment, 
substituting instead ironic summaries and laconic judgments. Rather 
than attacking completeness and closure, in other words, Austen indi­
cates her dissatisfaction with the ideologies embedded in conventions. 
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In positing that "we" all "admire" works that are either consistent 
and unified or at least self-conscious in their inconsistency and disunity, 
Booth is arguing in a polemical context. His antagonist is the currently 
fashionable notion that rupture or inconsistency or disunity is in itself 
a sign that a text has made a "genuine" ethical encounter with social 
reality. I readily grant his point, as well as his judgment of the particu­
lar feminist strengths of Emma. But I question whether ethical criticism 
should place as high a premium upon unity (or upon self-consciousness 
regarding disunity) as Booth suggests. For what is the ethical critic to 
make of a writer such as Harriet Wilson, who, in Our Nig, attempted 
to construct a bildungsroman around her agonized and profoundly re­
stricted life as "free black" in a "white house, North"? Or, to expand 
the analysis to another black woman writer not so visibly hampered 
by the particularities of her own experience, what should the ethical 
critic make of such an accomplished and sophisticated writer as Jessie 
Redmon Fauset, who, in Plum Bun, also attempted to enlist the con­
ventions of the bildungsroman to recount the ironically self-defeating 
life of a light-skinned woman trying to "pass" in the New York of the 
1920s? Did not the very requirements of the genre within which they 
were working—the notion that character is fate, for example, or that 
selfhood entails the attainment of autonomy—run counter to the social 
experience these writers wished to describe? Does the "ill fit" between 
subject matter and form simply reflect upon Wilson's or Fauset's lack of 
skill with plot or characterization? Or might it point to the ideological 
premises of the presumably "formal" qualities in a successful bildungs-
roman—namely, the notion that we are largely free to choose the selves 
we become? And, if this is true, might not it be appropriate to view 
genre itself as implicitly political—and problematic—for large num­
bers of writers possessing little if any access to such assumptions? And, 
if this is true, should not the literary standards that presuppose unity 
and wholeness as an "aesthetic" value be themselves subjected to ethical 
scrutiny? Is adequate recognition of the difficulties posed by conven­
tional forms to marginalized or oppositional writers granted by Booth's 
stipulation that these writers' conflictual relation to these forms should 
be articulated as a matter of conscious concern and control? To raise 
such questions is not, I repeat, to enshrine "incoherence, incongruity, 
or uncontrolled dissonance" (io8n). It is, however, to suggest another 
way in which noncanonical writers can provide ethical instruction. Such 
writers may not only reveal submerged aspects of social reality but also 
query the political presuppositions undergirding the literary conven­
tions through which that reality is ordinarily represented. 
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In short, Booth's abstention from any serious or extended encounter 
with the problems raised by the recent movement to open up the canon 
has the effect of isolating ethical criticism from politics. Booth's pas­
sion for the classics, his conviction that they deserve the most serious 
ethical commentary, enables him to tease out many of their points of 
political vulnerability. Yet this very loyalty prevents him from turning 
his attention to whole sets of texts that provide a fascinating plurality 
of ethical standpoints from which to criticize not only the implied ethi­
cal contents of classic works but also the ideological premises of classic 
forms. The narrowing of the domain of relevant literary texts entails the 
narrowing of the domain of relevant ethical issues. Ethics is collapsed 
into politics only at the cost of obscuring the various types of morality 
or immorality that can accompany the act of reading. 
The Company We Keep would benefit not only from a broader sense 
of literary tradition but also from a consideration of more, and different, 
ethical standards that might be brought to bear in ethical judgments 
of classic texts. My second major complaint about Booth's depoliticiz­
ing of ethics is that he does not adequately introduce considerations 
of social class into his discussion of the ethical critic's strategic prac­
tice. For, with the exception of the brief—though powerful—analysis 
of class bigotry in cummings that I mentioned above, Booth refrains 
from raising questions about the representation of classes and class hier­
archy throughout the book. Of course, Booth's defenders, seeing where 
I am heading (ah! here comes the Marxist!), might interrupt me here, 
arguing that, in faulting Booth for his failure to address these issues, I 
am simply disappointed that he does not happen to share my particular 
ethics. A writer's failure to exhibit sensitivity to inequalities stemming 
from social class, they might declare, may simply not be Booth's par­
ticular concern. This absence does not imperil the integrity of Booth's 
argument, these critics might continue, for he explicitly states that his 
own ethics may not coincide with those of other ethical critics and 
that he is simply attempting to delineate the parameters within which 
any act of ethical criticism can be performed, regardless of its specific 
social content. Booth's preponderant emphasis upon a feminist critical 
approach, they would conclude, is not to be taken as prescriptive, but 
simply as exemplary: the strategies of feminist criticism should be taken 
as "representative" of those of ethical criticism generally, rather than as 
constituting an exhaustive repertory of specific social values. 
I acknowledge that different critics may wish to emphasize different 
ethical concerns as they consider literary texts. But I question whether 
the strategies of feminist ethical criticism can be taken as "representa­
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tive" of all ethical criticism, especially a criticism based on consider­
ations of class. Feminist and Marxist analyses share, of course, certain 
important concerns: both stipulate that the classics contain egregious in­
stances of ethical blindness and, moreover, that this blindness matters in 
interpretation and evaluation. Nonetheless, feminist and Marxist criti­
cism do not always adopt similar critical maneuvers. To be sure, gen­
der issues are elided in whole genres or authorial oeuvres addressed to 
male readerships or focusing on male experience (I think here of West­
erns, various types of adventure narratives, and the sea novels of Joseph 
Conrad). More often than not, however, women are at least a marginal 
presence in even the most sexist of the classics. Sexist representation 
usually takes the form of denigration or distortion, not of wholesale 
omission. Feminist criticism thus generally addresses itself to the ideo­
logical implications of something that is represented. An examination 
of personal interactions among characters, narratorial intervention, and 
other textual features will ordinarily yield up sufficient material for the 
feminist critic to formulate an ethical commentary. 
Feminist criticism has developed useful strategies for examining such 
concerns, and in what I am about to say I in no way intend to detract 
from its achievement. But certain types of feminist criticism end up 
reinforcing the notion that the ethics of a text are projected through 
its representation of personalities; understanding the portrayal of the 
personal is the key to grappling with the political. Criticism empha­
sizing issues of class, by contrast, is more frequently confronted with 
absence; in any number of classics, the vast numbers of peasant and 
proletarian producers who enable the very existence of the narrative's 
interacting elite characters—male and female—are simply invisible. To 
be sure, this is not always the case: Joyce and Lawrence give us enough 
of working-class experience to whet our appetites, while Dickens treats 
problems of class hierarchy by boldly juxtaposing characters from di­
verse social levels. But generally the working class figures in literary 
texts in the bourgeois "great tradition" as an invisible presence. In Edith 
Wharton's House of Mirth, the fastidious Selden may intuit that "a great 
many dull and ugly people must, in some mysterious way, have been 
sacrificed to produce [Lily Bart]" (7). But this recognition does not seem 
to compel Wharton herself to grant more than the most passing recog­
nition to such sacrifices or to explore the mystery of their cause. In The 
House of Mirth, as in a great number of classic novels, the reader is 
left with the distinct impression that, however fully a character's per­
sonality and values may be grounded in his or her serial environment 
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(and Wharton is, it should be granted, better than many on this point), 
that environment itself is an autonomous world. This world may be 
juxtaposed in interesting ways with the world of the laboring and the 
poor, but is in no significant way dependent upon it. One result of this 
fetishization of wealth and leisure, I would argue, is a fetishization of 
morality. Questions of alienation, oppression, and injustice—questions 
that are political to the core—take shape as "moral" issues, embodied 
in the "good" and "bad" polarities signaled by the elite characters who 
ordinarily constitute the text's ethical spectrum. 
If it is true that class is often obscured in classic texts in ways that 
gender is not, then the ethical project of the critic concerned with issues 
of class is in certain crucial ways very different from that of the feminist 
critic. The Marxist critic treats as political both textual presences and 
textual absences. The final ethical judgments the Marxist critic arrives 
at may thus diverge significantly from those reached by the feminist 
critic; the "correct" ethical judgment of a text is not a preexistent given, 
waiting to be discovered by the enlightened critic, but a contested ter­
rain, where different political premises require different critical maneu­
vers and produce potentially divergent ethical conclusions. As Booth 
ably demonstrates, the various textual presences in Emma—both ex­
plicit and implicit—allow the feminist critic to conclude that Austen 
offers an emancipatory ironic commentary that recuperates her for con­
temporary feminism. But what are we to say of Austen's (or, Austen's 
narrator's) blithe remark that Emma had the "good fortune" to be pos­
sessed of great wealth? There are no represented elements in the novel 
that invite us to interpret this statement ironically. Austen's attitude 
toward the plot of romantic fulfillment can be inferred from the subtle 
interplay of action with tone; but the author's silence on the question of 
the sources, and legitimacy, of "fortunes" suggests that the conditions 
of their being got and spent are irrelevant to her ethical universe. For 
the reader who is concerned with ethical criteria encompassing con­
siderations of both gender and class, then, assessing Emma is deeply 
problematic. If this reader's discontent with Austen's blindness to the 
implications of early nineteenth-century class hierarchy is then fueled 
by encounters with texts that describe what class hierarchy meant in 
the lives of real people—Marx's searing account of the consequences of 
the enclosure movement in Capital, volume 1, for example, or Mayhew's 
description of the urban poor—it may become still more difficult for 
the ethical critic to respond with pleasure to Austen's account of self-
discovery and love among the leisure classes. Like Hucl{ Finn after its 
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encounter with Frederick Douglass, Emma after its meeting with Marx 
or Mayhew may never be so "wonderful" again.4 
N  o doubt the argument could be made that any ethical critic who 
relies so heavily upon a judgment of what is not represented in a text 
is a spoilsport in the groves of academe, anachronistically condemning 
great cultural monuments and, moreover, raising considerations that are 
fundamentally irrelevant to the sort of criticism Booth is describing. It 
is one thing to criticize a writer for failing to grant full humanity to 
characters who actually appear in the pages of a text: at least then the 
"ethics" of the text can be seen as consisting in its failure to grapple fully 
with its own donnee. It is quite another thing, however, to insist that 
authors talk about something that did not even occur to them. Indeed, 
the argument might be—and here a frown might be cast toward Booth 
as well as the Marxist—that the above comments on Austen, Marx, and 
Mayhew demonstrate why the whole enterprise of ethical criticism is of 
questionable value to begin with. Once the door is opened to the propo­
sition that critics have the right—indeed, the responsibility—to inject 
social values into literary evaluation, can it ever be closed again? Is there 
no domain of aesthetic evaluation exempt from political judgment? 
I would respond that the Marxist arguments I have raised are en­
tirely compatible with Booth's inquiry into the ethics of reading and 
criticism; to an extent I expect that Booth would back me up. Certainly 
he would grant little validity to the argument that complaints about 
earlier writers' failure to be aware of the realities of exploitation are 
irrelevant or ahistorical. As he notes with regard to the potential accu­
sation that he is imposing a i98os-based ethics of gender relations upon 
Rabelais, "The only 'Rabelais' I can be fully responsible to confronts me 
here and now. I do not possess Rabelais's works then; I possess them, 
or they attempt to possess me, now. I read him as I read anyone: in my 
own time. Whatever he does to me will be done within my frame of 
values, not his" (412). Where Booth and I would part company, how­
ever (and I would regret to see him go, for he is such splendid company 
to keep) would probably be around a disagreement regarding my claim 
that the forms of ethical criticism are inextricably bound up with their 
substance. He would assert, I suspect, that the particular ethics guid­
ing a given critic's act of ethical criticism are logically separable from 
the adopted strategy of critique. I, by contrast, would insist that differ­
ent social values necessitate different sorts of inquiries and that certain 
specific ethical contents—central among these being a full recognition 
of the ideological workings of assumptions regarding gender, race, and 
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class—are indispensable to a "full" ethical engagement with a text, one 
that accounts not only for what the text represents but also for what it 
sloughs over and obscures. The critic who ignores such considerations, I 
would argue, runs the risk of dissolving ethics into a matter of personal 
sensitivity, obscuring the important political questions at stake when 
we encounter texts and traditions that purport to represent a culture to 
itself. 
Much of The Company We Keep is given over to a discussion of the logi­
cal grounds upon which ethical criticism makes its claim to legitimacy. 
Near the beginning of the book, Booth asks, "Can we hope to find a 
criticism that can respect variety and yet offer knowledge about why 
some fictions are worth more than others?" (36). The argument that 
follows offers an eloquent refutation of the notion that ethical criticism 
can be nothing more than the imposition of subjective value judgments 
upon literary texts and traditions. There is, Booth emphatically argues, 
no valid basis for distinguishing between fact and value, interpretation 
and judgment, nor should we look for one. Even though Booth's own 
writing is largely directed toward a rehabilitation of the classic tradition 
as the object of ethical inquiry, his book serves to legitimate and support 
the activity of a broad range of canon-busting critics who have been en­
gaging in their own brands of "ethical criticism" for some years now. In 
many ways Paul Moses is generously vindicated by Booth's committed 
response to the issues his colleague posed twenty-five years ago. In this 
sense, The Company We Keep, coming as it does from a critic widely 
esteemed for his adherence to "traditionalist" values, offers aid and sus­
tenance to the insurgent modes of cultural criticism at a crucial moment 
in their development. For we should not be overly complacent about 
the foothold that the proponents of feminist and ethnic studies have 
gained in literature departments. While presently enjoying considerable 
prestige, these scholars are coming under increasing attack by cultural 
conservatives dedicated to expunging the barbarians in our midst and 
to lampooning "political correctness" as a new McCarthyism. Booth, 
for all his abiding dedication to the study of the classics, will clearly not 
allow himself to be enlisted in the conservatives' ranks. He may not be 
branded a barbarian or neo-McCarthyite himself, but as time goes by, 
he may well be seen as a renegade who, by theorizing the inseparability 
of the ethical from the aesthetic, gives succor and comfort to the mob 
at the gates. 
I hope I have not been looking a gift horse too much in the mouth, 
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then, when I direct attention to what I think are significant limitations 
in Booth's ethical program, limitations that are simultaneously ethical 
and political. For Booth can set forth his version of critique engagee with 
such aplomb—and can argue that its validation is primarily a logical 
matter—partly because his book does not raise particularly incendiary 
political questions. His success in urging the logical integrity of his 
thesis is a function not so much of his avoidance of politics as it is of his 
endorsement of a distinctively nonthreatening politics. The antiracism 
informing Booth's critique of Twain, while powerful within its limits, 
confines ethical judgment to the domain of stereotyping; it bypasses 
the more fundmental issues about economic and institutional power 
that would be raised by such texts as House Made of Dawn or Native 
Son. The antisexism informing his discussions of Austen and Rabelais, 
while perspicacious in its analysis of the limitations on female potenti­
ality projected in classic conventions and texts, speaks to constructions 
of feminism currently enjoying widespread acceptance (at least at the 
level of lip service) among middle-class academics. Considerations of 
class that would emphasize issues of exploitation or the legitimation of 
class hierarchy are virtually absent from the range of standpoints Booth 
presents as possible premises for ethical criticism. Booth can collapse 
politics into ethics because he invokes a version of the political that is in­
separable from the moral stance of contemporary liberal humanism. A 
Marxist version of the political, I hope to have shown, does not simply 
generate a different series of examples to make the same points. Instead, 
it places the ethical in tension with the political, requiring that "ethics" 
themselves—a plural, not a singular noun, we should note—be situated 
in the conflicted zone of social practice before they be invoked in the 
process of literary evaluation. Booth sets forth with passion and clarity 
the assumptions and strategies of an ethical criticism practiced from the 
vantage point of liberal humanism. Critics further to the left, taking up 
Booth's cue, need to theorize with equal rigor how ethics are embedded 
in their own strategic practices of reading, criticism, and evaluation. 
Notes 
i. The fullest application of Chicago school principles to the study of 
narrative fiction is Sheldon Sacks, Fiction and the Shape of Belief. Kenneth 
Burke's various works undertake an imaginative politicization of Aristotelian 
poetics that explores potentialities only partially realized by Sacks's work and 
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the earlier work of Booth. See, for example, The Philosophy of Literary Form 
and Counter-Statement. 
2. The use of the term bourgeois here refers not specifically to class origins 
but to a writer's general placement within a philosophical/political tradition 
that can be loosely described in this way. Clearly the term has somewhat more 
problematic application to a D. H. Lawrence than to a Jane Austen, but it 
remains useful in characterizing an overall ideological orientation. 
3. My own interpretation of Adventures of Huckleberry Finn does not ne­
cessitate such drastic conclusions regarding Twain's racism. While I concede 
that the portraiture of Jim is sterotyped and involves serious omissions regard­
ing the institution of slavery, I subscribe to the more "ironic" reading of the 
novel that Booth dismisses as overly ingenious (470-73). This reading—which 
is, I believe, amply buttressed by the text, and not simply imposed by 1990s 
wish fulfillment—does a good deal to salvage Twain for contemporary anti-
racist discourse. For antiracist readings ofHucl( Finn, see Wilding, "The False 
Freedoms of Huckleberry Finn," in Political Fictions 21-47; and David L. 
Smith, "Huck, Jim, and American Racial Discourse," in Leonard, Tenney, and 
Davis 103-20. 
4. I have not directly confronted here the relation of class to race: clearly 
the remarks I have made about the ways that criticism focusing on questions of 
class requires special attention to gaps and omissions are also true of criticism 
focusing on questions of race. Indeed, as my remarks on Huc\ Finn suggest, a 
writer's inattention to the position of blacks within the socioeconomic structure 
is closely related to the invocation of racial sterotypes. In terms of representa­
tional presences and absences, class is a good deal more closely aligned with 
race than it is with gender. Yet the treatment of racism differs from that of 
class, and shares certain similarities with that of gender, insofar as an ethics 
of the "personal" can more frequently emerge as central to a text's ideological 
stance. 
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Learning to Read Martin Luther 
King's "Pilgrimage to Nonviolence": 
Wayne Booth, Character, and the 
Ethical Criticism of Public Address 
FREDERICK J. ANTCZAK 
To imagine a language is also to imagine a way of life. 
WITTGENSTEIN 
MOST OF US KNOW something of Wayne Booth's contributions in 
bringing ethical concerns to the study of literary narrative, of his persis­
tent efforts and signal accomplishments at a moment in critical history 
when such activity had run counter to the intellectual fashion. Surely 
Booth is right in thinking narrative an important subject, one "of uni­
versal concern," for "in the beginning, and from then on, there was 
story, and it was largely in story that human beings were created and 
now continue to recreate themselves" ("Ethical Criticism" 289, 290). 
But it is not only, and not always most importantly, in literary narra­
tive that human beings constitute and progressively reconstitute their 
characters and communities; the study of narrative has recently been ex­
tending itself into the study of the narratives that structure our practical 
discourse, including those of public address.1 Booth remains a largely 
untapped resource for this line of inquiry; but he is a resource worth 
tapping, for his recent work can contribute to this study both theoretical 
insights and methodological approaches, both ideas and methods. 
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In this chapter, I first explore three of Wayne Booth's theoretical 
insights that challenge contemporary critical and ethical dogmas, and 
which for our purposes happen to stand in particularly productive inter­
relation. Then I suggest how they generate ways of examining the nar­
rative dimensions of our practical discourse for their ethical nature. 
Finally, following Booth's consistent good example, I apply these les­
sons to a particular text that has a special importance and interest, to 
which such a mode of criticism has productive access. I hope to show 
how Booth enables us to describe and evaluate texts in terms of the 
capacities of character they realize. 
THREE BOOTHIAN CONCEPTS

In Modern Dogma and the Rhetoric of Assent, Booth unpacked his notion 
of what it means to be human and to communicate to others who 
share our substance, describing the human self as "a field of selves," 
whose "primary mental act . .  . is to assent to truth rather than to de­
tect error, 'to take in' and even 'to be taken in'" (126, xvi). This view 
of human nature and agency mandated a new emphasis in rhetorical 
inquiry, a focus on character in the context of practical discursive com­
munities: "what is thus demanded by the principle of systematic assent 
is more rigorous thought than is customary about who 'we' are, the 
axiological experts whose shared experience confirms what we know 
together" (108). 
This rhetorical redefinition of the self, departing from modernist 
dogmas of both scientism and irrationalism, led to a consequent shift in 
the object of ethical criticism. "Most modern critics who have attempted 
any kind of ethical criticism," Booth acknowledges, "have sought ways 
of judging the effects of literary works on the lives of their readers— 
what modern jargon would call after-effects" ("George Eliot" 4); grant­
ing such empirical studies their place but noting their extraordinary 
difficulties, Booth offers an alternative: 
to shift our attention from consequences to qualities of experience sought 
or achieved by authors and readers during the time of reading or listen­
ing. Instead of asking whether this book or poem or play will make me 
a better person after I put it down, we might ask whether we can de­
scribe with any precision what sort of relation I have with it before I put 
it down. ("George Eliot" 5-6) 
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Booth's concern is with the quality of life lived in the company we keep 
with a work's implied author,2 an ethically relevant concern because, 
"insofar as the fiction has worked for us, we have lived with its values 
for the duration: we have been that kind of person for at least as long as 
we remained in the presence of the work."3 
One of the novelties of Booth's approach is that by this nonconse­
quentialist focus, he resists the modernist separation of description from 
evaluation practiced both by the scientismist (who emphasizes descrip­
tion and dismisses evaluation, at least as a form of knowledge) and by 
the irrationalist (who privileges the latter and disdains the former, at 
least as morally relevant). Such divisions and dismissals make little sense 
for a mode of analysis that is "practiced by characters who have been to 
some degree formed by the sort of thing they are judging, using a range 
of mental powers that will have been already affected by the narrative 
being judged" ("Ethical Criticism" 291); that is, for an ethical study 
that is in some part inescapably reflexive. But such a study must just 
as inescapably take into account the implied audience, its values, and 
their evolution over the reading of the piece. Booth is not utterly dis­
missing effects. He is, rather, reshaping our concepts of what counts as 
an effect in the ongoing rhetorical reconstitution of our own characters, 
and redirecting our notions about which of these effects are relevant 
for our study so as to include "not only the effects on listeners . . . but 
also the effects on tellers themselves." Because narrative ethics are in­
escapably reciprocal, as "any story told with genuine engagement will 
affect its teller fully as much as it affects listeners," we must expand 
our range of critical vision to consider both parties in every narrative 
exchange—both implied audience and implied author. "When we do 
that we discover a surprising range of responsibilities that might be 
explored" ("Ethical Criticism" 292). 
Those responsibilities emerge in the ethos of rhetoric constituted and 
enacted between implied author and implied audience. I use ethos here 
not in the technical Aristotelian sense familiar to rhetorical critics, to 
refer to the character of the speaker as projected in the speech; rather, 
I refer to the underlying and distinctive character of a practical com­
munity, its constitutive and ongoing way of life—more precisely in this 
case, its distinctive and characterizing way of life in language. These 
Boothian concepts—the self as a field of selves, the nonconsequentialist 
focus, and the vision of narrative ethics as a reflexive, reciprocal ac-
tivity—can generate at least an approach, if not a full-blown critical 
methodology, for how such a range might be explored. 
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ETHICAL CRITICISM 
So what does an ethical criticism based on Boothian insights into nar­
rative do, exactly? First, we know we are to explore how character is 
shaped in the field of selves shared by author and audience; it might 
be slightly more precise here to say "implied author" and "implied 
audience," but remember that it is Booth's premise that insofar as the 
rhetoric works for us, we live with and enact those values, and thus we 
become that kind of person for at least as long as we are engaged with 
the text. In such an ethical criticism, further, we are to focus not pri­
marily on the measuring of effects, but on describing with intersub­
jectively testable precision the way of life constituted and enacted, the 
quality of life lived while we are the kind of people, communicators, 
and moral agents whom the text invites and teaches us to be—the kind 
of people who take its starting point as our own, who move as we must 
move and who stop our interpretive deconstructions and reconstruc­
tions where we must stop if the text is to have its full intended effect. 
And finally, in such an ethical criticism we must take into account nar-
rative's reciprocal and reflexive nature; we must take into account how 
the stories, as embedded in and constitutive of a way of life, affect both 
their teller and their listeners. Tellers and listeners are human charac­
ters, to some degree inescapably shaped by the sort of thing which they 
are both judging and participating in; indeed, reshaped continuously 
by their processes of participation and judgment, depending on a range 
of intellectual and moral powers inescapably touched and triggered by 
experiencing the narrative that also is their object. 
Ethical criticism based on these principles—and this is one of the 
features that makes it distinctive in both contemporary ethical and rhe­
torical thought—unites the descriptive with the evaluative. If we follow 
Booth, we would begin by doing the best—by which he means the 
most intersubjectively verifiable—job possible in describing the text as 
an action. That is to say, in saying how the text acts, we must locate the 
means the text uses to constitute and enact its rhetorical relation with 
the intended audience. Then we must go on to describe the possibilities 
and limits of such a relation—but not, of course, exclusively in terms 
the critic imposes from outside the text, rather as ethical terms held in 
common with the audience of the criticism and affected by the experi­
ence of the text. We must describe the world of perception, choice, and 
action encountered in the text, seeing and evaluating as the text permits 
and enables us to do. For it must be our aim as ethical critics of this kind 
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to articulate the moral possibilities and limits of this particular ethos of 
rhetoric; to describe (and inevitably, by our very choice of descriptive 
terms, to begin to evaluate) what it is like to live, move, and grow in 
this way of life in language, in the practice of seeing and saying things 
this way. 
There is another way of putting this: Booth's contribution to the 
ethical criticism of American public discourse is to prompt us to clar­
ify and criticize the t{en of the discourse—the moral vision in terms of 
which the world may be seen and characterized for purposes of decision 
and action. As ethical critics, we must analyze the text's characteristic 
terms of description and evaluation, and explain how they work with 
one another to create the text's constitutive lines of argument, and to 
rank-order the possibilities for appeal and intersection of motive. This 
requires us to examine the language in which specific rhetorical situa­
tions are to be recognized; the values, assumptions, kinds of attention, 
and notions of authority with which that language is freighted; the 
thinkable alternatives for attitude and action therein to be character­
ized and made determinate for conscious and freely willed choice. It 
is our task to note how these terms clarify some possibilities (and ob­
scure others) for sustaining or denying, extending or transforming the 
immediate community of discourse and the wider world of experience 
in which that discourse is given to operate. By pursuing such concerns, 
the ethical critic aims to determine what one can and cannot say, can 
and cannot do, or even aspire to do, through discourse constituted and 
enacted in the text's characterizing way—to determine who we have to 
become, in our interactive relations with the author and with the text in 
its habits of language and dispositions of persuasion, in order to belong 
and to move appropriately and effectively in the world the text estab­
lishes. In short, Booth gives us an ethical criticism uniquely concerned 
with character as it is realized in author and audience "dancing together 
the dance" of the text. 
What is distinctive about this sort of ethical criticism is that in its 
own practice it remains persistently rhetorical—uniting value and fact, 
uniting critical evaluation to sharable, testable, improvable description 
of the text and of its ethos of rhetoric. For that ethos has a kind of 
recoverable public existence, an existence that may be the object not 
only of personal response, but also (and in a prior way) of sharable de­
scription and reasoned critical debate—intersubjective testing that itself 
becomes a matter of character, an influence on how we may hear and tell 
stories, and how we may draw from them practical public conclusions. 
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The proof of any criticism, especially rhetorical criticism of pub­
lic address, lies in what it can reveal about texts. In the hard case of 
Martin Luther King, Jr.'s "Pilgrimage to Nonviolence," ethical criticism 
becomes less a mode of passing judgment—the kind of verdict that 
usually reveals more about the critic than the object criticized—than a 
mode of noticing and explicating issues of character in understanding 
and evaluating the text.4 
MAKING KING S PILGRIMAGE 
Ethical criticism based on the principles that Booth has made available 
would seem a particularly appropriate and promising approach to study­
ing the rhetoric of the civil rights movement, since the movement drew 
so much of its remarkable (one might even call it transformatory and 
reconstitutive) persuasive force from moral appeals—not only in how it 
"talked its talk," but in how it "walked its walk" true to its principles. 
This also seems true of Dr. King in a variety of ways; for example, 
King's willingness to accept arrest was itself symbolic and persuasive, 
an expression of respect for democracy in general and American public 
opinion in particular, a kind of living appeal to conscience while being 
an unflinching enactment of its call to nonviolence. Surely Dr. King had 
vivid stories to tell, of confrontations, jailings, beatings, narrow escapes, 
radiant triumphs. But were one to select a King discourse particularly 
likely to demonstrate the insights of ethical criticism, "Pilgrimage to 
Nonviolence" would not be an obvious choice. However, employing 
ethical criticism enables us to see how "Pilgrimage" tells a character-
shaping story, a story after which neither King nor the movement— 
nor, perhaps, the reader and critic of the movement—can ever be quite 
the same. 
While "Pilgrimage to Nonviolence" does tell a story of sorts, it does 
not directly concern King's colorful public life; rather, by the way it asks 
its audiences to read in order to understand and appreciate it, it breaks 
down whatever distinctions between the vita activa and the vita contem­
plativa its intended audiences might bring to the reading. This essay is 
an account of his intellectual journey toward an idea that at least one 
critic has described as the most important contribution to American 
intellectual history since Dewey, at a minimum: the idea of nonviolent 
action.5 Originally appearing in 1958 as a chapter in his Stride Toward 
Freedom: The Montgomery Story, it might have seemed a curiosity: 
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an uncharacteristically scholarly and unblushingly abstruse disquisition 
about the relative merits of such esoteric thinkers as Niebuhr, Jaspers, 
Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre, and Rauschenbusch, ap­
pearing anomalously in the middle of a rousing story of one of the most 
interesting episodes in King's life. Revised for publication in i960 in the 
journal of theology and social ethics Christian Century, it might have 
seemed a little like preaching quite literally to the choir. Both kinds of 
audiences needed to learn how to read such a peculiar narrative; an ethi­
cal criticism of "Pilgrimage to Nonviolence" reveals how King taught 
such readers by moving them through a narrative that in several ways 
embodied and enacted its own message. 
The story begins with King himself at a formative learning stage, 
in theological seminary. There he is torn, not only intellectually but 
morally, between the "rather strict fundamentalist tradition" ("Pilgrim­
age" 35) in which he was raised, and the liberal theology in which he 
was being trained. Each tradition was "inadequate both for the church 
and for personal life"; each proved inadequate in the crucible of moral 
experience—much as, perhaps, King's readers may have found them­
selves torn between hopeful philosophy and unbending reality. Funda­
mentalism "fell into a mood of antirationalism . . . stressing a narrow, 
uncritical biblicism"; it was "too pessimistic" in defining man "only in 
terms of his existential nature, his capacity for evil." Liberalism was "all 
too sentimental concerning human nature and . .  . leaned toward a false 
idealism" in coming to terms with "the complexity of human motives 
and the reality of sin on every level of man's existence"; in displaying a 
"superficial optimism concerning human nature," liberalism "failed to 
see that reason by itself is little more than an instrument to justify . . . 
distortions and rationalizations." In short, "an adequate understanding 
of man is found neither in the thesis of liberalism nor in the antithesis of 
neo-orthodoxy, but in a synthesis which reconciles the truths of both" 
(36). And it is just here in the text that King enacts the importance of 
this intellectual quest, this characteristic quest for synthesis. 
Fundamentalism seemed to King to accept the unacceptable, to tol­
erate the intolerable ravages of bigotry in this life, overemphasizing the 
"better world" beyond. "Any religion that professes to be concerned 
about the souls of men and is not concerned about the slums that damn 
them, the economic conditions that strangle them and the social con­
ditions that cripple them is a spiritually moribund religion awaiting 
burial." But liberalism's optimism about the prospects of change under­
estimated not only the tactical problems of politics, but the deeper prob­
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lem of intractable evil in human hearts, which drove King to suspect 
that "the 'turn the other cheek' philosophy and the 'love your enemies' 
philosophy," the very Gospel itself, had only a limited practical applica­
tion, that "when racial groups and nations are in conflict a more realistic 
approach is necessary" (38). 
King's audiences came at this narrative from different directions, 
each with their own blind spots; King was asking of each a new ken, a 
new kind of reading activity, calling on new sorts of personal resources 
from each. The scholars were used to dealing with and assessing ideas as 
such; indeed, it must have seemed to them circuitous to confront ideas 
in an explicit narrative rather than in what would have seemed to them 
the more straightforward form of a treatise. King asked them now to 
examine those ideas as they would be embodied in human events, and 
to care about their outcomes. The members of the popular audience on 
the other hand were no doubt ready to read about events in the story 
of civil rights; King asked them now to inquire about how those events 
could be perceived and interpreted with greater moral insight if put in 
the context of deeper philosophical questions. In other words, to catch 
the full meaning and force of King's story of synthesis, these different 
audiences had to perform a synthesis themselves: each had to animate 
their concerns with the concerns of the other, each had to exercise new 
personal resources of empathy in order to read on. 
At that point King explains how he himself had performed his syn­
thesis, how he had been taught to perform it by his intellectual and 
practical engagement with Gandhi's philosophy oisatyagraha (quite lit­
erally a synthesis: "truth-force or love-force"). King came to terms with 
it first intellectually; however committed the members of the civil rights 
movement might be to their activity, to appreciate its origins and its 
hold on their leader they had to learn to see their cause as informed with 
a truthful philosophy that needed to be struggled with and thought 
about. But at first King "had a merely intellectual understanding" (38). 
However scholarly the theologians might be about their philosophy, to 
appreciate the force of that "merely" they had to become interested in 
King's forceful enactment of his ideas, at Montgomery and beyond. 
King goes on to discuss practical applications of Gandhi's philoso­
phy about which Gandhi had not directly spoken: the implications of 
nonviolence on international relations in a nuclear age, and the reality 
of a personal God. The story of King's learning to read Gandhi only 
reaches a conclusion that is to be regarded as satisfying when it becomes 
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a story of how he extended those ideas to new intellectual problems and 
new fields of human endeavor and experience. Our story of learning to 
read the pilgrimage to nonviolence—King's journey, and our own— 
cannot find a satisfactory ending in merely changing others' hearts: "it 
first does something to the hearts and souls of those committed to it. It 
gives them new self-respect; it calls up resources of strength and cour­
age that they did not know they had"; and ultimately, it reaches out 
to the other so that synthesis may occur, and "reconciliation becomes a 
reality" (39). 
"Pilgrimage to Nonviolence" is a pivotal text for the character of 
the civil rights movement and of King's work in particular, and ethical 
criticism can help us see how. Afterward, the movement could never be 
the same, for it was now made accountable, not only for its pragmatic 
effectiveness but its intellectual content and moral character. But at a 
time when "discerning the subject" has become more complicated— 
and the very notion of agency, that seems essential to the history of 
rhetoric and potentially important in some form to retrieve, is a re­
gion of theoretical controversy—Booth's ethical criticism brings even 
more within our ken: it opens a path for critical inquiry and discourse 
that can recover some sense of subjectivity, can as it were relocate it in 
the ethical field of texts and readers, from which self is continuously 
constituted and reconstituted. 
By examining the author's self as a field of selves, we find that 
King, by becoming the storyteller of the pilgrimage, could never be the 
same either, henceforward being bound to practice a kind of leadership 
that synthesized expediential concerns with philosophical ones. By ap­
proaching the ethos of rhetoric practiced in this text nonconsequentially, 
we can appreciate the kind of engagement it offers and the qualities 
that mark and characterize it. 
But in practicing narrative ethics as a reflexive, reciprocal activity, 
the readers of "Pilgrimage"—at least the readers who have moved with 
the text, and done all they had to do to understand and appreciate its 
suasive effects fully in the way they were intended—are also changed. 
Having performed these syntheses, having called on new resources of 
strength and courage and empathy, they are readied to extend those 
powers to new areas of their experience. Learning to read "Pilgrimage 
to Nonviolence" enacts, at least for the time of engagement with the 
text, a way of life in language that prepares its readers to make simi­
lar pilgrimages in their own lives. We can describe and appreciate the 
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importance of this text because Booth has equipped us with an ethical 
criticism focused on the capacities of character realized in the author 
and audience dancing together the dance of the text. 
Notes 
1. Perhaps the most important recent move in this direction has been 
Walter Fisher's articulation of "the narrative paradigm," along with the 
critical responses it has stimulated. See Walter R. Fisher, Human Communi­
cation as Narration: Toward a Philosophy of Reason, Value and Action (Colum­
bia: U of South Carolina P, 1987). See also Barbara Warnick, "The Narrative 
Paradigm: Another Story," Quarterly Journal of Speech 73 (1987): 172-82, and 
Robert C. Rowland, "Narrative: Mode of Discourse or Paradigm?" Commu­
nication Monographs 54 (1987): 264-75. 
2. See especially The Rhetoric of Fiction, part 2, "The Author's Voice in 
Fiction." 
3. Booth, "Ethical Criticism," 291-92. In this way he has much in com­
mon with James Boyd White's concern with "textual community," but I take 
it to be one of Booth's distinctive and more richly implicative contributions for 
the study of narrative ethics to characterize them as reflexive and reciprocal. 
See James Boyd White, When Words Lose Their Meaning: Constitutions and Re­
constitutions of Language, Character and Community (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 
1984), especially 14-20. It would be fair to characterize my critical enterprise 
as an attempt to elaborate what seems to public address scholars still somehow 
implicit (and what has been in any case still largely unexamined) in the impor­
tant work of Booth and White, and to make their contributions more clearly 
relevant and readily usable in the analysis of public address. To the extent that 
I would claim an original contribution, it would be in adapting the focus of 
ethical criticism from individual texts to larger bodies of materials of various 
kinds over time and changing circumstance. 
4. The rhetorical critic Edwin Black, in "The Second Persona," has de­
scribed an essential difficulty with current forms of ethical criticism: "the 
moral judgment of a text is a portentious act in the process of criticism, and . .  . 
the terminal character of such a judgment works to close critical discussion 
rather than open or encourage it" (109). I discuss this difficulty and the possi­
bilities that Booth and James Boyd White provide for circumventing it in "Dis­
cursive Community and the Problem of Perspective in Ethical Criticism," in 
Conversations on Communication Ethics, ed. Karen Joy Greenberg (Northwood, 
IL: Ablex, 1991). 
5. The critic in question was myself, at the Speech Communication 
Association's January 1988 Conference on the Oratory of Dr. Martin Luther 
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King, Jr., in a presentation entitled "When 'Silence is Betrayal'": An Ethical 
Criticism of the Revolution of Values in Martin Luther King's Speech at the 
Riverside Church"; and in "Remembering Martin Luther King, Jr.," in the 
Iowa City Press-Citizen 20 Jan. 1988: 3 A. 
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"Three Times out of Five 
Something Happens": 
James M. Cain and the Ethics 
of Music 
PETER J. RABINOWITZ 
IN JAMES M. CAIN'S 1937 novel Serenade, the down-and-out narrator 
John Howard Sharp arrives in Acapulco with his mistress, a prostitute 
named Juana Montes, to help her open a brothel. But even before a 
fit of sexual jealousy encourages him to punch out one of the town's 
leading politicos (at which point he finds himself a wanted man), he 
decides he wants to get away; and at a local hotel, he comes across a 
feisty ship captain who might be able to smuggle him across the bor­
der. To get his help, of course, Sharp needs to prove himself; and in a 
traditional and highly coded macho confrontation, parallel to the one 
between Robin Hood and Little John, his worthiness is put to the test. 
But despite the reference to "feinting and jabbing" (62), it is a verbal 
rather than a physical sparring. More significant, the subject is neither 
sports, nor politics, nor sex, although the style used is appropriate for 
such topics. Rather, the struggle climaxes in a dispute over the rela­
tive merits of Mozart and Beethoven—and Sharp wins the argument 
(and hence saves his life) by tossing off the serenade from Don Giovanni 
("Deh vieni alia finestra"), accompanying himself on a guitar that he 
borrows from a mariachi. 
Cain, author of the notoriously successful Postman Always Rings 
Twice (1934), is of course remembered as one of the toughest of those 
tough writers that Edmund Wilson called "the boys in the back room." 
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The New Yort{ Times review by Harold Strauss that helped launch Post­
man claimed that "Cain can get down to the primary impulses of greed 
and sex in fewer words than any writer we know of"; and David Mad­
den, besting that Times reviewer's characterization of Cain as a six-
minute egg, dubbed him the "twenty-minute egg of the hard-boiled 
school" {James M. Cain 23). Indeed, he's so tough that even Raymond 
Chandler dismissed him as "the offal of literature": "Everything he 
touches smells like a billygoat" (qtd. in Madden, Cain's Craft 6). Given 
this reputation for toughness, given the plot situation, and given the 
language, "Deh vieni alia finestra" is sufficiently incongruous that one 
might at first suspect irony. But while the hard-boiled label helped 
market Cain, over the years he found it an increasing hindrance. In a 
letter to Alfred Knopf, he protested that "Being tough or hard-boiled 
is the last thing in the world that I think about. . .  . I am shooting for 
something quite different" (qtd. in Hoopes 256). And in the preface 
to The Butterfly he warned his readers, "I belong to no school, hard­
boiled or otherwise, and I believe these so-called schools exist mainly 
in the imagination of critics, and have little correspondence in reality 
anywhere else" (352). 
Indeed, Chandler may have been closer to the truth than he thought 
when he knocked Cain as "a Proust in greasy overalls" (qtd. in Madden, 
Cain's Craft 6). For like Proust, Cain was not only obsessed with sexu­
ality, but also with music. Indeed, Cain considered his writing career a 
"consolation prize" failing as an opera singer (qtd. in Hoopes xii), and 
singing figures as the central subject in three of his best novels, and as a 
subsidiary concern in many of the others. Even the mobster Sol Caspar, 
in Love's Lovely Counterfeit (Cain's icy equivalent of Hammett's The 
Glass Key), takes time out from running the rackets in Lake City to 
assess a new recording of // Trovatore. And what I would like to argue 
here is that, if treated seriously, Cain's novels can offer valuable insights 
into the relationship between music and ethics. 
That vexed relationship, of course, has been explored by a wide 
variety of theorists from Plato onward. But as Wayne Booth points out, 
no one has yet come close to a "full ethical criticism" of music {Company 
19, italics in original). What might that entail? Ethical analysis is always 
an analysis of actions, not of objects. As Booth's rhetorical analyses since 
The Rhetoric of Fiction have continually made clear, there is thus no 
way to talk seriously about literary ethics simply by looking at the doc­
trines espoused in a text, without taking into account the transaction 
between author and reader. Similarly, while it might be possible to pro­
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duce an ethics of composition or an ethics of performance, such study 
would inevitably be subsidiary to an ethics of listening—in particular, a 
study of the way musical meaning is tied, not simply to abstract shapes, 
but to the rhetorical dynamics through which works of art "change" us 
(Modern Dogma 165). Booth himself, in his occasional forays into music, 
invariably takes this position. Thus, for instance, one of his discussions 
of "what art teaches" starts with a "mental experiment" that attempts 
to unpack the experiences of listening carefully to Beethoven's A Minor 
Quartet (Modern Dogma 168-80). 
But although Booth, in his stress on reception, points clearly in the 
right direction, he has never explored the dynamics of listening with 
anything like the scrutiny he has applied to the dynamics of reading— 
especially the increasingly contextualized notion of reading that has 
come to ground some of his later work.1 What follows, then, is not so 
much an analysis of Booth, nor even a debate with him, but rather an 
expansion beyond his work, asking what kind of insights we might gain 
if we treated the process of listening with the same kind of detailed at­
tention, say, that Booth gives the process of reading irony in A Rhetoric 
of Irony. 
It is perhaps not surprising that Booth has not taken this next step, for 
until recently most theorists of music—whether they have praised music 
for its ethical benefits, blamed it for its corruptive influence, sorted it out 
into various ethical categories, or steadfastly refused to admit its ethical 
dimensions at all—have started with questionable postulates that have 
deflected our attention from the complexities of listening. In particular, 
they have tended to assume that, as W. J. Henderson put it in a once-
popular guide, the best music "exercises her sway upon us wholly by 
means of her own unaided powers" (87)? Of course, not everyone is so 
flowery; but for all the differences in vocabulary and style, Henderson, 
in this regard, is not far distant from Leonard Meyer or Milton Bab-
bitt.3 That is, all of these theorists skim over, or at least fail to develop, 
that process of mediation through which the composer's acts are trans­
formed by the listener. In this context, it is perhaps not surprising that 
Booth too, even though he is not unaware of this intermediate process, 
is apt, like Henderson and Meyer, to treat it as outside the realm of 
his analysis, as if, like the best digital-analog processing, it were for all 
practical purposes a self-canceling coding-decoding procedure. 
Thus, it is not, as it might at first appear, a hubristic claim when he 
tells us that "listening well fto Bach], totally engrossed in the musical 
moment, Bach and I—the implied Bach and the postulated listener—-
17o PETER J.RABINOWITZ 
become indistinguishable" (Critical Understanding 238).4 Rather, this 
vision of unity is but the logical consequence of bracketing the com­
plexity and variety of the mediation between listener and music—of 
assuming, as he puts it, that "music does not offer me as many invita­
tions [as literature does] to create epicycles of meaning on my very own" 
(Critical Understanding 238) and of assuming, as well, that "whether all 
such meanings [of detailed musical structural relationships] are con­
ventional and learned, or (as I believe) some are innate and univer­
sal, the repertoire of such 'reasons of art' possessed by everyone in a 
given culture, in advance of any one experience, is immense" (Modern 
Dogma 169). 
In going beyond Booth, I would like to complicate this model by 
asking what the process of listening would look like if we don't assume 
that those "invitations to create epicycles of meaning" are negligible and 
if we look, not at the shared repertoire of interpretive procedures, but 
at the points where cultural agreement breaks down. In other words, I 
would like to propose that listening, no less than performing (or read­
ing), is an interpretive act, and that like any other interpretive act, it 
is always grounded in mediating principles that are both ideologically 
charged and contextually variable. I will be using Cain's novels in my 
case study to illustrate the process of listening; but before turning to 
them, I need to respond to the traditional assumptions of theorists of 
music with some countertheorizing, specifically by setting out a musical 
distinction that Jay Reise and I have developed in detail elsewhere.5 
As Reise and I conceptualize it, the act of listening involves the braiding 
together of three separate strands. The first is what we call the technical, 
and it consists of only those elements that are specifically represented 
in the notation—or, in the case of un-notated music, those elements 
that would be captured by a transcriber. Statements about the techni­
cal level would include, for instance, "The first note of Scott Joplin's 
Maple Leaf Rag is an eighth-note octave E-flat on the second half of 
the second beat of a measure." To a large extent, traditional analysis has 
assumed that the technical component is the totality of the music. It is 
this assumption, for instance, that supports Alan Walker's claims not 
only that meaning is inherent in the notes, but that quality is inherent 
as well ("You need not prove that the Eroica symphony is a masterpiece 
before you can be certain that it is a masterpiece . . . : its mastery is 
self-evident") (xii). 
In fact, though, the technical is only the raw material of the music. In 
and of itself, for instance, it has no hierarchy of importance, no shape, 
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no content, no symbolic force. To put it more sharply, on its own the 
technical is meaningless—which is why we are generally disoriented 
when we hear pieces from radically different cultures. Despite the long 
tradition of theorizing to the contrary, listeners can only make sense 
(and I would like to stress the act of "making" here) of the technical 
in combination with what Reise and I call the attributive, a second 
component of the listening process that assigns (or proposes) meanings 
(in the broadest sense), a component that is inevitably extracomposi­
tional (usually even what traditionalists would call "extramusical"), a 
component that is always at least provisionally in place before the act of 
listening begins. 
Many types of information coexist on the attributive level, but they 
can be loosely divided into two categories, what Reise and I call codes 
and mythologies. Codes consist of "regulations" of conventional behav­
ior, and are often arrived at through statistical analysis. Harmonic prac­
tice, at least during Western classical music's common practice period, is 
especially subject to codification.6 But for my purposes here, the second 
type of attributive information, the mythological, is more relevant. The 
mythological consists of the verbal discourse and the other cultural appa­
ratus that surrounds and in a sense grounds the experience of the music 
in question. It includes, for instance, the stories about Beethoven rag­
ing against his deafness, stories that help determine, before we start to 
listen, what kind of stance we will take toward the music. Many music-
appreciation analyses of "sonata form" (especially those couched in nar­
rative terms, which often assign gender roles to various themes) are, 
despite their apparent stress on technical matters, mythological in spirit. 
Performance practice, too, is a part of the mythological—as are the sys­
tems, such as Schenker's, that provide the philosophical underpinnings 
for the claims made for particular analyses or analytic techniques.7 
Especially in its more overt forms, the mythological makes many 
contemporary musicians uneasy. Ernst Krenek went so far as to try to 
exorcise it completely, calling on composers "to avoid the dictations of 
such ghosts" as "recollection, tradition, training, and experience" (90). 
Milton Babbitt is an even more fiery ghostbuster. He takes as his ex­
ample the sentence (unattributed, but taken from a work by Paul Henry 
Lang) "There can be no question that in many of Mendelssohn's works 
there is missing that real depth that opens wide perspectives, the mys­
ticism of the unutterable." Such a "verbal act," Babbitt insists, should 
not "be allowed"—indeed "a book containing a sentence such as this 
[should not be saved] from theflames"(11).8 
But Babbitt's incendiary arguments light up serious misconceptions 
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about the nature of what we are calling mythological discourse. He sets 
himself up in opposition to any utterances in which there is "virtually 
nothing to be communicated." In theory, of course, it is hard to take 
issue with such a wholesome (albeit Quixotic) position. But in practice, 
his argument depends on the assumption that "responsible normative 
discourse" is synonymous with "cognitive communication"—which is 
in turn equated with empirically verifiable statements (n )  . That is, he 
depends on the assumption that the only valid form of communication 
is through the kind of speech act that J. L. Austin called constatives, 
" 'statements]' [that] 'describe' some state of affairs, or . .  . 'state some 
fact,' which [they] must do either truly or falsely" (i). In fact, how­
ever, the statement about Mendelssohn is more properly viewed as what 
Austin calls a performative (an utterance that performs an act rather 
than describes a situation), specifically as an advisory? That is, instead of 
describing a state of affairs, Lang's sentence offers a framework within 
which to make sense of and evaluate Mendelssohn's art. 
Babbitt's complaint that such statements are nonfalsifiable, while un­
deniable, thus has no bearing on the issue. For to judge the legitimacy 
of the sentence, we need to assess not its "truth" but its utility: its ability 
to provide a grid that can help guide and support listeners as they at­
tribute meaning (or, in this case, a lack of a certain kind of meaning) 
to the music at hand. The same holds true, as I have suggested, even 
for many supposedly formalist statements that appear on the surface 
to be descriptions of what is "objectively there" on the technical level: 
they too, more often than not, turn out to be not descriptions at all, but 
advisories in formal attire. Whatever his claims to the contrary, Alan 
Walker's complex thematic analyses do not in fact reveal a preexist­
ing unity within the "masterpieces" he discusses. Rather, they attribute 
unity to them, to persuade us to hear them in the same way he does. 
Although listeners can switch or merge attributions (even during 
listening), attributive screens are only available if they precede the par­
ticular act of listening. Likewise, the technical is always in place before 
the act of listening begins; even in improvised music, the performer 
decides what sounds to play before the audience hears them. Where 
is the activity of the listener in all of this? Listening is an active pro­
cess: although it requires both the technical and the attributive, their 
mere presence only make the music potentially available. It is up to the 
listener to apply (whether self-consciously or not) attributive screens to 
the technical material at hand in order to transform it into a particular 
listening experience. Reise and I call this the synthetic level.10 
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The difference between the levels can be seen as follows: "The 
next-to-last chord of Joplin's Crush Collision March (reduced to closed 
position) is FACE''" is a statement about the technical level; "Crush 
Collision is a turn-of-the-century parlor piece ending in B^  major, and 
in that context, such a dominant seventh chord is most likely to be fol­
lowed by a tonic" is an attributive statement; "On hearing that dominant 
seventh, I expect a B^ major chord to follow" is a synthetic conclusion 
drawn from the application of attributive information to technical facts. 
The lines between technical, attributive, and synthetic, of course, are 
imprecise: one listener's synthetic activities, for instance, can become 
part of the attributive information for another listener, or even for that 
same listener at a different time. Despite the smudged boundaries, how­
ever, these distinctions, as we will see, are of considerable analytic use. 
What does all this have to do with ethics? If our analysis is correct, then, 
even when talking about music without texts, "the music itself" (espe­
cially the music as listened to) is not to be found in the sounds on their 
own, but in a complex interaction between sounds and the discursive 
practices that surround them and open up their potential for meaning. 
And whatever the ethical dimension of that raw sonic material, those 
discursive practices are inevitably ethical in Booth's broad sense of the 
term, which refers not simply to morals or to "the approved side of 
choices," but rather to "the entire range of effects on the 'character' or 
'person' or 'self " (Company 8). In other words, the ethical dimension 
of music should be sought not in the technical, but rather in the attribu­
tive and the synthetic. For regardless of what, if anything, the music 
teaches us that we could not otherwise know (Modern Dogma 169), and 
regardless of whether we are, in the long run, "better" because we have 
been exposed to Bach, the attributive and synthetic levels, by their very 
nature, require us to engage in one or another kind of ethically impli­
cated practice before and while we listen. And Cain's novels, because 
they provide such highly charged examples of how attributive screens 
and synthetic strategies operate, give us a sharpened vision of the way 
listening is intertwined with ethics. 
Cain might seem an unlikely source of insight into the ethical 
grounding of so-called absolute (that is, non-texted) music, for his musi­
cal interest is directed primarily to opera—and this preference would 
seem to sneak the problem of texts back into our discussion. In fact, 
though, while Cain writes extensively about operas, he hardly ever 
touches on their texts. Indeed, he seems to hold opera plots in con­
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tempt: when Columbia Pictures asked him for a film script to star Rita 
Hayworth in Carmen, one of his favorite operas, his response was blunt: 
"It is a skimpy, dated little tale, and considerable work would have to 
be done to it to explain why Columbia Pictures Corporation saw fit 
to bring up the subject in connection with Rita Hayworth in this year 
1945" (qtd. in Hoopes 377X11 
Why was Cain so consumed with music? In part, I suspect, it was 
the result of nostalgia for his lost career, or for his opera-singer mother. 
But he also had an aim that makes his work especially valuable for my 
project. Like most of us, he wanted to offer (and perhaps justify) what 
he loved to those he respected; and opera, he felt, was the property of the 
wrong crowd.12 As John Dillon notes in The Moth, "There's something 
about a guy who uses steel that goes for football more than he does 
opera" (215). Conversely, in Cain's eyes opera audiences were dominated 
by the decadent: by the "gray-haired women with straight haircuts and 
men's dinner jackets, young girls looking each other straight in the eye 
and not caring what you thought, boys following men around" that 
we see attending Winston Hawes's concerts in Serenade (131); by the 
woman "that goes to concerts because they give her the right vibra­
tions, or make her feel better, or have some other effect on her nitwit 
insides" (Serenade 128); by the Social Register types who were "so cul­
tured that even their eyeballs were lavender" (Career 4). In other words, 
opera audiences are effete in ways that link to both class and sexuality. 
Cain's perceptions do not come out of nowhere; they replay familiar 
myths about opera, class, and sexuality. They may have their origins, 
in part, in the ambiguities of gender introduced by the castrati of 
early Italian opera. Certainly, in the Anglo-American tradition, these 
myths go back to the early eighteenth century, and the works of Defoe, 
Swift, and especially Pope, who was particularly concerned with opera's 
breakdown of clear sexual difference.13 It is found, as well, in the por­
trayal of Maggie and Jiggs's responses to opera in George McManus's 
long-running comic strip Bringing Up Father, a portrayal that neatly 
illustrates Herbert Gans's claim that while "high culture condemns 
popular culture as vulgar and pathological," popular culture can 
counterattack by insisting that high culture is "overly intellectual, snob­
bish, and effeminate" (43). Things haven't changed much in the past 
sixty or seventy years: the same image of opera as effete, pretentious, 
and unfit for men showed up a few years back [March 4, 1990] on The 
Simpsons. Indeed, even Catherine Clement, who should know better, 
falls into gay-bashing when her anger at opera audiences is aroused.14 
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The issue, of course, is not whether Cain's sociological analysis of the 
interconnections of culture, class, and sexuality is correct. The point, 
rather, is that Cain tries to remedy the perceived problem by proposing 
an alternative way of listening, one that is straight, masculine, and work­
ing class. Or, to put it more accurately, he tries to come up with a set of 
attributive strategies that is consistent with what he believes to be the 
worldview of the working-class guy who uses steel and goes for foot­
ball. And the resulting strategies provide an especially vivid illustration 
of the ways in which ethics and listening intersect. 
Cain's musical aesthetics snuggle up against the "art for art's sake" 
tradition (he criticizes producers who haven't yet understood that sing­
ing might be "good for its own sake") {Serenade 99), but the object under 
scrutiny is almost always a performance. That is, for Cain, you don't 
listen to music in the abstract, but rather to a particular act of music 
making. When he describes an operatic event, he's directing our atten­
tion neither toward the relationships among the characters, nor toward 
what traditional music analysis would call the music's eternal formal 
properties. Instead, he proposes a set of interpretive strategies through 
which a performance can be redefined and made comprehensible. 
As I have argued in Before Reading, literary interpretive strategies 
fall into four basic categories: what I've called rules of notice (which 
tell us where to focus our attention), rules of signification (which allow 
us to draw the meaning from particular elements), rules of configura­
tion (which allow us to predict the future course of events), and rules 
of coherence (which allow us to ascribe generalized meaning to the 
completed experience of the work). Such procedures are not exclusively 
"literary"; they have analogs in other arts, as well. In particular, the 
scheme is useful for charting out the synthetic activities of listening, and 
I would therefore like to use it to clarify what synthetic activities Cain is 
proposing. And since the core of Cain's attributive screen is found in his 
recommendations for acts of signification, I will start there. Cain offers 
two major strategies of signification: he equates meaning and technique, 
and he equates voice and body. 
The first strategy advises us to judge musical events less in terms of 
so-called musical expression than in terms of virtuosity. Not for Cain's 
stars is the slow, painful process of spiritual self-discovery undergone by 
Thea Kronborg in Willa Cather's Song of the Larfy the quality of your 
musicality has little to do with the quality of your soul.15 It is consis­
tent with this virtuosic vision that Cain's best singers are immediately 
recognizable, and that they learn quickly. Once coloratura Veda Pierce 
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is discovered by her teacher Treviso—who can measure her singing tal­
ent simply by hearing her hum a few bars of Schubert on her way home 
after a concert (Mildred 212-13)—she emerges as a great singer in just 
a few months. 
Because Cain is concerned with the meaning of an event, not an ob­
ject, the virtuosity involves the ability to handle not only the demands of 
the written music, but also whatever unanticipated difficulties arise out 
of external circumstances. A good singer, Sharp points out, "can spot 
trouble a mile away" {Serenade 90)—and can improvise his or her way 
around it. When the scheduled Escamillo backs out of a Hollywood 
Bowl Carmen, Sharp can jump into the role without preparation—even 
though he has to sing some music added to the opera in order to accom­
modate a local ballet school. Since the interpolated music comes from 
L'Arlesienne—and was not even originally scored for voice—he has 
never sung it before; he consequently sails past a repeat. "The dancers 
were all frozen on one foot, ready to do the routine again, and there 
was I, camped on an E that didn't even belong there." But he shows his 
musicianship in the way he handles the crisis: the conductor "looked 
up, and I caught his eye, and hung on to it, and marched all around with 
it, while he spoke to his men and wigwagged to his ballerina. Then he 
looked up again, and I cut, and yelled 'Ha, ha, ha.' He brought his stick 
down, and the show was together again" (Serenade 93-94). 
But besides valuing virtuosity, Cain also believes deeply in the sen­
suality of the human voice, and he proposes a second set of synthetic 
strategies to enable his readers to interpret that sensuality in a way 
that he thinks will appeal to them, equating voice and body, often 
through fairly direct analogy. "What makes a great voice," notes Sharp, 
"is beauty, not size, and beauty will get you, I don't care if it's in a man's 
throat or a woman's leg" (Serenade 77). Consequently, in Cain's novels 
voice often becomes the locus of the erotic. Indeed, Mildred Pierce ends 
as clumsily as it does because of Cain's fixation on the voice he had cre­
ated. The "keystone" of the novel is "the implication of having a big 
coloratura soprano in the family" (qtd. in Hoopes 348) and the story 
pivots around Veda, a singer whose musical talent is equalled only by 
her moral bankruptcy. At the climax, Veda's mother Mildred learns 
that her husband has been seduced by her daughter; finding them in 
bed together, she turns against that crucial throat, strangling the young 
woman for whose musical advancement she has sacrificed so much, and 
"destroying," as Cain himself put it, "the one thing she loved most on 
this earth, Veda's beautiful voice." But Cain could not follow through. 
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Instead, he engineered an improbable denouement where Veda only 
pretends to lose her voice to get out of an onerous contract. As he later 
admitted, "It got the curtain down, but that's about all I can say about 
it. Believe it or not, I had by that time fallen in love with Veda's totally 
imaginary voice, and I couldn't bear to think it was permanently gone" 
(qtd. in Hoopes 309). 
Cain's infatuation with so monstrous a character as Veda, a passion so 
strong that he forfeited the integrity of his novel to preserve her voice, 
makes it clear that he listens in a way that elevates voice over character, at 
least over moral character. But if, according to Cain's attributive screen, 
voice is divorced from moral character, his attempt to counteract High 
Cultural effeteness leads him to marry it all the more tightly to sexual 
character. Specifically, Cain gives his own twist to some traditional my­
thology about the voice. There's a long history, of course, connecting 
sexuality, variously defined, and vocal quality. Catherine Clement, for 
instance, summarizes Phantom of the Opera as follows: "Voices bring 
down lights; they do things, they kill. But their power depends on a 
pitiless chastity" (27). Thus, the soprano will lose her voice (or stop 
singing) when she becomes married. Song of the Lar\ presents a varia­
tion of that theme. So, more distantly, does the legend of Echo, whose 
reduction to pure voice derives from erotic failure. 
None of these stories, of course, would appeal to Cain's intended 
audience, so he proposes a countermythology, one that explicitly 
reverses the Echo story (simultaneously conflating it with a distorted 
reference to the corollary story of Narcissus): in Serenade, Sharp is en­
raptured by the echo of his own voice which—following his crackup— 
is restored precisely through sexual activity. Cain's tough style may cloak 
his argument in a crudeness that seems laughable in an academic essay. 
But in fact, his strategic equation of voice and body (especially his 
emphasis on the throat) bears a striking kinship to the academically 
respectable strategies in Roland Barthes's "The Grain of the Voice." 
Barthes privileges the throat over the lung (the lung "swells but gets no 
erection" [183]), equates "the grain" with "the body in the voice as it 
sings," and proposes an orgasmics of listening that overlaps considerably 
with Cain's. "I am determined," notes Barthes, "to listen to my relation 
with the body of the man or woman singing or playing and that relation 
is erotic" (188). 
Of course, for Cain's intended audience, proper erotic activity is 
strictly bounded. Indeed, it is precisely the assumed association with 
homosexuality that helps make opera distasteful. So it is no surprise 
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that Cain and Barthes part company when it comes to the nature of the 
sexual component of listening. Cain insists that you can determine the 
affectional preference of a singer, at least a male singer, by his voice, 
and that good singing is congruent with straight sex. As Juana puts it 
in Serenade, men who love other men " 'have no tow in high voice, no 
grrr that frighten little muchacha, make heart beat fast. Sound like old 
woman, like cow, like priest'" (Serenade 142). Or as Cain puts it himself, 
a good singer sings "with his balls," and there is a "peculiar color of 
a homo's voice" (qtd. in Hoopes 266). Serenade represents a scandal­
ous version of this myth, for the tale centers around the deterioration 
of Sharp's voice whenever his homosexual side (the "five per cent" he 
claims that every man has in him [Serenade 144]) is brought out. From 
the perspective of the 1990s, the novel may seem distastefully homo­
phobic, but (especially considering its historical context) its ambiguities 
are many. After its publication, Cain found himself attracting numerous 
gay men who thought he was, as he put it, a "brother" (qtd. in Hoopes 
287). More interestingly, Leonard Bernstein (whose sexuality was more 
complex than Cain thought his own to be) met with Cain in 1948 with 
the hopes of turning Serenade into an opera. The project never ma­
terialized, but a few years later Bernstein wrote another work of the 
same name—a violin concerto based on The Symposium and celebrating 
Platonic love.16 
Given this traditional masculine approach to signification, Cain's 
proposed rules of notice, if unconventional, follow readily. Standard 
guides to music offer varying suggestions about what to listen for, where 
to direct our primary attention, but more often than not it is something 
formal, something divorced from the particular performance—melodic 
contour, or harmonic motion, or contrapuntal structure. Booth, for in­
stance, starts his analysis of the act of listening with the "innumerable 
detailed structural relationships that must be perceived before even the 
simplest fragment [of the slow movement of the Beethoven A Minor 
Quartet] can be experienced" {Modern Dogma 169). Cain, in contrast, 
urges us to give priority to something quite different. First, in terms of 
the body/voice equation, you listen for the color, for the balls. Second, 
in terms of the meaning/technique equation, you pay attention to virtu­
osic difficulties. Thus, in Career in C Major, Leonard Borland describes 
the quartet from Rigoletto: "Well, you've heard the Rigoletto quartet a 
thousand times, but don't let anybody tell you it's a pushover. The first 
part goes a mile a minute, the second part slower than hell, and if there's 
one thing harder to sing than a fast allegro it's a slow andante, and three 
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times out of five something happens" {Career 108-9). Likewise, we are 
warned, in Serenade, that the interpolated high F-sharp at the end of 
the Don Giovanni serenade is treacherous, because it "catches a baritone 
all wrong, and makes him sound coarse and ropy" (Serenade 119). Thus, 
as we imagine listening to a particular performance he describes, the 
traps that await the singers are highlighted. 
From this, Cain's proposed rules of configuration also follow readily. 
When Borland tells us that "three times out of five something happens," 
the something that happens has little to do with the kinds of events 
(motivic repetitions, thematic variations, modulations, and returns) that 
traditional guides to music teach us to anticipate, nor even with what 
Irving Kolodin calls the quartet's "dramatic effect" (170, italics in origi­
nal). Rather, the something that happens is performative disaster. From 
this perspective, the repetition of the Duke's opening phrase is antici­
pated not because of its contribution to formal balance, but because it 
provides a potential trap for the person singing Maddalena, who might 
thoughtlessly come in at the wrong time. For Cain, music is less an 
organic structure than, say, a roller coaster, and anticipation is primarily 
directed toward the virtuoso challenges that remain. Thus, a Proppian 
analysis of Cain's narratives might see the operatic performances as 
functionally equivalent to such activities as driving a train (in Past All 
Dishonor) or drilling for petroleum (The Moth): as we look ahead, we 
steel ourselves for the possibility of a collision or a blowout. It is thus ap­
propriate that Borland's disaster with the Rigoletto quartet is described 
in terms similar to those Cain uses to describe the catastrophic explosion 
of the oil well John Dillon is managing in The Moth. And, as we have 
seen, how a skilled musician handles those challenges is more a mat­
ter of quick thinking and practical know-how than it is of traditional 
"musicality." 
Technical expertise, quick thinking, sexual glamor, stamina, inge­
nuity, successful negotiation of difficult challenges: these are among 
Cain's key points of orientation, and they provide the attributions by 
which he urges us to map the raw sounds into coherent experiences. 
And this map is consistent with his larger cultural project of making 
classical music accessible to a broad audience, for the coherence he pro­
poses is both familiar and highly valued. A rite of passage that tests 
the character of the performers, it is more like a battle or athletic con­
test than an abstract form of expression or communication.17 Indeed, 
the contest exists not only between the performer and the composer, 
but between the performer and the audience as well. As Cecil Taylor 
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warns Borland, the audience is " 'always a pack of hyenas, just waiting 
to tear in and pull out your vitals, and the only way you can keep them 
back is to lick them. It's a battle, and you've got to win'" {Career 37). 
Opera is often loosely referred to as a sport.18 But rarely is that meta­
phor treated as seriously as it is in Cain. No wonder Sharp compares 
John McCormack to Ty Cobb (Serenade 75)—and no wonder Borland 
compares himself, after his failure at the Hippodrome, to Georges Car­
pentier after his defeat at the hands of Jack Dempsey in 1921 (Career 
112-13). 
That strategy of coherence makes good rhetorical sense: since Cain's 
aim is to open up opera to the guy who uses steel and goes for foot­
ball, what better way than by showing him (and the masculine term is 
crucial) that opera and football can be viewed and evaluated according 
to the same principles? But it is worth looking at some of the ideologi­
cal baggage this recasting involves. Cain once praised opera singers as 
"a separate breed" because "opera is ten times as tough as any other 
challenge to a singer" (qtd. in Hoopes 508). Toughness is a loaded term, 
and it signifies roughly the same thing here that it does in his novels. 
That is, opera becomes just one more arena in which traditional male 
American virtues can be demonstrated: the ability to think quickly, to 
meet challenges, to improvise, to "troupe" (that is, to operate as part of a 
team).19 Thus, Sharp is a musical hero because he consistently shows his 
mettle by doing what has to be done with whatever he's got on hand— 
for instance, by knocking off the prelude to the last act of Carmen on 
a guitar: "You may think that's impossible," he tells the reader, "but 
if you play that woodwind stuff up near the bridge, and the rest over 
the hole, the guitar will give you almost as much of what the music is 
trying to say as the whole orchestra will" (Serenade 15). Likewise, he 
manages to save a mediocre movie by composing an elaborate five-part 
overdubbed version of "Git Along Little Dogies" that allows the film­
makers to incorporate some visually spectacular footage of a snowstorm 
that otherwise wouldn't fit in. It's no wonder that one of Sharp's idols 
is a man named Harry Luckstone, who insisted that you didn't have to 
know a song to sing it (93); no wonder, either, that in Hollywood, he is 
most appreciated by the tech people who, unlike the producers, know 
what they are doing. 
Given his project of opening opera up to guys who like football, it is 
obvious why Cain found it useful to cast music in such terms—terms 
with provocative ties to the aesthetics of such American musicians as 
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Gottschalk and, especially, Ives, and terms with serious implications for 
both the sexual politics and the class politics that surround high art in 
America today. But for my purposes here, it is important to see not only 
the content of Cain's implied ethics, but also its locus: for Cain's novels 
seriously challenge traditional musical thinking in two ways. First, like 
any significant analysis of music, Cain's turns out to be not a descrip­
tion but a proposal for a way of listening, and that way of listening 
is profoundly contaminated by a preexisting ethical (especially sexual) 
hierarchy, a contamination that inevitably colors whatever he hears. You 
can, of course, reject the masculinist assumptions of his proposals; but 
you cannot do so without falling back on some equally ideological alter­
native. Thus, for instance, while she is not responding specifically to 
Cain, Clement is clearly trying to escape from masculine habits when 
she remarks, "One day, I became aware that opera did not come to me 
from my head. . . . Opera comes to me from somewhere else; it comes 
to me from the womb" (176). Listening for the balls and listening with 
the womb are obviously different strategies; but together they suggest 
that the very act of listening is bound up with the ideological categories 
with which we live; and using them as a background, we can see that 
Booth's image of listening as if we could become "indistinguishable" 
from Bach is not a description of the ethical consequences of immers­
ing oneself Bach's notes, but an ethically charged piece of advice that 
encourages us both to listen in a certain kind of way and to attribute a 
certain kind of ethical value to that act. 
Second, this analysis suggests that if we want seriously to understand 
the ethical implications of music, we have to learn to attend less to 
what used to be called "the music itself" and more to the processes by 
which listeners make sense of it: for as surely as Cain's novels repre­
sent the ideology behind the act of listening, they remind us that the 
act of listening is in fact an act that alters the object listened to. In 
Opera and Ideas, for instance, Paul Robinson distinguishes the politics of 
Mozart and Rossini. Specifically, he points out the "striking emotional 
difference" between their Beaumarchais operas {Figaro and The Barber 
of Seville), and argues that this difference "reflects . . . the changes in 
the European climate of opinion over the thirty-year span separating 
the two works" (11). The post-Enlightenment reaction, the "modulated 
cynicism" (16) of Rossini is marked particularly by the fact that, for 
instance, in "Largo al factotum," what we listen for is "the demonstra­
tion of vocal technique, not the revelation of character" (29). What is 
significant here is not simply that Serenade takes on the relative merits 
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of Rossini and Mozart, too, but even more that Cain presents Mozart 
in the same terms that Robinson reserves for Rossini alone. Robinson, 
in other words, clings to the formalist notion that the attitudes he 
finds in Rossini are "forced on us by the composer himself" (29). Cain 
demonstrates, in contrast, that the differences are as much brought to 
the music by the procedures through which we choose to interpret it. 
In the end, then, my interest lies less in the particular cultural ref­
ormation Cain has in mind than in the means he chooses for putting 
it into effect, and the implications those means have for ethical study. 
Booth's work, from The Rhetoric of Fiction on, has always reminded 
us that rhetoric and ethics are inextricably linked. And if Booth's own 
work on music has been limited by its tendency to privilege the techni­
cal level, Cain's fiction suggests a direction in which his insights can be 
profitably expanded. For if music exists, as his novels seem to confirm, 
not simply in the notes, but in the verbal discourse around them and the 
synthetic acts that this discourse encourages listeners to engage in, then 
rhetoric about the notes may be more significant than the rhetoric we 
used to think was in the notes. If we want to think seriously about the 
ethics of music in the ways that Booth has thought seriously about the 
ethics of fiction, therefore, we have to turn away from the technical level 
and concentrate instead on the attributive and the synthetic: on those 
stories we tell about music, whether as novelists or critics or theorists, 
and the ethical dimensions they inevitably bring with them. 
Notes 
1. See, in particular, his discussion of Rabelais in Company, ch. 12. 
2. Other critics, of course, have analyzed the ethical implications of the 
words set to music. But although words, as we shall see, are important in 
any music criticism, analysis of the texts that are set hardly leads to an ethics 
of music. 
3. In the past few years an increasing number of musicologists—in par­
ticular, feminist musicologists—have come to question the traditional assump­
tions of the field; and I see my work here as a complement to that of such col­
leagues as Lawrence Kramer (for instance, in Music as Cultural Practice), Susan 
McClary (in Feminine Endings), and Ruth Solie (in "Whose Life?"). There has 
also been an increasing interest in the semiotics of music; see, for instance, 
Nattiez. For the most part, however, the study of music remains wedded to 
formalist principles. For a fuller discussion of this point, see my "Chord and 
Discourse" and "Whiting the Wrongs of History." 
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4. A similar model is found in Modern Dogma: "I take the work in, or, as 
phenomenologists say, it enables me to dwell in it. I live the work; it lives its 
life in me. Its creator and I become, in a part of our lives, indistinguishable as 
we live in the work together" (169). 
5. Indeed, this analysis of listening is so much a product of our collabo­
ration that claims to authorship of this essay are hardly unencumbered. For 
further discussion of this issue—the subject of a forthcoming, jointly authored 
book—see also my "Chord and Discourse" and our "The Phonograph Behind 
the Door." I appreciate Jay's willingness to allow me to use these ideas here. 
6. While traditional analysis, of course, often deals with such codes, it 
usually treats them as if they were part of the technical level, rather than a 
cultural apparatus for processing the technical. Such analysis thus ignores the 
degree to which the choice of what code to apply when listening to a given 
piece is an interpretive decision, subject to debate. For a fuller discussion, see 
our "Phonograph." 
7. For a fuller discussion of sonata form from this perspective, see my 
"Chord and Discourse." 
8. The citation comes from Paul Henry Lang, Music in Western Civiliza­
tion (New York: Norton, 1941) 811. Thanks to Fred Maus for helping me find 
the original source. Babbitt's burn-the-books rhetoric is an allusion to the final 
paragraph of Hume's Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. 
9. Of course, by the end of How to Do Things with Words, Austin has dis­
mantled the constative/performative distinction; it is, nonetheless, useful for 
our purposes here. What I call advisories would fall under Austin's general class 
of "exercitives"; see Austin 155-57. 
10. In the "mental experiment" described above, Booth begins with "a 
highly intelligent, sensitive adult who had never heard any music but who 
had . .  . a complete capacity to 'take in'" the Beethoven A Minor Quartet {Mod­
ern Dogma 168). Booth recognizes this as an "impossibility"; but although he 
never explains where the impossibility comes from, it seems to be a kind of 
sociological impossibility: in our culture (indeed, in any culture I know of), 
no intelligent, sensitive adult capable of hearing at all could grow up without 
experiencing music. I would agree that his experiment hinges on an impossi­
bility, but would argue instead that it is a cognitive impossibility: such a listener 
would not know how to perform synthetic activities at all, and would thus be 
listening to sounds, but not to music. 
11. Sharp talks enthusiastically about this opera—indeed, he calls the Pre­
lude to the last act "one of the greatest pieces of music ever written" {Serenade 
15). There's good reason to believe that he is echoing Cain's sentiments at this 
point, too, since Cain elsewhere called Bizet one of his "favorites" (qtd. in 
Hoopes 552). 
12. See Bloom's claim that in the 1950s, "emotive experience" with classical 
music "was probably the only regularly recognizable class distinction between 
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educated and uneducated in America" (69). Cain would agree, in the 1930s, 
with the fact; he would, of course, disagree with its significance or its possible 
remedy. 
13. See Robert Ness; see also Michael Bronski on Defoe's The True Born 
Englishman (1701) (Bronski 137). Thanks to John O'Neill for advice on this 
issue. 
14. In her discussion of the men who posthumously adulated Callas, she 
remarks: "She died a banal death. But her ashes were stolen from the Pere-
Lachaise cemetery; a pyre of books was built for her; hastily pressed records 
were sold in abundance. Come on, men, shut up. You are living off her. Leave 
this woman alone, whose job it was to wear gracefully your repressed homo­
sexual fantasies" (Clement 28). 
15. Bronski, in contrast, argues that stress of form over content is one of 
the features that ties opera to gay sensibility (136). 
16. Although the violin piece sits right next to Cain's novel in the index, 
Joan Peyser—surprisingly—makes no connection between them, although it 
would fit neatly into her lurid Bernstein biography. 
17. Richard Ohmann insists this applies to television news broadcasts as 
well (173-74). 
18. Arthur Groos, for instance, refers to "the blood sport of opera" (2). 
19. See also Ann Douglas's praise of "toughness" as an antidote to senti­
mentality (11). 
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Keeping the Company of Sophisters, 
Economists, and Calculators 
DONALD N. MCCLOSKEY 
// is now sixteen or seventeen years since I saw the Queen of France, then 
the Dauphiness, at Versailles. . . . Little did I dream that I should have lived 
to see disasters fallen upon her in a nation of gallant men. . . . I thought ten 
thousand swords must have leaped from their scabbards to avenge even a loo\ 
that threatened her with insult. But the age of chivalry is gone. That ofsoph­
isters, economists, and calculators, has succeeded; and the glory of Europe is 
extinguished for ever. 
EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 
ADAM SMIT H WAsa professor of moral philosophy. John Stuart Mill 
was a moral and political philosopher. Since then the worldly philoso­
phers have withdrawn from morality. 
Kurt Heinzelman places this "divorcing philosophy from economics" 
in the emblematic year of 1871, when Mill issued the last edition of 
Principles of Political Economy, with some of their Applications to Social 
Philosophy and William Stanley Jevons, the new scientist of British eco­
nomics, published The Theory of Political Economy (Heinzelman 85-87). 
The Truce of Modernism took place unheralded sometime in the late 
nineteenth century, the truce that placed science from 8 to 5 in business 
hours, art for an evening's entertainment, and morality on Sunday. By 
1894 a  n article by F. C. Montague in the Dictionary of Political Economy 
could formulate the business of economics in a way that few economists 
would now dispute, under the article "Morality": 
.87 
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The relation of morals to economics is often misunderstood. Political 
economy is, properly speaking, a science rather than an art. It aims in 
the first instance at the explanation of a certain class of facts. . . . The 
special knowledge of economic facts possessed by the economist may en­
able him to give valuable advice on economic questions, but this, strictly 
speaking, is not his business. His business is to explain, not to exhort. It 
is therefore beside the mark to speak of economists, as such, preaching 
a low morality or rejecting morality altogether. 
T h  e economist was to be seen as a man of business, not a preacher. 
H  e sold Gradgr ind facts, not the mere preaching of morality. In 1900 
the word preach already sneered, as teenagers now sneer at their par­
ents ' "preaching" (or, worse, "lecturing"). T h  e Dictionary claims that 
economic facts are Science rather than Art . 
By 1900 the specialization of science in English to mean "lab­
coated and quanti tat ive" had already been accomplished. N  o other lan­
guage did it. In French, Italian, Spanish, German , Du tch , Norwegian, 
Swedish, Icelandic, Polish, Hind i , Hungar ian , Finnish, Turkish , 
Korean, Hebrew, Tamil, and all the other languages where the question 
arises the science word to this day means "disciplined inquiry" {Wissen­
schaft), as it did in English until the last quarter of the nineteenth cen­
tury. T h  e first occurrence of sense 5b in the Oxford English Dictionary 
is from the Dublin Review of 1867: "We s h a l l . . . use the word 'science' 
in the sense which Englishmen so commonly give to it; as expressing 
physical and experimental science, to the exclusion of theological and 
metaphysical." T h  e pre-nineteenth-century (and non-English) sense is 
found for instance in Johnson: "Of Fort George I shall not at tempt 
to give any account. I cannot delineate it scientifically, and a loose and 
popular description is of use only when the imagination is to be amused" 
( Johnson 50, emphasis added). John Stuart Mill, wri t ing in 1836 on 
the "science of political economy," refers to "moral or mental sciences," 
of which political economy is a part , and in the next paragraph uses 
"reasoners" and "inquirers" as though synonymous with "scientists" (a 
word he does not use, because it is a later coinage; Mill 55). Mill later 
in the same passage distinguishes "art" from science; but by "ar t" he 
means applications of the abstractions of science, not the fine arts, the 
T ruce of Modernism being still fifty years away. And John Ruskin in 
 w a r n  sThe Stones of Venice (1851-1853)  that "the principal danger is 
with the sciences of words and methods; and it was exactly into those 
sciences that the whole energy of men dur ing the Renaissance period 
was t h rown" (3.^.32, 58, emphasis added). 
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By 1882 Matthew Arnold is struggling against the new specialization 
of the word, and against the biologist Thomas Huxley: "all learning is 
scientific," asserts Arnold, "which is systematically laid out and followed 
up to its original sources, and . .  . a genuine humanism is scientific" 
(411). He applies the word here to the study of classical antiquity (in 
German, Altertumswissenschafi), as he had applied it in 1867 to chairs of 
Celtic literature at Oxford and Cambridge. Some time after Arnold's 
tug of war with Huxley over the word the English economist Alfred 
Marshall, in his style of writing an old-fashioned man, declares that to 
say that supply or demand dominates a particular market, as against 
the scissors of both, "is to be excused only so long as it claims to be 
merely a popular and not a strictly scientific account of what happened" 
(Marshall 348 [5-iii, 7]). The physicist Lord Kelvin would have nothing 
of the broader and now old-fashioned usage, sneering as early as 1883 
at the nonmeasureable, excluded by 5b: "When you cannot measure it, 
when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre 
and unsatisfactory kind. It may be the beginning of knowledge, but you 
have scarcely in your thoughts advanced to the state of science" (1). The 
statistician Karl Pearson's The Grammar of Science, the bible of neo­
positivism, claimed that to use the word "in no narrow sense" (24), but 
in opposing his Science to "philology and philosophy" (10) showed that 
he meant to convert "anthropology, folklore, sociology, and psychology 
into true science" (16) by the standard of "geology, or biology, or geome­
try, or mechanics" (11). (And yet [37], "To draw a distinction between 
the scientific and philosophical fields is obscurantism.") Huxley, Kelvin, 
and their allies won the quarrel over the word. The peculiarly English 
definition—by 1933 the Supplement to the OED notes that sense 5b 
is of course "the dominant sense in ordinary use"—made it easy for 
Jevons and other English-speaking economists over the past hundred 
years to suppose that a science would have nothing to do with morality. 
It would be a strange economics, of course, that did not treat at 
least the pursuit of happiness, and therefore the morality of doing well. 
Economics has a branch called "welfare economics" into which moral 
questions have been diverted since Jevons and the coming of scientism. 
The graduate schools teach that economists need merely the distinc­
tion of positive from normative, "is" against "ought," the way things are 
against how they should be. Though philosophically mistaken (Searle, 
see "Deriving 'Ought' from 'Is'" in Speech Acts), as a theory of ethics 
it has the merit of brevity. The sole moral judgment an economist is 
supposed to make is the least controversial one: if every single person 
is made better off by some change, the change should take place. Such 
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a change is said to be "Pareto optimal," in honor of the economist who 
first made the point, in 1906. Even philosophers like John Rawls have 
adopted the notion of Pareto optimality, trying in the economist's man­
ner to pull a decently detailed moral theory out of an empty hat. Welfare 
economics has shown recently some stirrings of more complex moral 
life, as in the works of the economist and philosopher Amartya Sen and 
a few others. But welfare economics is for the most part late-Victorian 
neoutilitarianism stuffed and mounted and fitted with marble eyes. 
The demise of moral reasoning among economists in the late nine­
teenth and early twentieth century, of course, would not come as news 
to Wayne Booth. He sees it happening in literature, too, noting how 
thoroughly since modernism (in both his sense and mine) the moral 
questions have been segregated, the better to sidestep them. "There is 
no such thing as a moral or an immoral book," proclaimed Oscar Wilde. 
"Books are well written or badly written. That is all." As was his tal­
ent, Wilde spoke only a little ahead of his time. Biologists, historians, 
economists, even theologians subscribed in the end to the modernist 
amorality. There is no such thing as a moral or an immoral economy, 
says the economist. Economies are efficient or inefficient. That is all. In 
this life, we want nothing but Facts, sir, nothing but Facts! 
Booth's book gives a reply, and suggests to an economist that the 
"ethical criticism" it propounds can reach beyond literature. Booth him­
self takes it as far as the Ajax Kitchen Cleanser jingle. It can be taken all 
the way to economics, and particularly to the use in economics of ethics-
laden stories. Tzvetan Todorov put the matter so: "literature . .  . is a 
discourse oriented towards—let us not be intimidated by the ponder­
ous words—truth and morality.... If we have managed to lose sight of 
that essential dimension of literature, it is because we began by reducing 
truth to verification and morality to moralism" (164). For "literature" 
here read "economics." The subject of economics is ethical in any case, 
which makes worrisome a claim by the economist to sidestep ethics. We 
do not worry overmuch if an astrophysicist refuses to think ethically 
about her stories. We should be more worried if an economist does. 
Economists are not willing to elaborate their ethical opinions (cf. 
Booth, Critical Understanding 27). No ethical talk, please—we're econo­
mists. One day at lunch in the late 1970s the Chicago economists (of 
whom I am one) were talking over lunch about the economics of capital 
punishment. Gary Becker, the embodiment of economic thinking (for 
which he received in 1992 a well-deserved Nobel Prize), was explaining 
the finding of his colleague and student Isaac Ehrlich that one execu­
tion appeared to deter seven murders. I objected, not to the statistics or 
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to the economics, with which I agreed, but to the ethical notion that 
an execution was the same as a murder. An execution elevates the Gov­
ernment to life-and-death power; whereas a murder is an individual's 
act. The two are not ethically comparable, said I, and so their ratio 
is no knock-down argument in favor of capital punishment. Becker 
was irked, because he was unprepared to argue on ethical grounds. No 
economist is prepared to argue on ethical grounds, at least since the 
demise of moral reasoning in the West. The facts were there, said he, 
seven to one. In this life, we want nothing but Facts, sir. What's this 
maundering about ethics? Becker truncated the conversation (a habit 
among modernists, incidentally), collected his dishes on the cafeteria 
tray, and strode off towards the door muttering, "Seven to one! Seven 
to one!" 
In one way the story is unfair to Becker and to economics. Welfare 
economics contains ethical arguments, conclusive in their sphere, which 
can be used indifferently to attack or support, say, private property. 
Economists, including Gary Becker, speak wonderfully explicitly about 
certain ethical matters. (Becker preaches against welfare economics, but 
his practice of course is different.) No other social science can approach 
economics in the thoroughness of its ethical reflection, when it reflects. 
Political philosophers and literary folk accustomed to sneering at the 
ethical naivete of economists are mostly pikers when it comes to the 
details of ethical theorizing, and are left gaping at the economists' as­
tounding equations concerning Mr. A's happiness and Ms. B's chances 
in the lottery. Still, a reasonable complaint about the economist's style 
of ethical thinking is its razoring away of certain issues (the image 
of "razoring away" comes from the article on "Morality" in Eatwell 
et al., eds., The New Palgrave [1987], the modern successor to Palgrave's 
Dictionary of Political Economy [1894]). Economists think ethically, if 
within a narrow sphere. 
The easiest point to make in reproach is that economists have ethics, 
perforce. Booth remarks that "even those [economists] who work hard 
to purge themselves of all but the most abstract formal interests turn out 
to have an ethical program in mind" (Company 7). Ideology motivates 
economists, despite their protestations of ideological innocence. Admit­
tedly, the economists have a wider ethical purpose in mind, which it is 
true they do not acknowledge. To use the magic word, the economists 
are in the grip of Ideology. Some of them love capitalism; others hate 
it. But both sides find it hard to articulate their reasons, or to know that 
they have them. 
Nowadays students of literature are quick to make the Ideological 
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Point. Score one for the Department of English. Yet one can ask, So 
what? Lacking a fuller sociological analysis—an analysis more com­
monly demanded than supplied—there is not much more to say. After 
one has pinned the tag of "ideological" on a scientific analysis, what 
then? An ideological purpose is unveiled: "Aha, Professor Becker! 
Caught favoring capitalism again, I see!" Well, so what? 
To suppose that the mere unveiling of motive suffices to annihi­
late Becker and his economistic tribe is what Booth has called else­
where "motivism" {Modern Dogma 2^\f; and the case of Russell, Modern 
Dogma 71-72). Motivism is the notion that an argument is wrong if it 
can be shown to arise from a hidden motive. Santayana describes Ber­
trand Russell's motivism during the First World War: His "informa­
tion, though accurate, was necessarily partial, and brought forward in a 
partisan argument; he couldn't know, he refused to know everything; 
so that his judgments, nominally based on that partial information, 
were really inspired by passionate prejudice and were always unfair and 
sometimes mad. He would say, for instance, that the bishops supported 
the war because they had money invested in munition works" (441). 
It is understandable that professors of economics would favor motiv­
ism. The argument fits with their model of humankind. The late 
George Stigler, for example, America's leading vulgar Marxist (though 
a Chicago economist), routinely reduced politics to the pocketbook. But 
it is less easy to see why professors of literature sneer at the force of 
political words, and yearn to reduce ethical questions at once to ama­
teur sociology. When the professors hear the word ethics they reach for 
their ideology. Compared to the average social scientist, the best pro­
fessors of literature are ill armed for the task. As Gerald Graff put it, 
"[m]aking political judgments and classifications of theories requires an 
adequate analysis of social practices. Is there any reason to think current 
literary critics possess such an analysis?" (604-5). The literary people 
would perhaps do better to pause with Booth on the literary matters, 
about which they can claim plausibly to speak. When Wallace Stevens 
regretted in the 1940s "that we have not experimented a little more 
extensively in public ownership of utilities," he had the sense to add 
it was "rather a ridiculous thing for me to be talking about" (qtd. in 
Longenbach 145). One wishes such diffidence were more widely shared 
by literary folk, most of whom are ignorant of economics and content 
to remain so. (Most literary folk since about 1880 have not read any eco­
nomics, imagining that a smattering of Marx and The New Yorl( Review 
of Booths will suffice.) 
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The big point is not ideology and its inability to see itself; we know 
that already, and not much follows from it. The big point is a literary 
one, from which things do follow, namely, that economists are story­
tellers, like Twain or Austen or Lawrence, and that their stories, as 
Booth argues in detail for novelists, have an ethical burden. "We all live 
a great proportion of our lives in a surrender to stories. . . . [E]ven the 
statisticians and accountants must in fact conduct their daily business 
largely in stories: the reports they give to superiors; the accounts they 
deliver to tax lawyers; the anecdotes and parables they hear. . . ." {Com­
pany 14). "[A]ll of us spontaneously make narratives out of just about 
every bit of information that comes our way" (162). "[I]t is impossible 
to shut our eyes and retreat to a story-free world" (236). If we enter 
into it we "embrace the patterns of desire of any narrative" (285). As 
Peter Brooks put it, "Our lives are ceaselessly intertwined with narra­
tive, with the stories that we tell, . .  . all of which are reworked in that 
story of our own lives that we narrate to ourselves.... We are immersed 
in narrative." (3). Or as the historian J. H. Hexter put it: story-telling is 
"a sort of knowledge we cannot live without" (8). 
Economics has not lived without fictional stories, not ever. That eco­
nomics purports to be a true fiction does not of course exempt it from 
the rules of fiction. Economics (at any rate my sort) is true. But that does 
not keep it from being fiction all the way down. Economic scientists, 
like everyone else, use a rhetorical tetrad—fact and logic, to be sure, 
but also metaphor and story, their explicit models and their tacit nar­
ratives. The stories of the first three minutes of the universe or the last 
three months of the recession are shaped by the conventions of human 
storytelling, even if constrained by considered human opinion about the 
nonhuman and the human facts. 
The philosophically inclined need not at this point commence kick­
ing stones and pounding tables, showing thereby that facts are facts, 
nothing but facts, and therefore all we need. Thinking of science as also 
involving stories and metaphors does not entail skepticism about the 
facts. The facts are there, killing the story or giving it life. The story is 
made by people, the facts are made by God. We of course need both to 
make sense. It's like fishing in the sea. Humans make the nets to catch 
the fish, but the fish are there by God's command, "really" there. We 
can believe trustingly that the fish are there even when our backs are 
turned, yet still admit that the design of the nets is a human job. Or 
we can believe skeptically that the fish are after all themselves fish by 
human construction (is a guppy a fish?), yet admit that the world's best 
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net trailed through a sea without something we call fish in it would 
be hauled in empty. "We receive in short the block of marble," wrote 
William James, "but we carve the statue ourselves. . . . Altho the stub­
born fact remains that there is a sensible flux, what is true of it seems 
from first to last to be largely a matter of our own creation" (247, 255). 
As Richard Rorty puts it, "The world is out there, but descriptions of 
the world are not" (5). Any professor of English knows: She was the 
single artificer of the world / In which she sang. 
But any professor of economics knows that a narrative criticism of the 
field needs to come at least in part from economists themselves. People 
other than economists can read the texts, making a text of their own, 
and then can think usefully about it all (see, for example, Heinzelman 
or Woodmansee on copyright and the Romantic idea of the author). But 
by definition the economists themselves have most thoroughly internal­
ized the writings of economists. The rhetorical study of the sciences 
and social sciences had better involve the artificers of the worlds in 
which they sing, who best understand (see Klamer; Gergen and Ger-
gen; Geertz; Billig; and Carlston, Davis and Hersh, Landau, Megill and 
McCloskey, and Rosaldo in Nelson, Megill, and McCloskey). 
Booth makes the point repeatedly. It is the second item in his "Hip­
pocratic Oath for the Pluralist": "I will try to publish nothing about any 
book or article until I have understood it, which is to say, until I have 
reason to think that I can give an account of it that the author himself 
will recognize as just. Any attempt at overstanding will follow this ini­
tial act of attempted respect" {Critical Understanding 351). Economists 
are better placed to understand and respect what they write than are 
literary critics. 
Therefore, most attacks on economics by law professors and sociolo­
gists or even professors of literature do not bite (I can think of a few 
exceptions, such as the strictures on economics raised by the political 
theorist Brian Barry, which make even an economist uncomfortable; but 
they are rare). In this respect, by the way, many economists themselves 
are incompetent to judge the ethical effect of so-called neoclassical eco­
nomics, the mainstream of economics and an oppressor of minorities to 
the left and right, because they do not and cannot read it with compre­
hension. 
Yet Booth notes the danger of being too good a reader of a text: 
"To understand a book well enough to repudiate it, I must make it a 
part of me, . . . and to that degree I will have already experienced an 
ethical change, for better or worse" {Company 239). There is no alter­
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native to giving the best readers a good deal of attention—Fish on 
Milton, Bloom on Stevens, Booth on Austen. But the expert readers be­
come, for better or worse, Miltonic, Stevensish, Austenian. Likewise, if 
there is going to be a serious ethical criticism of economic writing, the 
part accomplished by economists is going to exhibit whatever corrupt­
ing influence the arguments may have (such as McCloskey, Rhetoric of 
Economics; If You're So Smart; Knowledge and Persuasion). 
Start the ethical criticism of economics, then, with Booth's central ques­
tion about the corrupting influence of literature {Company 11): "What 
kind of company are we keeping as we read or listen?" As our mothers 
told us, keeping good or bad company is good for us, or bad. Though 
Booth can hardly be faulted for not reflecting elsewhere on scholarship 
more generally, he does not in The Company We Keep examine the read­
ing and listening to the stories of scholarship itself (as against literature), 
and the company therefore that scholars keep. 
The levels at which we are asked to be a kind of person by economic 
scholarship can be distinguished. 
First, the scientific paper in economics has an implied reader it shares 
with other self-consciously scientific productions of the culture. The 
implied reader has some unattractive features: he is cold-blooded, des­
iccated, uninvolved. Isaac Newton, in many other ways an unattractive 
man, invented some of the attractive rhetoric of the scientific paper 
(Bazerman ch. 4; contrast the dialogues of Galileo and the personal 
confessions of Pascal). It is an ethical stance claiming to avoid an ethical 
stance. 
For example, in the typical scientific paper in economics, as much as 
in physics or biology, certain high-minded precepts about the ethics in 
science are accompanied by low-minded notions that other ethical ques­
tions are "just matters of opinion." The scientific paper in economics 
treats the matter of how income should be distributed, for example, as 
an unarguable matter of opinion, sheer opinion, like one's preference 
for chocolate ice cream. If you say "I like chocolate ice cream" you are 
not inviting a discussion. Either you like it or you don't. No argument 
could move you. The economist's conveniently brief 3" X 5" card for 
ethical reasoning, dividing positive from normative, leads to a chocolate 
ice cream theory of ethics. Heh, either you like murder or you don't. 
The eminent economist Mark Blaug, for example, believes "there are 
long established, well-tried methods for reconciling different method­
ological judgements. There are no such methods for reconciling dif­
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ferent normative value judgements—other than political elections and 
shooting it out at the barricades" (Blaug 132-33). The economists think 
that either you like chocolate ice cream or you don't; you shoot it out or 
you shut up. As Blaug's master, Joseph Schumpeter, put it, "We may, 
indeed, prefer the world of modern dictatorial socialism to the world 
of Adam Smith, or vice versa, but any such preference comes within 
the same category of subjective evaluation as does, to plagiarize Som­
bart, a man's preference for blondes over brunettes" (Schumpeter 330). 
The theory is emotivism, "the doctrine that all evaluative judgments 
and more specifically all moral judgments are nothing but expressions 
of preference" (Maclntyre 11; emotivism is of course self-contradictory, 
since the sneer at evaluation applies to the evaluation of evaluation). 
Undergraduates and many of their professors become uneasy and 
start giggling when a moral question arises. The agreement to disagree 
that ended the wars of religion in Europe can be traced in their unease, 
and in their stock remarks expressing it: "That's just a matter of opin­
ion"; "Religion should not be mentioned in polite conversation"; "In 
questions of morality, it is thy blood or mine"; "The only methods for 
reconciling different normative value judgments are political elections 
or shooting it out at the barricades"; "It is within the same category of 
subjective evaluation as a man's preference for blondes over brunettes." 
The highbrow, philosophical doubt of the Vienna Circle that moral 
statements were even meaningful has this lowbrow, chocolate ice cream 
trace. According to modernist theory, therefore, to be caught making 
moral statements is to be caught in meaningless burbling. 
The chocolate ice cream theory pervades academic life and explains 
why academics are so unwilling to discuss—as against assert or im-
pose—their judgments. The question remains, of course, "How do we 
think about our judgments, once we decide that our goal is to thinly 
about them and not simply to assert them?" {Company 59; and Booth 
any year, passim). The values asserted by the scientific paper in eco­
nomics and elsewhere are certainly not all bad. We should not burn 
people at the stake on account of their opinions on transubstantiation 
and we should not lie about our data on the IQs of identical twins. But 
it is worth remarking sharply that the values narrated in the scientific 
paper are not all good, either, even though Scientific. 
The second point about the people we are asked to be in the reading 
of economic texts is more particularly economic. The economist asks 
the reader to take on certain ethical positions for the sake of the econo­
mistic argument. Most of us do not like the implied reader of economic 
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stories: "Am I willing to be the kind of person that this story-teller is 
asking me to be?" {Company 33). About the coldly calculating Homo 
economicus, no, say we, for the fellow has a levelling, rancorous, ratio­
nal sort of mind / That never looked out of the eye of a saint / Or out 
of a drunkard's eye. And yet (I will be making this point repeatedly— 
and yet) the cold calculation had better be done, by someone, or else 
we will again ban Japanese autos at a cost to American auto buyers of 
$200,000 annually for each job saved in Detroit or we will again bomb 
German civilians indiscriminately at night without affecting the out­
come of the war or we will again regulate airlines for the benefit of the 
present holders of landing rights at O'Hare. The person you are asked 
to be in a modern economic argument is not entirely attractive, but is 
not a character that society can do without. The economic persona is 
usefully realistic about constraints, and thinks hard about certain of the 
ethical choices we must face, albeit ignoring certain others. 
On utilitarian grounds, in other words, the economist is necessary; 
on wider grounds she is sometimes ethical. In policy questions, the ethi­
cal position that economics recommends is that of the social engineer, 
who provides her masters the plans indifferently for full employment 
or extermination camps. The social engineer will protest that she would 
have had nothing to do with extermination camps. She must ask where 
she draws the line, or where German engineers in 1942 in fact drew the 
line, an ethical deliberation that economists are reluctant to undertake. 
They will argue, remarkably, that they are not specialists in ethics and 
should stick to their comparative advantage. 
Third, as Booth says, "artists often imitate the roles they create. The 
writer is moved, in reality, toward the virtues or vices imagined for the 
sake of the work itself" {Company 108). The same is true of scholars; 
perhaps more so. Historians of the medieval papacy or students of com­
parative politics adopt their subjects' methods, at least in spirit. It is not 
irrelevant that Henry Kissinger's first book was on Metternich. Anthro­
pologists have begun to wonder recently about how their people affect 
them. It's about time. 
For economics, the analysis of the ethical effects of the roles they 
create is simple, and partly true. Some economists imitate the role of 
that Homo economicus they have created. Anyone who has administered 
economists will report that a third or so of them behave in frankly self­
ish ways, and will justify their behavior when challenged by smirking 
reference to the economic model of humanity. "If I serve on the search 
committee I want a more than an average raise next year." "Jim, you're 
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kidding: I can't hitch salary to service in such a mechanical way. We're 
in this together." "Ha! Don't talk to me about togetherness. You believe 
in economics, don't you?" What he means is, Don't you believe that 
people are unsocialized SOBs, disciplined only by the invisible hand 
of the marketplace, and therefore that professors of economics should 
act the same way? Historians and, I suppose, professors of literature 
have their own occupational diseases, but cheeky selfishness is not one 
of them. It's not done in their circles; in economics, believe me, it is. It 
would be impossible to get a group of modern economists to vote each 
a strictly equal raise in salary, so deeply do the economists believe in 
the ethics of competition. The egalitarian solution regularly occurs in 
history departments, by vote. 
And yet (there it is again) the ethical effect of paying close attention 
to economic behavior, I repeat, is not entirely bad. Economists suggest 
sometimes that the splendid rationality they study is worthy of imita­
tion. Economics provides the rudiments of ethical thinking for a bour­
geois age: accumulate; think ahead; be methodical if it suits the task; 
be as honest as is the local custom; above all, do not feel socially inferior 
to an impulsive aristocracy—their day is done. The ethical thinking of 
the bourgeosie is not worthless (reflexively, an economist would make 
the joke that after all it has sold well). The intellectuals who sneer at 
it are the beneficiaries of its virtues, which, "during its rule of scarce 
one hundred [now near 250] years, has created more massive and more 
colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations together." 
And since Marx and Engels penned these lines, the real income per 
head of Americans has increased by a factor of ten and of latecomers 
to capitalism, such as Korea or Mexico, by more. Viewed socially, the 
economic man is no pest. 
Even viewed from a strictly individual point of view the merchant's 
virtues, though not those of Achilles or Jesus, are not ethical nullities. In 
his wretched play at the dawn of bourgeois power (1731), George Lillo 
makes his priggish ideal of the London merchant, Thorowgood, assert 
that "as the name of merchant never degrades the gentleman, so by no 
means does it exclude him" (294). Lillo lays it on thick. Thorowgood 
in his exit instructs his assistant to "look carefully over the files to see 
whether there are any tradesmen's bills unpaid." Hah. One can smile 
from an aristocratic height at the goody-goody tendencies of bour­
geois virtue, and scorn the earnest lists of virtues in how-to-succeed-in-
business books from Ben Franklin's autobiography down to the latest 
best-seller. But after all is it not a matter of ethics to pay one's tailor? 
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What kind of person accepts the wares of tradesmen and then refuses 
to give something in return? No merchant he. 
And one cannot leave the matter at "a strictly individual point of 
view." That is the main point of the eighteenth-century philosophers, 
that there are wider, unintended consequences of this or that individual 
act, such as publishing a book or paying a bill. In 1830 Macaulay noted 
the elementary instance: "A man who owes large bills to tradesmen, 
and fails to pay them, almost always produces distress through a very 
wide circle of people with whom he never dealt" (152). 
The honesty of a society of merchants in fact goes beyond what 
would be strictly self-interested in a society of rats, as one can see in that 
much-maligned model of the mercantile society, the small midwestern 
city. A reputation for fair dealing is necessary for a roofer whose trade 
is limited to a community of 50,000. One bad roof and he's finished. 
A colleague once refused to tell me at a cocktail party the name of a 
roofer in Iowa City who had at first done a bad job (he redid the job 
free, at his own instigation), because she knew he would be finished 
in town if his name got out. But her behavior itself shows that ethical 
habits of selfish origin can grow into ethical convictions, the way a child 
grows from fear of punishment to servicing an internal master. An un-
socialized SOB, or DOB, would have told me the name of the roofer, to 
improve the story. After all, the DOB's own reputation in business was 
not at stake. 
The economist who relishes the telling of a story of greed could be 
seen as its advocate, whatever she may say about the distinction be­
tween "is" and "ought." Since the beginnings of modern economics the 
economist has urged us to look on the good side of greed. Again I 
say: The morality of the almighty dollar is not the worst of moralities. 
Dr. Johnson said, "There are few ways in which a man can be more 
innocently employed than in getting money." "The more one thinks of 
this [said Strahan], the juster it will appear" (Boswell 532; 27 March 
1775). Economists have been arguing since the eighteenth century that 
the ancient and aristocratic distaste for acquisitiveness is naive ethically. 
It is naive because it fails to see that greed prospers in a market econ­
omy only by satisfying the ultimate consumers. A capitalist prospers by 
supplying what consumers demand (the power of advertising is grossly 
exaggerated: were it as powerful as it is portrayed any business could be 
profitable merely by advertising). The state or the church, free of greed, 
are no better as employers and are worse as suppliers than the market. 
Donald Trump offends. But for all the jealous criticism he has pro­
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voked, he is not a thief. He did not get his billions from aristocratic 
cattle raids, acclaimed in bardic glory. He made, as he put it, deals, all 
of them voluntary. He did not use a .38 or a broadsword to persuade 
people, but honeyed words. Both sides at the outcome of persuasion, as 
in any free exchange, are better off than they were when they began, in 
contrast to the violence or hectoring favored by most intellectuals. 
The businessperson is a rhetor, as David Lodge notes in Nice Worf(. 
Robyn Penrose, the professor of literature, watches the businessman 
persuading: 
[I]t did strike [her] that Vic Wilcox stood to his subordinates in the re­
lation of teacher to pupils.... [S]he could see that he was trying to teach 
the other men, to coax and persuade them to look at the factory's opera­
tions in a new way. He would have been surprised to be told it, but he 
used the Socratic method: he prompted the other directors and middle 
managers and even the foremen to identify the problems themselves and 
to reach by their own reasoning the solutions he had himself already 
determined upon. It was so deftly done that she had sometimes to tem­
per her admiration by reminding herself that it was all directed by the 
profit-motive. (219) 
Donald Trump persuaded bankers to finance his buying of the Com­
modore Hotel. He then sold it for a profit, persuading people to come 
there. Penn Central, Hyatt Hotels, and the New York City Board of 
Estimate—and behind them the voters and hotel guests—put the old 
place at a low value and the new place, trumped up, at a high value. 
Trump earned a suitably fat profit for seeing that a hotel in a low-
value use could be moved into a high-value use. An omniscient central 
planner would have ordered the same move. Market capitalism can be 
seen as the most altruistic of systems, each capitalist working to help 
someone else, for pay. Trump does well by doing good. 
And yet there is an ethical problem in the theory and practice of 
economics. The problem lies deeper than the mere distaste for greed 
and calculation. Booth argues persuasively that a good author is a good 
friend, the good friend being "a kind of company that is not only pleas­
ant or profitable, in some immediate way, but also good for me, good 
for its own sake. . . . Hours spent with this best kind of friend are seen 
as the way life should be lived.... [M]y true friend is one who [quoting 
Aristotle] 'has the same relations with me that he has with himself " 
{Company 146-47). 
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The model of economics conserves on this sort of friendship, trying 
to get along on as little of it as possible. Economics has been described 
as the science of conserving love. The notion is that love is scarce, and 
that consequently we had better try to get along without it, organizing 
our affairs to take advantage of the abundant selfishness instead. The 
argument is economic to the core. As Adam Smith said famously, "It is 
not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that 
we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest" (1. 1. 
2,16). 
Smith did not overlook love—on the contrary, he wrote what he 
himself thought was his best book on "the theory of moral sentiments." 
Yet he did not connect his theory of love with his theory of selfishness. 
The problem is that conserving on love, treating it as terrifically scarce, 
and not expecting it, may be a bad way to encourage its growth. That is 
the modern social democratic position against market capitalism: that 
market capitalism discourages love (the social democrats believe that 
bureaucracies located in London or Washington, on the contrary, en­
courage it). 
The novelists in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries did 
better in thinking about love and selfishness. I do not think I am say­
ing anything new in observing that not economists but novelists first 
gave prominence to commercial greed and calculation. Novelists, poets, 
and playwrights, not primarily social theorists, first portrayed a society 
of the bourgeoisie. I just described Smith's The Wealth of Nations as a 
"theory of selfishness." That is the reading that a modern economist 
gives the book, projecting back onto the father the sins of the children. 
In truth, the book itself does not support such a reading very well. 
Smith never describes a project of rational selfishness without noting 
the emotional and ethical obstacles to achieving it. Foreign trade free 
of tariffs, for example, is recommended by more than "police" (that is 
to say, policy, expediency, the achieving of high incomes). Most funda­
mentally, Smith asserts, free trade accords with the natural right of a 
person to use her own labor as she wishes. 
The idea of Homo economicus itself arrives late in economics, toward 
the end of the nineteenth century, by way of an analogy with physical 
molecules. (It arrives at the same time that morality drops out.) Yet it 
comes early to the English novel, full blown in Defoe circa 1719, and 
prominent later in, say, Austen's comedies of calculation circa 1800 or 
Dickens's satires of greed circa 1840. 
Homo economicus is a facer of choices, a considered spurner of 
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the option foregone, known in economics as "opportunity costs." The 
notion of opportunity cost does not become clear to economists until 
the so-called Austrian economists explain it in the 1870s. Yet it has been 
a commonplace of poets since the beginning, two roads diverging in a 
yellow wood, and I, being one traveler, able to take only one, and facing 
therefore the opportunity cost. Achilles spurns fighting in preference to 
sulking in his tent; Satan spurns Heav'n to reign in Hell. 
Robinson Crusoe selects what to load on the first raft trip from 
the wreck: 
It was in vain to sit still and wish for what was not to be had, and this 
Extremity rouz'd my Application.... [H]ope of furnishing my self with 
Necessaries, encourag'd me to go beyond what I should have been able 
to have done upon another Occasion. My raft was now strong enough to 
bear any reasonable Weight; my next Care was what to load it with. . . . 
[H]aving considered well what I most wanted, I first got three of the 
Seamen's Chests . . . and lowered them down. . . . [T]he first of these I 
filled with Provision, viz. Bread, Rice, three Dutch Cheeses. . . . [T]his 
put me upon rummaging for Clothes, . . . but [I] took no more than I 
wanted for present use, for I had other things which my Eye was more 
upon, as first Tools to work with on Shore, and it was after long search­
ing that I found out the Carpenter's Chest,... much more valuable than 
a Ship Loading of Gold. . . . My next Care was for some Ammunition 
and Arms. . . . (41-42) 
The raft is not of infinite size; at any moment the weather may turn and 
sink the wreck; this may be the only trip. Crusoe cannot have every­
thing, and so must make choices. He takes only the clothing "wanted 
for present use," because there were "other things which my eye was 
more upon." That is, he chose to have fewer clothes and more carpen-
ter's tools. He could not in the circumstances have both. He faced a 
road of many clothes or a diverging one of many tools and had to choose 
between them, spurning one. He later "resolv'd to set all other Things 
apart [so incurring the opportunity cost of projects elsewhere], 'till I got 
every Thing out of the Ship that I could get" (44). 
Each time Crusoe, or any Homo economicus, faces a choice he draws 
up a balance sheet in his head. Crusoe speaks in the passage just cited 
of calling "a Council, that is to say, in my Thoughts, whether I should 
take back the Raft," but more commonly he uses commercial meta­
phors, especially those of accounting (most particularly on 53-54). It is 
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the rational way to proceed—understanding the word rational to mean 
merely the sensible adjustment of what you can do to what you want; 
calculation, but of course humanly imperfect. Crusoe is the first cal­
culator, projector, undertaker, entrepreneur. The rational person is a 
calculator making rough and ready choices about what next to put on 
the raft. After the second storm destroys the wreck, " I . .  . recover'd my 
self with this satisfactory Reflection, viz. That I had lost no time, nor 
abated no Diligence to get everything out of her that could be useful to 
me" (47). 
Opportunity cost says that Crusoe cannot have every scarce thing. 
He is a commercial man making choices under conditions of "scarcity" 
(another notion articulated late in economics, well after the novelists 
had shown it working in a bourgeois society). In the book the details 
of the style throughout contribute to the force of scarcity—a contrast 
to the stories of shipwrecks in the Odyssey or the Aeneid, over which 
hover intervening gods willing to perform miracles of abundance. The 
miracles in Crusoe's world are naturalistic, reflecting always Adam's 
Curse. Defoe's story is filled with realistic disappointment, signaled 
often by an ominous "but": "[T]here had been some Barly and Wheat 
together" on the wreck, "but, to my great Disappointment, I found 
afterwards that the Rats had eaten or spoil'd it all" (41). The wreck had 
"a great Roll of Sheet Lead: But this last was so heavy, I could not hoise 
[sic] it up to get it over the Ship's Side" (45). He takes a kid from a she-
goat, and "hopes to have bred it up tame, but it would not eat, so I was 
forc'd to kill it and eat it myself" (50). He endeavored to breed some 
young wild pigeons, "but when they grew older they flew all away" (62). 
"May 4. I went a fishing, but caught not one Fish that I durst eat of" 
(68). "I searched for a Cassava root,.. . but I could find none" (79). He 
spent three days bringing grapes to his cave, "But, before I got thither, 
the Grapes were spoil'd" (80). The "but" (all emphases added above) 
is unsentimental, aware of life's scarcity. It is the economist's master 
conjunction. 
Homo economicus may or may not be bad company for us, but lit­
erary artists, not worldly philosophers, are responsible for getting us 
acquainted. 
And finally, the doctrines of economics themselves have ethical conse­
quences. Booth argues in the manner of Aristotle that there are many 
kinds of goodness, which depend for their effect on the character the 
reader brings to the text. Narratives are to be thought of as "a botanical 
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garden full of many beautiful species, each species implicitly bearing 
standards of excellence within its kind" (Company 47). Booth, like Mac-
Intyre and other modern Aristotelians after virtue, does not want to 
reduce The Good to one all-purpose juice. 
Economics has both its Platonists and its Aristotelians, ethical 
plungers and ethical hedgers. The labor theory of value, reducing all 
value to an ideal juice, is Platonist. The utilitarians were also Platonists: 
"the principle of utility," wrote Jeremy Bentham on the first page of 
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789) "approves 
or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency 
which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the 
party whose interest is in question." 
The so-called marginalists of the 1870s and after them the modern 
economists are Aristotelians masquerading as unreconstructed Plato­
nists. Their "marginal utility" of water and diamonds was dressed up as 
utilitarian and Platonist, but in fact admitted that the value of different 
goods could not be reduced to one number. Value could not be reduced 
to embodied labor, say, or God's own valuation of water or of diamonds. 
The science turned gradually away from the question of what the single 
juice might be that constituted value; and turned toward the answerable 
question of what relative value consumers put on one good as against 
another—in the vernacular, the "tradeoff," or in the economist's jargon, 
the opportunity cost. It was like the seventeenth-century turning away 
from the question of what gravity was to the answerable question of the 
rate at which two things fell toward each other. Water and diamonds 
in such a story are not merely sources of utility to be added up into 
one number. They are different, un-add-up-able goods. Their values 
depend on individual tastes and circumstances, not on something mea­
sureable independently of human choice. The human choice reveals a 
relative value. 
Modern economics would do well to recognize its Aristotelian ethos. 
("Austrian" economists make the point frequently, though not quite in 
these terms.) The economist can do a cost-benefit analysis as measuring 
one juice, in which case the economic wizard in her tower will be left 
to make the determination of what is to be done. Clearly, if society's 
valuation of the distinct goods of a clean environment and of cheap 
auto travel can be reduced to a single dollar measure then the economist 
should recommend arrangements that maximize the dollar measure. To 
hell with democracy. The best use of Prince William Sound might well 
be as a fluid medium for oil tankers, if that is how the calculation of 
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cost and benefit comes out, in which case the otters and water birds be 
damned. 
Aristotle would properly object that cost-benefit analyses should not 
be brought down to a universal juice. The analyses should be stopped 
before the juicing stage, and should present alternatives. In a democ­
racy it should be the people who choose between otters and gasoline, 
not an economist king. The rhetoric of advising real kings makes it 
difficult to resist, but the economic expert should avoid forcing moral 
conclusions on his clients. Some economists would agree, though they 
keep on saying that good counselorship consists in not thinking about 
ethical matters. 
If economists tell stories and exercise an ethical sense when telling them, 
then they had better have as many stories as possible. "Powerful narra­
tive," writes Booth, "provides our best criticism of other powerful nar­
ratives" {Company 237). This is an economic justification of pluralism, 
an argument for not keeping all one's eggs in a single narrative basket. 
The application to economics is straightforward: we need pluralism in 
our economic narratives. Marxist narrative provides a criticism of the 
bourgeois "neoclassical" narrative, and vice versa. "The serious ethical 
disasters produced by narratives occur when people sink themselves 
into an unrelieved hot bath of one kind of narrative" (Company 237). 
If you are accustomed to thinking in Platonic terms, within which 
knowledge consists mainly of propositions like the irrationality of the 
square root of two, provable now and forever, then monism looks at­
tractive. There's One Truth out there, isn't there? If you are by contrast 
accustomed to thinking in Aristotelian terms, within which knowledge 
consists of judgments like the desirability of democracy, uncertain even 
when agreed to after much discussion by people of good will, then 
monism looks foolish. Dogmatic Marxists, dogmatic neoclassicals, dog­
matic Austrian economists, dogmatic institutionalists, who have put the 
other's writings on an index of forbidden books, are foolish and ethi­
cally dangerous, all of them. They are true believers, or, rather, believers 
in Truth: The best lack all conviction, while the worst / Are full of 
passionate intensity. 
The Boothian pluralism of stories, then, speaks to economics. Albert 
Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin have recently noted the failures of "prin­
cipled dogmatism," the one-story world, as an approach to morality 
—"legalism without equity, and moralism without charity" (342). 
Economics is an encouragement to such dogmatism, attempting to re­
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duce ethical questions to a system of axioms. The stories of economists 
could better be used casuistically, as Jonsen and Toulmin would put it. 
The case-by-case method is quite opposed to modernism, and was at­
tacked on modernist grounds by Pascal in his Provincial Letters of1656­
1657 (Jonsen and Toulmin, ch. 12). It does not seek universal principles 
to be applied by social engineers. It seeks an ethical conversation in 
which principles of less-than-universal applicability are discovered. 
The best economists do exactly this. Ronald Coase, for example, is a 
British-educated economist for a long time on the faculty of the Law 
School of the University of Chicago (in 1991 he received the Nobel 
Prize). His approach to economics is casuistic, looking for the stories 
and metaphors and facts and logics that fit the case at hand, and avoiding 
the unreasonable obsession with one of them alone. His most famous 
article, "The Problem of Social Cost" (1959), is exactly casuistic. It has 
therefore been misunderstood by modernist economists, who see in it a 
"theorem" for their social engineering. The theorem they have in mind, 
as it happens, is due to Adam Smith, some years in advance of Coase 
(namely, that exchange free of trammels works well to decide about air 
pollution and property rights; Coase's actual point was the opposite, 
that in a world of trammels the particular trammels need to be exam­
ined one by one). A style of ethical storytelling that insists that cases 
matter as much as principles is foreign to most of modern economics. 
The Boothian pluralism of stories, then, has something to teach eco­
nomics. The application of an ethics of fiction to economics, though, 
can hardly fail as well to teach in the other direction. It would violate 
Booth's maxims of critical pluralism if it were not so. Students of lit­
erature can learn a thing or two about ethics from economists, and not 
only the ethical point that we must be grownups and face scarcity when 
after all it exists. 
The main lesson in ethics that literary people can learn from eco-
nomics—economics of any sort, or indeed social science of any sort— 
is that action is social. Booth takes ethical matters to be one-on-one af­
fairs. He uses Wallace Stevens's "The House Was Quiet and the World 
Was Calm" as a motto for Company: 
The house was quiet and the world was calm. 
The reader became the book. . . . 
. . . the reader leaned above the page, 
Wanted to lean, wanted much most to be 
The scholar to whom his book is true. . . . 
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Literary people will naturally take the reader and the poet-novelist-
scholar as the relevant pair. But this is a mistake, an economist (and 
critics like Northrop Frye) would note. Reader-response criticism is 
one thing, and very nice. But a full rhetorical criticism would be an 
audience-response criticism, fully social, noting the linguistic and, yes, 
ideological consequences unintended in the dyad of writer and lone 
reader. You cannot fully understand forests by examining trees one by 
one. You cannot take a fish out of its school and expect to learn much 
about schooling. An economist listening to the stories told by Adam 
Smith, David Ricardo, Knut Wicksell, John Maynard Keynes, or Paul 
Samuelson resists narrowing the ethical question down to me and thee. 
She has a lively appreciation of the we. 
A book with economic implications—Ayn Rand's Atlas Shrugged, 
for example, or Keynes's The General Theory of Employment, Interest 
and Money—can have the consequences in wholly unintended ways on 
the individual reader (which Booth emphasizes) and in social ways, too 
(which he does not, that being the point here). Atlas Shrugged, for in­
stance, can sustain a country-club Republicanism far removed from the 
romance of the novel. The General Theory can sustain a perpetual class 
of welfare recipients and perpetual employment for college graduates 
enriched by service to the welfare recipients. The economist looks for 
moral consequences beyond the dyad of author and reader. A book can 
have obviously "good" ethical effects on individuals, encouraging them 
to save (to take the standard Keynesian example), yet the saving can 
have disastrous effects in the society at large. We recognize the pursuit 
of profit as in some ways an ethical failing in an individual, yet it can 
lead to great good. 
The classic definition of economics was given by Alfred Marshall in 
1890 on the first page of his Principles of Economics—"a study of man­
kind in the ordinary business of life." To this Northrop Frye would have 
added: "The fundamental job of the imagination in ordinary life . .  . is 
to produce, out of the society we have to live in, a vision of the society 
we want to live in" (140). Economists preach ethics unaware, but have 
limited their imagination in the telling of ethical stories. 
Economics seems to be ready to get back to ethical thinking. Many 
economists have realized that the utilitarian and Platonist hat does not 
have a rabbit inside it. We cannot do economics without ethical think­
ing in detail, and we cannot do ethical thinking in detail without varied 
and Aristotelian stories. An economist comes to recognize that he is a 
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teller of tales and therefore, as Booth notes, a giver of judgments. When 
he does, he writes better economic stories, truer and with sager morals 
at the end. He trusts less in models on a blackboard and more in an 
ethics of fiction read from people's lives. And he makes better, much 
better, company to keep. 
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Saying What Goes without Saying: 
The Rhetoric of Bacon's Essays 
EUGENE GARVER 
FRO M The Rhetoric of Fiction through The Company We Keep: An Ethics 
of Fiction, Wayne Booth has devoted himself to showing how literature 
can make us into better, or worse, people. His work is rhetorical not 
only in that he is concerned with the effects of literature on an audience, 
but because his terms of analysis are rhetorical, viewing literature as a 
transaction between writers and readers. Like Sidney's Apology, his de­
fenses of literature and his exposition of its powers translate traditional 
defenses and expositions of the powers of persuasion into a new realm. 
But Booth's work also departs from traditional rhetoric by directing at­
tention to literature, and novels above all, which achieve practical effects 
through an independence from the institutional setting and practical 
purpose that were essential to classical rhetoric. 
While he expands the range of materials to which rhetorical criticism 
applies to include literature, he also narrows the scope of the literary, 
and of his criticism, by excluding didactic writing. The preface to the 
first edition of the Rhetoric of Fiction begins by excluding "didactic fic­
tion" to look at "the rhetorical resources available to the writer of epic, 
novel, or short story as he tries, consciously or unconsciously, to im­
pose his fictional world upon the reader." He defends this restriction by 
Don Bialostosky, Wayne Booth, and Victoria Kahn were useful readers of an earlier version 
of this piece. Participants in the faculty workshop entitled "Machiavelli and the Renaissance" 
at Lebanon Valley College patiently raised helpful objections to some less temperate expo­
sitions of my thesis. Jim Phelan helped make the "Wayne Booth" who appears in this essay 
somewhat closer to the person of that name. 
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claiming that the "problems raised by rhetoric in the sense [mentioned 
above] . . . are seen more clearly in non-didactic works" (xiii). 
Someone not educated and chastened by Booth might call the situa­
tion ironic. Booth's shift of rhetorical attention from the didactic to the 
literary was revolutionary and productive. But that change of focus was 
meant to expand the field of rhetoric to include the fictional, not to 
shift it from the didactic tofiction. This chapter is designed to see some 
significance in the above quotation from Booth. If "problems raised by 
rhetoric . . . are seen more clearly in non-didactic works," then it is 
time to see how much light can be reflected back on rhetoric's more 
traditional home among the didactic. 
I want to ask Boothian questions about a kind of discourse or lit­
erature that he does not consider, a kind that is didactic by design, and 
ask how reading Francis Bacon's Essays can make us better (or worse) 
people. The noninstitutional character of literary rhetoric becomes espe­
cially interesting in looking at works whose purpose is to teach. The 
Essays are not a random choice for a test case, because they occupy 
middle ground between traditional instances of oratory and genres like 
the novel, which have freed their purposes from institutional settings. 
Without entering into the extensive debates concerning the ideology 
of the novel, I think it fair to say that the Essays are worth exploring 
because, while not tied to institutions or particular practical decisions, 
neither author nor reader is fully abstracted from specific ethical and 
political context. The individualism that is often a part of the presuppo­
sitions and outcome of the ethics of the novel, and which I think is 
presupposed by Booth, will itself be called into question by an ethics of 
the essay that is simultaneously self-asserting and self-effacing. 
Bacon explains what the Essays are for and how they work in the Ad­
vancement of Learning. He says that it is strange that wisdom concerning 
the "husbandry" as opposed to the "fruit" of life, has not been pre­
sented: "This part therefore, because of the excellency thereof, I cannot 
but find exceedingly strange that it is not reduced to written inquiry: 
the rather, because it consisteth of much matter, wherein both speech 
and action is often conversant; and such wherein the common talk of 
men, (which is rare, but yet cometh sometimes to pass), is wiser than 
their books" (Advancement 2.22.3, 167-68).1 He supplies the beginning 
for an explanation for the puzzling fact that this wisdom has not yet 
been collected: "This part of knowledge we do report also as deficient: 
not but that it is practised too much, but it hath not been reduced to 
writing" (2.23.13, 188). But why has something so useful not been re­
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duced to writing? It has not been "reduced to writing" because to do so 
transforms the nature of such knowledge. Unlike the secrets of nature, 
which are given up only when she is tortured, truths that are unknown 
because we so far lack the right method of investigation, this kind of 
learning is deficient for a different reason. Secrecy is connected not to 
obscurity and difficulty but to darkness and shame. Bacon notices that 
there are things that are best left unsaid because they are not decent to 
talk about: "some things are secret because they are hard to know, and 
some because they are not fit to utter" (2.23.47, 2O5)- Consequently, and 
here is the central point to the rhetoric and ethics of the Essays, if re­
ducing this knowledge to writing transforms it, performing these sorts 
of actions from learning transforms the nature of the acts. If negotiation 
is an object of knowledge, then successful negotiating can be taught, 
can become a commodity, potentially accessible to everyone, and poten­
tially matter for specialization and profit. When something becomes a 
craft, then it can be used for ends outside itself. It can be displayed as 
well as used. It is ungentlemanly to try too hard to succeed; much better 
to be upright and let success follow as God and luck allow. 
What is most interesting and troubling in the Essays is what happens 
to What Everybody Knows when it becomes publicly stated and col­
lected into an art, how What Everybody Knows becomes transformed 
into something quite different simply by being known, and, more spe­
cifically, by being collected, by being presented in writing. The novelty 
of the Essays and their moral force is in their existence, not just in what 
they say. If these things have until now been tacit, there is good reason 
why. The transformations involved in making common knowledge ex­
plicit are enormous, and make more complicated the claim that Booth 
makes in the afterword to the second edition to The Rhetoric of Fic­
tion: "The reader whom the implied author writes to can be found as 
much in the text's silences as in its overt appeals. What the author felt 
no need to mention tells us who he thinks we'll be—or hopes we'll 
be. . .  . The same holds for our beliefs about values: what the author 
feels no need to mention, of the values the story depends on, tells us 
who he thinks we are before we start to read" (423). Those silences may 
be signs of tacit agreements, but some of them, including those that 
bear most directly on moral teaching, will be signs oi agreements to hold 
certain things tacit. An author may "feel no need to mention" things 
that everyone knows, because to mention such things proves that either 
author or audience is not part of that community in which they go with­
out saying. The things that go without saying might go without saying 
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because they are too obvious, or because they are hidden too deep to 
be seen—some foundations don't work when they're above ground— 
or because they are unsightly.2 Writers and readers are parts of com­
munities, communities of silence as well as of speech. The Rhetoric of 
Fiction considers "authorial silences," but Bacon brings to our attention 
communal silences.3 
The Essays present what everybody knows, and by the act of pre­
sentation change the nature of such knowledge. Everybody knows that 
necessity and fortune create gaps between what is and what ought to 
be and between what should be and what can be. To be ignorant of 
that fact is the ethical immaturity called youthful idealism. But to an­
nounce that necessity creates such discrepancies is in bad taste, and to 
acknowledge that one realizes that such gaps exist is to accuse oneself 
of bad character and loose living.4 It is part of sociability and indi­
vidual goodness to present a face to others that insists that goodness is 
rewarded, that we are all equally submissive to the demands of what 
should be. There is, for example, an affront to decency in Bacon's dec­
laration in "Of Ambition": "Since we have said it were good not to use 
men of ambitious natures, except it be upon necessity, it is fit we speak 
in what cases they are of necessity" (Essays 113). Such declarations are in 
questionable taste, and are signs of bad character, because it is an easy 
road from admitting that circumstances sometimes create exemptions 
to moral laws to declaring that the speaker is exempt from those laws. 
We want presidents who say that they will not negotiate with hostage-
takers, and we want them to negotiate. When someone points out a gap 
between what should be done and the demands of necessity, there is at 
least the danger that that gap increases by being mentioned. 
We all know that sometimes necessity dictates that we not act as we 
would like, that we not do what is right, but the more we admit ne­
cessity as an excuse, the easier it becomes to appeal to necessity as an 
excuse, and the more often we act against reason and goodness. Excuses 
become justifications; we start out doing wrong because it is necessary, 
and end up thinking that because it's necessary, it's not wrong after all. 
Among the excuses that become justification, the notion that Everybody 
Does It must be high on the list, and so stating what everybody knows, 
through the act of exposure, widens the discrepancy between what is 
and what ought to be. Once ought no longer implies can, obligations 
seem less compelling. Maybe it's better not to mention such things. 
Bacon himself sees the connection between saying what goes with­
out saying and turning to necessity and fortune. When he claims in the 
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Advancement of Learning that the novelty of his approach is to note the 
existence of wisdom that exists but which has not yet been collected in 
writing, he simultaneously proposes to offer practical advice concern­
ing fortune as well as goodness: "Fortune layeth as heavy impositions 
as virtue; and it is as hard and severe a thing to be a true politique, 
as to be truly moral" (2.23.13, 188). But he does not tie the project of 
"collecting" to its subject matter, fortune and necessity. Expanding the 
realm of the practical to fortune seems innocent and optimistic, but it 
turns out that acting in the face of necessity can often become acting 
in the guise of necessity.5 Consequently Bacon's moral teaching—both 
his didactic practice and the practice he preaches—inverts Aristotle's 
advice to the rhetorician: "Do not seem to speak from thought [dia­
noias] as men now do, but from choice [prohaireseos]. Say, for example, 
'I wished this. Indeed, I chose this. But if I gained nothing, still this is 
better.' For the one way of speaking is the mark of a practically wise 
man [phronimou], the other way is the mark of a good man [agathou]. 
The practically wise man is involved in pursuing the advantageous, but 
the good man in pursuing the noble" (Rhetoric 3.16.1417324-28). In­
stead of that advice of Aristotle's, Bacon shows that recognizing the 
force of necessity provides an all-purpose excuse and denial of respon­
sibility, one that applies to the Essays themselves. And so Bacon says in 
"Of Cunning," "In things that a man would not be seen in himself, it is 
a point of cunning to borrow the name of the world; as to say, The world 
says, or, There is a speech abroad," (Essays 69). The inversion of Aristotle's 
point goes beyond persuasiveness: if knowledge of things outside our 
control, rather than our attitude towards things we can do something 
about, determines success, then such knowledge is now to be valued 
over goodness. By stating what everybody knows, Bacon offers a kind 
of knowledge that is a substitute for character. Hence the inversion of 
Aristotle's precept. 
Bacon's writing is more than just another case of the moral act of 
saying what goes without saying; it makes discursively accessible the 
entire realm that must go without saying, the realm of necessity, the 
fortuitous, those things that lie outside human control. There are many 
rhetorical genres that say what everybody knows, debunkings and expo­
ses among them. But fortuna is the realm of events for which people, 
especially powerful people, cannot be held accountable. Making neces­
sity and fortune amenable to advice and teaching threatens the excuses 
that prevent misfortunes from being read as injustices. When Bacon 
presents an art for dealing with necessity, necessity becomes at the same 
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time both more available and more suspect as an excuse and rationale. 
The realm of the practical is things within our power as opposed to 
things we cannot do anything about. The realm of the ethical is reliably 
located in our characters as opposed to the vicissitudes of the fortuitous 
external world. The realm of the moral,finally, is those things for which 
praise and blame are accorded regardless of outcome, as opposed to an 
amoral realm in which success is the measure of goodness. Making hus­
bandry, negotiation, and fortune subjects for teaching and for practice 
threatens conventional equations between the practical, the moral, and 
the ethical. 
Stating what everybody knows also widens the reference of everybody 
as stating rules for action makes successful action accessible to new, up­
start, actors. The moral thing to do is right regardless of consequences, 
but only people who possess sufficient wealth and power can afford to 
act without regard for consequences; the rest of us have to worry about 
success, and when Bacon's Essays present an art of husbanding one's 
fortune, he legitimizes the unseemly concerns of us outsiders. 
In making negotiation and dealings with fortune subject to teaching, 
Bacon upsets the division of labor between the moral realm in which 
consequences do not count and the nonmoral domain in which con­
sequences are everything, a division of labor that seems conveniently 
equivalent to a division of classes in society between those who act 
gracefully and those who must be industrious. His work can be read as 
domesticating the fortuitous, making chance subject to policy, and so 
leading the moral into new territory, civilizing something still in a state 
of nature. It can also be read as a process of infection and corruption 
running in the opposite direction, with vulgar considerations of worldly 
success tainting the moral and the ethical.6 
Although it is easy to think that Bacon's project is one of under­
mining conservatism and replacing it with selfish opportunism, the 
opposite case can be made equally well: he expands the realm of the 
moral to match the broadened domain of the practical. Saying what 
goes without saying is alternatively conservative and upsetting, preserv­
ing and overthrowing traditional moral rules and the social roles that 
are aligned in a privileged way with the practical, the moral, and the 
ethical.7 While it is easy to see a concern for successfully making it in the 
world as a leveling one, Horkheimer, for example, insightfully argues 
instead that success is an essentially conservative concept: "The prag­
matic concept of truth in its exclusive form . . . corresponds to limitless 
trust in the existing world. If the goodness of every idea is given time 
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and opportunity to come to light, if the success of the truth—even after 
struggle and resistance—is in the long run certain, if the idea of a dan­
gerous, explosive truth cannot come into the field of vision, then the 
present social structure is consecrated.... In pragmatism there lies em­
bedded the belief in the existence and advantages of free competition."8 
The reason that Bacon's rules for making it in the world can seem alter­
natively conservative and destabilizing, can appear either to extend or 
to contract the territory of the moral, is that in different circumstances, 
the same teaching can either serve to expose hypocrisy in others or it 
can itself become instruction in manipulation. Those circumstances are 
not themselves contained within the Essays.9 Therefore, the ethics of the 
Essays is a rhetorical problem in that its ethical value and effect depend 
on circumstances and purposes outside itself, unlike a purely aesthetic 
object, if such a thing exists, which carries its principles of application 
within itself, and unlike a traditional rhetorical appeal, which is tied 
to its circumstances of production and reception.10 Because those cir­
cumstances of application cannot be given within the Essays themselves, 
reducing this wisdom into writing opens up possibilities for manipu­
lation that did not exist before.11 Bacon has made a way of acting into 
a rule-guided technique, and by that transformation his wisdom be­
comes something that can be used for any purpose, good or bad. When 
Aristotle noted that that character is to be preferred to knowledge, his 
evaluation relies on just that morally indeterminate feature of knowl­
edge: character is oriented towards ends, knowledge looks back to its 
justifying principles. There were good reasons why these things went 
without saying, at least good reasons for the people who knew them but 
didn't say them.12 Saying them makes them into matters of technique 
by loosening the bonds between action and circumstance. The very act 
of announcing how people act brings into question the appropriateness 
of actions. 
The distinctions Booth develops in The Company We Keep permit a 
more sophisticated statement of the problem of character and knowl­
edge as he distinguishes the moral effects of reading from the moral 
work in the act of reading itself. It is true that the moral effects of 
reading depend on circumstances of reception outside the text. But the 
moral values of the activity of reading are something within the control 
of the author. Every method for confronting fortune and for success 
in business and negotiation can be used for good or bad external pur­
poses. In addition, corresponding to Booth's idea of the morality in 
reading, each method for confronting fortune articulates a set of prin­
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ciples that define a person; the rhetoric of fiction and, more generally, 
of noninstitutional discourse, develops a conception of character that is 
relatively independent of circumstances. Consequently, such character 
can be understood as a set of principles used by a person, and so it be­
comes a kind of knowledge that substitutes for character. Every precept 
and example can be read and then can be imitated as a kind of faking 
or as a kind of incorporation. They are all, that is, subject to use in what 
The Company We Keep calls upward and downward hypocrisy.13 
For this inner, ethical side, which Booth expresses as the moral ex­
perience in the act of reading, therefore, Bacon not only has to teach his 
readers how to act—that is the easy idea of reading literature as caus­
ing moral effects—but also has to teach them how to read, to read his 
directions on how to act—the more sophisticated idea of reading litera­
ture as itself an ethical activity. To that extent Stanley Fish is right to 
direct the attention of the critic to the experience of reading the Essays, 
although it does not follow at all, as Fish claims, that that experience of 
reading is therefore the "subject" of the Essays.1* That latter inference is 
not only a danger for the literary critic, but for the moral agent as well. 
The practical equivalent to thinking that the experience of reading 
is the subject of the Essays is the thought that what one learns from the 
Essays is a certain ability to use language, not to refer to what language 
is about but to use language to refer to and thereby define oneself as a 
certain kind of person, a person who speaks the right way. The danger 
of the Essays is not Booth's general conception of the downward hy­
pocrisy of the sophist who uses a better mask to cover a worse cause, 
but a quite specific kind of hypocrisy, subject to frequent attention in 
the Renaissance, that uses a mask to substitute for any face at all, the 
kind of chameleonlike concealing that occurs when knowledge replaces 
character. In terms to which I will return, mention becomes a substi­
tute for use, as aesthetic style becomes a substitute for practical action. 
As Johnson puts it in a sentence {Idler 84) that perfectly fits the diffi­
culties with Bacon, "The examples and events of history press, indeed, 
upon the mind with the weight of truth; but when they are reposited 
in the memory, they are oftener employed for shew than use, and rather 
diversity conversation than regulate life." 
Without thinking about how to read Bacon's precepts and examples, 
the critic will be forced to make the elisions from "ambiguity" to 
"secrecy" to "unintelligibility" that Hexter makes in talking about 
More's Utopia: "While ambiguity may enhance the value of certain spe­
cial kinds of poetry, it docs not enhance the value of social comment. 
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We should think rather poorly of any present-day social thinker whose 
intention was inscrutable or mysterious, and unintelligibility is no more 
a virtue in a criticism of society written four hundred years ago than 
it is in current social criticism" (n).15 Hexter's thesis makes sense only 
if Bacon, or any social thinker, need not teach the readers how to read, 
only if reading consists in drawing out some informative content. If part 
of Bacon's project must be to teach his readers to read, then ambiguity 
can have more intelligible functions. This further dimension is essen­
tial to Bacon's enterprise, since without reading the Essays prudently, 
the reader will either make them, and himself, into aesthetic objects, or 
make them into amoral techniques and instruments distinct from any 
particular uses. 
Bacon's practice in the Essays has the dual function that imitations 
have of both providing a model and providing an authority, offering 
both resources for action and resources for argument in support of ac­
tions one wants to undertake anyway, including the future resource of 
citing Bacon's arguments. That provision of authority offers the dimen­
sion in which his arguments can be mentioned as well as used, the sense 
in which mention becomes an unusually efficient and productive form 
of use.16 Mentioning becomes a form of use, since to cite Bacon, and to 
cite Bacon's citations, is a way of authorizing one's behavior. In negotia­
tion and in confronting fortune, everybody knows what to do, namely 
to win; Bacon's teachings offer a way of respectably clothing one's ac­
tions. His teachings are then used for ownership and display. Analogous 
to the use/mention distinction applied to language is the distinction be­
tween use value and exchange value applied to commodities.17 While it 
might seem obvious, and while it is true on a grammatical as opposed 
to a rhetorical understanding of language, that use is prior to mention, 
Bacon shows ways in which mentioning a rule, moral principle, au­
thority, or example is prior to or constitutive of using it, ways in which 
displaying a line of argument is its use. In the same way, an understand­
ing of economics that grounds economic value in demand and need will 
naturally make use value prior to exchange value, but the range of eco­
nomic activity obviously explained by a connection to demand seems so 
small that instead needs become products of economic activity, not its 
genesis, and exchange value determines use value. We can learn what is 
good for us by what sounds good. 
So the essay "Of Usury" begins by distinguishing between the many, 
who have made "witty invectives" against usury and Bacon himself, 
who will speak "of usury usefully," constructing a new kind of didactic 
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rhetoric that realigns the practical, the moral, and the ethical. Speak­
ing usefully means, it turns out, first pointing to the "discommodities 
of usury" (Essays, all 123), then its advantages, and finally of the "ref­
ormation and reiglement of usury; how the discommodities of it may 
be best avoided, and the commodities retained" (125). What begins as a 
necessary evil turns out to be necessary, and therefore not evil after all. 
(Rhetorically, there is an important innovation here: Aristotle says that 
deliberative rhetoric concerning the useful and epideictic rhetoric about 
the good are convertible by a change of phrase [Rhetoric 1.9.1367D37-
1368a 10]. The differences between witty invectives and useful maxims 
are greater than that.) The essay ends with a formula that captures 
Bacon's intent of saying what goes without saying: "If it be objected 
that this doth, in a sort, authorize usury, which before was in some places 
but permissive; the answer is, that it is better to mitigate usury by dec­
laration, than to suffer it to rage by connivance" (126, emphasis added). 
According to that ending, saying what goes without saying and speak­
ing usefully reduce rather than expand the gap between is and ought}* 
But, I have been claiming, such reduction and consequent realignment 
of the practical, the moral, and the ethical is possible only if Bacon 
teaches a method of reading as well as a method of acting and imitating 
what one reads, which is in turn possible only if he grounds the ethical 
in the activity of prudent reading itself. Only then will speaking use­
fully have the added dimension of doing more than providing seemly 
clothing for what one wanted to do anyway; only then can we learn 
what is good for us by what sounds good. 
In the Advancement of Learning, Bacon makes the activity of the 
learner turn on the method of presentation drawn through a series of 
"diversities of method." I want to show how some of them permit a 
characterization of prudent reading, and then add a couple of diversi­
ties of method of my own that seem to me to capture the work of the 
Essays more specifically. First, the method of probation is opposed to the 
magistral method, which is founded on a "kind of contract of error be­
tween the deliverer and the receiver: for he that delivereth knowledge, 
desireth to deliver it in such form as may be best believed, and not as 
may be best examined; and he that receiveth knowledge, desireth rather 
present satisfaction, than expectant inquiry; and so rather not to doubt, 
than not to err: glory making the author not to lay open his weakness, 
and sloth making the disciple not to know his strength" (2.17.3, M1 U» 
449; cf. De Augmentis 10,123]). The Essays will have an internal ethical 
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side, as well as external practical effects, if the author instead employs 
the method of probation, and if the reader recognizes that this is what 
the author is doing. "Knowledge that is delivered as a thread to be spun 
on, ought to be delivered and intimated, if it were possible, in the same 
method wherein it was invented: and so is it possible of knowledge 
induced" (ibid.). The reader acquires a character, and not just knowl­
edge, by imitating Bacon's process of invention, including his processes 
of observation, qualification, quotation, and appropriation.19 
Next, Bacon contrasts "the delivery of knowledge in aphorisms" 
as opposed to delivery in method: aphoristic writing is, among other 
things, a better test of whether the writer has something to say. More­
over, "methods are more fit [than aphorisms] to win consent or be­
lief, but less fit to point to action"; finally, "Aphorisms, representing a 
knowledge broken, do invite men to inquire farther; whereas methods, 
carrying the show of a total, do secure men, as if they were at farthest" 
 t n  e(2.17.7, M2)-20 F°r  subject of the Essays, though, inquiring further 
would not be directed towards the growth of knowledge, but towards 
further husbanding of fortune. The civil or ethical project is not of a 
piece with scientific investigation. Bacon's method for scientific inves­
tigation, as spelled out in the New Organon, is based on a grammatical 
analogy between language and nature, in which elements and rules of 
combination are fundamental to both. His method for articulating and 
teaching conduct is based on a rhetorical analogy between language and 
action, stressing competence and performance.21 Neglect of this differ­
ence leads Fish fallaciously to suppose that because the essays are scien­
tific and descriptive, they cannot be practical or prescriptive. Similarly, 
Box thinks that the Essays are not scientific or even Baconian because 
they do not contribute to a kind of progress that would be inappropriate 
to business and negotiation.22 
Bacon's series of contrasts of methods—there are more—concerns 
the quite general problem of how writing makes its readers active, and 
so I think the Advancement of Learning is a fundamental theoretical 
contribution to the general problems of the ethics of teaching to which 
Booth has forced attention. More specifically, these distinctions bear on 
the perennial problem of moral education, how to make readers active 
rather than passive, how to make readers regard one's teaching as en­
gaging character rather than a narrower kind of knowledge. Although 
these first diversities of methods are quite general, later in the Advance­
ment of Learning he offers a further contrast specifically designed to 
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show how discourse about negotiation, husbandry, and fortune can be 
organized to issue in activity rather than passivity on the part of its 
readers. The first dichotomy is worth quoting at length: 
The form of writing which of all others isfittest for this variable argu­
ment of negotiation and occasions is that which Machiavel chose wisely 
and aptly for government; namely, discourse upon histories or examples. 
For knowledge drawn freshly, and in our view, out of particulars, 
knoweth the way best to particulars again; and it hath much greater 
life for practice when the discourse attendeth upon the example, than 
when the example attendeth upon the discourse. For this is no point of 
order, as it seemeth at first, but of substance: for when the example is 
the ground, being set down in history at large, it is set down with all 
circumstances, which may sometimes control the discourse thereupon 
made, and sometimes supply it as a very pattern for action; whereas the 
examples alleged for the discourse's sake are cited succinctly, and with­
out particularity, and carry a servile aspect towards the discourse which 
they are brought in to make good. (2.23.8, 186 [5, 56]) 
The realm of fortune is the realm of particulars resistant to generaliza­
tion in rules, and so examples rather than precepts are the best teachers. 
Fortune is unpredictable, and the behavior appropriate to managing and 
husbanding fortune is similarly resistant to statement in rules. Conse­
quently, the reader who successfully learns Bacon's lessons will know 
how to follow a rule loosely and conveniently.23 In classical rhetoric, the 
best art is the art that looks natural and hides its artful quality, and 
the rules Bacon teaches must be followed in a similarly disguised and 
ingenuous-looking way. No one is supposed to be fooled into thinking 
that one is acting naturally; it's just that here is something new that goes 
without saying. In a realm in which examples rather than precepts are 
authoritative, the place of rules must be loose and tacit. The aristocratic 
lack of concern for consequences is universalized into a nonchalance, 
sprezzatura, towards rules of good behavior.24 His description in "Of 
Ceremonies and Respects" applies to his method of teaching throughout 
the Essays: 
To attain [good forms] it almost sumceth not to despise them; for so 
shall a man observe them in others; and let him trust himself with the 
rest. For if he labour too much to express them, he shall lose their grace: 
which is to be natural and unaffected. Some men's behaviour is like a 
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verse, wherein every syllable is measured; how can a man comprehend 
great matters, that breaketh his mind too much to small observations? 
Not to use ceremonies at all, is to teach others not to use them again; and 
so diminisheth respect to himself; especially if they be not omitted to 
strangers and formal natures; but the dwelling upon them, and exalting 
them above the moon, is not only tedious, but doth diminish the faith 
and credit of him that speaks. And certainly there is a kind of conveying 
of effectual and imprinting passages amongst compliments, which is of 
singular use, if a man can hit upon it. (6, 500-501) 
I want to suggest two further "diversities of method" not mentioned 
in the Advancement of Learning that also characterize the ethics of the 
Essays, and characterize Bacon's contribution to the ethics of moral edu­
cation. First, there is a diversity of method between transparent writing 
that puts the reader's attention on what is said, and more opaque prose 
that directs attention to itself.25 The structure and tactics of the Essays 
are apparent on the surface as Bacon uses techniques in a way that 
makes his audience aware of those techniques: His style constantly di­
rects attention to itself not, though, as an object for delight, but instead 
to increase a certain kind of reflection and suspicion. In the description 
of the "rhetoric" best suited for negotiation quoted above, he recom­
mends "knowledge drawn freshly, and in our view," and the Essays 
work by constantly keeping the acts of fresh drawing in view. The pru­
dence needed to read the Essays is less an increased facility at a method 
of reasoning than an increased facility at speaking a new language, 
and Bacon's teaching resembles that required for teaching a second, 
nonnative language, allowing foreigners, or social upstarts, to pass for 
natives. This facility at a second language is rhetorical rather than gram­
matical, centering on rules of application and performing appropriately 
rather than competence at correctness and well-formedness. 
Although the things that go without saying are not difficult to know, 
they have been left unsaid. There is a further reason, beyond the fact 
that it is not only a sign of ill-breeding and social climbing to admit 
that one is acting from knowledge rather than nature. These things 
seem unknowable because of their particularity or, as Bacon also puts, 
it, their immersion in matter.26 This immersion in matter is character­
istic of practical problems of confronting fortune, as opposed to ethics 
and practical problems of directing one's own intentions, and so the 
neglect of knowledge of fortune comes from the particularity of the 
accidental. Bacon will have to change the meaning of counsel accord­
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ingly. Things which from one point of view are shameful to talk about 
are also too indeterminate to say anything dignified about. As they are 
made more discursively accessible, the nature of counsel must transform 
the manifold that counsel is about, the realm of fortune, and change 
the relation between the useful and the noble, and consequently the 
relation between the useful and the shameful. 
Given the "immersion in matter" and ascendency of examples that 
characterize negotiations with fortune, it would be just the sort of pas­
sivity Bacon wants to avoid to make his teachings into rules. By making 
explicit What Everybody Knows, mentioning as well as using principles 
of action, he transforms such knowledge, transforms what it means 
to follow, or violate, a rule.27 Following a rule loosely, or prudently, 
or opportunistically—in a word, rhetorically—is different from the 
grammatical conception of following a rule that authorizes its instances. 
What it means to follow a rule is made problematic when following 
naturally is distinct from following the rule artfully and loosely, thus 
changing the nature of advice and the rhetoric of the Essays. Following 
a rule prudently cannot be an excuse for bad behavior, the way obeying 
a law removes one's accountability for bad consequences: "Don't blame 
me; I was obeying the law when I arrested the shoplifter; if she sub­
sequently killed herself that's none of my business." Following a rule 
does not remove the need for thought and responsibility. 
Making his own persuasive tactics explicit, while it has one advan­
tage, seems in another respect to backfire. In order to make his readers 
active, and thereby increase their chances for success in the world, Bacon 
shows them how he is working, exhibits the lack of fit between rule and 
example, between goodness and utility, between what we say and what 
we do. But the more we understand Bacon's method, the less we should 
in fact follow it. The rules he offers work only if actors do not look 
as though they are following rules.28 In other words, they work only 
when they go without saying. Bacon the teacher must lay bare his own 
techniques and therefore act tactlessly so that his audience can become 
decorous. 
I think that it is to address that problem and those possibilities for 
rule following, rule citing, and exploitation that we need a final "di­
versity of method" to characterize Bacon's moral teaching in the Essays. 
These Essays, especially in comparison with their model in Montaigne, 
are astonishingly impersonal, especially in contrast to the self-assertion 
they enjoin, but that too is a part of their teaching. Knowledge once 
again becomes valued over character; in this final paradox and final 
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diversity of method morality becomes separated from self-knowledge. 
Once there are rules for success, Bacon's method will suppress the role 
of individual talent or nature in ethics as much as in science.29 Common 
knowledge is common, available to all, and so exploitations are differ­
ent from deviations based on individual insight. It is hard to see how 
character, and ethics, can survive such publicity and impersonality, but 
of course the history of ethics is full of transformations of the relations 
of knowledge and character that suppress individuality. 
The innovation of the Essays is to teach successful negotiation with 
fortune, and such success takes knowledge, not character. "It is not pos­
sible to join the wisdom of the serpent with the innocence of the dove, 
except men be perfectly acquainted with the nature of evil itself; for 
without this, virtue is open and unfenced; nay, a virtuous and honest 
man can do no good upon those that are wicked, to correct and re­
claim them, without first exploring all the depths and recesses of their 
malice" {De Augmentis, 5, 17).30 In the end, then, the moral geography 
of the world is revised. In Bacon's world (both the world in which he 
writes and the world constructed and implied in his writing) the task 
of discriminating prudence from opportunism, moderation from per­
fidiousness, accommodation as a form of making one's values real and 
accommodation as a form of deviating from one's values, is a perma­
nent job.31 There are no sure signs that make the discrimination for the 
reader; it simply takes prudence. (Or opportunism.) It is no easier or 
safer to tell whether one is oneself being accommodating in the one 
way or the other than it is to make that decision about others. The lack 
of reflection on one's inner life and conscience in the Essays directs the 
reader's attention to acts, circumstances, and consequences, rather than 
intentions, but it is only a judgment of intention—a judgment one no 
longer has available—that can make a distinction between prudence 
and opportunism. Perhaps this is a world that one gains only by losing 
one's own soul. 
In such a world, one learns not to avoid evil but to use it. Evil thereby 
becomes neutralized in being used. As part of that process, its dan­
gers are deflated, and so he says in "On Cunning," "There be that can 
pack the cards, and yet cannot play well." Facility at rule exploiting is 
unseemly, but not very dangerous, since the contraction of attention be­
comes self-defeating. Moreover, by a kind of parody of the economy of 
nature, the more someone practices deception and relies on the gulli­
bility of others, the more he himself turns out to be credible. Just as 
the principal purpose of intelligence agencies is to counter other intel­
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ligence agencies, and the main use of advertising seems to be to negate 
competing advertising campaigns, so Bacon pictures the cunning use of 
rules and the cunning display of rule following to be an activity mainly 
directed at others engaged in similar practices: "If we observe, we shall 
find two differing kinds of sufficiency in managing of business; some 
can make use of occasions aptly and dexterously, but plot little; some can 
urge and pursue their own plots well, but cannot accommodate or take 
in; either of which is very imperfect without the other" {Advancement 
2.23.35, I9^)- The more loosely we follow the rules of business, Bacon 
implies, the less harm will be done by cunning. Cunning is the false 
form of prudence (in Booth's terms it is hypocrisy downwards rather 
than upwards), but it works by promoting a misunderstanding of what 
it means to follow a rule concerning what everybody knows. Therefore 
Bacon associates the "delight in deceiving, and aptness to be deceived": 
This vice [which concerneth deceit or untruth] therefore brancheth itself 
into two sorts; delight in deceiving, and aptness to be deceived; impos­
ture and credulity; which, although they appear to be of a diverse nature, 
the one seeming to proceed of cunning and the other of simplicity, yet 
certainly they do for the most part concur: for as the verse noteth, Percon­
tatoremfugito, namegarruluae idem est an inquisitive man is a prattler; so, 
upon the like reason a credulous man is a deceiver: as we see it in fame, 
that he will easily believe rumours, will as easily augment rumours, and 
add somewhat to them of his own; which Tacitus wisely noteth, when 
he saith, Fingunt simul creduntque: so great an affinity hath fiction and 
belief. {/Advancement 1.6.8, 28)32 
But this neutralizing of the vices cannot supply too happy an ending. 
The virtues too become neutralized in being used, and so Bacon will 
describe the good and bad uses of the virtues: "Virtue in ambition is 
violent, in authority settled and calm" ("Of Great Place," Essays 33). 
The goodness of virtues then consist in their use and their appearance: 
it is good to have friends because they can praise you when it would not 
be decent to praise yourself. Once they can be used, and once exchange, 
display, and mention become prominent forms of as well as use—they 
are not good and evil in any stable sense any longer: Misanthropi "are the 
very errors of human nature; and yet they are the fittest timber to make 
great politics of; like to knee-timber, that is good for ships that are or­
dained to be tossed, but not for building houses that shall stand firm" 
("Of Goodness, and Goodness of Nature," Essays }8). If the instability 
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of the distinction between prudence and opportunism is permanent, 
then "there is no better way to moderate suspicions, than to account 
upon such suspicions as true, and yet to bridle them as false" ("Of Sus­
picion," Essays 100). Ultimately, we have no place left from which to 
judge the morality of the Essays. Instead of making such judgments, we 
learn to "speak usefully." 
What can Bacon, and the Essays, show about the rhetoric and ethics 
of reading? Bacon's attention to the social uses of saying, and not say­
ing what goes without saying, opens an expanded set of connections 
between writer, reader, and the material talked about. If one conceives 
the rhetoric of fiction to be a transaction between authors and readers 
completely defined by the written object, saying what goes without 
saying might be bad manners, but nothing more.33 Bacon constructs 
a momentous work out of what might otherwise be simply a breach 
of etiquette. Social silence has problems of its own that reach beyond 
those of authorial silence narrowly considered. Bacon shows that there 
are ways of being didactic that increase ethical activity by the reader. I 
would hope—although it cannot here be more than a hope—that this 
display of how Bacon works might force a reconsideration of the explic­
itly didactic purposes of novels, dramas, and poems, purposes that we 
are currently too inclined to discount. Regardless of that hope, Bacon's 
Essays add to the dimensions of how literature can make us better, and 
worse, people. Bacon's exhibition of a readjustment of the practical, the 
moral, and the ethical makes the rhetoric of fiction and the ethics of 
reading all the more central to how we ought to live. 
Notes 
1. References are to the standard edition of the Wor\s, ed. Spedding et al., 
1857-61. In addition, I give page numbers to the Everyman edition of The 
Advancement of Learning and the Essays, both ed. Kitchin. 
2. Gadamer, Truth and Method 16-17: "By 'tact' we understand a particu­
lar sensitivity and sensitiveness to situations, and how to behave in them, for 
which we cannot find any knowledge from general principles. Hence an essen­
tial part of tact is inexplicitness and inexpressibility. One can say something 
tactfully; but that will always mean that one passes over something tactfully 
and leaves it unsaid, and it is tactless to mean to avert the gaze from something, 
but to watch it in such a way rather than knock against it, one slips by it. Thus 
tact helps one to preserve distance, it avoids the offensive, the intrusive, the 
violation of the intimate sphere of the person." 
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3. Contrast White, "Thinking About Our Language" 1975: "Part of 
maintaining a community is maintaining the agreement not to speak or ask 
about the ways in which its language means differently for different members," 
with Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy 102: "It is one aspi­
ration, that social and ethical relations should not essentially rest on ignorance 
and misunderstanding of what they are, and quite another that all the beliefs 
and principles involved in them should be explicitly stated. That these are two 
different things is obvious with personal relations, where to hope that they do 
not rest on deceit and error is merely decent, but to think that their basis can 
be made totally explicit is idiocy." 
4. That the Essays' intent is one of removing gaps between is and ought 
is noted by Levy. "Bacon shifted his emphasis from man's ability to train and 
control himself to resist the onslaughts of fortune to man's ability to control 
fortune herself, to be the architect of fortune. That shift was heralded by re­
placing the effort of cultum animi by an examination of the arts of rising at 
court, that is, by replacing how to 'be' with how to 'seem'" (113). See also, 
more generally, Maclntyre, "Epistemological Crises." 
5. Plato notes the connection between claims of necessity and rationaliza­
tion for what one wanted to do anyway at Rep. 6.493D-C: The sophists know 
"nothing in reality about which of these opinions and desires [sc. those of the 
many] is honorable or base, good or evil, just or unjust, but should apply all 
these terms to the judgments of the great beast, calling the things that pleased 
it good, and the things that vexed it bad, having no other account to render 
of them, but should call what is necessary just and honorable, never having 
observed how great is the real difference between the necessary and the good." 
6. Whigham, Ambition and Privilege 170: "To the established aristocrat 
these [new competitive forms of political advancement] were, in Bacon's term, 
not virtues but 'activity.' Political accomplishments based on new kinds of 
ability were now read as subversive of the old order. But the members of that 
order had long recognized the role of ability (those raised as humanists could 
do no less); the powers manifested by the promotions therefore had to be de­
nied qua virtues. Political success was redefined as failure, that is, as moral 
ugliness; political failure was redefined as a moral purity in one who chooses 
to turn aside from public life rather than to occupy its roles at the expense 
of integrity. . . . This attitude has long been familiar as a way of mystifying 
the direct engagement of a leisure class in political dominance by denying its 
engagement in the most obvious manifestations of power." 
7. So Levy 120: "The man of judgment, the friend of the great, could 
offer two sorts of advice: how best to wear a mask, and how to discover the 
reality behind the masks of others." 
8. "On the Problem of Truth" 423. See also Lovibond, esp. 99-101. 
9. Whigham x-xi: "The received sense of personal identity, seen as 
founded on God-given attributes such as birth, was slowly giving way to the 
more modern notion that the individual creates himself by his own actions. 
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This new view was enticing to those on the rise, but it threatened those who re­
sisted sharing their positions or who feared they would be displaced. The latter 
proposed the distinction found in courtesy theory in order to maintain their 
preeminence; the former read the courtesy books, hoping to avoid being too 
distinguished. The effect of this practical intellectual struggle was to articulate 
a sophisticated rhetoric, indeed an epistemology, of personal social identity— 
a new understanding of how people tell who they are." 
10. White, Heracles' Bow 65: "One way to identify what is misleading 
about the form of a legal rule might be to say that it appears to be a language 
of description, which works by a simple process of comparison, but in cases of 
any difficulty it is actually a language of judgment, which works in ways that 
find no expression in the rule itself. In such cases the meaning of its terms is 
not obvious, as the rule seems to assume, but must be determined by a process 
of interpretation and judgment to which the rule gives no guidance whatever. 
The discourse by which it works is in this sense invisible." 
11. Levinson 112—13: "There is a fundamental way in which a full account 
of the communicative power of language can never be reduced to a set of con­
ventions for the use of language. The reason is that wherever some convention 
or expectation about the use of language arises, there will also therewith arise 
the possibility of the non-conventional exploitation of that convention or expec­
tation. It follows that a purely conventional or rule-based account of natural 
language usage can never be complete, and that what can be communicated 
always exceeds the communicative power provided by the conventions of the 
language and its use." Dewey 26: "Just because circumstances are really novel 
and not covered by old rules, it is a gamble which old rule will be declared 
regulative of a particular case, so that shrewd and enterprising men are encour­
aged to sail close to the wind and trust to ingenious lawyers to find some rule 
under which they can get off scot free." 
12. Whigham 41: "Obscurantism is the code of the religious and courtly 
ruling elites; disruptive literalism is that of the unruly oppressed, ambitious for 
social and religious mobility." 
13. For a suggestive remark that indicates just why texts like Bacon's Essays 
should be central to an ethics of literature, see Company 253^3: "Along with 
the strange history of the word 'hypocrisy,' we should add the ambiguous his­
tory of the word 'practice.' The earliest recorded sense of the word is 'the action 
of scheming or planning; artifice; a trick or plot.' Yet the word quickly devel­
oped more favorable senses, since—as we say—practice makes perfect." For 
details, see Orsini, " 'Policy' or the Language of Elizabethan Machiavellian­
ism." Booth's discussion of hypocrisy, a crucial but not deeply examined factor 
in his account of the ethics of fiction, would be enriched by consideration of the 
complexities of Renaissance debates about imitation, both literary and practi­
cal. While the literature is enormous, for some of the interesting details, see 
Greene, The Light in Troy. 
14. See Fish, Self-Consuming Artifacts. I was glad to be confirmed in my as­
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sessment of Fish's readings of Bacon by Richard Strier's unpublished consider­
ation of the image of the reader and the reader's experience in Self-Consuming 
Artifacts. See also Whitney, Francis Bacon and Modernity. 
15. For an application to the Essays, see Fish 80-81: "The characteriza­
tion of the Essays as objective, dispassionate, and concisely analytic is hardly 
borne out by the collective response of those who so characterize them. An 
impersonal report does not leave its readers wondering about the inner life of 
the author; nor does it encourage speculation as to whether its own focus is 
'traditional,' 'utilitarian,' 'moral,' or blurred." 
16. For some purposes it is useful to distinguish several species of mention, 
all opposed to use. Equally, though, it is important to see how in use these 
different practices of mention run together. The Searle-Derrida debate turns 
in part on whether, as Searle claims in the name of common sense and logic, 
use is primary and mention parasitic, or whether, as Derrida more perversely 
claims, mention is primary and use derivative. For some complications, see Far­
rell, esp. 56: "I do not see that Derrida distinguishes clearly among four sorts of 
things: the mentioning of an expression in our talking about it; the quoting of 
a speaker's earlier speech; the sort of citing we do when, in using an expression 
rather than mentioning it, we deliberately make a reference to an earlier use of 
the expression (as when I use the phrase 'Parting is such sweet sorrow' not in 
order to quote it but to make an assertion to a friend); and the use of language 
in a play or poem when I am not making assertions about the world." That the 
idea of use includes a diverse set of phenomena, including what goes without 
saying, is noticed in Cohen 174: "Wittgenstein remarked that under normal 
conditions it would be odd to say, when I have a pain, / KNOW / am in pain. 
But perhaps this oddity tells us nothing of interest about the meaning oiknow, 
since it may be due just to the oddity of saying things that are too obvious to 
be worth saying. The 'use' terminology tends to confuse problems about the 
conditions under which a concept is applicable to problems about the condi­
tions under which it is appropriate to make utterances involving the concept." 
See also Sperber and Wilson, "Irony and the Use-Mention Distinction." 
17. Whigham 29-30: "AH these texts function as commodities, in two 
ways. First, each offers a specimen of its author's worth, epideictically; many 
criteria are at work here besides interior intellectual ones. Second, each offers 
itemized concepts that may be traded anew by its consumer. . . . The Renais­
sance conversation in which such coin was spent was often organized by the 
canons of the querrelle, wherein the conduct of argument was primarily epi­
deictic and formal, rather than substantive. In such a case ideas as quotable 
segments of texts may be analyzed in terms of exchange value rather than 
use value." 
18. Pace Fish 118: "Bacon is not rejecting the ideal of goodness, but point­
ing out how far from it are the practices of men. It is this that distinguishes 
him from Machiavelli, or at least from the Machiavelli of popular reputation, 
a cynic who counsels self-interest at the expense of morality. Bacon is neither 
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immoral or amoral, but premoral. He accepts the moral ideal as a point of de­
parture, and measures everything against it. The conclusions that follow, then, 
are conclusions to matters of fact, not directives for future action. When Bacon 
has finished, the ideal remains; what does not remain is any illusion we may 
have had about the ease of living up to it. And without illusions, Bacon would 
argue, our chances of doing just that are much better." On the more general 
question of what happens when rules become explicit, see Schneewind 535: 
"Explicit articulations make sense where unspoken consensus seems to have 
reached its limits. An appeal to principle is a way of seeing whether that con­
sensus can be projected into a novel area of controversy. Statements of rules and 
principles thus have a social function in this sort of context, one quite different 
from that envisaged by moral philosophers but important nonetheless." 
19. Fish 92: "The Essays are to be read not as a series of encapsulations or 
expressions, but as a refining process that is being enacted by the reader; and to 
some extent, the question, in any one essay, of exactly what abstraction is being 
refined, is secondary." I have already argued against Fish's tacit and qualified 
inference to the conclusion that "to some extent" the emphasis on teaching 
the audience to read prudently somehow makes the content of that teaching 
irrelevant. See also Box 42: "Most of the essays of 1625 present an initial de­
claratory statement followed by qualifications and exceptions that undermine 
our confidence in the initial claim. The effect of this is unsettling but far from 
provocative in the Baconian scientific sense." 
20. Booth, Rhetoric of Fiction 424: "The fictive experience, in contrast to 
the experience of most narrative in history and journalism, is thus made out of 
a special kind of double role-playing: as the actual listener or viewer, capable 
of joining an unlimited number of authorial audiences, I am 'made' to join the 
ones that are postulated by this particular story—to join them, as we might 
say, really and not just in pretense; but as a member of the narrative audience, 
I pretend to go much further and may even weep tears that I know to be 'false' 
even though they are physically real. 
"The resulting tension between belief systems (a tension ordinarily not 
brought into consciousness) is the essential mark of the domains of fiction and 
it is the source of many distinctive effects, including our freedom to dwell in 
worlds expanded beyond what we could permit ourselves to dwell in 'really.' 
And it is utterly missing from all historical narratives except those that deliber­
ately and openly contradict what the auctorial audience believes about historical 
fact—in short, those that become fictional." 
21. Rossi 15. "Bacon analysed substances to determine their primal natures 
or irreducible qualities, so that gold becomes a combination of yellowness, spe­
cific weight, a degree of pliancy, malleability and so forth. This process is akin 
to that of reducing a word to its component letters, and so these primal natures 
are 'nature's alphabet' and constitute the ultimate elements to which the whole 
of nature can be reduced." 
22. Fish 94. "Such a morality, [Bacon] implies, may well be immoral (use­
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less), for it leaves a man ignorant of and defenseless against the real complexity 
of the situations that will confront him The essays advocate nothing (except 
perhaps a certain openness and alertness of mind); they are descriptive, and a 
description is ethically neutral, although, if it is accurate, it may contribute to 
the development of a true, that is, responsible, ethics." Box, after refuting some 
of Fish's stranger mischaracterizations pf Bacon's aphoristic method, questions 
whether Bacon's description of the method in fact applies to the Essays. "It 
would seem a simple matter to decide whether the Essays are aphoristic and 
therefore scientific in Bacon's sense. Unfortunately, this is not the case be­
cause . . . the Baconian aphorism is defined by use and effect rather than by 
length, pithiness, or any other structural quality. . . . Accordingly, in passing 
judgment on the scientific style of Bacon's writing it is necessary to pay more 
attention to the effects of the content on the reader than to the actual form 
of the work in question. The question is whether the Essays, by presenting 
fragmentary but suggestive data, exert a 'pressure in the direction of "further 
enquiry"' [quoting Fish quoting Bacon]. . . . The later essays are not apho­
ristic in the 'Baconian' sense. Rather, the systematic presentation of assertions 
followed by qualifications is intended to impart to the reader a sense of the 
uncertainty and contingency of social life" (34). 
See also Whitney 183: "Like the Novum Organum, the Essays reveal the 
modern paradox of the aphorism, that the literary effort to present the naked 
truth with all the force of its flashing moment of discovery occludes, veils, or 
all but dissolves naked truth." 
23. "There is no greater impediment to action than an over-curious obser­
vance of decency, and the guide of decency, which is time and season" (2.23.3, 
180). "Behavior seemeth to me as a garment of the mind and to have the con­
ditions of a garment. For it ought to be made in fashion; it ought not to be 
too curious; it ought to be shaped so as to set forth any good making of the 
mind, and hide any deformity; and above all, it ought not to be too strait, or 
restrained for exercise or motion" (2.23.3,  I^i) . 
24. Kant, Critique of Judgment, sec. 29. 136/275: "Simplicity (artless purpo­
siveness) is, as it were, nature's style in the sublime. Hence it is also the style 
of morality, which is a second (namely, a supersensible) nature, of which we 
know only the laws, without being able to reach, by means of intuition, the 
supersensible ability within ourselves that contains the basis of this legislation." 
25. For an elementary treatment of this distinction, see Lanham, Style: An 
Anti-Textboot{. 
26. 2.17.13, 145: ". . . rule unto what degree of particularity a knowledge 
should descend. . . . For certainly there must be somewhat left to practice; but 
how much is worthy the inquiry. We see remote and superficial generalities 
do but offer knowledge to scorn of practical men; and are no more aiding to 
practice than an Ortelius' universal map is to direct the way between London 
and York. The better sort of rules have been not unfitly compared to glasses 
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of steel unpolished, where you may see the images of things, but first they 
must be filed: so the rules will help, if they be laboured and polished by prac­
tice." Compare the following: "Of Seditions and Troubles" {Essays 45): "For 
the remedies [of seditions]; there may be some general preservatives, whereof 
we shall speak; as for the just cure, it must answer to the particular disease, 
and so be left to counsel rather than rule." "Of Counsel" {Essays 65): "Neither 
is it enough to consult concerning persons secundum genera, as in an idea or 
mathematical description, what the kind and character of the person should 
be; for the greatest errors are committed, and the most judgment is shewn, in 
the choice of individuals." 2.23.1, 179 (5, 32): "Civil knowledge is conversant 
about a subject which of all others is most immersed in matter, and hardliest 
reduced to axiom. Nevertheless, as Cato the Censor said, That the Romans were 
lit{e sheep, for that a man might better drive a floc\ of them, than one of them; 
for in a floc\, if you could but get some few to go right, the rest would follow: 
so in that respect moral philosophy is more difficult than policy." (Cf. 2.23.15, 
189: "Although the knowledge itself falleth not under precept, because it is 
of individuals, yet the instructions for the obtaining of it may.") 2.25.11, 214: 
"As to brevity, we see, in all summary methods, while men purpose to abridge, 
they give cause to dilate. For the sum or abridgement by contraction becometh 
obscure; the obscurity requireth exposition, and the exposition is diduced into 
large commentaries, or into common places and titles, which grow to be more 
vast than the original writings, whence the sum was at first extracted." 
27. For what it means simultaneously to follow a rule and to be active, see 
Vining 45: "How does one imagine oneself going about following a decision? 
What are called 'the rules laid down by a decision' are verbal formulations of 
the reasons relied upon by a decision maker in making the decision. Those 
reasons are values, importances; any decision maker acting in a particular role 
necessarily gives relative weights to them in making a particular decision. One 
follows the decision by focusing upon the values appropriate for that role and 
discovering the weights used by the decision maker." 
28. Cf. Cavell 307: "No rule or principle could function in a moral context 
the way regulatory or defining rules function in games. It is as essential to the 
form of life called morality that rules so conceived be absent as it is essential 
to the form of life we call a game that they be present." 
29. Rossi 33. "What debars magic and alchemy from the status of sci­
ence . .  . is precisely the burden they entrust to individual judgment and skill." 
30. Advancement of Learning, 2.21.9,165-66: "Men of corrupted minds pre­
suppose that honesty groweth out of simplicity of manners, and believing of 
preachers, schoolmasters, and men's exterior language: so as, except you can 
make them perceive that you know the utmost reaches of their own corrupt 
opinions, they despise all morality; Non recipit stultus verba prudentiae, nisi ea 
dixeris quae versantur in corde ejus." This view is expressed in the Republic 
by Adiamantus: "Except that a man by inborn divinity of his nature disdains 
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injustice, or, having won to knowledge, refrains from it, no one else is will­
ingly just, but that it is from lack of manly spirit or from old age or some 
other weakness that men dispraise injustice, lacking the power to practice it" 
(2.366d). 
31. Consider, for example, the first essay, "Of Truth." We are told both 
that a pure truth is less and more desirable than one mixed with falsehood: 
"Truth may perhaps come to the price of a pearl, that sheweth best by day; 
but it will not rise to the price of a diamond or carbuncle, that sheweth best 
in varied lights. A mixture of a lie doth ever add pleasure" (Essays 3). On the 
other hand: "It will be acknowledged even by those that practise it not, that 
clear and round dealing is the honour of man's nature; and that mixture of 
falsehood is like allay in coin of gold and silver; which may make the metal 
work the better, but it embaseth it" (Essays 4). For a similar sentiment in the 
Advancement of Learning, see 2.23.33, 197: "These grave solemn wits, which 
must be like themselves, and cannot make departures, have more dignity than 
felicity." 
32. See also 2.23.35,  ! 9^  ' quoted previously, and 2.14.6, 131: "This part 
concerning elenches is excellently handled by Aristotle in precept, but more 
excellently by Plato in example; not only in the persons of the Sophists, but 
even in Socrates himself; who, professing to affirm nothing, but to inform that 
which was affirmed by another, hath exactly expressed all the forms of objec­
tion, fallacy, and regardution. And although we have said that the use of this 
doctrine is for regardution, yet it is manifest the degenerate and corrupt use is 
for caption and contradiction, which passeth for a great faculty, and no doubt 
is of very great advantage: though the difference be good which was made be­
tween orators and sophisters, that the one is as the greyhound which hath his 
advantage in the race, and the other as the hare which hath her advantage in 
the turn, as it is the advantage of the weaker creature." See also Advancement 
6, 268-69, discussing "lesser forms" or "those parts of a speech which answer 
to the vestibules, back doors, antechambers, withdrawing-chambers, passages, 
&c, of a house; and may serve indiscriminately for all subjects. Such are pref­
aces, conclusions, digressions, transitions, intimations of what is coming, ex­
cusations, and a number of the kind. For as in buildings it is a great matter both 
for pleasure and use that the fronts, doors, windows, approaches, passages, and 
the like be conveniently arranged, so also in a speech these accessory and inter­
stitial passages (if they be handsomely and skilfully fashioned and placed) add 
a great deal both of ornament and effect to the entire structure." 
33. In addition to The Company We Keep, the final section of Critical Under­
standing is an important reflection on connections between "flesh and blood" 
authors and readers and implied and constructed authors and readers. 
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Wayne Booth and the 
Ethics of Argument 
PATSY CALLAGHAN AND ANN DOBYNS 
ARGUING AS AN ETHICAL ACT

WAYNE BOOTH'S WORK has been dominated by ethical concerns, from 
his early The Rhetoric of Fiction with its overtly ethical conclusion, in 
essays proclaiming the need for reasoned discourse collected in Now 
Don't Try to Reason with Me, to his defense of shared literary experi­
ences in A Rhetoric of Irony, in his faith that some truth is to be found 
in the mutual exchange of differing opinions in Critical Understanding, 
and recently by his advocacy of friendship as the metaphor for the inter­
action of author and reader in The Company We Keep. While all of these 
works are predicated on the assumption that as human beings discourse 
they make meaning together, they also present a philosophy of argu­
ment as primary in the testing and embracing of values. Argument is 
then the theoretical heart of the ethical pursuit. In 1974 Booth explic­
itly defined his philosophy of argument in a book written in part as a 
response to the protests of the 1960s and the "failure of communication" 
between warring factions {Modern Dogma ix). Originally a lecture series 
at the University of Notre Dame in 1971, the essays presented in Mod­
ern Dogma and the Rhetoric ofAssent constitute what is perhaps Booth's 
most direct explanation of his rhetorical position. Rhetoric, he explains 
in his introduction, is "the art of discovering warrantable beliefs and 
improving those beliefs in shared discourse" {Modern Dogma xiii). 
Why argue anyway? To pursue an answer, we must set two lines of 
reasoning that render the question pointless. First, if it were possible 
to address the question through objective observation of available facts, 
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people would have no need to discuss it, for the answer would be self-
evident. Second, if the question is not one of "hard fact" but instead 
one of "soft faith," then whatever answer is proposed would necessarily 
be an assertion of "value" or belief, and thus mere personal preference. 
To go on talking about the question in either case would be to join a 
"world of futile babblers" (Modern Dogma xi). As Booth sees it, these 
ways of addressing the question assume a passive, almost unconscious 
acceptance of the "dogmas of modernism," dogmas which have created 
a rhetorical crisis that is also an ethical one: "We have lost faith in 
the very possibility of finding a rational path through any thicket that 
includes what we call value judgments" (Modern Dogma 7). And yet, 
Booth holds out hope for such a rational path. As users and sharers 
of symbols, and as imperfect beings in an imperfect world, humans act 
ethically when they reason together toward probable and contingent 
truths. In the process of discovering assent, humans seek a point of 
agreement from which to begin a dialogue. The dialogue itself builds 
the self, so we discover who we are and become who we are through 
communicating with each other. Through this process the world and 
truth are both found and made, and the act of finding meaning together 
supercedes the importance of any particular product. The sense of this 
stance seems as practical as the humor in the old story about the three 
blind philosophers and the elephant: The first feels the trunk and de­
clares he's found a snake; the second feels the tail and pronounces it a 
rope; the third feels a side and knows he faces a wall. Wayne Booth asks 
us to consider the possibility of discovering the whole elephant: reason­
ing together, accepting that which we have every reason to believe and 
no good reason to doubt, we argue in order to agree. 
Assent Instead of Scepticism 
As Booth represents them, the two "sects" of modernism present man 
as an atomic, physical mechanism, the universe as impersonal and value 
free, and knowledge as the provable. The first sect of modernism Booth 
identifies, scientism, posits a neutral universe, inherently impersonal, in 
which truth exists apart from the individual as a set of facts to be discov­
ered through the systematic doubt of empiricism. The individual in this 
universe is isolated, the mind a material organ that operates mechani­
cally by chemical and physical laws. Our human responsibility consists, 
then, of seeking certainty through the examination of facts, of discover­
ing knowledge and truth while avoiding the self-delusion of opinion, 
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belief, and value by doubting all pending proof. The second sect, ir­
rationalism, recognizes the limit of scientism to be that it fails to cope 
in other than empirical terms with multiple, simultaneous, even contra­
dictory truths. Since little, as we know, is invulnerable to the probings 
of empiricism, scientism must eventually disprove all external truths; 
thus certainty would be found only in self-knowledge. Isolated in a self-
constructed reality, the individual seeks truth through the subjective 
examination of internal feelings, since each person's truth is uniquely 
valuable for that person alone. Seeming opposites, the two schools of 
modernism share the methodological assumptions of science, the me­
chanical metaphors of technology, the isolation of the individual, and 
the goal of certainty. Though in one case facing human responsibility 
means finding the world through objective observation and in the other 
case creating the world out of our own perceptions and feelings, in both 
cases individuals seek certain truth through retreat to skepticism—into 
the corner they find by doubting all pending proof, or into a "self" of 
preconceived notions and biases. 
Given these assumptions, argument—all discourse about values— 
will be necessarily divisive, mechanistic, competitive, and isolationist. 
The only answers to the question "why argue" would either be "to win" 
or "to assert the self," and the only way to go about arguing would be 
to pronounce assertions at each other. Booth regards such a situation 
a failure of rhetoric resulting from a "radically mistaken conception 
of the nature and possibilities of argument" {Modern Dogma 11), and 
posits instead a habit of mind that radically alters the epistemologi­
cal groundings of our process of communicating: a rhetoric of assent. 
Rather than rejecting hypotheses or approaching them with skepticism, 
people ought rather tentatively to accept any premise (1) that they have 
no particular reason to doubt, (2) that they have good reasons to be­
lieve, and (3) that others who are educated about the problem also 
believe (Modern Dogma 40). "It is reasonable," Booth insists, "to grant 
(one ought to grant) some degree of credence to whatever qualified men 
and women agree on, unless one has specific and stronger reasons to 
disbelieve" (Modern Dogma 101). 
Rhetorical Communities 
Countering what he has called "dogmas," Booth asserts that the "pri­
mary act of man is to assent to truth rather than to detect error" (Modern 
Dogma xvi). Rather than seeing humans as isolated, material beings 
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operating by mechanical laws, he presents the self as existing in a com­
munity of individuals who build each other through symbolic exchange. 
Instead of existing in a universe that is value free, found through ob­
jective examination of facts or through subjective examination of feel­
ings, Booth's individual operates as a field of selves, both discovering 
and changing the world through dialectic. The answer to "why argue" 
becomes then a matter not of asserting positions or winning ground, 
but of discovering "together, in discourse, new levels of truth (or at 
least agreement) that neither side suspected before" (Modern Dogma 
11). Individuals do this, Booth argues, to exercise responsible judgment, 
to achieve cooperation, to solve problems, and finally, to survive. "If," 
Booth asks, "language is not a means of communication but the source 
of our being, and if the purpose of rhetoric is not to persuade but to meet 
other minds in the best possible symbolic exchange . . . everything we 
value, including the achievements of science and mathematics, depends 
on this fact which is a value: men ought to attend to whatever good 
reasons are offered them by other men" (Modern Dogma 142). Thus the 
responsibility placed upon us is clear: "we must build new rhetorical 
communities, we must find a common faith in modes of argument, or 
every institution we care about will die" (Modern Dogma 150). 
Seen this way, the process of argument is essentially ethical: we ought 
to attend to whatever good reasons are offered to us by others, and we 
ought to seek the conditions under which a meeting of minds is likely 
to occur. As participants in the dialogue, we should react with common 
sense, accepting only premises that in some way are true to our experi­
ences. We should begin not with doubt, as many theorists of critical 
thinking would have us do, but with assent, giving credence to a valid, 
shared position as a starting point in a line of reasoning. We should 
test our ideas through discourse, listening with understanding to the 
arguments of others. And we should be willing to change our minds. 
Thus the process of rhetorical inquiry becomes more important than 
any possible conclusions, as individuals discover and test not just what 
they believe, but what they find they should believe, creating a rhetorical 
community based on shared values. 
Community and Good Reasons 
Rhetoric is the "art of discovering good reasons," and individuals pur­
sue that art because good reasons provide the only basis for rational 
behavior. "Good rhetoric" is not what is successful or effective in the 
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face of "pig-headed" audiences, but what "any reasonable person ought 
to be persuaded by" {Modern Dogma xiv). Conversely, "bad rhetoric 
lacks genuine power to move reasonable auditors" (Modern Dogma xv). 
To argue well, individuals should argue honestly, genuinely, attending 
to their own assumptions and making sure they have good reasons for 
believing that to which they would encourage others to assent. Further­
more, individuals should argue critically, listening to the arguments of 
others with understanding. As Booth explains, "To be genuinely criti-
cal—to judge on the basis of thought—is to have no easily predictable 
relationship with belief or doubt, with yes or no, with joining or split­
ting. The critical mind does not know in advance which side it will 
come out on" {Now Don't Try to Reason 66). 
Essential to this process of arguing is the grounding of the rhetori­
cal community in common sense, or those principles agreed upon by 
"any thoroughly informed and rational—any thoroughly qualified— 
human being" (Modern Dogma 110). As humans, individuals have more 
common than different experiences. And because of our common ex­
periences, we share many beliefs or values. In other words, we choose to 
hold many postulates first because they ring true to our patterns of ex­
perience, and further, because they stand up when tested against others' 
patterns of experience. Rather than an argument for universal prin­
ciples, Booth's position suggests that humans make meaning together 
and do so through dialogue about shared experiences. Further, the 
strength of the testing of such agreements rests on the rationality and 
experience of the testers. Our rhetorical communities then comprise 
ourselves and those whose empirical testing qualifies them as experts on 
the question at issue. Such a concept seems to come dangerously close to 
that of the bandwagon, and Booth acknowledges the comparison. What 
makes Booth's explanation of assenting to values in rhetorical commu­
nities different is his faith in the credibility of the educated examination 
of experience. Fanatical groups exist whose beliefs seem based on com­
mon experience, but it does not follow that reasonable humans will 
assent to such beliefs, precisely because the beliefs would contradict 
their own experiences and those of other reasonable humans. 
Such a definition of systematic assent allows Booth to find a start­
ing place for discussion when individuals disagree, thus identifying a 
rhetorical community in which real dialogue is possible. It is only in 
real dialogue, Booth argues, that humans create themselves as they pro­
pose good reasons for the positions they hold and seriously entertain the 
good reasons offered by those with whom they disagree. Such a mutual 
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exchange, on issues important to all participants and discussed on com­
mon ground with respect for opposing arguments, promises what Booth 
calls "improving beliefs in shared discourse" (Modern Dogma xiii). At­
tending to a multiplicity of voices is for Booth inherent in ethical argu­
ment. Individuals may choose to ignore what Booth elsewhere calls the 
"dialogic imagination" (see "Freedom of Interpretation: Bakhtin and 
the Challenge of Feminist Criticism"). But by doing so they miss oppor­
tunities to see the world in new ways, to grow and change consciously 
as they participate in the exciting social interaction of "being persons 
together" {Modern Dogma 134). 
The Rhetoric of Assent and the Study of Literature 
In many ways, Modern Dogma and the Rhetoric of Assent shows the 
coherence of Booth's writings. Though clearly a work about reason­
ing, Booth's Modern Dogma presents a philosophy of good reasons that 
has less to do with logic than with ethics. The self, Booth argues, is 
"essentially rhetorical, symbol exchanging, a social product in process of 
changing through interaction, sharing values with other selves" (Modern 
Dogma 126). In the dialogue with other selves, whether face to face or 
with the implied author of an artistic work, humans are making and re­
making themselves. This process is an ethical one, first because human 
actions form human character, or ethos, and further because the dia­
logue Booth describes involves judging good reasons offered by other 
selves. Booth's philosophy of good reasons rather than being an inquiry 
into certain truth concerns the formation of character. 
Throughout his discussions of argument, Booth explores the way 
humans change through their interactions with others, whether people 
or ideas or art, music, or literature. Having concluded The Rhetoric of 
Fiction with a consideration of the ethical dimensions of literary works, 
Booth comes back repeatedly to the discussion. In Modern Dogma, he 
claims that art "is of fundamental importance in making and changing 
our minds (or souls or selves or identities)" (168). The study of litera­
ture for Booth is less a matter of the attempt to find the meaning of 
a text than to engage in dialogue with a writer about values. Literary 
works, he suggests, present positions on questions of value and, further, 
give good reasons for those positions. Readers engage in dialogue by 
considering the strength of the reasons and by judging them against 
their own experiences and the experiences of other careful readers. In 
Modern Dogma, Booth describes this process as one in which the writer 
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presents a position on a question of value by performing a narrative 
act and in that performance affirming an attitude toward a question of 
value. Stories are the reasons writers give for their position—the ex­
perience of the story expresses a worldview. Readers participate in the 
constructed experience and judge the validity of the attitude expressed 
through that experience. When readers participate in the experience, 
they are in some way changed, and because art has the power to change 
us, Booth argues, we ought to read critically and examine the reasons 
writers give for the positions they espouse. 
In The Company We Keep: An Ethics of Fiction, Booth takes on the 
task of presenting a definition of ethical criticism and giving good rea­
sons for engaging in such an activity. In this book, he explicitly shifts 
the issue from the determinacy of meaning to the value of the narrative 
experience and the ways in which that experience is sharable. Booth 
acknowledges that "the question of whether value is in the poem or 
in the reader is radically and permanently ambiguous," but to admit 
the inherent ambiguity is not to suggest that all judgment is subjec­
tive. Booth explains, "Of course the value is not there, actually until it 
is actualized, by the reader. But of course it could not be actualized if 
it were not there, in potential, in the poem" {Company 89). The process 
of actualizing the potential value system of a literary work initiates a 
dialogue between author and readers that develops into a larger critical 
conversation about the values at issue. While readers may not evaluate 
the experience in precisely the same ways, they can discuss their judg­
ments and their reasons for such judgments. The ethical inquiry is one 
conducted in a critical community. For Booth "the most important of 
all critical tasks is to participate in—and thus to reinforce—a critical 
culture, a vigorous conversation, that will nourish in return those who 
feed us with their narratives" {Company 136). 
TEACHING ETHICAL ARGUMENT

If it is ethical to argue, to seek shared understandings regarding values, 
then it is also good to promote rhetorical inquiry. We should ask "what 
'rhetorical communities' can be discovered that may in fact unite seem­
ingly warring factions, and what are the real conflicts that separate rhe­
torical communities based on conflicting assumptions?" {Modern Dogma 
xiv). We study rhetoric to learn to argue "ethically," to increase the possi­
bility that we can reach shared understandings with others. As teachers, 
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we are in a position to create communities of inquirers in our own class­
rooms, and yet we often have to work against the traditional authority 
of writing texts based on the dogmas of scientism, which have taught 
"that the goal of all thought and argument is to emulate the purity 
and objectivity and rigor of science, in order to protect oneself from 
the errors that passion and desire and metaphor and authority and all 
those logical fallacies lead us into" {Modern Dogma 88). We also have to 
work against the traditional authority structure of the classroom, which 
inhibits notions of community and sharing. 
Two textbooks by Booth and Marshall W. Gregory, the Harper and 
Row Rhetoric and the Harper and Row Reader, help teachers and stu­
dents consider the value of thinking about ideas together. The Rheto­
ric, subtitled Writing as Thinking, Thinking as Writing, introduces the 
choices writers must make in the symbolic exchange as they attempt to 
change the minds of others, while the Reader approaches the symbolic 
exchange from the recipient's perspective and thus examines the ways 
other writers share their intentions, values, and meanings. The distinc­
tions are, of course, not so neat as the contrast might make them appear. 
One way the authors of the Rhetoric discuss the various choices student 
writers might consider is by analyzing the strategies that were employed 
in completed essays. Likewise, in the Reader, Booth and Gregory ask 
students to participate in the dialogue invited by the essays they read, 
not merely to analyze the strategies of argument. Throughout both 
texts, the dialogic nature of the processes of reading and writing, as 
well as the importance of those arts, is reinforced. Writing is treated as a 
'conversation' with potential readers" {Rhetoric xiv), a conversation that 
will involve students in a process of inquiry through which they will 
repeatedly be making themselves—finding, testing, evaluating, and fre­
quently changing their beliefs, and thus it is clear that the composition 
course is not a service course but potentially the most significant college 
experience. 
As in Modern Dogma, the emphasis is on the importance of find­
ing common ground. The process of becoming educated, the authors 
say, is "in part, learning to take in the contrasting perspectives of other 
lives" {Rhetoric 157), and writing itself "is one of our most effective ways 
of learning, for it not only forces us to attend to other people's argu­
ments and opinions, but also forces us to thinly through our own views" 
{Reader 12). Unlike in other introductory writing texts that include the 
inevitable warning of the danger of discussing controversial and appar­
ently irresolvable issues (for example, Maxine Hairston's Contemporary 
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Rhetoric, in which she argues in chapter 4, "Where Rhetoric Starts 
and Stops," that communication is impossible when a priori premises 
conflict), Booth and Gregory demonstrate ways to discuss and even 
sometimes resolve apparently irresolvable issues. In analyses of pieces 
of completed writing, Booth and Gregory put the reader in the mind 
of the writer, most importantly by making them consider the rhetorical 
context that compelled the writer to write. 
An early example from the Rhetoric illustrates their approach. The 
authors reprint a letter written to the editor of the New Yorf^ Times in 
which the writer recounts the martyrdom of Sir Thomas More, an act 
of conscience claimed inspirational by many politicians, such as New 
York's Governor Cuomo. In his narration of the events leading to More's 
martyrdom, the writer emphasizes the consistency of More's private 
principles and his public actions. Today, the writer concludes, public 
officials claim private disapproval of abortion while publicly defending 
laws that allow its practice. Such officials, he suggests, have not learned 
the lesson the martyr's death ought to teach. The analysis that follows 
the letter demonstrates the kind of critical understanding Booth and 
Gregory advocate. Why did the writer compose his letter, they ask; what 
was the situation that compelled him to write, and to whom was the let­
ter addressed? Given his particular rhetorical situation, what strategies 
did he employ—strategies of argument, design, cohesiveness, character, 
and style? Throughout the discussion, Booth and Gregory withhold 
judgment as to the correctness of the writer's position, taking on the 
task as if it were their own. If you were to tackle this situation, they 
seem to say, how might you choose to proceed? By taking the reader 
through the writer's hypothetical thinking process, they encourage the 
reader to consider the writer's concerns, beliefs, ways of approaching 
the task—to examine the issue from his perspective and thus enter into 
real dialogue with him. 
Writers also are obliged to do all they might to seek understanding 
of others' positions as they attempt to discover the best possible reasons 
in support of their own arguments. As the letter to the Times illustrates, 
purposes consist of both writers' motives and the changes writers hope 
to make in their readers. While considering strategies, the authors ar­
gue, writers must explore issues in light of the positions their readers 
might hold—they must, in other words, "bring in the voice of the 
opposition" {Rhetoric 82). The processes of discovering arguments then 
involves critically questioning one's own principles and thus, poten­
tially, changing one's mind. But while there are no infallible rules for 
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judging good reasons, Booth and Gregory establish some principles to 
help writers consider their options. To argue well, writers should know 
the variety and kinds of reasons available to them because the modes 
of argument, shared as they are by humans, provide the most obvious 
common ground (or commonplaces, in Aristotelian terms) from which 
to argue. Further, writers should spend time thinking about their audi-
ence's beliefs and needs, should strive to meet their readers' standards 
as well as their own, and should adjust the strength of their own claims 
to the strength of their reasons. Keeping these principles in mind could 
make it less likely that writers would fall into the dishonest practice 
of trying to "get readers to follow without thinking about the cost, the 
direction, or alternative paths" (Rhetoric 241). To do so is, according 
to the principles espoused in Modern Dogma, dishonest to both writer 
and reader because such a practice misses the point of argument. "The 
supreme purpose of persuasion in this view could not be to talk some­
one else into a preconceived view; rather it must be to engage in mutual 
inquiry or exploration. In such a world, our rhetorical purpose must 
always be to perform as well as possible in the same primal symbolic 
dance which makes us able to dance at all. If it is good for men to 
attend to each other's reasons—and we all know that it is, because with­
out such attending none of us could come to be and questions about 
value could not even be asked—it is also good to work for whatever 
conditions make such mutual inquiry possible. Whatever imposes be­
lief without personal engagement becomes inferior to whatever makes 
mutual exchange more likely. The purpose of mental change is thus 
to fulfill one's nature as a creature capable of responding to symbolic 
offerings" (Modern Dogma 137). 
These texts, then, explicitly endorse Booth's vision of argument as 
coming face to face with human responsibilities. Booth and Gregory 
offer students reasons for writing that appeal not to their desire for 
better grades or better wages, but to their personal, social, and cultural 
identities, reasons that reinforce the notion of argument as the basis 
of human existence. Writers write to gain greater control over their 
own lives, and "to help create the kind of world—presumably a 'better' 
one—that [they] want to live in" (Rhetoric 11). Writers discover that 
"[l]earning to think critically about the way powerful language is used 
in our culture is really the same as learning to think about the culture 
itself: about freedom and community" (Rhetoric 244). And they find 
that language, rather than being something they inherit like property, 
is "more like the air we breathe, the medium that sustains our very 
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life" (Rhetoric 28); it is, Booth and Gregory point out in their introduc­
tory comments in the Reader, the form of behavior that characterizes 
humans. 
Thus the textbooks, in admitting, even insisting on, the discussibility 
of values, clearly include an agenda of ethical beliefs. In addition, the 
authors provide the best model of their teachings, refusing to allow 
readers to adopt that agenda uncritically. The dialogic process is re­
inforced both in the manner and the matter of the approach. As the 
authors observe in the Rhetoric, "Instead of leading you like sheep, we 
keep inviting you to think critically about our claims and our argu­
ments" (241). In fact, at the end of the first chapter, they list some of 
the claims about writers and writing they have made so far—claims 
that assert the uncertainty of "truth," the social and dialogic nature of 
the self and language, and the value of seeking assent—and ask that 
students "argue" the claims, finding good reasons to support their truth 
or falsehood. 
Teachers, following the model of the authors of the Rhetoric and the 
Reader, thus have a dual role: they act both as participants in the rhe­
torical community, exhibiting their own "high excitement about learn­
ing steadily toward higher standards for their answers" {Rhetoric 22). 
To establish the dialogic nature of the classroom, teachers are advised 
to start modeling "active learning" on the first day, getting students to 
talk, read, and write together; to hold personal conferences early; to use 
editorial teams and workshop sessions; and to practice discussion, a dif­
ficult art in an environment plagued by naive relativism and a constant 
devaluing of "opinion" in favor of "fact." They are asked directly to fol­
low in their teaching the same rhetorical ethics they would encourage 
in their students, exhibiting openness, tolerance, and liberality of mind 
and heart. As Booth and Gregory put it, "we address each other, and 
try to change one another's minds, because we all know that nobody is 
perfect, either in knowledge or behavior. In learning to write better— 
without hope of perfection—we join the age-old, never-ending human 
project of trying to make life better for us all" {Rhetoric 467). 
ETHICAL ARGUMENT BEYOND THE WRITING CLASSROOM 
If the limited "vision" of the three blind philosophers is obvious enough 
to be the basis of the old story's humor, then why is it that a similar 
absence of common ground so often seems to muddle public discourse 
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about issues? Booth's own observations of the complicated entangle­
ments characterizing campus rhetoric in the 1960s prompted his concern 
with the ethics of arguing, but our own experiences offer little evidence 
that, twenty years later, a discussion about values is less likely to result 
in an impasse. On the national front recently, a row of senators with 
furrowed brows contemplated the testimony of Clarence Thomas and 
Anita Hill at hearings concerning Thomas's nomination for Supreme 
Court Justice. The senators' puzzlement was painfully obvious. They 
sought diligently and hopefully for the fact, the single witness, the piece 
of news that would take the situation out of the realm of probability 
and into the empirical science of certainty. Without that missing fact, 
they seemed to lack even an awareness of how to go about regarding 
the information they had. It was obvious from both the questions and 
answers that the senators had not articulated, much less agreed upon, 
assumptions about the nature and seriousness of sexual harassment, the 
qualifications of the candidate, or the relevance of the charges to their 
understanding of the qualifications for the job. Because they had not 
undertaken the chore of articulating their positions, of defining their 
common ground, of establishing the nature and limitations of their task, 
they were left with the impossibility of determining who was telling 
"the" truth. Given this example of public discourse, it is obvious why 
students have difficulty accepting that it is even possible, much less 
desirable, to make decisions in a situation where the facts aren't enough. 
In the 1992 presidential elections, media personalities made much 
of the difference in the candidates' "styles." George Bush, it seemed, 
was more "decisive." Clinton, the continuing story asserted, was "inde­
cisive." Time and time again what the examples illustrated was that 
Clinton, unlike Bush, not only changed his mind when confronted with 
new knowledge or good reasons, but was willing to admit such changes 
publicly. Far from considering the possible ethics of the strategy, many 
regarded this openness as a lack of character: a suspicious weakness. 
Given this assumption, it is no wonder that students presume in their 
courses that their task is to assert their preconceived ideas—that they 
have a right to say only what they can assert with certainty, or what 
they can assert with pretended authority. We think of one student who 
came to class in tears on the day a paper was due. "I'm sorry," she said. 
"I have to write about something else. While I was reading about my 
other topic, I changed my mind." 
In our public involvements beyond the writing classroom, we also 
witness the frequency with which discussions of values result in an 
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impasse. With the help of an administration practiced in the art of 
collaborative dialogue, a local school district recently extricated itself 
from what could have been a devastating crisis. It began when a par­
ent objected to some of the contemporary stories included in a recently 
adopted anthology of short fiction. Some teachers joined in the call for 
review of the decision; others were appalled at the possibility of self-
censorship among their ranks. Suddenly and without warning, tempers 
flared. Anger divided long-term colleagues. Assumptions about knowl­
edge, training, learners, aesthetics, responsibility, and public trust were 
articulated as if permanent, paramount, and uncomplicated by situa­
tion and particulars. Though the issue seemed hopelessly polarized, an 
administrator asked the faculty to name and invite a panel of parents 
and university faculty to participate in a dialogue on the decision. He 
required that the meeting continue until the participants reached some 
agreement, and agreed to support that decision to the school board. 
The panel was instructed to establish, first, a list of criteria for select­
ing literary texts, and then to evaluate the anthology in light of those 
criteria. 
In the end, no one, it seemed, questioned the quality of the literature 
included in the anthology. Second, everyone accepted the principle that 
the appropriateness of the material depended on how a good teacher 
might handle it. Third, and this was an essential discovery, many of 
the teachers, already overworked, admitted that their stance was influ­
enced by their fear of having to prepare to teach literature they had not 
"mastered" in their university training. Having identified this common 
ground, the panel proposed a resolution acceptable to all parties: Be­
cause no one should have to teach a text with which they are unfamiliar, 
and because no one should be prevented categorically from using a text 
they can justify professionally, the story anthology should remain avail­
able as an optional text for teachers to use depending on the needs and 
backgrounds of their students and the specific teaching goals. 
The warrant is simple. It recognizes and acknowledges matters of 
value, even though it may not resolve them permanently. It recognizes 
that solutions to problems are contextual, and yet that people can agree 
on the ethical grounds of the answers. But possibly more important 
than the particular wording of the resolution were its other effects: a 
release in the tension surrounding the issue that allowed more honest 
inquiry, a greater understanding of purpose and goals among the lan­
guage arts professionals, and the survival of dialogue in an essential 
teaching community far in time and space from Booth's Chicago cam­
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pus, but identical in its need for ways to arrive at shared understandings 
through the art of discovering warrantable beliefs. 
If we argue to agree we must also agree to argue. Understanding, 
justice, even our existence as a human community depend upon our 
ability to keep critical interchange vital: "The Babel of critical voices is 
transformed at the moment when each critic decides that his survival 
depends not on shouting down all the others but on granting them 
a hearing" (Critical Understanding 232). Thus Booth enjoins us all to 
employ the ethics of argument, to create community through rhetoric, 
to discover warrantable beliefs, and to improve those habits in shared 
discourse. 
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The Logic and Rhetoric of 
Systematic Assent 
ALAN BRINTON 
Modern Dogma and the Rhetoric of Assent is a provocative book, both in 
its attacks on "modern dogma" and in its own affirmative rhetoric. As 
I read Modern Dogma, the attack on what Booth takes to be governing 
presuppositions of modern thought is meant to clear the decks for a 
rhetoric of assent and to lay the groundwork for a series of affirmations. 
Among modern dogmas, "a kind of unproved and unprovable convic­
tion that thought doubts; that that's its job" (57) is of central importance 
in the overall plan of Modern Dogma. Booth especially identifies this 
dogma with Bertrand Russell, among twentieth-century philosophers, 
but sees Russell's views about doubt and certainty as arising from "a tra­
dition willed to him by centuries of western skepticism" and "brought 
to a head" by Descartes in his method of systematic doubt (55).1 The 
Cartesian method of systematic doubt is apparently regarded by Booth 
as constituting the dominant methodological dogma of modern phi­
losophy. As an alternative to it, he proposes a diametrically opposed 
method of systematic assent. And in opposition to a "habit of negative 
rhetoric" (as manifested in the negative political rhetoric of the 1960s, 
but also in more "metaphysical" modern nay-saying about the meaning 
of human life), he means to affirm rhetorical and epistemological poli­
cies of communal yea-saying, as well as to engage in some significant 
yea-saying of his own. 
So Modern Dogma attempts a clearing away of "dogmas of doubt," to 
make way for an assentive rhetoric, but also in preparation for Booth's 
own experiment in assenting—assenting to propositions that give rise 
to the conception of man as "essentially" rhetorical, as "a rhetorical 
253 
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animal," created and defined symbolically in interaction with other per­
sons. The rhetoric recommended in Modern Dogma purports to be a 
rhetoric of good reasons; and the introduction of his method of assent is 
meant to provide justification for an outbreak of assenting in chapter 4. 
Some aspects of the early stages of Modern Dogma are worthy of 
hearty approval, such as the treatment of the dogma of "motivism." 
And some of the details of the constructive program of the later parts 
seem to me also to be important and able to stand on their own, inde­
pendent of what goes on in earlier chapters. In particular, much of what 
is said in chapter 4 about ethical and emotional proof seems important 
and essentially correct. But the critique of the method (and attitude) 
of Cartesian doubt and the attempt to replace it with a method of sys­
tematic assent strike me as highly problematic. In any case, it is the 
conception of a method of systematic assent, along with the suggestion 
that there can and ought to be one, which I find to be a most provocative 
aspect of Modern Dogma, and which I would like (as a self-confessed 
"analytic" philosopher, I must add) to examine in this chapter. 
THE METHOD OF SYSTEMATIC DOUBT 
A Cartesian method of systematic doubt, Booth claims, underlies and 
gives the impetus in modern thought to both "scientism" and irratio­
nalism, in both cases by engendering a kind of skepticism about values 
and about discussion of questions of value. But just what is this method 
of doubt, and what really are its tendencies? What other attitudes does 
it, by its nature, and also historically, tend to produce? 
The skeptical method of Descartes's first Meditation is self­
consciously Pyrrhonistic. That is to say, it is a method that has its earliest 
origins in the views of the Greek skeptic Pyrrho of Elis and its classic 
formulation in the Outlines of Pyrrhonism and other works of Sextus 
Empiricus.2 Descartes does not, as anyone who has read the Meditations 
knows, end up in skepticism. That he ends up not a skeptic but a dog­
matist has more often been taken as evidence that his commitment to 
the method of doubt is less than wholehearted than as evidence that 
systematic doubt leads to dogmatism, scientismic or Fideistic. But more 
about that shortly. 
Descartes says in the first of his Meditations that, when he came to 
the realization that many of the opinions he had accepted in his early 
life were mistaken, he determined that the only way he would come 
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to a true knowledge was by undertaking to "set aside all the opinions 
which I had previously accepted" (75) and to "start again from the very 
beginning," putting aside, as he says later (Meditation 2, 81), every be­
lief in which he can "imagine the least doubt" and assenting only to 
propositions that he finds it impossible to doubt.3 Now, in the early 
Meditations, we find sometimes the language of doubt and sometimes 
the language of denial. Early along he speaks of abstaining from belief 
in what is not entirely certain (75), and later he says that if he achieves 
no other result at least he will have the power in the end to "suspend 
judgment" (80). But then he also says that, to counterbalance the force 
of his longstanding habits of belief, it may not be enough to "consider 
that they are what they really are—that is, somewhat doubtful," that 
it might be better if he "deliberately took the opposite position" and 
deceived himself, "pretending for some time that all these opinions are 
entirely false and imaginary" (79). 
There are, then, two quite different methods recommended in the 
first Meditation, a method of systematic doubt and a method of system­
atic denial. It would be a misreading of Descartes's intentions, however, 
to regard the method of denial as anything more than a propaedeu­
tic. The method of systematic denial in Meditation 1 is on a level with 
the "evil genius" hypothesis; it is a device with a specific purpose. The 
real method of the first Meditation is a method of systematic doubt, 
not a method of systematic denial. Denial is, in the face of a program 
of systematic doubt, simply another form of affirmation; and negative 
propositions (that the sky, the air, the earth, are nothing but illusions, 
for example, or that God does not exist) are on an equal footing with af­
firmative ones, disallowed if unaccompanied by the appropriate creden­
tials. Now it is probably unfair to accuse Booth of confusing doubt with 
denial and consequently with misrepresenting the skeptical method. On 
the other hand, it is perhaps fair to say that some readers of Modern 
Dogma might get the impression that its author attributes a method of 
systematic denial to Descartes, a kind of systematic metaphysical nay­
saying, a program of disbelief rather than one of nonbelief. This would, 
among other things, make the method look less plausible than it is, since 
disbelief (being itself a form of belief) carries a much heavier epistemic 
burden than nonbelief, the suspension of belief. 
So the method of systematic doubt, in the hands of Descartes (or in 
the hands of later philosophers, for that matter) is not so negative as 
a careless reader of Booth's account might suspect. Furthermore, Des­
cartes, like many of the classical skeptics whom it was his intent to 
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refute, has a positive program, one that he can implement even if he 
cannot get beyond his skepticism. And that positive program is one that 
in a sense preserves a commitment to values (which is at least part of 
what Booth wants to do with his method of assent). In part 3 of the 
Discourse on Method ("Some Moral Rules Derived from the Method"), 
Descartes says that he decided in implementing his method that "while 
reason obliged me to be irresolute in my beliefs, there was no reason 
why I should be so in my actions" (18). He then sketches a "provisional 
morality," whose first principle is "to obey all the laws and customs of 
my country, constantly retaining the religion which I judged best. . . , 
and in all other matters to follow the most moderate and least excessive 
opinions to be found in the practices of the more judicious part of the 
community in which I would live" (18). The second principle is to act as 
resolutely on these principles as if he were certain of their correctness: 
"when we cannot determine the course which is certainly best, we must 
follow the one which is probably the best; and when we cannot deter­
mine even that, we must nevertheless select one and follow it thereafter 
as though it were certainly the best" (20). 
These are not the words of a man left awash in the wake of the 
application of his method of systematic doubting; they constitute, in 
fact, a kind of affirmation. And they have their counterpart in the truly 
skeptical philosophies of late antiquity, as well as in the views of sophis­
ticated skeptics of later periods (and even in the skeptical rhetoric of 
the old Sophistic). According to the reports left to us by Sextus Em­
piricus, Cicero, and others, Academic skeptics of the post-Aristotelian 
period, while denying that we can be certain about anything more than 
appearances, adopted a policy of "living with the appearances," some 
going so far as to judge that there is a kind of "reasonable justification" 
for taking some appearances more seriously than others and for choos­
ing some courses of action and policies over others.4 Sextus reports that 
the Academic skeptic Arcesilaus "says that one who suspends judgment 
about everything will regulate choice and avoidance and actions in gen­
eral by 'the reasonable'; and that by proceeding in accordance with this 
criterion he will act rightly" and that Carneades found grounds for dis­
tinguishing "merely convincing" impressions or appearances from "un­
diverted impressions," which were to be taken more seriously, and those 
from the weightiest of all, "thoroughly explored" impressions (Long 
and Sedley 451, 453). The significance of these reports and others like 
them is that they are evidence of the tendency of systematic doubt, after 
having illegitimized assent, to legitimize another order of affirmation. 
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Whether skeptics are consistent in this is open to debate; but the point 
is that systematic doubt does not inevitably engender a rhetoric of nega­
tion (on either of the levels Booth is concerned about). Systematic doubt 
need not provide the basis or impetus for the dogmas of scientism or 
for irrationalism; it can as easily generate a logic or rhetoric of "ap­
pearances" (as something akin to it did in the older Sophists) or clear 
the way for a logic and rhetoric of probabilities (giving the impetus to 
works such as Joseph Butler's Analogy of Religion or Newman's Gram­
mar ofAssent). (It is historical, causal connections we are concerned with 
here, not logical entailments, because it is on the grounds of the former 
that Booth impugns the program of systematic doubt.) One might even 
argue for an identification of the "appearances" of Academic skepticism 
and those of Sophistic rhetoric, and even for a kinship of both of those 
with the kind of probabilistic rhetoric that we find in Butler (though I 
would not be so bold as to advance such a hypothesis).5 
The general point is that an attitude or method of systematic doubt 
tends to have a loosening effect. Its natural tendency, I suggest, is toward 
legitimizing a logic and rhetoric of probabilities, in some form or other, 
despite its ostensible commitments to a standard of certainty. Its partial 
failure to do so in the case of Descartes is his failure rather than a failure 
of the method or attitude. 
Nor does a method of skeptical doubt inevitably generate the kind 
of "metaphysical" nay-saying with which Booth is concerned in the last 
chapter of Modern Dogma. A kind of optimism was actually more typi­
cal of the Pyrrhonistic and Academic skeptics. It was their view that 
systematic doubt liberates the mind, that it is therapeutic, that it pro­
vides the basis for inner tranquility (ataraxia).6 Its influence in modern 
philosophy has at least sometimes been in that same direction. Whose 
works in modern philosophy are more pervasively cheerful than those 
of Hume, for example (or those of Bertrand Russell, for that matter)? 
The truth of the matter seems to be that systematic doubt leads 
nowhere in particular. Skepticism provides a pretext sometimes for sci­
entism, sometimes for Fideism, sometimes for irrationalism, sometimes 
for a rhetoric of angst, sometimes for moral cynicism; but among its 
purest devotees, I have meant to suggest, it has, if anything, tended 
to generate affirmation more than denial, and to clear the decks for a 
rhetoric of probabilities. It has tended, that is, to undermine the anti-
rhetorical rhetoric of certainties. The pervasive effect, and enduring 
value, of skeptical doubt has always been that it undermines dogma­
tism, even if it at the same time tends to undermine itself. "The skeptics 
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from Sextus Empiricus to Montaigne, Bayle, Hume, and Santayana," 
writes Popkin, "have pointed out that the strength of skepticism lies not 
in whether it is tenable as a position but in the force of its arguments 
against the dogmatic claims of philosophers" ("Skepticism" 457). 
Let us grant, however, that there are certain important matters, cer­
tain metaphysical questions, and certain questions of value that seem 
to demand some more solid foundation than can be provided by the 
skeptic's "living by the appearances," that seem to call for some more 
vigorous and sustained affirmation than the systematic doubter seems 
entitled to provide. How is such a foundation to be provided? In par­
ticular, can it be provided by the method of systematic assent that Booth 
wants to counterpoise to the method of systematic doubt? And what 
exactly is this method of systematic assent? 
SYSTEMATIC ASSENT 
In the introduction to Modern Dogma, Booth endorses the view that 
"the primary mental act of man is to assent to truth rather than to de­
tect error" (xvi). This brings to mind James's claim, in The Principles of 
Psychology, that "all propositions, whether attributive or existential, are 
believed through the very fact of being conceived, unless they clash with 
other propositions believed at the same time" (290). Let us grant that 
assent is the primary mental act, that it is our nature to assent to what­
ever propositions confront us, until we have reason to do otherwise, that 
the habit—even the act—of dissenting or of suspending belief has to 
be acquired, and that dissent and even doubt are in some sense parasitic 
upon assent. But to say that it is our nature to assent and that we have to 
learn to doubt is not to say that we ought to assent unless, as Booth puts 
it, we "cannot not doubt" (111). So the question remains whether assent 
ought to, or even can, occupy the kind of methodological position that 
doubt occupies in the method we have been considering in the previous 
section. 
Booth's suggestion (40) that we consider what would happen to our 
"moral and intellectual life" if we "reversed that formula" (of systematic 
doubt) is a real conceptual eye catcher, though its impact is diminished 
somewhat by qualifications he immediately adds. Before looking at the 
method as Booth actually develops it, however, I would like to consider 
what it would mean to employ a method of systematic assent that was 
truly the logical counterpart to the method of systematic doubt. 
In the first place, we need to remind ourselves again that the method 
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of systematic doubt is not a method of systematic denial. The logical 
opposite of a method of systematic denial would perhaps be a method 
of systematic assertion. Such a method (either of assent or of denial), 
purely considered, would be logically incoherent. In theory, at least, 
every proposition that confronts us as a possibility confronts us also, by 
implication, with its negation, the proposition that asserts that what it 
asserts is not the case. A real unimpeded procedure of systematic assent 
would yield exactly the same incoherent results as a real procedure of 
systematic denial, an assenting to both every proposition confronting us 
and to its negation as well. (Bear with me if I seem for a moment to be 
"logic-chopping"; the point is to get at the logic of Booth's proposal. I 
know very well that such a procedure is not what Professor Booth has 
in mind; but I want to discover the logic of what he does have in mind.) 
It would not do, I think, to suggest that it is only the affirmative propo­
sitions, as opposed to the negative ones, that are to be assented to in this 
method, unless we are equipped with a procedure for deciding which 
propositions are truly affirmative and which truly negative. While this 
might seem easy enough with respect to certain classes of propositions 
(even though it isn't), its difficulty becomes apparent in the case of the 
kinds of propositions that are mainly in question in Modern Dogma. 
"A man ought to covet his neighbor's wife." "We should always act 
only for our own interests." "Ugliness is better than beauty." Are these 
affirmations or negations? 
The bare fact that a proposition is affirmative rather than negative 
(if we can even make that differentiation with confidence) does not in 
itself count either for it or against it, does not make it any more or any 
less likely to be true. Assertion is inseparable from denial. Every act of 
affirmation is at the same time an act of negation. To assert that p is to 
deny that not-p, and to deny that/? is to assert that not-p. Distinguishing 
ps from not-psy moreover, is notoriously problematic, especially with re­
spect to questions of value. The relevance of all this to Booth's program 
is this: the question, at the earlier stages of his game, is not really a 
question about the difference between affirming and denying; it is more 
a question about the status of certain foundational beliefs, beliefs that 
have already provided the foundations for our thinking about matters 
of value, or beliefs Booth wants to use as foundations for certain kinds 
of "yea-saying." The way in which Booth wants to qualify his method­
ological recommendation, which we will look at shortly, should make 
it clear that a contrast between "yea" and "nay" is not the real issue; the 
real issue is one of presumption. 
But, in any case, a method of systematic assent cannot be the logical 
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counterpart of a method of systematic doubt. We can withhold assent 
from both a proposition and its negation; we cannot yield assent to both 
a proposition and its negation. A method of systematic doubt may be 
impracticable if taken too seriously, but at least it makes sense. At least 
it is not in itself logically incoherent. Let us turn now, though, to the 
proposed method of systematic assent as Booth actually describes it. 
The first real characterization of the proposed method of assent in Mod­
ern Dogma is at the end of chapter i, in a passage from which I quoted 
earlier: 
But I ask you to think a bit . .  . about what would happen to your 
intellectual and moral life if you reversed that [the skeptical] formula, 
cultivating a benign acceptance—perhaps temporary and tentative, but 
real—of every belief that can pass two tests: you have no particular con­
crete grounds to doubt it (as distinct from the abstract principle to doubt 
what cannot be proved); and you have good reason to thinly all men who 
understand the problem share your belief. (40) 
Now the caveat "perhaps temporary and tentative" significantly closes 
the gap, I think, between the kind of procedure Booth seems to have in 
mind and the skeptic's "living with the appearances." But it is the sec­
ond of the two "tests" to which I particularly draw attention. What is the 
real character of this test, how is it to be applied, and what are the likely 
results? What will constitute good reasons for thinking that all persons 
who understand the problem share my belief? Motivists (proponents 
of the first of the five dogmas attacked in Modern Dogma) surely have 
good reason to think that all who understand the problem share their 
belief, since it is the way in which they conceive the problem of believ­
ing that gives rise to, which entails, motivism. A simpler procedure is 
this: Believe what all right-thinking people believe; by "right-thinking 
people" I mean people whose beliefs on the question at hand are cor­
rect. "It is reasonable," Booth says later (101, at the start of the book's 
most full-blown account of the method), "to grant (one ought to grant) 
some degree of credence to whatever qualified men and women agree 
on, unless one has specific and stronger reasons to disbelieve." 
The qualification, "whatever qualified men and women agree on," is 
highly problematic. Booth openly acknowledges a "deliberate embrace 
of circularity" (101). Circularity indeed; these formulations encourage 
a kind of begging of the question with respect to philosophical doc­
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trincs. But, that problem aside for a moment, it is not at all clear that 
this is a method of assent any more than it is a method of dissent or 
of doubt. A consistent adherence to the policy will oblige us to follow 
qualified men and women in their disbeliefs and doubts as well. (That 
is to say, we will be obliged, unless we have specific and stronger rea­
sons not to do so, to assent to their beliefs about what is false and what 
is doubtful.) It is misleading, I say again in this context, to speak here 
of a method of systematic assent. I understand the point of a kind of 
application of that terminology later in the book, when Booth wants to 
promote rhetorical optimism and cooperativeness; but I do not under­
stand it at this earlier stage, when the point is to offer an alternative to 
the philosophical method of systematic doubt. 
THE METHOD 
Booth's method is neither truly systematic (in the relevant sense) nor 
truly a method of assent. But if it is not really a method of systematic 
assent, what kind of a method is it? Well, it seems to have two related 
aspects. On the one hand, it is an ad verecundiam method, a method in 
whose application we defer to authorities in matters of belief. On the 
other hand, it is a conservative method, a method weighted in favor of 
established beliefs. There is something to be said in favor of both of 
its aspects, although Booth's account of the first is problematic (partly 
for reasons already given, and partly on account of vagueness), and the 
relationship between the two is not very clearly established. It may be 
that qualified authorities are simply authorities who agree with the be­
liefs we already hold, in which case it is the conservatism of the method 
which really carries the weight. By virtue of both of its aspects, the 
method's application (by philosophers, at least) seems weighted in favor 
of some of the very dogmas under attack in Modern Dogma. But let me 
say more clearly what I mean by the claim that the method is really a 
method of conservation. 
"Abstract commands to 'doubt pending proof " are to be replaced in 
this method with "the ancient and natural command to 'assent pending 
disproof " (101). But we have seen that the real issue is not whether to 
follow a policy of assenting as opposed to a policy of doubting. Perhaps 
we can distinguish two real issues. One is whether we ought (in "non­
scientific" matters, let us say) to assent at all (and, if so, in what sense 
or how strongly we are entitled to assent). The other is the question 
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of what propositions or what sorts of propositions we ought to assent 
to, at the ground level, so to speak, in the application of this method. 
As to the first, let me say only that Booth's claim that modern dog­
matists (Russell, for example) have "sliced the world into two unequal 
parts, the tiny domain of the provable, about which nobody cares very 
much, and the great domain of 'all the rest,' in which anyone can be­
lieve or do what he pleases" (85) is a straw man (see also 91). Even the 
older skeptics tend to reject, at some level, so absolute a dichotomy, to 
say nothing of Descartes or Russell, each of whom clearly affirms that, 
among propositions that are susceptible to neither proof nor disproof, 
and among possible courses of action, some are more reasonable than 
others.7 
What sorts of propositions is it that Booth wants to have assumed 
innocent until proven guilty? Well, the way he begins to put the method 
into operation (starting on 111) is strikingly reminiscent of the "common 
sense" philosophy of Thomas Reid, or of G. E. Moore in the twenti­
eth century. He runs through a series of propositions he thinks we all 
know very well that we know (even if we sometimes say otherwise): 
"Men are characteristically users of language," "Sometimes we under­
stand each other," "What an adult man or woman is, in all societies, 
is in a large degree what other men and women have created through 
symbolic exchange," "We characteristically intend to change our fellows 
by symbolic devices," and so on.8 These propositions are not randomly 
selected; Booth is, as we guess pretty quickly, headed in a certain direc­
tion. But what recommends these propositions to us—or what exempts 
them from the need for a recommendation, we should say—is the fact 
that we and our fellows already believe that they are true or at least 
conduct our mutual affairs as if their truth were unquestionable. What 
Booth is suggesting is that there is a presumption in favor of such beliefs, 
that the burden of proof is on the person who questions them rather 
than on the person who assents to them, so that the very fact that we 
hold them, especially the fact that we hold them collectively, carries a 
certain amount of weight. Richard Whately's discussion of presumption 
in The Elements of Rhetoric comes to mind: "There is a presumption," 
says Whately, "in favor of every existing institution. Many of these . . . 
may be susceptible of alteration for the better; but still the 'Burden of 
Proof lies with him who proposes an alteration; simply, on the ground 
that since a change is not a good in itself, he who demands a change 
should show cause for it" (114). Certain classes of propositions have a 
kind of "institutional" status from a commonsense philosopher's point 
of view. They cannot be abandoned, our attitudes toward them cannot 
 263 The Logic and Rhetoric of Systematic Assent
even be significantly altered (from confidence to doubt, for example), 
without serious doxastic and pragmatic consequences. Reasonable cause 
can be shown, of course, for alterations in belief; but there is, according 
to this policy, a heavy burden of proof that falls on the person who 
questions existing epistemic institutions.9 
I hope I have not distorted Booth's view by putting it in these terms. 
The heart of the matter is a kind of epistemic conservatism, for which I 
believe there is something to be said. This heart is not really a question 
about assent, systematic or otherwise. The actual procedure in Modern 
Dogma is to focus on a carefully chosen subset of moderately institu­
tionalized propositions and to lead us from them toward a certain con­
ception of human nature (man the "rhetorical animal").10 A critique of 
that constructive program is beyond the scope of the present discussion. 
However, I would like to make two comments about it in closing. First, 
it is ironic that the strategy of Modern Dogma is remarkably Cartesian, 
as it consists in an attempt to sweep away old prejudices and to lay and 
build upon new foundations. Second, it is also an irony that something 
like the kind of principle of conservation that the "method of system­
atic assent" really boils down to is, after all, endorsed by the chief foil 
of Modern Dogma, Bertrand Russell, from whose hold Booth has per­
haps not gotten as free as he would like. In The Problems of Philosophy, 
after having pointed out that the view of the solipsist "cannot be defini­
tively refuted," and after having given probabilistic arguments for the 
"common-sense" view that there is a world of objects independent of 
us, Russell says the following: 
The argument which has led us to this conclusion is doubtless less 
strong than we could wish, but it is typical of many philosophical argu­
ments, and it is therefore worth while to consider briefly its general 
character and validity. All knowledge, we find, must be built up upon 
our instinctive beliefs, and if these are rejected, nothing is left... . 
Philosophy should show us the hierarchy of our instinctive beliefs, be­
ginning with those we hold most strongly, and presenting each as much 
isolated and as free from irrelevant additions as possible. It should take 
care to show that, in the form in which they are finally set forth, our 
instinctive beliefs do not clash, but form a harmonious system. There 
can never be any reason for rejecting one instinctive belief except that 
it clashes with others; thus, if they are found to harmonize, the whole 
system becomes worthy of our acceptance.... 
This function, at least, philosophy can perform. (25) 
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Notes 
1. I feel compelled, as in some respects an unrepentant Russellian, to ob­
serve that Russell receives what has to strike some readers as rather shabby 
treatment in chapter 2, especially in what looks like an imagined dialogue be­
tween Booth and Russell, but which really consists in a run of text from the 
first chapter of Russell's What I Believe (1925) with a series of interruptions by 
Booth. As was observed long ago by Plato in the Phaedrus, a written text has 
the disadvantage of being unable to defend itself. One has to wonder whether 
Russell the man (who comes across as a fool in this little dialogue) would have 
done somewhat better in a face-to-face symbolic exchange. 
2. The extant works of Sextus Empiricus are published in four volumes, 
trans. R. G. Bury, in the Loeb Classical Library. For a detailed treatment of 
the more immediate skeptical antecedents to Descartes, see Popkin, History of 
Scepticism. 
3. All quotations from Descartes will be from the Discourse on Method 
and Meditations, trans. Laurence J. Lafleur. 
4. See Long and Sedley, section 69, "Living Without Opinions." 
5. There is a theme here that one might attempt to trace through a variety 
of sources. One might, for example, argue that Cicero's defense of honestas in 
Definibus and De officiis is a kind of philosophical argument from appearances. 
The argument strategy of those two works consists largely in presenting the 
reader with examples of virtue and vice, the case for virtue being left to rest 
most heavily on the reader's response (a kind of assenting, we might say) to the 
appearances. Arguably, it is at least in part the influence of Academic skepti­
cism on his philosophical works that makes this sort of approach agreeable to 
Cicero. For a more detailed account of Cicero's method (though without an 
attempt to make connections with skeptical doubt or a doctrine of "appear­
ances"), see my "Cicero's Use of Historical Examples in Moral Argument." 
6. "The Greek skeptic," writes Nussbaum, "does not present himself as 
seeking an external justification for beliefs. He is seeking freedom from dis­
turbance; and he wishes to attain this happy condition by suspending belief. 
The equal force of opposing beliefs achieves, for him, this effect" (481-82). 
7. That Russell believes in and is committed to the giving of "good rea­
sons" with respect to questions of value and matters of practice should be clear 
enough from his ethical and political writings. With respect to the supposed 
gap between this commitment and Russell's commitment to a method of doubt, 
one ought to attend to Russell's efforts at theorizing about morality. See Mon­
roe, "Russell's Moral Theories." The Pears volume also contains a bibliography 
of Russell's ethical, social, and political writings. 
8. Compare, for example, G. E. Moore's list of "truisms" in "A Defence 
of Common Sense." 
9. My characterization of Booth's method is influenced somewhat by 
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Quine and UUian, especially chap. 2, "Belief and Change of Belief," and 
chap. 6, "Hypothesis." 
10. Among these propositions, some—such as the proposition that we are 
largely "created through symbolic exchange"—would have a strange ring in­
deed to ordinary people, as it is mainly among theorists of discourse that they 
are institutionalized. 
Bibliography 
Booth, Wayne C. Modern Dogma and the Rhetoric of Assent. Notre Dame, IN: 
U of Notre Dame P; Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1974. 
Brinton, Alan. "Cicero's Use of Historical Examples in Moral Argument." 
Philosophy and Rhetoric 21 (1988): 169-84. 
Descartes, Rene. Discourse on Method and Meditations. Trans. Laurence J. 
Lafleur. Indianapolis: Bobbs, i960. 
James, William. The Principles of Psychology. 1890. New York: Dover, 1950. 
Long, A. A., and D. N. Sedley, eds. Translations of the Principal Sources, with 
Philosophical Commentary. Vol. 1 of The Hellenistic Philosophers. Cam­
bridge: Cambridge UP, 1987. 
Monroe, D. H. "Russell's Moral Theories." Philosophy 35 (i960). Rpt. in Ber­
trand Russell: A Collection of Critical Essays. Ed. David Pears. Garden 
City, NY: Anchor, 1972. 325-55. 
Moore, G. E. "A Defence of Common Sense." Contemporary British Philosophy. 
Ed. J. H. Muirhead. 2nd ser. London: Macmillan, 1925. 193-223. 
Nussbaum, Martha. The Fragility of Goodness. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
1986. 
Popkin, Richard H. The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes. New 
York: Humanities, 1964. 
. "Skepticism." The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. Paul Edwards. 
1967. New York: Macmillan, 1972. 
Quine, W. V., and Joseph Ullian. The Web of Belief. 2nd ed. New York: Ran­
dom, 1978. 
Russell, Bertrand. The Problems of Philosophy. 1912. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1959. 
Sextus Empiricus. Worlds. Trans. R. G. Bury. 4 vols. Loeb Classical Library. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1933. 
Whatley, Richard. The Elements of Rhetoric. 1828. Carbondale: Southern Illi­
nois UP, 1963. 
15

Rhetoric without Sophistry: 
Wayne Booth and the 
Rhetoric of Inquiry 
JAME S B. MCOMBE R 
JUDGING FROM SOME of his more offhand remarks, Wayne Booth has 
had uneven relations with the discipline of philosophy. As he introduces 
a group of essays in Now Don't Try to Reason with Me, for example, he 
expresses a general commitment to the spirit of reasonableness he finds 
in eighteenth-century philosophy. But he seems less generous toward 
some of the more recent voices. One of these, he tells us, suggested that 
Booth's own attempts at philosophy are "a shameless form of revenge on 
modern philosophy" (79). In Modern Dogma and the Rhetoric of Assent, 
clearly his most philosophical book, Booth gives the impression that he 
knows philosophers would find his arguments an easy target: "[T]hey 
know how much could be said about many of the questions I seem to 
settle with a twist of the wrist." Lest we take this as good reason to 
leave his book behind and turn to the true philosophers, he adds, "But 
it is part of my point that modern philosophy—at least until the last 
two decades—has saddled us with standards of truth under which no 
man can live" (xii). 
We could w rite two different stories about Booth's attitude toward 
philosophy based on these sparse comments. On the one hand, we might 
portray him as a philosophical conservative who longs for the times 
when philosophy was relevant to everyday concerns and when even the 
most important philosophical works were accessible to the lay reader. 
On the other hand, we could use these same remarks to make Booth into 
something a little more trendy: an ^ntiphilosopher. He seems to want 
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to rescue academic argument from the logic-chopping his imaginary 
philosophical opponents would use against his own ideas. If we wanted 
to extend this image, we might say that in denouncing the "saddle" 
of rigorous standards of truth, Booth questions the philosopher's right 
to stand in judgment over the argumentative practices of other disci­
plines. This image, in short, might portray Booth as an opponent of 
what Richard Rorty calls "foundationalism." 
While I suspect that Booth himself feels more comfortable with the 
first image, in this chapter I examine the antiphilosophical potential 
of Booth's writings. The reason for my choice should be apparent to 
anyone familiar with the body of research and argument now called 
"the rhetoric of inquiry." Booth's antimodernism already has been en­
listed in the service of a project that seeks both to set aside formal 
epistemology and to reconstruct academic inquiry with rhetorical self-
consciousness. Economist Donald McCloskey, for example, lets Booth 
and not Aristotle define rhetoric in The Rhetoric of Economics (29). And 
while he does not rely on Booth for his antiphilosophy, McCloskey cer­
tainly makes it clear that for him, promoting rhetorical thinking about 
science requires dethronement of the epistemologist: "The philosopher 
undertakes to second-guess the scientific community. . . . Such claims 
from the easy chair are hard to take seriously" (20). Elsewhere in the 
literature on the rhetoric of inquiry, Booth's name turns up alongside 
such famous antiphilosophers as Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, and of course 
Rorty (Nelson and Megill; Nelson, Megill, and McCloskey 3-18). 
Given their goal of understanding the rhetorical dimension of in­
quiry, it is hardly surprising to find McCloskey and others citing Booth 
as an authority on the weaknesses of scientific epistemology. At least in 
the respects that he resists positivism, behaviorism, systematic doubt, 
the is-ought distinction, and other dogmas of modernism, Booth be­
longs with the antiphilosophers. But to what extent is Booth a par­
ticipant with the more strident among them? And if he is not, what 
differences in Booth's approach to the rhetoric of inquiry might have 
significance for that line of scholarship? To answer these questions, it 
will help to have a good example of an antiphilosopher to compare with 
Booth. Simply because of his popularity among rhetoricians of inquiry 
and his unequivocal opposition to systematic philosophy, Richard Rorty 
makes an obvious choice (Nelson and Megill 26; see also Lyne 67). I will 
therefore explore some of Booth's antimodernist arguments in relation 
to Rorty's. My exploration will not make any new contentions about 
antiphilosophy; that discipline seems to be thriving quite well enough. I 
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hope instead to use this comparison to provide some suggestions about 
how to say that inquiry is rhetorical without saying it is the worst sort 
of sophistry, or what Booth would call "the art of winning." I am in 
search, then, of a rhetoric of inquiry that is also an ethic of inquiry. 
Readers of Modern Dogma and Critical Understanding can see plainly 
enough that Booth rejects certain philosophical ideas popular in this 
century. We know, for example, that Booth has little regard for Bertrand 
Russell's brand of modernism {Modern Dogma, chap. 2). But to say that 
he dislikes certain philosophers or their ideas is not to say that Booth 
altogether rejects the philosophical impulse, however defined. Rorty, on 
the other hand, seems committed to just such a rejection: 
People have, oddly enough, found something interesting to say about 
the essence of Force and the definition of "number." They might have 
found something interesting to say about the essence of Truth. But in 
fact they haven't. The history of attempts to do so, and of criticism of 
those attempts, is roughly coextensive with the history of that literary 
genre we call "philosophy"—a genre founded by Plato. So pragmatists 
[such as Rorty] see the Platonic tradition as having outlived its usefulness. 
{Consequences xiv) 
It is difficult to imagine Booth ever entertaining such a sweeping dis­
missal. In what sense, then, can I even begin to compare Booth and 
Rorty for their antiphilosophical inclinations? 
First, whatever generalizations Rorty may make about the whole 
gamut of Western philosophy, he does not intend to denounce every­
thing that we call philosophy, and he does not anticipate the closing of 
philosophy departments. His enemy is Philosophy with a capital "P," 
defined as the discipline that seeks to "underwrite or debunk claims 
to knowledge," and more generally as literature that "proceeds on the 
assumption that all contributions to a given discourse are commensu­
rable" {Mirror 3, 316). He invokes a great many philosophers, including 
many who make their livings in contemporary philosophy departments, 
to earn his antiphilosophical conclusions. By repeated appeal to his 
heroes—Dewey, Heidegger, and the later Wittgenstein—he further re­
fines his concept of Philosophy. What really bothers him, it seems, is 
the attempt to make philosophy "systematic." In Rorty's view philoso­
phy can still play an "edifying" role by constantly reacting against "the 
latest claim that such-and-such a discipline has at last made the nature 
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of human knowledge so clear that reason will now spread throughout 
the rest of human activity" (Mirror 367). 
So Rorty's antiphilosophy turns out to be a reaction against a particu­
lar kind of philosophy and the ambition that gives rise to it. When Rorty 
questions this "foundationalist" conception of philosophy in these more 
limited senses, he seems to have entered territory familiar to Wayne 
Booth. In Critical Understanding, Booth tries to find a pluralistic ap­
proach to critical argument. His concerns are largely with modes of lit­
erary criticism, but with just a little broadening, they come to resemble 
some of Rorty's rejections. Booth, for example, questions any form of 
critical "monism," or the view that there is one true critical conclusion 
to draw about a literary work (12-17). Rorty's rejection of foundational-
ism seems to be based on the same suspicion of final pronouncements, 
except that he rejects any claim to final truth in any domain. 
Yet perhaps at this point the similarity between these two writers 
must end. As I suggested, Rorty rejects not just any claim to finality in 
matters of truth, but any claim to "systematicity." For Rorty, procedural 
rationality is inherently problematic (Nelson, Megill, and McCloskey 
40). He would prefer to support philosophies precisely to the extent they 
mock any pretension to formulate recipes for reaching truth—or as he 
would put it, to the extent they "edify." At first glance, Booth's resis­
tance to various modernist philosophies arrives at very different conclu­
sions. Booth would replace one kind of systematicity with another: an 
exchange of systematic doubt for systematic assent. Would all of Rorty's 
dismissals of systematic philosophy apply equally to the procedures of 
systematic assent? 
Again, however, a closer look at these two positions reveals their re­
semblance. Booth defines systematic doubt as "assent pending disproof" 
in deliberate contrast to the Cartesian and modernist formula of doubt 
pending proof [Modern Dogma 101). But when he discusses systematic 
doubt in detail, it becomes more than a mirror image of the modernist 
formula. The traditional conception made doubt an individual affair. 
Booth deliberately and consistently replaces the modernists' "I" with 
"we": "Instead of making doubt primary, let us see what happens if we 
know whatever we can agree together that we have no good reason to 
doubt, whether or not we can apply other more formal tests of doubt" 
(Modern Dogma 106, emphasis added). This simple change in pronoun 
has some important consequences. Once the process of assent becomes 
communal, it also becomes considerably more susceptible to the charge 
that it lacks the kind of systematicity Rorty objects to. Indeed, at such a 
270 JAMES B. McOMBER 
formulation of the essence of knowing, Booth's imaginary philosophi­
cal opponents might assume that he has settled some very important 
questions with a twist of the wrist. Until we have reached some con­
clusions about who "we" are, we cannot say much about the kind of 
knowledge systematic assent will get us. 
I will let Booth answer the obvious question about what he means 
by "we" in a moment. First I must note the important sense in which 
the notion of communal assent pending disproof converges with Rorty's 
ideas about the attainment of truth. Rorty is famous—perhaps notori-
ous—for adopting an unrepentantly local and communal notion of 
truth: "[T]here is nothing to be said about either truth or rationality 
apart from descriptions of the familiar procedures of justification which 
a given society—ours—uses in one or another area of inquiry" (Nelson, 
Megill, and McCloskey 42). In this way truth-seeking becomes nothing 
more than a matter of letting academic conversations proceed with the 
hope of intersubjective agreement, and the only universal value to sus­
tain in inquiry is the desire to keep the conversation going: "The appli­
cation of such honorifics as 'objective' and 'cognitive' is never anything 
more than an expression of the presence of, or the hope for, agreement 
among inquirers" (Mirror 335). 
Booth does not make any of these "nothing more than" arguments 
about the nature of truth. Indeed, he makes a point of avoiding the 
latent foundationalism that inheres in Rorty's embrace of consensus and 
conversation (Critical Understanding 25-26; Modern Dogma 99). Yet both 
Booth and Rorty are asking us to show a respect for honestly obtained 
consensus that their modernist predecessors either ignored or explic­
itly rejected. As a matter of everyday scholarly practice the need for 
consensus is difficult to challenge. Even philosophers with a distinctly 
individualistic notion of how truth is acquired tried to persuade their 
colleagues that their view of truth was correct. Then why not cele­
brate the virtues of tolerance, honesty, and willingness to listen that 
make conversation and consensus possible? Booth and Rorty want us to 
pay more than lip service to these simple virtues, and in this way they 
both authorize attention to the rhetorical practices on which scholarly 
inquiry depends. 
Up to this point I have stressed the senses in which Rorty's attacks on 
foundationalism and Booth's resistance to critical monism and the dog­
mas of modernism resemble one another. We have seen that they both 
want to challenge any claims to finality and systematicity in matters of 
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scholarly justification. They both authorize careful attention to schol­
arly consensus as well. But I have not attended to the arguments Booth 
and Rorty adduce in support of these notions. Critical differences be­
tween the two become apparent as soon as one turns away from their 
conclusions and begins to ask how they arrive at them. 
Several strategies recur in Rorty's meticulous arguments against 
foundationalist philosophy. Overall, he relies on a version of Occam's 
razor: we can do all the work of scholarly justification we need to do 
without appealing to some immutable epistemological standards. In 
evidence for this, he notes that in spite of the failure of philosophers 
to agree on such standards, the practices of justification have continued 
anyway. In themselves, these strategies are not greatly different from 
anything Booth might use. But to apply these arguments, Rorty traces 
a path through the history of philosophy that begins with what he calls 
"the invention of the mind" in the seventeenth century. According to 
Rorty, a great mistake of modern philosophy was Descartes's decision 
to single out the mind as the special ontological realm where thought 
takes place. Once philosophers came to believe in such a nonspatial sub­
stance, they had to theorize its relations with the material in some way. 
The results were a preoccupation with that metaphysical relationship, 
a skepticism about the existence of other minds, and a host of other 
philosophical pseudoproblems cleared up hundreds of years later by 
Wittgenstein, Quine, and their followers {Mirror 17-127). 
Rorty would prefer to do away with the notion of "mind" as an inner 
eye requiring a special theory of inner representation. Only once phi­
losophers have stopped worrying about this "Glassy Essence" can they 
begin to see the problem of justification for what it is: a problem of 
"what our peers will, ceteris paribus, let us get away with saying" (Mir­
ror 176). Rorty anticipates the obvious objection to this elimination of 
the concept of mind. He knows that for many, the notion of "self" or 
"personhood" is intimately connected to mentality. Without any con­
ception of mind, so the argument runs, human beings lose their unique 
right to the respect of their fellows. But Rorty contends that the connec­
tion between mentality and personhood is a crucial mistake, perhaps 
even a historical accident. Once the notions of consciousness and rea­
son are separated historically, "then personhood can be seen for what I 
claim it is—a matter of decision rather than knowledge, an acceptance 
of another being into fellowship rather than a recognition of a common 
essence" (Mirror 37). 
At many points these arguments stand deeply at odds with Booth's 
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whole approach to problems of rational justification. For Booth, the 
impulse to question modernist epistemology comes from its disastrous 
consequences for contemporary rhetoric. He finds that when system­
atically applied, the demand for rigorous doubt pending proof leaves 
arguers affirming truths at one another; again, rhetoric becomes "the 
art of winning" (Modern Dogma xi). When Rorty writes that truth is 
nothing more than "what our peers wil l . .  . let us get away with saying," 
he seems to invite a view of rhetoric little different from the one Booth's 
whole effort sets out to overturn. One of the lessons of Rorty, then, is 
that even a dramatic and thorough rejection of constraining epistemolo­
gies is not enough to solve the rhetorical problems they have created. 
A winning argument against logical positivism, for example, does not 
guarantee a rosy future for practical reason, even though strict logical 
positivism inhibits the development of practical reason. 
But there is another respect in which Booth's argument diverges 
from Rorty's. Booth depends heavily on the integrity and independence 
of the mind in both the premises and conclusion of his arguments for a 
responsible rhetoric of assent. Indeed, it often seems that Booth assumes 
the same interdependence of "mind" and "self" that Rorty so carefully 
dissolves. Modern Dogma's opening question, "When should I change 
my mind ?" surely presupposes that there is something to the notion of 
mind that is worth inquiring about. This something cannot be under­
stood merely as a collection of dispositions toward certain behaviors, as 
Booth's frequent criticisms of behaviorism make clear (Modern Dogma 
114; Critical Understanding 112, 262). Once Modern Dogma arrives at 
the concept of systematic assent as a guiding rhetorical principle, Booth 
first applies that principle to the mind itself. Among other things, he 
discovers that human beings do have the capacity to understand each 
other, that they do possess intentions, and that they are capable of infer­
ring the intentions of their fellows. Throughout this discussion, Booth 
makes no distinctions between the mind and the self (111-25). 
Thus, on this question of the nature of mind and its relationship to 
personhood, the differences between Booth and Rorty are so great that 
to accept the arguments of one in any degree precludes the acceptance 
of the arguments of the other. If we agree with Rorty that the path away 
from foundationalism requires abandoning the belief in the mind's inti­
mate connection to personhood, then all of Booth's arguments about 
the changing of minds become unintelligible. If, on the other hand, we 
agree with Booth that abandoning the dogmas of modernism requires 
a fresh respect for the integrity of the mind and the self, the first step of 
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Rorty's complex argument becomes equally unintelligible and perhaps 
reprehensible. 
Of course, I will choose the latter path. I have already suggested the 
problem with a rhetoric of inquiry based on Rorty's reduction of knowl­
edge and truth to a matter of victory in argument. That problem is 
partly the one that prompted Booth to write Modern Dogma in the first 
place. Its cause is similar as well, for under the banner of "epistemo­
logical behaviorism," Rorty dismisses all claims for the philosophical 
importance of the concept of "mind" {Mirror 98-99). But no doubt 
Rorty would say that anyone who accepted Booth's story on this basis 
begs the question. Rorty is arguing that we can have respect for persons 
without recognizing a common essence, the mind, lying behind each 
of their utterances. Surely our peers will not let us get away with argu­
ments that in some way grossly neglect personhood. So what have we 
to worry about in saying that truth is what we can persuade people to 
believe? 
Answering Rorty on this point will require something more than the 
Booth I have already discussed. Specifically, the answer must show that 
in giving up our notions about the mind we are giving up something of 
vital importance in spite of the failure of modern philosophy to reach 
any final conclusions about what the mind is. And, because the answer 
cannot rely simply on what this or that community or culture finds per­
suasive (for that would be Rorty's point all over again), it must aspire 
to some degree of transcendence, perhaps even a latent "foundational" 
status. Finally, any well-rounded answer to Rorty must show concretely 
that it can do a better job of promoting respect for personhood than any 
purely consensual notion of truth. 
Booth has more than fulfilled these apparently tremendous require­
ments. He does so in a way that Rorty never appears to anticipate, even 
though parts of the argument are not unique to Booth. The argument 
begins where Rorty leaves off—with the practical necessities of striving 
for and living with consensus in all human affairs. From the fact that all 
of us try to persuade each other to live and think similarly Booth infers 
the necessity of doing so. And from this necessity it is but a short step 
to the conclusion that persons and minds are essentially a matter of the 
persuasions they engage in and respond to: "What is a 'mind' and what 
is a 'self in this rhetorical view? It is essentially rhetorical, symbol ex­
changing, a social product in process of changing through interaction, 
sharing values with other selves. Even when thinking privately, T can 
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never escape the other selves which I have taken in to make 'myself/ 
and my thought will thus always be a dialogue" (Modern Dogma 126). 
Here Booth begins to reply to that important question about who we 
are that I left dangling. At least as far as answering Rorty is concerned, 
the important point about this definition is not that it makes statements 
about what is essential to being human, although Rorty would probably 
object to that. Its significance lies in its constitution of a mind and a 
self that ought to be responsible for their persuasion precisely because 
they are partially remade in their attempts to shape other minds and 
other selves: "But if all men [and women] make each other in symbolic 
interchange, then by implication they should make each other, and it is 
an inescapable value in their lives that it is good to do it well—what-
ever that will mean—and bad to do it badly" (Modern Dogma 137). On 
this view, the reason rhetoric should not degenerate into the art of win­
ning is that while mere victory might make others into what the rhetor 
wants, by itself it does not guarantee that it will help remake rhetors 
themselves into that same image. 
To see the importance of this self-actualization for real academic 
arguments, it will be helpful to consider a rhetor who tries mightily to 
disregard it. Philosopher of science Paul Feyerabend, another resource 
for the rhetoric of inquiry, also argues against the traditional notions 
of formulaic rationality. One of his favorite strategies is to adopt his 
opponents' beliefs as an important resource for persuading them. For 
example, he challenges his opponents to be consistent, even though he 
does not recognize any problem with his own inconsistencies. In reply 
to the obvious criticisms of this tactic, he announces, "Some readers [of 
Against Method] objected that though I do not seem to mind inconsis­
tencies I still present them as parts of my argument against standard 
views of rationality. I reply that I assume my readers to be rationalists. 
If they are not, then there is no need for them to read the book" (14). 
Elsewhere he explains that the mistake of these critics is to assume that 
an argument reflects the commitments of the arguer: "An argument 
is not a confession, it is an instrument designed to make an opponent 
change his [or her] mind. The existence of arguments of a certain type 
in a book ma, permit the reader to infer what the author regards as 
effective persuasion, it does not permit him [or her] to infer what the 
author thinks is true" (28). 
With this stark theory of the purposes of rhetoric Feyerabend per­
mits the construction of a clear line between Booth and Rorty, and 
he also reveals where Booth's notion of "the self as a field of selves" 
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can have an important application. Clearly, Rorty could have very little 
to say against Feyerabend's strategy. Possibly he would say that Feyer-
abend's own use of inconsistency does not avail itself of the practices 
of justification endorsed in his own scholarly community—if indeed 
that audience of "rationalists" he addresses is Feyerabend's scholarly 
community. But to the extent that Feyerabend's audience lets him "get 
away with" his appeals to their inconsistencies, what challenge could 
Rorty raise? 
Booth, on the other hand, would probably object to Feyerabend in the 
strongest of terms. Feyerabend's rhetorical appeals make Feyerabend, 
just as they hope to remake his opponents. What sort of Feyerabend 
comes into existence when he rebukes the rationalists for their inconsis­
tencies while tolerating his own ? Surely not one who hopes to engage in 
mutual inquiry, who would be as open to the persuasion of his fellows 
as he appears to want his opponents to be. Feyerabend probably would 
respond that respect for mutual inquiry and the constitution of a com­
munity of inquirers was never his intention anyway. But at this point 
we come to the bottom line of Booth's argument, indeed the bottom 
line of many of Booth's arguments. Feyerabend attempts to persuade 
his opponents. Booth has argued that the mere presence—or perhaps 
omnipresence—of attempts to persuade sets in motion a chain of infer­
ence leading to the conclusion that persuaders ought to attend carefully 
to the kinds of persons they make of themselves and their fellows as they 
inquire together. Thus even as Feyerabend tries to argue with his oppo­
nents he is already illustrating the importance of building a community 
of inquirers. Booth clinches this point in one of the more memorable 
sentences of Modern Dogma: "If a committed doubter says to us that he 
[or she] will not accept the valued fact of [our] rhetorical nature, we see 
now that he [or she] cannot avoid illustrating it as he [or she] tries to 
argue against it: we discuss our doubt together, therefore we are" (138). 
No doubt this argument also would not pacify Feyerabend. Indeed, »:s 
he sees no harm in his own inconsistencies he might simply deny the 
intention to persuade his opponents, even though he flatly states that 
effective persuasion is the proper goal of argument. But, as Booth says, 
once the objections reached this level of absurdity, "we may well con­
tinue to worry . . . about the intellectual climate that can make his kind 
of intellectual game seem less in need of defense than our own" (Modern 
Dogma 138). But what about that notion of "mind" that is so crucial to 
the differences between the arguments of Rorty and Booth? Notice that 
the force of these criticisms of Feyerabend depends on some degree of 
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continuity of consciousness beyond the effects of Feyerabend's individual 
pronouncements on their readers. Once Feyerabend makes himself and 
his readers in the rhetorical process, then his opponents earn the right 
to question his inconsistencies because they have inferred his intentions 
and have assumed they live beyond his words. Without the ability to 
raise such challenges, of course, there would be no possibility that Feyer­
abend and his opponents could continue their conversation with any 
hope of agreement. 
I have argued, in short, that while Rorty separates the "acceptance of 
another being into fellowship" from the "recognition of a common 
essence" of humanity, Booth gives us good reason to see such acceptance 
as an essential constituent of humanity. Without such a recognition, 
we lose the ability to make a certain kind of argument. This argument 
allows us to reason from the fact of our persuasion to the requirement 
that we do it with a respect for the kind of community our persuasion 
builds. While Rorty worries about "keeping the conversation going," 
his own arguments against the philosophical importance of the con­
cept of mind prevent him from articulating any good reasons to be so 
concerned. 
These differences have important consequences for the rhetoric of 
inquiry. That discipline has justified itself partly as an attempt to pro­
mote rhetorical self-consciousness among scholars (Nelson, Megill, and 
McCloskey ix; Bazerman). From Booth's standpoint, such rhetorical 
self-consciousness has an inescapably moral dimension: we build our­
selves and our scholarly communities through our persuasion, and thus 
we have the responsibility to examine our own persuasion if only to find 
out about the sorts of people we are making of ourselves. That concern 
does not reinstate any particular formal system of inquiry, nor does it 
plunge us again into vexing and possibly insoluble philosophical prob­
lems of the sort Rorty dismisses. But it does allow us to recognize that 
some scholarly arguments, like Feyerabend's, inhibit the possibility of 
mutual inquiry. For this reason I would recommend Booth over Rorty 
as a rhetorician of inquiry who both attacks the foundationalist or mod­
ernist project and who reveals what more one can do with a rhetorical 
perspective on inquiry. 
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Afterword

Let Us All Mount Our Good 
Chargers, Whatever Their Names, 
and Gallop Off Joyfully in All 
Directions, a Mysteriously United 
Company Serving the Empress of 
All the Sciences, Rhetoric 
WAYNE BOOTH 
"The crisis for all honest students of rhetoric comes when they realize that they 
know too much about too many things about which they fyiow too little." 
DIONYSIUS OF HALICARNASUS 
"// is good to have friends because they can praise you when it would not be 
decent to praise yourself." 
EUGENE CARVER 
I CAN'T THINK of any writing assignment tougher than this one— 
except perhaps trying to draft a preface when you feel that a book is 
not really finished. The plaguey task here is to keep focused on the true 
point of such a book as this. 
I'd love to be able to claim that none of the diverse selves in the 
chorus that Jost, McOmber, and others describe could be tempted to 
see that point as the exclusive celebration of "our" work or the correc­
tion of careless or hostile misrepresentations. The unsurprising fact is 
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that among my chorus of selves there is a rather insistent deep bass who 
keeps his Who's Who entry up to date, who on rare occasions has even 
signed a letter of recommendation as "Distinguished Service Professor 
of English and Ideas and Methods Emeritus," and who cares far too 
much about being attended to. This self gets angry or depressed when 
people misread him, and he is already demanding a voice here. But be­
cause to give him his way would be to deflect us from our true business, 
I'll try very hard to ban him from our company. 
To say as much of course implies that there is another self who 
feels some contempt for what I—we, the other selves—like to call 
DISTSERPROF: we like to mock him and all others who see the world 
as little more than a status-race. Indeed, we—that is to say, the I that 
is above all such stuff—recently wrote an utterly sincere satire—so far 
rejected by only two journals—against the growing practice of citation-
counting—the very thing that DISTSERPROF might be guilty of. 
DISTSERPROF: Oh, come off it. You know you think that our satire is 
better than just "utterly sincere." Actually it's brilliant, not to say devas­
tating. And while we're at it, surely we should mention that hilarious, 
published, but sadly neglected satire of ours directed against the national 
sport of image-building, The Art of Deliberalizing. And while I have 
thefloor, surely we should .. . 
That's enough of that. Just keep out of this, while we go about our 
serious work. As James Stephens once exclaimed to his unruly phallus, 
"Down, wanton, down!" I don't want to hear any more from you or 
from any of the others I sense clamoring for entry here. I promise that 
if I come to feel that you have anything really to say for yourself I may, 
just may, give you a chance later on. 
IGNORAMUSWB: AS the only really honest one among those voices, 
can I just point out that we are not even sure it was James Stephens; we 
surely ought to be careful here throughout not to disguise our immense 
ignorance . . . 
Don't you see what you're both doing? You're spoiling the true point. 
No more, please! 
Every alert student of rhetoric must be plagued at times by St. Paul's 
kind of self-laceration: "I have left undone those things which I ought 
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to have done, and I have done those things which I ought not to have 
done, and there is no [rhetorical] health in me." Reading through these 
essays I've been struck not so much by what we students of rhetoric 
have achieved, since "the great revival," as by what a wonderful variety 
of openings now face us. So, with rhetoric and its study fully legitimated 
in the academy, I would like now to imagine the totally unlikely ap­
pointment, in the year 2014, of a carefully selected international Board 
for Rhetorical Inquiry in General, twenty scholars authorized to make 
unlimited grants to their rhetorical brothers and sisters, using the essays 
in this book as one major source of topics, but adding, with the char­
acteristic bricolage of rhetoricians, whatever else falls into their hands. 
The Board will begin with the task of defining rhetoric, and it will 
find, if it prove honest, that it must support studies of all human dis­
course. Nothing anyone says about anything, even the weird result when 
two is added to two, can be ruled out: we live, as Jost has shown better 
than I have ever done, in our topics—neither in discursive Pandae­
monia nor in a Utopia but in a polytopia. Every utterance expresses 
not just the speaker's character but also the speaker's culture, including 
that culture's assumptions about what can be said and what should or 
should not be said. Even if Board members were to think, mistakenly, 
of our subject as the "mere" act of persuading, every utterance could be 
shoehorned into their domain. 
The point about ubiquity will become more telling when the Board 
learns to move "upward" from persuasion in their definition to make 
rhetoric include the whole art, or faculty, of discovering what are good 
reasons, reasons capable of changing the thought and behavior not only 
of rhetors' hearers but also of rhetors themselves. That definition will 
naturally lead them on "upwards" to the heights where the hermeneu­
ticists and theologians dwell (rhetoricians all), finally arriving at the 
peak, the comparative study of rhetorics—what I've recently been try­
ing, rather unsuccessfully, to get people to call "rhetorology." And that 
will in turn lead them to see their conflicts and irresolutions and reso­
lutions as implying that ultimate Rhetor, master of mystery and silence, 
who answers, when we ask "who are you?" with the enigmatical, "I am 
that I am." 
With such properly universalized definitions (unargued here), the 
Board will quickly see that it cannot organize its allocations according 
to current academic disciplines. Name any field and you will almost cer­
tainly find not only laborers who call themselves students of rhetoric— 
the "revival" is in that sense demonstrable simply by citation counting. 
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You will also find under other rubrics innumerable projects that can 
only be effectively pursued using methods that only a full attention to 
rhetorical practice will support. 
Naturally, every Board member will at times feel a sense of panic at 
the discovery that the diverse efforts to build a coherent field of rhe­
torical study prove just as confusing, just as difficult to interrelate, as 
the ultimate values they seek to serve. One can hope that after consider­
able debate they will deal with that panic by suppressing the impulse to 
precision and finality, and simply agree that their problems fall, loosely, 
loosely, under the three master headings that have outranked all others 
in the history of philosophy, of religion, and—of rhetoric:1 
Goodness: how rhetorical study can improve the world or the souls that 
inhabit it; 
Truth: how it can further the pursuit of genuine knowledge; 
Beauty: how it can assist artists in their creation of alternative, "better 
worlds," and enable re-creators to embrace and appraise such worlds. 
The Board will discover that every applicant has a strong tendency 
to elevate one or another of these three to become architectonic—the 
emperor of the sciences. And they will soon find themselves in deep 
controversy over which of the three is in charge, as the one true and 
proper generator of the ultimate rhetorology. 
What is more confusing, they will find that every applicant they deal 
with seems committed to one of two absolutely contradictory positions: 
(i) In the long run, "in principle," given sufficient thought and time for 
discussion, all such battles about the primacy of goodness, or of truth, 
or of beauty, or about the primacy of particular goods, or of particular 
truth-systems, or of particular standards of beauty, can be resolved into 
general agreement: that's what I—we—once firmly believed, and it 
seems to be the claim of the study by Callaghan and Dobyns here; (2) in 
both the long and short run, "in principle," we must accept the ulti­
mate and absolute "incommensurability" of some "values," some goods: 
that's what many modern thinkers, such as Isaiah Berlin and Bernard 
Williams, have been arguing. For them, although many controversies 
can be resolved through the use of a powerful rhetorology that probes 
to the deepest levels underlying conflicts, some human goods are in 
permanent and irreconcilable conflict. 
Of this second group, some will claim that the incommensurability 
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demonstrates the ultimate irrationality of the universe; others, I among 
them, will claim that it is a blessed gift of life itself. We embrace the 
condition of being inherently limited, unable as human beings to re­
duce everything to some supreme harmony. The story of the tower of 
Babel carries a deeper message than is usually recognized: as creatures 
exercising freedom in manifold and unpredictable patterns, we cannot 
expect ever to achieve full agreement about any one One as a supreme 
Good. To have been banned from God's perspective on Her/His cre­
ated multiplicities was to have been invited into meaningful debate and 
inquiry; if instead we had been granted unanimity, all values harmo­
nized, ordered under any one of them, we would have lost one of the 
greatest gifts of human life itself. 
Such a position need not diminish our passion for achieving under­
standing, especially when the alternative to understanding seems to be 
violence. What the Board must support is those studies that seek to 
discover just what kinds of encounter avert violence through an under­
standing of difference and what kinds lead to violence by insisting on an 
impossible harmony. When should we in effect lock controversialists up 
in a closed room pending verdict or compromise, and when should we 
not? What conditions allow the achievements that the jury system man­
ages, at its best, or that President Carter and his team managed at Camp 
David? What kind simply escalate conflict? To insist that agreement, 
even loving agreement, is the ultimate purpose of discussion, or of life 
itself, would in fact destroy life as we value it—and love as we value it 
would die. Thus, though McOmber is right to say that my rhetoric of 
assent need not raise all the vexing philosophical problems of the kind 
that Rorty dismisses, it does plunge us into an eternally inexhaustible 
supply. 
Anyway—as G. K. Chesterton taught everyone to say when a transition 
is weak—here at last is my memo to that Board, "A Rhetorologist's 
Agenda, 2014." 
RHETORIC AND GOODNESS,

OR IMPROVING THE WORLD

Most rhetoricians have, like me, elevated political or ethical or social 
effect over the other two grand values—though the most penetrating 
ones, like Cicero, Quintilian, Kenneth Burke, and so on, have recog­
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nized that Goodness can't be achieved without Beauty and Truth, and 
have found ways to embrace them within their "practical" schemes. 
What does this world of practice most need from students of 
rhetoric? 
Studies of Pluralism, Politics, and the Rhetoric of Assent 
Foley, Antczak, Garver, and McCloskey suggest or imply that what we 
most need are studies of the kind that grapple with political or institu­
tional problems in a way that I have only rarely even attempted. I agree. 
My most overt missionary work, from the time when I was literally a 
missionary for the Mormon church on, has largely been centered, as 
they claim, on how persons, characters, and selves, real or literary, are 
made and improved or debased by rhetoric. In the hierarchy of goods 
served or harmed by rhetoric, the quality of rhetors and their hearers 
has indeed been my center. A given utterance (whether a one-word ex­
clamation or a five-volume novel) affects, or is intended to affect, or is 
likely to affect, any person "taking it in." My emphasis has most of the 
time thus been one-on-one, and on how various "virtues" are strength­
ened when the right one meets the right one rightly. Though always 
in theory believing that politics is more fundamental than ethics (Aris­
totle is right: "You cannot create a fully good 'man' in a genuinely bad 
state"), I've done far too little with the rhetorical side of larger political 
conflicts and influences. 
Especially important for our Board, then, is the question of whether 
a given kind of pluralistic rhetoric implicates a given politics. They 
should fund someone to work through the widespread charge that a 
pluralistic ethics like mine is always a covert power play, an effort to 
reduce all radical and controversial views to an easily accommodated 
range of possibilities that can be exhibited safely on the pluralisms chart, 
thus "conserving" the established and disempowering everybody else. 
The grantee would obviously get Phelan and Foley together to talk it 
out. Phelan agrees with Foley that every pluralisms discourse is indeed 
political in one sense (because it "privileges" pluralism over any specific 
political claim to do the whole job). But he then argues that discourse 
need not be thought of as only political. To think of it as such is to 
impoverish our sense of what "conversation" can accomplish. 
I think Phelan's argument will be hard to answer, if not impossible. 
Is it not puzzling that strong arguments like his, of which we have 
quite a few by now, seem to be ignored by those for whom everything 
is politics? 
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At the same time I have to agree with Brinton, whose critique I wish 
I could have read before Modern Dogma was sent to the printer, that 
my particular version of a rhetoric of assent, with all its professions of 
pluralism, is indeed in one strong sense conservative: it rejects any ha­
bitual "innovationism" that values change for its own sake. As Brinton 
puts it, it gives "presumptive" power to institutions and beliefs as they 
are inherited or imbibed, putting the burden of proof on those of us 
who would change them. 
Such a stance is not conservative in the sense of being right-wing. 
Many of the institutional forces that have constituted me from birth on 
seem to me quite indefensible. I feel especially threatened these days by 
the consumer capitalism that most of us are largely mired in, and that 
the simplifiers tout as having "won against Communism." But since we 
inevitably "are" (that is, are constituted to some degree as) both what we 
would criticize and the techniques of criticism that we have inherited 
from institutions, we should be sure of our grounds when we attack 
them: we should not doubt everything we cannot prove, but assent to 
everything that we have no good reason to doubt. 
I would still hold to that conserving line, while continuing with my 
fumbling attacks on the grotesque ravages committed by what some 
people call capitalism. The rhetoric of assent may be conservative, then, 
but in itself it need not lead any more strongly to my enthusiasm for 
(most parts of) Edmund Burke's Reflections than it does to my passion­
ate belief that capital punishment is a terrible practice that must finally 
be abolished. 
Still, Brinton is right to claim that if anything like a systematic rheto­
ric of assent is to survive, it will require extensions and somewhat more 
philosophically sophisticated articulations than I managed in Modern 
Dogma and have touched on here and there since. I'll return to this 
point when I get to Truth itself. 
Studies of Fictions Overtly Political 
The Board should approve, as Foley suggests, more studies of how par­
ticular fictions perform their reinforcement or questioning of political 
institutions and social structures; similarly, we should have more care­
ful rhetorical studies of the works that Foley blames me for neglecting. 
So I must say a bit more about Foley's critique, which is to me the most 
challenging of the claims, in and out of this volume, that ethical critics 
fail to do justice to the claims of politics. 
Her piece is challenging partly because she has labored to under­
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stand my work before criticizing it—not a fashionable practice these 
days. And she is right to complain that Company pays skimpy atten­
tion to various minority and protest literatures and critical theories. As 
I look at Company under her tutelage, I do wish that I had addressed 
more fully the ethical power of works like Morrison's Beloved or Silko's 
Ceremony. And she is right to call for studies of works in which the 
political import is more explicit, even blatant, and the classical status 
as literary form less obvious. She has forced me to wonder just why, 
given how much of my reading time is spent precisely with works of 
the nonestablished or anti-establishment kind, did I address no one of 
them at length. 
It is certainly not, as she suggests, that I don't recognize the cru­
cial importance, especially in America today, of any literary work that 
genuinely startles complacent readers into assuming "more egalitarian 
attitudes (anti-racist, anti-sexist, anti-elitist) than they might already es­
pouse: of any work in which "the writer may be the principal 'ethical 
critic,'" and the would-be emancipated reader becomes "chastened . . . 
indignant, even resentful" (142). Company stressed—though with in­
sufficient examples—that such challenges are one of the chief values of 
narrative. I would still want to insist that such chastening is often per­
formed even more powerfully by a deeply probing classic—even a clas­
sic that on its surface might seem to be written within the same culture 
as the reader's—than by a passionate contemporary work that claims to 
shatter but that really just duplicates would-be shattering experiences 
already comfortably accommodated by the reader or spectator.2 As Marx 
claimed, the highly conservative Balzac, with his painstaking reports of 
just how bourgeois capitalism worked, did more for the cause than any 
number of aggressively "progressive" arguments could do. 
What's more, Foley does have too firm a notion of just what sort 
of jolt all readers need; she somehow knows that they all need a jolt 
in the direction of her particular politics. Though my confused politics 
are closer to hers than to the views of most of her opponents, what the 
Board should support are studies of how fictions can jolt readers alive. 
I quite agree that in America today, and quite probably in 2014, most 
middle-class readers need to be jolted from a complacent assumption 
that the market economy will save the world singlehandedly, and that 
everything about socialism, including its demand that we take respon­
sibility for the welfare of others, has been discredited. But is that what 
readers in Moscow most needed, say, in i960? The politics of fiction 
turns out to be as complicated, as bound to circumstance and human 
variety, as the ethics of fiction. A major value of some classics is their 
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capacity to jolt political dogmatists. Every Marxist and in fact every 
socialist I have known, including Foley (and myself when I thought I 
was an atheistic socialist) needs the jolt that can result from a genu­
ine engagement with any one of the great philosophies or theologies or 
religiously oriented fictions. If Foley, who really knows how to dig in, 
would ever settle into as sympathetic a reading of Augustine or Aquinas 
or Tolstoy's Resurrection or Mauriac's Knot of Vipers as she has given 
Marx, she would be jolted. I can't predict where she would come out, 
but she would no longer be her present kind of Marxist, or an "ist" 
of any kind, a bit too readily relying on one political perspective. (We 
know that she'll reply that she's read these greats—but just "reading" 
is not quite the kind of digging in that I have in mind.) 
This does not mean that we can afford to neglect the ethical and 
political deficiencies, minor or major, of established works. Of those 
authors I dwelt on, Rabelais, Lawrence, Austen, and Twain, Austen 
is the only one who came off largely exonerated. The others sur­
vived as powerful and enduring literary friends, but only because they 
are redeemed by various qualities we readers always will need. They 
are not cleansed of their ethical faults, most of which do count for 
Foley as in some sense political: Rabelais's and Lawrence's sexism; 
Twain's optimistic racial liberalism, misleadingly comfortable to his 
predominantly white readers; Lawrence's forays into totalitarianism and 
anti-semitism). The purpose of choosing such classics rather than con­
temporary works was precisely to convince readers who were inclined 
to resist ideological criticism (of Foley's kind, say) that the narratives 
they love ought not to be swallowed uncritically just because they are 
seen as classics; in other words, my purpose would place me at least in 
part on Foley's side here. 
Indeed I am puzzled by her suggestion that I would take the side of 
the canonists against the anti-canonists. I can only hope that when she 
sees Thomas's development here of my thoroughly political article on 
Hirsch's cultural literacy proposals, and of what Thomas rightly sees 
as the implications of my way of dwelling with the classics, she will 
want to change the line of her critique: not my neglect of politics, but 
perhaps my mistaken way of going about it. 
Anyhow, my choice of the four established authors resulted from my 
reading of the critical audience in 1988—is that not a political, or at 
least an institutional, choice? I had no sense that feminists, or black aes­
theticians, or Marxists, needed to be persuaded that narratives should 
be subject to an ideological critique. The resisters are those who, while 
rightly insisting that most classics are classics for sound reasons, can­
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not sec that the very power conferred by classical status cries out for a 
critical analysis of what that power can do to us as readers. 
It is clear that our scene is still full of such resisters. Even those who 
were ostensibly convinced of our case, even those who claimed to agree 
that in my special sense "all fictions are didactic" {Company 13, 151­
53), still often deny that an ethical fault in a novel can be legitimately 
taken as a "literary" or "aesthetic" fault. Perhaps in twenty years all such 
will have been converted, though I doubt it, especially when I see how 
widespread are "aestheticist" current attacks on what is called "political 
correctness." In any case, I'm not worried about the classics holding their 
own in the various battles. What should worry the Board is any temp­
tation to take any established classic (or traditional educational view) as 
above ethical criticism. 
The readers I wanted most to reach were of two kinds: those we have 
just described, readers who were not already converted to the relevance 
of ideological substractions when dealing with a classic, and those who 
were already too strongly converted to the pat application of narrow 
moral or political criteria in dealing with any work, classic or modern. 
If I had done a full ethical treatment on Our Nig, say, as Foley recom­
mends, I would in fact have found just as much to question as I found 
in Huc\ Finn—but to what end? Every reader who is ever likely to 
read Our Nig will see it immediately and without question as inviting 
political and ethical questions: it is in effect about its own quite open 
protest. HucJ( Finn, in contrast, has too often been treated as above the 
battle. 
Finally, if Foley had addressed Modern Dogma or some of the essays 
in Now Don't Try to Reason with Me and The Vocation of a Teacher 
her case about the neglect of politics would have been more difficult to 
make. Or if she'd given a careful reading to Antczak's essay here . .  . 
Ohmigod! What happened? Where was I? Oh, yes, the conspec­
tus for the Board. How did I allow DISTSERPROF to take over like 
that? Will Foley see that for me to get distracted into petty personal 
speculation about her actually is a compliment? 
Rhetoric and Morality 
As rhetoricians have always claimed, all good rhetorical inquiry is em­
bedded in moral questions—provided we use the broader definitions of 
"morality" to include not just moral demands but what I mean by ethi­
cal matters: the creation, improvement, or debasement of persons. So I 
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can only say to the Board here, go read Aristotle's Rhetoric again, and 
then his Politics and Ethics, and put 'em all together with the GOOD 
on top, and you'll be ready to make your grants. 
Studies of Rhetoric and Teaching 
All teaching is—as every reader will by now expect me to say—rhetori-
cal, in our definition, which by no means suggests that a teacher must 
be merely preaching or indoctrinating. The Board should not just read 
but study Thomas's answer to Hirsch here. 
They should also give more support to studies of the best rhetoric for 
teaching the best rhetoric. Rhetoric as mere persuasion can be taught 
pretty well by lecturing persuasively, and thus demonstrating good per­
suasive techniques. But rhetoric as inquiry, rhetoric as the dialogical 
path to mutual understanding, rhetoric as the training of active, growing 
rather than passive, meandering minds—that rhetoric cannot be taught 
by even the cleverest of lecturers; it is learned in discussion, in the give-
and-take that only a skilled discussion leader can elicit from a fairly 
small class. Many of us have made this claim again and again, while 
observing, in anguish, a national increase in class sizes and a growing 
dependence on clever lecturing—often in mechanical reproduction. Is 
it not possible that some careful statistical studies of just how little real 
improvement in thinking results from most so-called teaching (includ­
ing of course inept discussion methods) would lead a statistics-besotted 
nation to pay attention to what we really need ? 
For about fifteen years I've been contemplating a book on the uses 
and abuses of classroom discussion, what Bialostosky might call the 
struggle for "genuine dialogics." The book just doesn't get written; 
the tapes recording successes and failures sit in the drawer unattended. 
The trouble is partly that most of the advice I try to extract from my 
experience sounds, when put into a book, frozen and uninventive, or 
self-dramatizing. Perhaps I can hope that by the time the Board gets to 
work, Homer Goldberg's promised book on the subject will be avail­
able, and that other scholars will be clamoring for support for similar 
studies. 
Meanwhile I have a totally unrealistic fantasy of the one stroke 
that would, without waiting for further study, "save" American edu­
cation: some grand philanthropist, some Ross-Perot-grown-wise, will 
announce massive grants available to any college or school district that 
will promise (with appropriate legal guarantees) to spend the money 
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on one stroke only: cutting by half the enrollment in all courses that 
are devoted to improving thought through improving writing—that 
is, to "rhetoric." If this fanciful "Perot" himself (must it be a male?) 
wants to make doubly sure of success, he will decide to require that 
every institution receiving the grant install mechanical silencers at every 
teacher's desk, set to send an electric shock through the teacher's bot­
tom whenever he or she talks longer than eight-and-a-half minutes at 
a stretch. 
Studies of How the "Rhetoric of Assent" Applies 
to Particular Issues Beyond My Ken 
Just as the ethics and politics of fictions need to be extended to a far 
broader range of texts than I have even dreamed of, so I would like to 
see the notions of Modern Dogma developed, as McOmber implies, into 
political and moral areas I've scanted. My hints at just what a genuine 
"presumptive" rhetoric would lead to are feeble compared with what 
we need, both in developing methods of argument and analysis and in 
making public arguments ourselves. 
McCloskey's essay here is afine start on how a rhetoric of assent could 
uncover, discipline by discipline, the largely silent ethical and political 
foundations of scholars at work. We need more studies that plunge us 
into the precise rhetorical complexities of special issues, studies like 
Antczak's exploration of Martin Luther King's rhetoric of non-violence. 
Far too many studies of particular debates fail, as my book did, to give a 
sufficiently sustained probing of how sheer faith (not unthinking at all 
and even systematic in the sense of critical, but privileged nonetheless) 
is depended on by every effort to engage in that controversy. 
Studies of Why Mutual Understanding Is Itself a Good 
Our Board must grapple with the radical difference between rhetorics 
that elevate the mere enlivening of a scene through controversy and 
those like mine that, while not rejecting the importance of sustaining 
vitality {Critical Understanding), would subordinate it to understanding: 
the intellectual equivalent of love. Not mere winning, and certainly not 
mere goading, but a genuine joining is what rhetoric should be about. 
Because joining need not entail agreeing, some devotees of mere vitality 
have rejected the very notion of finding an interpretive stopping point— 
the point, for example, when a reader or listener knows without ques­
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tion that an ironic reverse is intended. Is not the whole purpose of 
interpretation to keep going, to find one's very own reading, something 
to say that nobody else would think of saying, because it violates the 
"obvious" intention of the text? 
Studies of both the ethics and the politics of these would-be dis­
rupters should be related to the "goods" of community that are touted 
by us devotees of stabler ironies. Perhaps all one can hope for from the 
Board, though, is that they will be smart enough to reject projects that 
consist of the sort of pretentious padding I mocked in "The Empire of 
Irony"—the mere packing in of fashionable words in the "irony family." 
In a world that exhibits, as I say there, an average of three "ironically"s 
per article or chapter, surely we need more examples of meticulous de­
ciphering based on careful theory about what is being deciphered. If 
"everything is ironic," nothing really is, and nobody can hope to possess 
that greatest of goods, human understanding. 
RHETORI  C AN D TH E B E A U T I F U L  , OR, 
" H O  W B E A U T  Y BECOME S A GOOD " 
The Rhetoric of Craft 
The Board will want to fund an unlimited number of "rhetorics of" 
arts other than fiction: of drama, of every variety of poetry, painting or 
sculpture; of classical or rock music; of such-and-such an artistic period; 
of cartoon strips; of videos; and so on.3 They should seek out critics who 
are willing to attempt not just piecemeal notations but full-scale inquiry 
into how different makers manage to induce their receivers to join the 
implicit worlds underlying (or overlaying) the radically different stories 
told by the different works. 
Some projects worth funding will perhaps be described as sciences of 
fiction, not rhetorics: technical studies that show the strokes, the how, 
but don't ask sharply why the strokes are there. (Gerard Genette's pro­
cedure in Narrative Discourse could be a model for anyone working on 
the "how.") Needed even more, however, are studies that, while embrac­
ing anything that scientific probing can teach about the how of things, 
dwell on the question "why?" As Rabinowitz proceeds with music here 
and in his forthcoming book, so might students of every conceivable art 
or craft help the artists themselves to become better makers. 
Such studies will naturally meet head-on any claims, if they are still 
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around in 2014, that there are no real distinctions of better and worse in 
matters of art. One would think that the patent absurdity of such claims 
would long since have extinguished them. Every journal publishing 
such ostensibly "democratic" or "post-modernist" levelings exhibits on 
almost every page evidence that the asserters do not believe what they 
say. Somehow the assertions continue, and efforts to unmask the ab­
surdity, like mine in The Company We Keep or Francis-Noel Thomas's 
in The Writer Writing, are never met as argument, only dismissed as 
elitist. 
Studying with full attention and a fully open mind the rhetoric 
of various instances of a given art, no post-modernist, however free­
wheeling, could continue to say that value judgments are totally con­
tingent or relative. It is in the details of structure and style that one 
finds overwhelming evidence that some rhetoricians, including those 
we call artists, are better than others, when judged on any scale except 
patently arbitrary ones that come into play when we say such things as: 
" 'Ride-a-cock-horse' is better than King Lear—for two-year-olds" or 
"A whistled version of a bugle call will mean more, as a work of art, 
than Oedipus Rex means—to a dog.") 
The Ethics of Craft, or One of Many Places 
Where Beauty and Goodness Meet 
Here we meet not just the "How" and the "Why" but the "Ought." 
Having been instructed by the authors in this book, the Board will as­
sume that any invitation to enter any alternative artistic world invites 
ethical appraisal: my ethos (my character, my psyche, my soul—the 
terms are by no means identical but they overlap, and they all fit my 
case) is changed—at a minimum for the duration of any artistic experi­
ence, but often enough also after "real life" is rejoined. It is rendered 
deeper or more shallow, muddier or more vital and down to earth; 
broader or narrower, moreflabbily unfocused or more finely organized; 
morally improved or corrupted; more or less bigoted, inhibited, alert to 
injustice—any adjective for any human quality can be added here. 
Every change will occur on disputed territory, but the changes are 
real, and I am puzzled about why so few critics, even now, seem will­
ing to talk about them, professionally and openly: they all in fact have 
been changed by fictions, and the changes are reflected in their work. 
But they usually don't "theorize" ethical evaluation in the ways under­
lined here by Johnstone, in her honest and revealing struggle with the 
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vicious Genet, or by Shapiro, in grappling with the quite different test 
presented by Wiesel and the Holocaust, or by McCloskey in revealing 
the ethics of economists' stories, or by Rabinowitz, in uncovering the 
powers of opera and stories about it. 
Fortunately more and more critics have been addressing ethical ques­
tions. These too often avoid technical and formal talk about the quality 
of a total experience, in all its detailed articulations. Too many of them 
rely on the sort of judgment that would have resulted if Johnstone 
had said in her piece here, "Genet's books clearly advocate vicious be-
havior—therefore they are worthless or harmful, for all readers on all 
occasions." May the Board heed our call and fund those who are willing 
to plunge into the threatening difficulties that underlie moral surfaces. 
The word "threatening" leads to one more recommendation, before 
we leave the subject of rhetoricians as beauticians. The subjects writers 
choose can be threatening not just intellectually but quite personally to 
the writers themselves: they are sometimes blessed, sometimes harmed, 
and sometimes even destroyed by living with their subjects. If the Board 
cares about the ethics of narration at all, it will fund ethical inquiry into 
fictional, biographical, and autobiographical writing as it affects those 
who write it. James Gleick has recently reported—explaining why he 
will never do another biography—just how much his own behavior was 
changed by spending five years working on his biography of Richard 
Feynman: "I wasn't prepared for what happens to your psyche when 
you spend that long tunnelling . . . into someone else's life . . . One 
gets taken over by this other person to the extent that I would some­
times be getting dressed . . . and I would think, Well, what would my 
subject wear?"4 
I offer the Board a title for the first of such studies—Lives Changed 
by 'Lives'—without even requesting a grant for my friends or heirs. 
RHETORIC AND TRUTH 
Studies of Pluralism and Relativism 
The quarrel-ridden marriage of rhetoric and truth, or of what we might 
call philo-logos and philo-sophy, is going to give our Board a lot of 
trouble. Do we need more philosophers' claims that truth gets ignored 
by rhetoricians, all of whom are Sophists? 
The conflict of Booth and Rorty with philosophers of various kinds, 
as carefully traced by McOmber, like the conflict with Bertrand Russell 
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and Descartes that Brinton attributes to one "Professor Booth" (close 
kin to DISTSERPROF), is almost certainly one of those essentially 
contested matters that, like the ancient battle between poetry and phi­
losophy, will always produce incommensurables: you can't grant total 
allegiance to the God of successful practical discourse and at the same 
time honor the God of truth. 
Brinton's critique is just the kind that any honest author ought to 
take seriously. He teaches us a lot about just how much rhetoric of as­
sent has been practiced by some whom I earlier blamed as excessive 
doubters. 
He and I agree that for practical purposes the question of truth boils 
down to the question of just what kinds of argument offer good reasons 
for changing one's mind. Like most philosophers since Kant, he wants 
good reasons to be subjected to a systematic doubt, and then rejected 
if they cannot offer hard proof for themselves; all my selves, except 
IGNORAMUSWB, believe that such privileging of doubt will finally 
destroy even the best of our reasons—in all of the matters that matter 
most to us. 
I agree that what I called systematic assent is not systematic in any 
sense that would be recognized by Brinton's philosophical schools: I 
should perhaps have used a different adjective: "persistent," or "ha­
bitual," or "privileged." The point was to privilege assent, or as Brinton 
puts it, to show that our assent to what we know already puts the bur­
den of proof on doubt. Our "common sense"—that is, whatever our 
deepest intuitions tell us is true—should be assented to unless and until 
we are presented with reasons to doubt, reasons that seem stronger than 
the reasons to assent. Such a view could never be systematic in the way 
that analytical philosophers try to be systematic; as Brinton says, the 
problems of determining, in theory, just which "intuitive" or commu­
nal assents to assent to are immense. But these new problems do not 
leave us, like the problems a habitual doubter faces when forced to 
make practical choices, convinced that all of our reasons for choice are a 
bit shameful. And McOmber is right to distinguish my problems from 
those raised by Rorty's or Feyerabend's kinds of rootless freewheeling. 
I do wish that my rhetoric of assent had been less catch-as-catch-
can. Further work like McOmber's would show that such a rhetoric 
need not lead, as Brinton claims, to "exactly the same incoherent re­
sults as a real procedure of systematic denial" (p. 259). Systematic denial 
leads, as he says, nowhere—or as I would say rather, to Nowhere: it 
leaves us without a leg to stand on, and, as all of the great pursuers 
Afterword 295 
of where it leads have shown (Descartes, Hume, Santayana . . . ), it 
leaves the doubter forced to find some way out of nothingness: either to 
total silence (often that has meant suicide), or to the employment, more 
or less shamefacedly, of the methods the unsystematic folk have been 
practicing all the while. Is that not where the most influential of recent 
skeptics, Jacques Derrida, tells us we are forced to return, relying on 
the very language with which he has conducted his annihilations and 
deferrals? 
Brinton shows that Bertrand Russell, one of whose three major per­
sonae I used as whipping boy in Modern Dogma, readily assented in 
many of his works to forms of reasoning that resemble what I call the 
rhetoric of assent. Almost all professional philosophers who've seen my 
little gambit have, like Brinton, resented it as if it were an effort to deny 
Russell's greatness, which it is not. My claim was only that Russell, 
taught by philosophical history and his own failed attempts to believe 
that values could not be "proved," was always plagued, sometimes even 
tortured, by the belief that when he turned to "probabilistic" or "every­
day" reasoning (of the kind quoted in Brinton's conclusion) he was in 
effect betraying his own standards of rationality. He also believed, as 
the quotation shows, that unless we could harmonize all our instinctive 
beliefs, they have no intellectual standing. 
Still, Brinton's concluding quotation from Russell could almost make 
an epigraph for Modern Dogma, which was only one of many attempts, 
neither "modern" nor "post-modern," back beyond Shaftesbury and 
Bishop Berkeley and the Bacon uncovered in Garver's fine digging here, 
and on back to Cicero, to claim full intellectual respectability for a 
communal pursuit of where our sensus communis leads. 
The battle between the apodeictic and the just plain reasonable will 
inevitably continue, perhaps forever, regardless of the cogency of any-
one's rhetoric of assent. I do hope that professional philosophers, as they 
continue their work in rehabilitating what they call informal logic and 
rediscovering the relevance of the basic virtues to philosophizing,5 will 
begin to incorporate the work of traditional rhetorical theories, supple­
mented nicely by the current discoveries of just how "rhetorical" was 
the work of the great Wittgenstein. 
Studies of Metaphors as the Key to All the Mythologies 
The Board should study Richter's piece carefully, not for what it says 
about me but for what it says about how to analyze metaphors. It is true 
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that much of his method in exploring me is implicit in the teaching of 
that recent grand invasion of French rhetoricians (raiding under other 
banners, of course). Close attention to an author's or movement's meta­
phors, and especially their macro-metaphors (or metaphorical "worlds" 
that I grappled with in Company) is one of the three best paths to full 
understanding of any rhetorical practice (the other two, which after full 
probing tend to merge with metaphor, are—as everyone still with us 
"here" knows—invention, as dealt with by Jost working on the top­
ics, and arrangement: the choice of hierarchies, whether vertical (as in 
Burke's Rhetoric of Religion) or horizontal (as in the long history of 
advice about how best to organize a speech). 
The fashionable study of metaphors under the "rhetoric of suspi­
cion," in the search for a foreordained and inherently disempowered 
incoherence (or, as with some French feminists, an inherent drive for 
patriarchal dominance) is radically different from Richter's practice, 
which would suggest for our masthead the slogan: Metaphors are in­
herently constructive, not deconstructive. 
Studies of the Rhetoric of Silence 
Board members: Read Garver. Read him again, then go read Bacon. 
Fund studies of silence, of What Goes Without Saying. This piece of 
Garver's is original. 
Studies of Dialectic, Dialogics, Pluralism, and the Threat of Relativism 
Among the essentially contested, eternally irresolvable conflicts the 
Board must face are two that, as Bialostosky shows, Bakhtin and I 
wrestle with, (i) How can we interrelate or choose among our dialogics 
or pluralisms? (2) How can we harmonize our dialogics or pluralisms 
with the demands of practical decisions in the world?—or even better, 
make use of them, a problem Phelan addresses. 
(1) If the Board does its work properly, it will take massive steps to 
break down the isolation among various universalist "specialists in gen­
eralities." It will fund lots of studies like Bialostosky's. And it will work 
to persuade every field in which specialists make a claim, in principle, 
to "cover everything," to appoint at least one rhetorologist to serve as 
reconnaissance and liaison officer to the other groups: "cognitive sci­
ence," linguistics, structuralism, deconstruction, "informal logic," "criti­
cal thinking," and so on. A lot of wasted efforts at refutation could thus 
be avoided. 
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(2) The charge of relativism—or its genuine threat—will not go 
away. The Board should plan to fund Phelan (after all, he'll still be 
perking in 2014) and others like him, to continue the search for per­
suasive routes through the Scylla of dogmatism and the Charybdis of 
skepticism. We can be sure that dogmatists will continue to label efforts 
like ours as utterly relativistic, and that utter relativists will continue to 
show (as would be easy to show about Bakhtin), that we are in fact "not 
total pluralists" but actually committed to certain "values" (in my other 
terms, "assentings") that remain finally—in our sense of the word— 
indubitable. 
The Board need not feel uncomfortable about this unresolved battle 
about and among pluralisms: it is both the case that no statement is 
true except as relative to other statements, and that there are genuine 
(though multiple) standards of taste, of moral judgments, and of truth. 
And this means that there are many assertions about such matters that 
have to be rejected by anyone who thinks hard about them.6 
Studies of Rhetoric and Religion 
If they do things right, the Board must spend a good share of their 
unlimited budget on the rhetoric of religion. The whole enterprise of 
criticism, and particularly of rhetorical criticism, is pointless unless it 
has a point—to return to the key word of my opening paragraph. And 
to me it has become increasingly obvious that to claim a point to any 
human activity is to see it in one or another cosmic perspective, leading 
to the kind of inquiry Shapiro exhibits here. Everything we do, if it has 
a point, can be shown to relate to some notion of a cosmos that, how­
ever "chaotic," validates its making. A real point is a point that matters, 
and to matter, unless one thinks of mattering as only private, personal, 
and hence entirely relativized, is to matter in some scheme, or world, or 
pattern, or dimension of reality, larger than any one person's vision. 
Such a claim seems self-evident once one sees it clearly—as Anselm 
said of his ontological proof. The steps to its self-evidency, however, 
are difficult and manifold. In other words, the field/fields of rhetoric 
require the Board to fund lots of hard argument about religion—lots 
of theological study, most of it under different names. Let us hope that 
many will follow Shapiro and Jost here in pursuing leads that have been 
largely mere assertions or wonderings. 
In "Are Rhetoric and Religion Permanently Wedded?" I argue that 
"the student of rhetoric will be led, inescapably led provided that he 
or she pushes the inquiry with full rigor, to religion"—not just, with 
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Kenneth Burke, to religious language but to religious belief itself. I can't 
argue that case here, but I do hope that the Board will fund studies of 
the entire history of religious rhetoric, and rhetorics of religion, to dem­
onstrate, in the languages of diverse schools, just why rhetorical inquiry 
and religious belief of some kind are inseparable. 
Studies of the Rhetoric of "Secular Religions" 
The Board should also pursue just how this or that current social move­
ment or academic discipline might be treated as a "secular religion," 
since it claims to provide the grounding for legitimate point-making 
that any true religion must provide. Our confusing culture provides in­
numerable claimants who offer some sort of "cosmos," some picture of 
the whole of things that legitimates, or commands, certain forms of be­
havior. When cosmologists, artificial intelligence enthusiasts, psycholo­
gists, deconstructionists, rational choice theorists, economists claim to 
offer us the picture of the world and our place in it, and when they 
then rehearse, often unwittingly, the topics that traditionally belonged 
to religion, it should be obvious that students of rhetoric are called on to 
attempt some high-powered translating and evaluating. We can be sure 
that between now and 2014 other secular religions will rise, claiming at 
last to tell us just what the world is made of and just what the making 
demands of us. 
These secular religions usually do not put their Thirty-Nine Articles 
up front, but they exhibit kinds of devotion and expression that tradi­
tionally marked religious devotion and inquiry. Be generous, oh, Board, 
in funding those rhetorologists who engage in comparing the strengths 
and weaknesses of our many secular religions. And while you're at 
it, you should fund unlimited studies of how conversion stories work 
and what they reveal—both conversions to "real" religions and to the 
secular religions that pretend to be freed of religion. 
To talk of religion leads us inevitably back to systematic assent, and 
to my lament about how few critics are really pursuing a full rhetoric 
of inquiry. Assent is in the air all right, if we mean by it only the habit 
of saying yes to whatever doctrine happens to seem appealing or pro­
vides temporarily the line of least resistance or most plausibly profitable 
results. But though by systematic assent I did not mean to suggest the 
kind of systematic philosophising that Brinton rebukes me for failing to 
achieve, I did mean something more than the blind unmethodical faith 
that McOmber sees in Feyerabend and that he helpfully distinguishes 
from the faith that I had in mind. 
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Studies of the "Self," of Just Who "We" Are as We Engage 
with One Another in our Rhetoric 
Having done a fair job of suppressing a chorus of voices who could have 
made this a decidedly silly response, I must urge in conclusion that the 
Board fund . .  . 
DISTSERPROF: The only proper summary here will be about US: pull 
us together, man. You can't deny that the five of us (no doubt along with 
others that we scarcely acknowledge) live together daily, happily united 
under my tutelage and without too many hours spent in quarreling. Let's 
make the point of this response, and thus of this book, what I've wanted 
it to be all along, an intellectual triumph . . . 
THE " 1  " OF THI  S RESPONSE: But if we do that we'll be not elevating 
but lowering ourselves to your competitive world, not only making US 
the center, as we should not be, but pretending to a clear harmony that 
would be a downright lie. I'm sure that we should maintain my tone— 
not that of a defensive, pedantic fool like you but of one who is calmly, 
open-mindedly inquiring . . . 
DISTSERPROF: Nonsense! If we really want that Board to fund—but 
let's drop the weak fantasy about what they might do in 2014 and come 
down to earth here and now: if we really want any reader to undertake 
studies of why and how the self is always a rhetorical society, and of 
what to do about our quarrel with individualism, we MUST end on this 
problem of voices. And in doing so we could unify our two points and 
impress everybody with . .  . 
Oh, all right, let's give it a try. But we simply must drop that cruddy 
effort to defend on every p o i n t . .  . 
In fact, knowing the rebellious voices as I do, I must advise all high-
minded folks just to skip now to page 306. You'd just be annoyed by 
the next few pages. 
Let's see now .  . . 
DISTSERPROF: This whole piece has been much too polite. You've 
simply silenced me at many points where it would have been highly 
appropriate to complain about the grotesque distortions our work has 
been subjected to. You're always going around quoting Aristotle, and 
any other polyanna you can find, such as Anatole France's M. Berge­
ret on the Dreyfus affair, claiming that since truth has a natural power 
to endure, a power that error lacks, we should not worry about petty 
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misunderstandings. Maybe. But that's true about truth, at best, only in 
the long run. Truth has that power only when someone like us has the 
guts to . .  . 
IGNORAMUSWB (henceforth IWB for short): Darn it, we just don't 
KNOW enough, any one of us or all together, to accomplish what we're 
trying to do here. We have read not a single classical rhetorician in the 
original language. We can't keep up with the journals, not even those 
explicitly in our . .  . 
TRUTHGOODNESSBEAUTYWB (Henceforth TGBWB for short):
must insist, once and for all, that I deplore interruptions from either 
of these rebels. On the one hand, DISTSERPROF's ego-stroking-and-
protecting stuff provides a wonderful opening for those who would like 
to whip us by practicing "motivism"—reducing everything we've done 
to our motives. On the other, we are really doomed if we must follow 
IWB, and confess to every yawning gap in our knowledge. Are you ALL 
going to claim that I am not the most important one of us, as I speak 
here for Truth, Goodness, and Beauty? Are you really going to let our 
readers think that we are speaking for anything other than those three 
supreme goals, which as I've said everyone from . . . ? 
THE " i  " OF THIS RESPONSE ("I" for short): I don't know yet. I 
feel thrown off balance by all this nattering, especially the boasting of 
DISTSERPROF. My only comfort, as I have expunged his pontifications 
from a first, second, and third draft, is that I have never yet encoun­
tered any member of our citation-counting, prize-seeking culture who 
was completely beyond all petty defenses of ego, completely freed of all 
fear of being discovered as a fraud. Even those who work hard to appear 
above the battle turn out, when we get a chance to see their diaries or let­
ters, to have spent too much of their time cursing or correcting reviewers, 
or lamenting the prizes awarded to others, or nagging their publishers 
about inadequate publicity. 
How sad it is to read the self-absorbed laments of aging celebrities 
angry about being neglected, or echoing Heidegger's (possibly apocry­
phal) deathbed lament: "Only one reader ever understood me—and even 
he didn't understand me." A recent biography of Philip Larkin reveals, 
among many other Larkins, one who convinced his public, including me, 
that he was not just indifferent to fame but contemptuous of it, above 
the battle, wise, mature. All the while he was living intimately with 
another Larkin, a would-be distinguished professor of poetry, as it were, 
who never turned down an offered honorary degree or invitation for a 
public reading; he was miserable and furious when criticized.7 Another 
 I 
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example: Derrida's reputation is being slightly tarnished, in my view, by 
his spending so much time, in journal after journal, worrying the bones 
of fame. "What he seems to be saying," one friend said, "is that everyone 
is plain stupid not to grasp the importance of his utterly clear, straight­
forward, unambiguous, undeferred meanings."8 I just don't want us to 
sound like Karl Popper in his later years. . . 
A CHILD'S VOICE, W H I N I N G  : What IS truth, anyway? Who cares 
about it? Why doesn't anybody pay attention to ME? It's not truth we 
should care about but getting people to love us, unconditionally. I never 
get the love we deserve. I'm always . . . 
TGBWB: Ohmigod! We're surely not going to let that one in, that 
WHINER, that eternal Id who never grows up. I say "Ban him!" He 
predates, and radically corrupts or misrepresents, all the rest of us . .  . 
W H I N E R  : Well, I should have at least this one chance, and I want to 
complain about. . . 
DISTSERPROF: Tais -toil You're embarrassing all of us. The point is not 
to be loved but to get credit for the truths of Booth, as straightened out 
in the public mind by me, and . . . 
' ' 1": I'm taking over here, for now. We've already spent far too long on 
this family quarrel. Do I have to say again that the point of a volume like 
this should be to invite our readers to join the field of inquiry that has 
been the most interesting and important of all fields, from ancient times 
to the present? We should be thinking about how one struggler's un­
finished and inevitably inharmonious and vulnerable projects could help 
him and others improve our study of rhetoric and thus our chances of 
understanding one another—and thus help us all to turn from physical 
violence, first at least to bloodless logomachy, and then hopefully 9 from 
logomachy to serious debate, and then from debate to dialogue, and then 
on, even perhaps to achieve the dialogics that Don Bialostosky derives 
from Bakhtin? And—to complicate the case—how can we develop, as 
part of that ultimately practical project, a philosophy of comparative 
rhetorics, what DISTSERPROF insists—perhaps justifiably—that we 
call a "rhetorology," one that would adequately "theorize," though never 
"finalize," the whole of humankind's communicative endeavors? There's 
our proper summary and . . . 
DISTSERPROF: If that's our only kind of point, we'll lose this chance, 
probably the last we'll ever have, to set the world straight—to choose 
only one example from this book—about how Bialostosky misleads 
readers by writing as if, in Critical Understanding, we ourselves embrace 
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the battle metaphors we use in deploring the world's way of handling 
conflict. Are you going to let even your friends' misreadings go uncor­
rected ? 
" i "  : Yes, certainly I am. What YOU will choose to do is another mat­
ter. But you know as well as I do, arrogant one, that Aristotle's picture 
of the magnanimous man is one of my, and I would wish "our," many 
ideals. What would he think of your way of thinking, foul lackey of 
Lucifer that you are? Yes, indeed, I've changed my mind, we're going 
to rule out petty cavils, including this conversation, leaving nothing but 
pure, disinterested inquiry. Only thus can we maintain our "hypocrisy 
upward" as generous-spirited, disinterested inquirers. 
IWB : It makes me feel embarrassed when you refer to Aristotle when 
we don't even know any Greek . .  . 
DISTSERPROF: Well, I certainly agree that you should cut all the dis­
senting voices—except mine. Do you really believe that our readers, or 
even Bialostosky himself, will see what a powerful challenge all this 
open-spirited dialogue gives to his critique? 
And speaking of what makes us vulnerable, take as one sad example 
your invention of that silly Board for Rhetorical Inquiry in General. 
Don't you see that your enemies will immediately spot that the acro­
nym is BORING? Why not—if you insist on the sort of game-playing 
that besmirches our ethos—why not something safe, like POROI, echo­
ing that outfit at The University of Iowa that McCloskey and Antczak 
are running? Or RUN, for Rhetoric-Universal, or UNIRHET, or even 
something that will resist mockery, like RFA (Rhetoric For All), or 
simply UR, for Universal Rhetoric? 
And while I've got the floor, I have to say that you exaggerate how 
fully we're legitimated by widespread recognition of rhetorical studies. 
Why not acknowledge the plight "rhetoric" is in—precisely the plight it 
has been in since at least the time of Plato's attack on the Sophists? You 
talk as if our study, as distinct from persuasive practice, were triumphing, 
but it's not. Worried about where we stand, I've just done a quick survey 
of the listed titles and ads in The London Review of Booths for April 8, 
1993, The New Yorf{ Review of Books for April 22, and The Times Liter­
ary Supplement for April 2. The word "rhetoric" occurs not even once in 
all those titles! Looking back a bit, and "rising" to the quarterlies, in the 
one issue of Critical Inquiry that I happen to have with me in London 
I find at last, among all the titles, all the advertisements, and the index 
of the entire 1992 volume, one appearance of "rhetoric"—and that in a 
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subtitle! One appearance only! I about gave up. But then, reading casu­
ally in a movie review by Terrence Rafferty in The New Yorker, what do 
I find? "Lucille heads off to college, which, in the rhetoric of growing-
up stories, means she'll be fine." Does that sound as if Rafferty were 
au courant in rhetorical studies? Meanwhile President Clinton is quoted 
using the word "rhetoric" twice in one speech, in exactly the sense we've 
been fighting against all our lives. If "rhetoric" is still languishing, what 
about its half-synonyms that are popular? I've made a long l i s t . .  . 
" 1 "  : Sorry, but I'm cutting two pages of your so-called research, and 
I want to insis t . . . 
ALL THE OTHER VOICES TRY TO INTERRUPT, BUT DISTSERPROF 
SHOUTS LOUDEST: What I want to insist on is that you make far too 
little of the misunderstandings even your friends exhibit of your con­
ception of rhetorical studies. Are you just listening to WHINER when 
you tread so lightly on Garver and Bialostosky, both of whom saddle 
our later views with earlier talk that made mere persuasion too central? 
If they had taken the pains that Richter takes to trace a development, 
they would not have frozen us into relatively authoritarian poses. And 
while I'm at it, surely we must tell the world that Garver's fine origi­
nal essay on Bacon, on "What Everybody Knows," and on the uses of 
silence, understates (while politely acknowledging) just how much we 
have recently done with the rhetoric of silence! 
AGAIN THE CHORUS TRIES TO INTERVENE, UNSUCCESSFULLY: 
And why not reveal the absolute scandal in the world's neglect of our 
admirably few and tastefully chosen neologisms? I'm pleased that you 
managed to bring in "rhetorology" without too much apology, but you 
really ought to Haunt it, man! It's true that some people find it absurdly 
ugly on first encounter, but so was "socio-logy" when it first appeared. 
"Bio-logy" was unheard of until early in the nineteenth century. And 
surely "theo-logy" offended many when it first offered to take over all 
talk about God. You know perfectly well that our rhetorology is a more 
useful term than Kenneth Burke's "logo-logy," because, though his term 
was useful for his study of "The Rhetoric of Religion," it is too narrow 
for our purposes: it covers only comparative religious languages. Rheto­
rology covers the theoretical interrelationships of all rhetorics about any­
thing. That would be clear to everybody by now, if you weren't such a 
pussyfooter . .  . 
w H 1 N E R : Who cares about all that? I care a lot more about the nasty, 
silly attacks we've been subjected to. For example, we absolutely must get 
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in here a reference to our annihilating and witty response to S **"" F **"s 
mutilation of A Rhetoric of Irony;™ it has been largely ignored, perhaps 
because our ironies against him were just too subtle. F### himself has 
shrewdly ignored it, reprinting his own inane and uninformed attack 
without mentioning our refutation. Get in there and gut F*** again, once 
and for all . .  . 
DISTSERPROF: AS for me, that is the ONLY one of WHINER's 
points worth preserving. It's important to include such evidence that will 
counter the misconception of friends like Callaghan and Dobyns who, 
careful as they are, seem to say that we say that everybody should "ar­
gue to agree," as if like Habermas we thought all reasonable arguers 
would agree if given enough time. Though we did once believe that, we 
no longer see ultimate harmony as either possible or desireable, especially 
with careless folk like F***. Look again at what I said earlier and . . . 
CHORUS: But. . . 
DISTSERPROF: But me no buts. The question of easy or final agree­
ment brings up the question of politics. You have been much too polite 
with those who accuse us of ignoring it. You could at least mention the 
range of our actual explicit wrestlings with politics—for example our re­
cent defense of Amnesty International's program, "Does Amnesty Have 
a Leg to Stand on?" with its extended refutation of the very notion of 
an isolated, in-dividual distinguishable from his or her political or social 
surroundings, what we are now calling "philiations"—another neolo­
gism the world is neglecting! 
Why not refer to your many anticapitalist digs, especially in that 
unpublished speech you gave in Moscow, arguing that the very prin­
ciples of free speech we all depend on are now seriously threatened by 
the control over "speech"—that is, over the media—exercised by com­
mercial exploiters? You've said a lot about the increasing debasement 
of our lives, especially in the direction of legitimated violence, sexual 
and otherwise, committed by the exploiters. And why not mention that 
idea of ours about a special "education" tax on all who make fortunes 
by miseducating us, in "An Arrogant Proposal" and "Self-Making in 
Imaginative Art"? 
And how about that unpublished talk, "The Crazy Canon Contro­
versy", different versions delivered at half-a-dozen campuses as an effort 
to see behind the false issue of pro-anti-classics? Besides, we could show 
that some reviewers of Company have accused us of selling out to vari­
ous current political movements that question the canon and thus of 
politicizing criticism. 
Afterword 305 
I W B  : I'm so embarrassed I could die. You're both concealing the fact 
that we haven't read more than a fraction of what would be important to 
any one of these matters. We have scores of unread books on our shelves, 
to say nothing of those we should have bought to put on those shelves, 
read or unread. Are you really willing to imply that in any sense we "keep 
up" on what is going on in ANY of this stuff? We don't, even in fields 
that travel under the word "rhetoric." Why don't you throw in the towel? 
We'll never know enough to do the response we're attempting here . . . 
DISTSERPROF: Well, we surely know enough to complain about "I" 's 
not even mentioning the current neglect of formal and technical literary 
questions, or our recent defense of the Poetics. Even the friendly authors 
in this book don't often look at any one work with the kind of loving 
attention to detail that. . . 
TGBWB: Doesn't it shock you more to have us ignore the whole ques­
tion of philosophical truth. You write as if Brinton's penetrating critique 
doesn't deserve a respectful demolition. You . .  . 
DISTSERPROF: What we should do is just point out that if Brinton 
would only admit the influence of his upbringing as an analytical phi­
losopher, he would see that his response to certain kinds of philosophy 
and to our questioning of Russell's coherence were foreordained. Move 
in there and do some punching for a change. For example, he seems to 
suggest that we are ignorant of Descartes's constructive side. Well, dang 
it all, I once even reported in print how much trouble I had trying to 
teach students of Descartes to respect his—to me—persuasive proof for 
the existence of God. . . . 
And while I'm at it, I have to say that it really burns me to see how 
lightly you deal with those French raiders. Here's our one chance to insist 
that they've been getting credit, because of their fancy Greek vocabulary, 
for a lot that we said earlier, and for even more that Richard McKeon 
and Kenneth Burke said more forcefully. And they are so awfully reduc­
tive: beneath their fancy surfaces there is a reduction of rhetoric almost 
as maiming as what Renaissance writers did when they turned the whole 
thing into lists of figures. By the way, on "listings," see Jost: he's good on 
their use and abuse—and you don't even mention it. 
As for pluralism, which you hardly touch on, at the very least you 
could refer the Board to our essay in the Encyclopedia of Poetics and the 
recent answer to Nussbaum, "On Relocating Ethical Criticism." 
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CONCLUSION I 
Who, then, is the WB who, like everyone else in the world, exhibits, 
for all who look closely, unlimited multiplicity? If Jost's "topics" won't 
quite hold him together, will anything? 
The question would seem a strange one in most historical peri­
ods, because until modern times nobody was troubled by the search 
for unique identity: it was enough to be simply a person practicing a 
variety of roles—not an identity at all, but a character employing "hy­
pocrisy upward" in an effort to do or be better. It is the history of 
in-dividualism, with all its triumphs and woes, that wills upon us this 
strange desire to get our act together. Today, instead of just doing what 
needs to be done, we all struggle to find someone inside, someone al-
uready made and waiting to be discovered, the real me.
I find all the unity I need in the simple continuation of the very 
drama among my selves that I have reflected here—one that is, like 
yours, oh, reader, far richer than my little game could hope to reflect. 
That continuation builds a story-line with a unique pattern of more or 
less untrustworthy but precious memories. We all plot out a little life-
story, a play that contains many "plays-within-the-play." Much of the 
story, like the stories of heroes in drama, is beyond our control, even on 
the rare occasions when our various characters act in harmony. But if 
we are born lucky we are able to plot a good deal of it. Uniqueness is no 
longer a problem for us because nobody else's plot is exactly like "mine," 
"ours." In that sense, and that sense only, "I" am an "individual." Just 
about everything I'm made of can be found in other people—both the 
defensible and the indefensible parts. 
As a rhetorical society, throwing my various roles into dialogue with 
one another, I find that many modern and post-modern anxieties simply 
evaporate. It is true that DISTSERPROF can still become very anx­
ious indeed about doing an adequate response to essays as diverse and 
challenging as these; he fears that we are in danger of ending a career 
with a whimper instead of a bang. I WB can, especially in the late after­
noon, panic because of how little we know about all this. WHIMPER 
can whimper about not getting enough loving admiration. TGBWB can 
pretend to a clearer and fuller conspectus than he has a right to, and 
"I" could wish that most of their deflections would just not occur. But 
as soon as we call them together they demonstrate the essentially comic 
point of it all. The comedy is by no means in itself divine, but once they 
start laughing together at one another, the life-story can continue vigor­
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ously—sometimes even happily—without much worry about whether 
it/we/they are modern, post-modern, or simply guilty of radical tradi­
tionalism. 
C O N C L U S I O  N 2 
I simply cannot accept that conclusion, which sucks us back into the 
very "point" I rejected in my opening paragraphs. The true point of all 
this is to give the best possible boost to humane studies, conceived as 
studies of how to improve our inquiry into how we inquire together. 
To deflect us back to the effort to pull various Wayne Booths together 
is exactly the wrong way to go about that task. When things seem, as 
always, to be falling apart, surely we should not encourage the world to 
see each self as in any way a fiction. Surely we should . .  . 
Notes 
1. For Plato, truth, goodness, and beauty; for Aristotle, inquiry into three 
kinds of activities and problems: theoretical, practical, and productive (the arts 
and crafts); for Kant, the three Critiques; and so on. 
2. Yes, I am thinking of a specific work here, one that recently bored me 
while in effect claiming to startle: Joe Orton's What the Butler Saw. The anti-
institutional cliches of 1960s revolt, turned into a skilfully constructed farce, 
do not undermine the destructive complacencies of American theatergoers in 
1991, whatever their political views. But then I suppose that Foley could admit, 
without hurting her case, that the play does not offer the kind of "political" 
challenge she would hope for. 
3. Discursive, non-narrative prose, the kind most often treated by tradi­
tional rhetoricians, will still deserve funding, though it has been somewhat 
better served than the arts have been. See, for example, Antczak's piece in this 
volume and his book, Thought and Character: the Rhetoric of Democratic Edu­
cation (Ames, I A, 1985); Gary Saul Morson's emerging works on what he calls 
"Prosaics"; and indeed a long history of rhetorics of "rhetoric," "rhetorologies." 
But I don't know of anyone who has come close to exhausting our needs. 
4. The New Yorker 29 March 1993: 41. 
5. For a sign of just how much of a return to the "virtues" recent philoso­
phers have been showing, see the Times Literary Supplement for 18 June 1993. 
6. Many current philosophers have embraced incommensurability theo­
ries that are not utterly relativistic. For a recent example see Isaiah Berlin, The 
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Crooked Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas, ed. Henry Hardy 
(New York: Knopf, 1991). 
7. Andrew Motion, Philip Larkin: A Writer's Life (London: Faber, 1993). 
8. See the series of letters, pro and con, in the New Yor\ Review of Books 
through the spring of 1993. 
9. For a defense of "hopefully" in this absolute construction, see the third 
edition of The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language. 
10. See my "A New Strategy for Establishing a Truly Democratic Criti­
cism." 
n . The best critique I know of this mistaken direction of the quest for au­
thenticity is that of Charles Taylor, in Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Harvard 
UP, 1989), and, in somewhat more "popular" form, in The Ethics of Authen­
ticity, same press, 1992. 
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